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Railroads and Aspects of Social Change in Senegal, 1878-1933
Abstract
In a dissertation, or any research subject for that matter, there are generally both narrow and broader
queries that can be pursued on a given theme. The narrow theme in this case concerns the "motives for
French railroad-building in Senegal." Unfortunately, despite prolonged searches through archival sources
available in Senegal, it soon became obvious that there were simply too many missing particulars to be
able to complete this story well. Even while searching out the missing information gaps for the narrow
theme, however, it also proved possible to gather abundant material for the broader theme of the social
impact of the railroad in Senegal, on trade patterns, on labor, and on land— sufficient material at the end
of a two-year sojourn in Senegal to write a dissertation regardless of the missing gaps in the narrow
theme.
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CANARD, GOVERNOR: 408-409
CARDE. GOVERNOR GENERAL: 332
CARRERE AND HOLLE: 320
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CASAMANCE: 18, 164, 264, 420*
CASAMANCE RAILROAD: 212*, 266-7, 297
CAYOR: 84, 88: LAND IN: 393-398; COMMERCE: 175, 178-180,
188; CONQUEST: 18-19, 21-22, 33, 40-45, 50, 54-59,
118, 122, 125, 129-134, 157, 159, 166-167.
CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE: 191, 200-201, 258, 308, 327-328
CHAPER REPORT: 137-139
CHAPRON: 112-113, 139
CHARDY, COLONEL:-332-333
CLIMATE: See WEST AFRICA
CLOUE, ADMIRAL: 53-54
COASTAL SHIPPING: 157, 193
COKI: 45, 178
COMMERCE: 8, 11-16, 34, 43, 58, 130, 157-159, 163-177,
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CONVENTION OF 1900: 197-198, 200, 202
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DAKAR: 19, 39, 100, 102-103, 105, 115-120, 157-159,
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202, 444-455; GOVERNMENT PURCHASE: 441-442, 452-455;
PROJECT: 19, 21, 37, 39ff; TRAFFIC: 163ff, 175, 195,
228, 249, 254-255, 445, 449, 450
DAKAR-NIGER RAILROAD: 320, 455, 469, 472; See also THIESNIGER RAILROAD
DAMGA: 163
DEMBA WAR (SAL, DEMBA WAR): 132, 134, 428*
DEPRESSION, GREAT: 266, 269, 438-441, 450-455, 463-467
DEVES (FAMILY): 173, 176
DIANDER: 21, 164, 170
DIARMEO GUEYE: 131
DIARRING-GATE REGION: 167
DIOURBEL: 233, 238, 241, 243, 259, 260, 264, 267, 405
DIOURBEL-- TOUBA' RAILROAD: 267-268, 309, 459
DJOLCF: 56, 59, 84, 129-130, 159, 182, 256, 264-266,
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ECOLE POLYTECHNIQUE: 20, 89
ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY: 6-7, 12-16, 34, 72, 163ff, 184-188
222-223, 225-228, 244-248, 252ff, 261-262, 268-273,
455-473 passim.
ECONOMIC HABITATIONS, OFFICE OF: 411
EDUCATION: 315, 320, 323, 349*
EICHTHAL, GUSTAVE D 1: 90
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS, RAILROAD: 326-328, 332
EMPLOYMENT STABILITY, RAILROAD: 302-306, 323-325
ENGINEERS, FRENCH CIVIL: 24-25, 89-90
ENGINEERS, MILITARY: 19-22, 62
ERNEVILLE, D' (FAMILY): 321, 428*
ESCALES: 169, 173-182, 254-255, 266, 458-459, 464-466,
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ETIENNE, PAUL: 135-139, 167, 196
EUROPEAN COLONISTS: 295-296, 302, 374-375.
EUROPEANS: See also FRENCH; RAILWAYMEN
EXPLORATION: 13-14, 29, 47
FAIDHERBE: 18, 20, 21, 32-33, 34, 39, 67*, 399, 208*,
209*
FAIDHERBE BRIDGE (PONT): 120, 387-388,403
FAL, AMADI N'GONE (Also Samba Yaye Fal): 57, 59, 134
FALEME RIVER: 239
FATICK: 167, 211*, 234, 285*
FERLO: 38, 84, 162, 233, 261
FINANCES (COLONIAL): 21-22, 45-48, 60, 222-224, 236,
246-247, 308, 470; See also RAILROAD FINANCES
FLATTERS EXPEDITION: 24, 32
FOGEL, R.: 165
FOUNDIOUGNE: 404
FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR: 21-22, 27
FRANKEL, H.S.: 6, 262
FRENCH MERCHANTS IN SENEGAL: 169-177, 207*, 209*, 254-258,
310r311, 380-381, 393, 396, 439, 458-459, 464, 469
FRENCH PRIVATE COMPANIES IN SENEGAL: 264-265, 296-297,
310-311, 337*, 386, 398, 443-455; See also BATIGNOLLES;
DAKAR-SAINT LOUIS COMPANY; FRENCH MERCHANTS
FRENCH GUIANA: 295
FRENCH GUINEA: 162, 227, 236, 244, 263
FRENCH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY: 45, 52ff, 92-97, 195, 202,
231, 242-244, 248, 256, 445, 454
FRENCH RAILROADS: 23, 89-90
FRENCH WEST .AFRICA, GOVERNMENT GENERAL: ; FORMATION:
222-225; INTEREST IN RAILROADS: 225-257 passim, 441442, 448-450, 452-455; LAND POLICY: 378, 380, 393-397
FREYCINET: 23-24, 36, 38, 55, 93, 96, 359
FRIOCOURT, INSPECTOR: 106-108, 136
GALAM: 163
GALLIENI: 75*, 229
GAMBIA:; COLONY: 17, 46, 161, 233, 239-241, 252-253;
RIVER: 10, 84, 233, 2.41
GANDIOLE: 21, 165
GASCONI, A.: 76*, 117, 149
GENERAL COUNCIL, OF SENEGAL: 49, 200, 201, 256, 374, 398
GENOUILLE, GOVERNOR: 129-134
GEOGRAPHY (GENERAL): 6, 10-13; See ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY
GIRAN, DIRECTOR DN: 320
GOREE: 16, 18-19, 162, 170-171, 177, 322, 407
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GOSSAS: 240, 258, 405
GGUIN (FAMILY): 89-95
G0UM30 GUEOUL: 102, 103, 169, 191, 396-397
"GRAND TRANSVERSAL" PROJECT: 223-231, 244-247
GUENOTO: 253
GUET N'DAR: 400
GUINGUINEO:
240, 241, 257, 258, 264, 405, 410
GUM TRADE: 18, 169-170, 367
HANN, BRIDGE: 136, 139-140
HEALTH AND DISEASE: 12, 13, 15, 49, 99-100, 195, 302305, 402-408; See YELLOW FEVER
HIVERNAGE: 99, 109-110, 135, 138, 192
HOTTINGUER, PHILIPPE & HENRI: 90
HOUSING:; AFRICAN: 348*, 401, 405-406, 408-409; EUROPEAN:
304, 401
HUYBRECHTS, A.: 186
IBRA FATIM SAR: 132
IMPERIALISM:; EUROPEAN: 3, 7, 8, 19-21, 67*, 68*, 270-273,
295-298, 318, 360-361, 368, 414-416, 469-473; FRENCH:
13-51, 60-63, 88, 91, 159-163, 184-186, 221-248; and
LAND: 372-373, 376-377
INDOCHINA: 89, 236
INTERNATIONAL LABOR OFFICE: 296
INVESTMENT, COLONIAL: 45-48, 67*, 91-98, 198-202, 224
ISLAM: 3-4, 9, 18, 83-88; See also MQURIDES
ITALY AND ITALIANS: 89, 127, 298-299, 302
IVORY COAST: 227, 245-247, 272, 336*
JAUREGUIBERRY,. ADMIRAL JEAN: 32ff, 40, 48, 50-57, 92
JOAL: 167, 171
JOFFRE, GENERAL: 229
JORET: 93
KAFFRINE: 240, 251, 261
KANYA-FORSTNER, A.S.: 23, 32, 46
KAOLACK: 239-241, 251, 257-260, 264, 388-390, 404, 441,
472, 474*
KAYES: 232, 239
KAYES-NIGER RAILROAD: 161, 199, 221, 225, 228-230, 237239, 248-252, 299; See also THIES-NIGER RAILROAD
KEBEMER: 43, 103, 169, 191, 396-397
KELLE: 40, 128, 179, 180, 191, 396-397
KEUR MANDOUBE KHARY: 178
KHASSO: 18, 84, 87
KITA: 238, 239
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KOLAS: 11, 188, 216*
KONG MOUNTAINS: 25, 30, 36, 60
KEDOUGOU: 262
KOUMPENTOUM: 261
KOUNGHEUL: 261
KOUROUSSA: 229
KOUSSANAR: 253, 261
LABOR: 51-52, 97, 184, 262-264, 295-358, 361-364; ABUSES
OF: 297, 345; CHINESE: 299, 336: IMPORTED: 127-128,
295-296, 298-299; LEGISLATION: 296-297, 327-328;
LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS: 316, 322-323; MANUAL: 295, 300,
301, 306-314; METIER & CRAFTS: 314-315, 323; RAILROAD:
298ff; RECRUITED (FORCED): 127, 237, 295-299, 301,
308-309, 311, 377; RECRUITED (2EME PORTION): 297, 299,
301, 308; RECRUITING, FOREIGN: 312-313; SEASONAL:
310-311; SHORTAGES: 295ff, 313, 376-377, 379, 404-405;
SKILLED: 184, 310, 313-324; STRIKES: 330-333; UNIONS
AND ASSOCIATIONS: 328-333
LAMINE, MAHMADOU: 161, 317
LAND: See also PROPERTY; AFRICAN CUSTOM AND ATTITUDES:
362-366, 372, 373, 375, 394-395, 398-400, 414-416;
CONCESSIONS: 372-375; EUROPEAN ATTITUDES: 362, 373-375,
392-396; EXPROPRIATION: 373-374, 377-380, 412-413;
OCCUPATION: 371, 378, 406, 410-414; SALES: 372, 375,
378, 381, 399; SHORTAGES (POTENTIAL): 261; SPECULATION:
359-361, 374-375, 398-399; TENURE: 364-366; URBAN:
380-392, 396-398, 400-416
LAT DIOR (DIOP, LAT DIOR): 50, 55-59, 88, 125, 133-134
LAUDE AFFAIR: 421*, 436*
LAVALLY AND MOLINOS: 93
LEBANESE MERCHANTS: 413, 424*, 458, 466, 486*
LEBRET: 90
LEBU: 85, 310, 322, 400, 407-408, 411
LEFEBVRE CARRIAGES: 57*, 161
LEGROS, N.: 36f£, 47-55 passim, 92-93, 95-96, 116
LESSEPS, FERDINAND DE: 24
LEYBAR: 100, 121-122, 139-140, 398-399
LIBERIA, RAILROAD: 275*
LIVESTOCK: 187
LO, FARA BIRAM: 428*
LOCOMOTIVES: 181, 283*
LORIEUX: 90
LOUGA (TOWN): 57, 100, 102, 130, 179, 232-233, 264-265,
396, 396, 411, 423*, 428
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LOUGA-LINGUERE RAILROAD: 265-266, 269-271, 309, 450,
451, 454-455, 459, 472
MACHINERY: 9, 313
MAGE, E.: 34
"MAITRES DES LANGUES": 174, 384
MALEME-HODAR: 243
MALINKE: 84
MARC MERLE & ROBERT: 76
MANDING: 84
MARKETS: 12-13, 187, 382
MARMIER REPORT: 206*, 207*, 233
MATAM: 163
MAUREL & PROM: 117, 130
MAURY, FERDINAND: 265
M ’BACKE: 294*, 483*
M'BAYE, MEISSA: 428*
M ’BOUR: 411
MEDINA: 407-408, 411, 461
MEDINE: 18, 22, 38
MEKHE: 103, 178, 191, 396-397
MESSAGERIES MARITIMES: 117
MIGRATION: 57-58, 183-184, 253-254, 262-264, 269, 295-296,
309-313, 325, 376
MILLET: 187,265
MINISTRY OF COLONIES: 139, 200, 202, 225, 232, 246-247,
446-448, 450, 453, 467
MINISTRY OF FINANCE: 55-56, 95, 104, 124, 447, 453
MINISTRY OF MARINE AND COLONIES: 32, 36ff, 50-51, 54-55,
92, 104, 106, 113-114, 118-124
MOBILITY: See MIGRATION
MOLLIEN: 179
MOORS (MAURETANIANS): 18, 42, 56, 74*, 165, 169
MOROCCANS: 170, 299
MOSSI: 227, 297, 308
MOURIDES (MQURIDYYA): 253-254, 263-264, 267-268, 309
M'PAL: 44, 100, 102, 106, 178, 186, 392-393, 396
MYRDAL, GUNNAR: 216*, 261, 268
NANGO, TREATY OF: 52
NAVETANES: 263, 298, 310
N'DANDE: 33, 40, 57, 130, 132, 134, 168, 179-180
N ’DIAGNE: 178
'to'DIATIGUISM 210*
N'DIAMBOUR: 57, 129, 131, 393, 398
N'DIAYE, BOUNA: 266
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N'DIAYE, SAMBA: 314
N'DOULO: 269
NEUBOURG, LODOIS & GASTON: 427*
NEWBURY, COLIN: 23, 32, 172
N'GAYE MEKHE: See MEKHE
N'GAHAYES: 234
N 1GUICK-MERINA: 57
NIANI-OULI: 161, 253, 262
NIANING: 167, 171
NIGER RIVER: 11, 13, 34, 36, 88, 161, 170, 221, 228
NIOMRE: 45, 178
OCEAN SHIPPING: 157-159, 168-169, 171, 176, 367-369,
390
OFFICERS, MILITARY: 18-21, 170, 229, 232, 2,37-240, 248,
303, 319, 456
"OFFICES DU TRAVAIL": 296-297
0UALLA: 253
OUALO: 18, 84, 419*
OULI: See NIANI-OULI
PACK ANIMALS: 12, 165-166, 240, 250, 458, 465-466
PANAMA CANAL: 25, 91-92
PASSENGER TRAFFIC: 157, 193-194, 261, 290*, 450, 460-462
PEANUTS: 15, 162-177, 189-192, 1.95, 241, 249-255, 261,
268-269, 271, 306, 308, 385-386, 439-441, 450-468 passim.
PEASANTS: 373-375, 378, 439-440, 458
PEREIRE, EMILE: 90
PETYT, LUCIEN: 317, 347*
PEULS: 83, 184-185
PFEFFERMAN, G.: 324
PINET-LAPRADE, J.: 20, 21, 39, 115
PIRE GOUREY: 102, 179, 396-397
PONTY, WM.: 242-244, 256
POPULATION DISTRIBUTION: 177-180, 183-188, 259-264, 271
PORTERAGE, HUMAN: 165, 297
PORTS: 168-169, 177ff, 366-370, 386, 402, 410; See also
individual ports by name
POUT: 102, 106, 125-126, 178
PRESTATIONS: 182, 298, 309
PROPERTY: 115-122, 129, 359-360, 379-380; COLONIAL LAW:
372-381, 393-396, 399; COMMUNAL: 395-396; RAILROAD:
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250, 299-306, 316-319, 329-330, 340*, 353*, 402
RAO: 43, 316
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REUNION: 93
RICE: 187, 188, 246
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PREFACE

In a dissertation, or any research subject for that
matter, there are generally both narrow and broader
queries that can be pursued on a given theme.

The narrow

theme in this case concerns the "motives for French
railroad-building in Senegal."

Unfortunately, despite

prolonged searches through archival sources available
in Senegal, it soon became obvious that there were simply
too many missing particulars to be able to complete this
story well.

Even vdiile searching out the missing

information gaps for the narrow theme, however, it also
proved possible to gather abtndant material for the broader
theme of the social impact of the railroad in Senegal,
on trade patterns, on labor, and on land— sufficient
material at the end of a two-year sojourn in Senegal to
write a dissertation regardless of the missing gaps in
the narrow theme.
These critical gaps had, in reality, been stored all
along in Paris, xdostly in unclassified cartons at the
-

1

-
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French National Archives, Section d'Outre-Mer. Happily,
all of this became available, just before I arrived in
Paris, with the French government's relaxation of the
fifty-year rule.

Given the bonanza of information at

Paris added to the riches already collected in Senegal,
it thus became possible to write on either of the themes.
It is hoped that the reader will welcome this attempt to
combine some of the more promising elements of both
narrow and broad themes within one dissertation, despite
the consequent necessary neglect of interesting sidelights
and omission of detail.
The narrow theme of French motives serves as the
main chronological thread for the dissertation and
forms the major concern within Chapters I, II, IV, and
VII, and to some extent Chapter III.

The more interesting

and challenging problem of the role played by the rail
road in shaping the colonial situation in Senegal is taken
up more specifically in Chapter V on labor and Chapter VI
on land.

Chapters III and IV also grapple to some extent

with the impact of the railroad on trade patterns and
population movements.

The complexity and abundance of

the available material forced analysis at a more general
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level, and the results are by no means definitive; but
it is hoped that they may serve as a frame of reference
for further studies.
French motives in building railroads^ it should be
added, also have their own broader implications because
of the ways in which the actions and attitudes of Euro
peans toward Africa and Africans were conditioned by the
sensed loss in mobility, and therefore a heightened sense
of isolation, experienced by Europeans in the African
environment— a notion that served to guide the general
approach taken in this dissertation.

Significant at

first only because of the rigors of a foreign climate,
this relative loss in mobility would become more per
ceptible and more vexatious to Europeans from the mid-19th
century as mobility and the pace of life within an
industrializing Europe grew.

The growing disparity in

the mobilities, indeed the internal rhythms, of European
and African societies may have been only a secondary
factor in the general encounter of the two societies,
with their differing norms, symbols and values.

But, this

disparity imposed, nevertheless, certain constraints on
the nature of their contact.
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Time limitations required that the study be confined
spatially to Senegal--to cover the Dakar-St. Louis and
the Thies-Kayes railroads and their small branch lines-to the neglect of the Kayes-Niger section of the DakarNiger rail line.

The year 1878, when a definitive Dakar-

St. Louis rail project was drawn up, was a logical start
ing date.

Choosing the terminal point at 1933 was more

arbitrary owing largely to the difficulty of carrying
the story to 1948 within a reasonable time.

However, in

retrospect, 1933 turns out indeed to have been a very
suitable cut-off point, since a major break in the
economic and social history of Senegal, if not its poli
tical history, did take place at that time.

For lack of

space and time, the story of Lat Dior's struggle against
the railroad--already done in some detail from documentary
sources by Germaine Ganier and Vincent Monteil-- can only
be touched on briefly.
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CHAPTER I

THE INCEPTION OF SENEGALESE RAILROADS

it is not alone and without arms, at the tail of a
native caravan or under the inadequate care of camel
drivers that we ought to penetrate there; but in a
locomotive, with all the material power, all the
moral prestige that our industrial and civilizing
power permits us to have at our command; with the
help of a railroad following us step by seep--simul
taneously an engine of conquest, of replenishment,
and of exploration.
-A. Duponchel,

1880^

The first question that comes to mind is, why study
railroads of all things?
familiar and obvious.

The impact of railroads seems

Railroads were faster than earlier

modes of transportation, could carry more, and were more
convenient--at least until the motor car came along.
commonplaces, however,

These

seem obvious simply because so

little is really understood about the workings of our
society or other societies of the past or present.
reality,
subtle,

In

the railroads have had a broad range of often
intangible impacts on the fabric of society--alter

ing it in ways that being untraceable or unmeasurable, have
to be labeled indirect effects, perhaps only to be briefly
mentioned before going on to the items that can be
analyzed.^
-

1

-
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MODERN SENEGAL AND ITS RAILROADS
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For African society, a study of railroads seems even
more vexing because the rail lines were, after all,
inserted into Africa by the colonial powers for their own
purposes, usually without much regard for the wishes of the
Africans directly involved; moreover,

these railroads

impinged on the lives of these Africans in indirect ways
generally--acting largely as instruments through which
external economic forces and political control could be
brought to bear on the local scene.

It w o ul d be immensely difficult to summarize in a
few lines the intricately complex social and political
developments in the West African societies of the SenegalSudan region before the advent of the railroad and the
"scramble for Africa."

But it may be said that the

principal motifs were the distortion and decay of tr adi
tional political structures,
Atlantic slave trade,

first under the impact of the

then on this trade's demise;

the

resurgence and expansion of Islam in a militantly reformist
form; and the persistence, through adaptation, of character3
istic African social structures and modes of thought.
Historical change in precolonial Sengambia centered
not so much upon the strife among social classes, nor upon
the clash of one cultural "ethnic" group with another, nor
even on the incessant struggles for political supremacy
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among rival, but kindred aristocracies, nor on the
promising concommittant growth of "legitimate" commerce
with Europe-- though all these developments did occur.
Instead,

change centered on the expansion of Islam

throughout the region, particularly in the attempts of
puritanical "marabouts" to forge immense Islamic empires-in great jihads, which could also act as vehicles for
other aspects of social change

(S e e Appendix

1 and

Figure 2 for some d e t a i l s ) .
After the colonial conquest, however,

the impact of

the loss of political sovereignty to the French and the
progressive absorption of the region's economy into a
global trade market also became crucial processes genera
ting change within Senegambian society, alongside the
continuing,

even more rapid Islamization of the region's
4
inhabitants.
Thus, whatever the continued importance of
Islamization in social change--and it ma y be argued indeed

that Islamization was still the most important of these
central p r o ce sse s- - it is undeniable that Africans were
obliged thenceforth to cope in their ordinary,

everyday

encounters and economic concerns with what Balandier has
termed the "colonial s i t u a t i o n . T h e

railroad was, of

course, one element helping to shape the colonial situa
tion that was intruding into African life, and it is in
this sense that a study of the railroad merits particular
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attention.
In Africa,

as elsewhere, railroads offered promising

solutions to the constraints imposed by nature since, u n 
like a fixed river valley,

a railroad could carve out new,

more convenient lines of communication far from the valleys,
and it was less subject to seasonal variations.

Yet,

railroad construction and exploitation in West Africa
differed substantially in certain senses from rail u n der 
takings in other climes.
For H. S. Frankel,

the distinctive feature setting

off African railroads from those of other global regions
lay in the continent's relative underpopulation, which
impaired the financial profitability of railroad ventures
and thereby hamstrung their potential for generating
economic growth
however,

(or attracting capital).^

Equal weight,

should also be given to the question of political

control and responsibility,

since the African railroads

were built in response to European needs in an African
environment, rather than specifically for African needs.
Railroads built in Europe,

for instance,

took into

account the preexisting social complex within which they
were constructed.

It was not simply that existing po pu l a 

tion centers were pivotal foci necessarily figuring in
the calculations of railroad planners,

but also that

European governments had taken care to ensure that the
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existing social and economic geographies of their own
countries were not altered too quickly or in directions
that were unacceptable to at least some local entrenched
interests.

7

Less burdened by such considerations or by

immoderate costs for right of way passage,
rail lines in the American West

"pioneering"

could in contrast first

be traced out with a freer hand on the basis of economic
and geographical considerations.

These lines then would

supply the framework around which the society settling
g

the West afterwards could spread out and grow.
Colonial railroad building in West Africa offers a
distinctive contrast to experiences in both the American
West and Europe.

In West Africa,

as in Europe,

the ■

peoples of the social communities already settled in place
had a vital stake in the existing regional social and
economic geographies and in the manner of their alteration.
However,

those who made the decisions regarding the

remolding of the West African economic and social g e o g r a 
phies with railroads were Europeans, unaccountable as a
rule to the Africans involved.

Indeed they were often

metropolitan Europeans who had never even visited Africa.
The French, whose movements were severely hampered
by what was for them a hard, alien climate, were not thi nk 
ing, moreover,

in terms of the "presettled" model of

railroad building applicable in Europe.

Beholding in
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West Africa an underpopulated region, unlike the denselysettled colonial areas of Asia, the French considered
indeed that they were operating in virtually virgin
territory, which was to be "opened up" by pioneering raii9
roads around which a new society would grow.
it was the
dazzling success of American railroad development, not of
European,

that captured the attention of French colonial

railroad builders as the model to be copied for African
railroads, and the French were acutely conscious that
they were not simply implanting lines of steel rails in
Africa, but also infusing a complex system of European
substructure and culture along the thin ribbons of
territory about these rails.
Two difficult problems are encountered in trying to
trace the social

impact of the railroad in Africa.

First

of all, although the importance of the railroad economi
cally,

strategically, and politically is undeniable,

its

role as a conveyor of European innovations perhaps crucial
in certain respects,

it is often difficult to separate

the specific impacts of the railroads, direct and indirect,
on life in Senegal from those caused by other innovations
carried into the region
selves).

(often by the railroads t hem 

Thus, while much of the prosperity of towns and

ports served by rails was due to the railroad,

it was

really the European export commerce acting through the
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railroad that had made the prosperity possible;

and the

morphological growth of these centers was also more
closely linked to the needs of commerce and the municipal
policies of the colonial government than to any intrinsic
effects of the railroad on local geography.

It is only

possible,therefore, to understand the social impact of
the railroad,

if other

broader developments are taken

into account.
Furthermore,

some effects specifically springing from

the railroad can be so diffuse and intangible in their
manifold,

indirect social and psychological results that

it becomes almost impossible to pinpoint or trace many
of them, even if they m a y be significant.

A n analysis

of the rail locomotive, or of Western machinery in
general, as value-laden symbols in African society,

for

example, would be of great interest--certainly the French
thought the locomotives would make a powerful,
terrifying impression;

even

but this question requires special

research efforts not attempted here.

11

The marabouts of

Senegal, likewise, took to the rails at an early date,
employing them as effective instruments for the wider
propogation of Islam;

12

and many young men also took

advantage of an increased accessibility of travel for
enjoying in a new way the familiar pastimes of voyaging
for pleasure and adventure.

But how could this be measured
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Of these indirect social effects perhaps all that can
be done for the moment is to sum them up in the catchword
of MaccessibilityM --obviously the increased accessibility
and exposure of Africans, particularly those previously
isolated in the interior,

to European military,

and cultural penetration and reciprocally

economic,

the ac ce s s i 

bility to Africans of European goods and ideas; but also
the increased mutual reciprocal accessibility among
Africans for interchanges of goods,

lands, or ideas.

This being said,

intangible aspects of

the multitudinous,

accessibility, unfortunately, have to be left aside.

It

is in the more obvious sense of the notion of a c c e s s i 
bility- -that dominating the thought of French planners of
colonial railroads--that the thread of the story can be
more easily followed.

Geographical access

Precolonial West Africa, and more

specifically pre-railroad West Africa, was faced with
particularly harsh transportation problems.

Both the shape

of the African continent as an essentially massive block
without strongly indented coast lines and the region's
shortage of navigable waterways inhibited the growth of
a substantial water-borne traffic.

13

With little dramatic relief, the key geographical
features marking out the Senegambian region are indeed
those of drainage, principally the Senegal and Gambia
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rivers that rise in the Futa Djallon massif well to the
south to flow in a generally westerly direction to the sea.
Only slightly to the east,

the Niger river rises in the

Futa Djallon and Guinea highlands, but flows contrariwise
in a northeastern direction into the Sudanese interior;

then

bends sharply southeastward after skimming the rim of the
Sahara to flow down to the Gulf of Guinea--managing th ere
by to encompass in its path much of the expanse of the
West African interi or .

The forms of these two river basins

and their alignment with each other would suggest major
highways for commercial traffic; but in fact there were a
number of obstacles, physical,

economic, and social,

inhibiting the flow of commerce along them.
The prevalence of weather fronts roughly paralleling
the southern tier of the West African coast, and their se a
sonal movement in north to south directions, created in West
Africa a diverse range of climatic and vegetative conditions
that encouraged domestic interchanges of goods among the
differing zones

(such as salt from the Sahara and kolas from

forest areas toward the Sudanese grasslands).

But these

climatic and vegetative zones running generally (with local
variations)

in east to west belts--corresponding to d ec r e a s 

ing annual rainfall and progressive dessication as one
proceeds northward--tended to support domestic trade in
a north-south direction rather than in the east to west
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orientation of the Senegal-Niger axis.

14

To compound transportation difficulties,

extensive

use of animal-borne traffic was precluded over substantial
zones infested by tse-tse flies, whereas in dry regions
free of the sleeping sickness carried by the tse-tse,
water shortages could be a serious burden or even a peril
to travellers.

15

Moreover,

the dramatic seasonal movement

of weather fronts could disrupt the regularity of both
land and water-borne traffic in Sahelian and Sudanese
West Africa.

Thus, during the rainy season, water-borne

traffic would flourish as rising water levels swelled the
rivers and reinvigorated dry Mm ar igo t " b e d s ; but many land
routes were also cut by the same flooding waters.

During

the dry season, on the other hand, water traffic shrank
or ceased when falling water levels dried marigot beds
and left river channels clogged with emerging obstacles-even while some land routes also became unusable for lack
of drinking w a t e r . ^

The close relation between t ranspor

tation ease and the quantity and timing of rainfall also
made transit arrangements difficult to predict on a yearto-year basis.
Widespread domestic market systems did develop in
West Africa despite the physical difficulties; but the
currents of domestic and external commerce could have been
stronger had there not also been economic and social

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-1 3 -

obstacles to the growth of commerce.

Particularly c r i p 

pling to the growth of long-distance commerce was the
low value of most of the commodities that were likely to
be traded

(gold, ivory, slaves were high valued, easily-

17
transported exceptions).

Low cost transportation over

waterways aligned in the right directions might have
stimulated the growth of commerce for the lower valued
goods.

18

But even where such river alignments occurred,

such as on the lower Niger river, unsettled political
conditions,

the interests of local trading monopolies,

and the conservative mores of some social ethos often
deterred much potential long-distance trade.

Perhaps

the real importance of the rivers in precolonial Sudanese
Africa lay less in their role as highways of trade than as
magnets for population--creating, with reliably abundant
waters, populated centers within the parched Sudanese
region.

19

European interest

Despite a long history of contact with

the coast of tropical Africa in modern times, Europeans
had displayed little relative interest in exploring the
interior of Africa until just before the 19th century.

2n

Already hampered by the geographic and climatic dif fi
culties of the region, Europeans encountered in tropical
Africa endemic diseases of a virulence unequalled in any
other quarter of the globe, and they were soon easily
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distracted by the allure of richer, more accessible lands
elsewhere.

The rigors of a foreign climate, with sudden,

sharp fluctuations in temperature adding to the fierceness
of sun and heat sapped the European's vigor even as deadly
diseases took a heavy toll among his companions--a f r i g h t 
ening experience since it was believed that the diseases
sprang from the climate and the ve ry soil of Africa.

The

difficulties of access to West Africa seemed all the more
formidable to an outsider since access to the interior was
guarded on the north by desert and semi-arid zones and
along the southern littoral by a dense rain forest.
Perhaps the apparent disinterest arose,

in large

part, out of the poisoned atmosphere born of the Atlantic
slave trade.

With violence always possible, European

traders rarely ventured into the interior, generally
huddling instead on ships and offshore islands, or in
forts that hugged the coast.

For Africans, on the other

hand, the arms procured by the trade were so important for
security that the layers of intermediate African traders
had every reason to discourage direct contact between the
coast and the interior.

In any case, an unremunerative

European occupation of African soil in the face of the
physical and military odds made little sense.
By the 19th century,

several developments were

acting to erode the strength of these physical and
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psychological barriers.

Successful humanitarian efforts

to end the slave trade, for one thing, had turned popular
European attention to the persistence of this trade in
the African interior.

Europe was industrializing, and the

new industrial technology was disgorging a plethora of new
devices and techniques.

There were steady gains in the

speed and capacity of modes of locomotion and communication,
as well as enormous advances in improved weaponry of p r o 
gressively increasing firepower.

Thus, the power equation

between Europe and Africa was strongly altered by a
growing European military superiority, while a series of
medical discoveries breaching the invisible barriers of
tropical diseases allowed the new military technology
to be brought to bear directly on the scene.

By the

1880*s and 1890's, Europeans had acquired so dispropor
tionate a military edge, that relatively trivial numbers
of Europeans leading African troops could prevail against
well-organized African empires of military renown.
At the same time, the needs of an industrializing
Europe for the cheap, raw materials
rubber,

(peanuts, palm oil,

etc.) available in West Afr ic a also fostered a

growing trade with the region, drawing to its coasts new
merchants and new attention.

For European traders, the

rivers would immediately suggest avenues for penetration
into the interior, moving highways on which trade might
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flow easily and cheaply, and on which Europeans could
glide quickly in relative security and comfort on their
own vessels.

But even if Europeans did use the rivers

to establish trading posts farther inland, much,
most of the trade with the interior,

if not

even along the

rivers, was in the hands of Afr ica n intermediaries.
Occasional European visits to the interior generally had
the character of adventures of little regularity, and
Europeans seem to have known little of realities in the
interior or of the active A frican trade networks of the
region.
A growing trade had sparked new interest in West
Africa and had given some Europeans a new material stake
in the region; but it hardly follows that this impelled
the European governments to occupy large slices of
African soil.

Perhaps it was rather that a Europe

enriched by the surpluses of industrialism could now
afford to indulge in such overseas enterprises with
little return as the difficult conquest of West Africa.
Early French expansion

22

Durable French trading contacts

with the Senegambian region date from 1659.

Objects of

the rivalries of the European maritime powers in the 17th
and 18th centuries,

the island port of St. Louis in the

Senegal river's mouth and Goree,

150 kilometers to the

south, definitely passed to the French in 1816.

Farther
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down the coast lay other French posts scattered from the
"Petite C8te" to the Saloum, the Casamance,
Rivers," even down to Gabon.

the "Southern

Interspersed with these posts

were strings of colonial trading posts of other European
nations--such as the Portugese at Bissau and on the
Casamance and, most importantly,

the solid British p o s i 

tions at Sierra Leone and on the Gambia river--the posts
on the latter virtually blocking French penetration by
this r o u t e . ^
The Senegal river, of course, afforded the French
a major avenue for penetration into the interior.

The

French had indeed taken advantage of this opportunity in
making a number of notable forays to the Upper Senegal,
even in the 17th and 18th centuries.

But these efforts

were sporadic in nature, especially since the upper parts
of the river were navigable only for a short season from
August to mid-October, and even then with difficulty.
After the failure,

from 1816, of French officials to turn

Senegal into an agricultural plantation colony, the river
trade largely remained in the hands of African and creole
intermediaries based at St. L o u i s . ^
The Senegal river,

indeed, was the primary axis for

the first major attempt at territorial conquest in the
interior.
absent,

While commercial motives were not entirely

this forward movement of French imperialism in
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the Senegambia from the 18 50's seems to have been provoked
by military officers who refused to tolerate any longer
any form (real or token) of subordination to neighboring
African powers and who resolved to end with military force
the local civil and religious wars that were disrupting
25
trade with the interior.
From 1854 on, the colony of Senegal took on a decidely
martial tone, with especial emphasis on the domination of
the Senegal river's banks by ships' artillery and wellplaced military posts.

At the end of 1854, a ne w governor,

Louis Faidherbe,

launched a program of continental ex26
pansion based frankly on the Algerian model.
Along the
river,

the neighboring arabo-berber Moors were vanquished,

chased out of Oualo,

and then forced to trade gum on French

terms, even while Oualo itself was annexed by the colony
(see Figure 2).

While the Tukolor nation along the middle

Senegal river was overawed with French arms, the reformist
Tukolor marabout El Hadj Umar was turned back from the
Upper Senegal, and a French post installed permanently at
Medine in Khasso.

27

French forces were soon equally active along the
Atlantic coast, with Cape Verde, next to Goree,
and annexed in 18 57 and Rufisque taken in 18 59.

occupied
Ex

peditions were launched into the interior to overawe Cayor,
Sine, Saloum, and the Casamance, while new posts were es-
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tablished along the African coast farther south, down to
Gabon.
One of the most vexing strategic problems of this
unfolding expansion was the separation of St. Louis and
the Senegal river basin from French bases at Gor£e and
Dakar by the powerful kingdom of Cayor lying between.

A

project submitted by one French officer in 1856 suggested
linking the two wings of the colony with a coastal r a i l 
road; but finally only a connecting coastal telegraph
protected by military posts was actually undertaken.

28

Even for the telegraph, Cayor had first to be invaded in
force in 1861, a French protege installed as "darnel" of
Cayor, and a strip of Atlantic seaboard for the line
annexed by the colony.

When control of Cayor through a

pro-French darnel failed, all of Cayor was conquered and
annexed directly to the French colony.

Warriors of progress
engineers

The striking prominence of military

in colonial expansion--those of the colonial

artillery as well as the corps of engineers--was not
accidental but indeed indicative of a cardinal aspect of
the process of French imperialism in West Africa that was
to emerge full-blown in the 1 8 8 0 ’s.
perspective,

From a modern

the imperialist proconsuls may appear as well-

shod barbarians perverting a new technology for aggressive
purposes;

indeed it would be easy to assemble a compendium
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of brutal,

even grisly imperialist acts.

not ignore, however,

29

One should

the very firm, contrary belief of

officers spearheading the imperialist advance
Faidherbe, P i n e t-L ap rad e, among others)

(governors

that they stood

indeed in the forefront of modernism--as the advanced
cutting edge,

on a planetary scale, of a triumphant

industrial society.

The undeniable sincerity of this

belief is indeed underscored by the striking penchant of
French colonial officers and officials to introduce,
times prematurely,

s o me

the latest technological devices into

Africa--telegraph and railroad lines in the 1 8 5 0 ’s, electri
cal municipal lighting in the 1880's,
1899, the airplane in 1918.

the automobile in

30

Perhaps part of the reason for the prominence of
military engineers in imperial expansion lies in the wellknown elan and solidarity of graduates of the French Ecole
Polytechnique.

31

Much more of the answer lies in the

apparent challenge presented by the physical obstacles in
West Africa that seemed so forbidding to intruders.
was here within this environment,
mentality,

It

that a certain type of

fusing complementary elements of the

(ideal)

characters of technologist and military conqueror, could
find a wide arena for expression in a way that would have
seemed inappropriate in the prosaic atmosphere of m e t r o 
politan Europe.

For in Africa, both exploratory penetra-
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tion and engineering ventures,

even in the name of

peaceful expansion, would take the form of assaults upon
a powerful,

contrary,

even hostile nature.

32

This

struggle need not be grim but even exuberant.

Certainly

a sense of joy is manifest in P i n e t - L a p r a d e ’s espousal
of a coastal railroad in 1856, as he wrote,
what nature has done and would certainly never do,
the Genius of man has provided the means to accomplish.
The marvels of our century, the application of steam
and electricity to useful things are the most p o w e r 
ful means that man has ever manipulated . . . Already
our small steamships are considered in these parts,
with reason, as the most powerful means to enlarge
our relations with the interior of Africa . . . is it
not certain that one day it will be desirable to unite
the important centers by other routes?
Will this
operation be accomplished by ordinary roads with
their slow, incessant traffic, or by the perfected
means of railroads?

Retrenchment

But these early dreams of soldiers and

builders were soon dashed, more by decisions made in the
metropole than by the actual physical difficulties encoun
tered in the colony.

Following Faidherbe's departure and

his successor Pinet-Laprade's death in 1869, the area of
French-held territory was sharply reduced.
garrisons were withdrawn from many posts.
abandoned,

French
Cayor was

except for Diander with its port of Rufisque

and the thin telegraph corridor from Cape Verde to Gandiole.
The French defeat in the Franco-Prussian war
Certainly accelerated the French retreat.

But for budgetary
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reasons, French authorities had already embarked before34
hand, in 1869, on a policy of retrenchment in Senegal.
If financial austerity now became paramount,
tion and communication difficulties

transporta

in Senegal certainly

played a major role in determining where retrenchment
would take place.

Thus,

it was easier to maintain a post

at far-off Medine on the Upper Senegal than in nearby
Cayor, where even modest road-building efforts had failed
and where military rule could be enforced only with
periodic cavalry s w e e p s . ^

The gravity of the problem

is perhaps best expressed in an account of the later
conquest by a French officer of the 1890's, who wrote,
One imagines that the native constituted the
greatest obstacle,the most fearsome peril.
That's
not so!
The Negroes, except in certain regions, were
neither warlike enough nor sufficiently organized to
resist us.
It was nature itself that in its tropical
zeal raised itself against the European . . .The
Negro, the savage of the woods, the cannibal, the
Mahdist armies were nothing; their arrows or their
rifles didn't count; the insurmountable obstacle was
always the transportation of an enormous, heavy
ordnance across a country without roads. 36
Railroads,

of course, offered one solution of the

military logistics problem; but, there were no funds for
that.

Instead the French retreated back into a scatter

ing of trading and military posts dotting the coast and
the Senegal river.
the region,

Still a paramount military power in

the colony had become,

again peripheral to it.

in some senses, once

37
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The Transsaharan

As is well-known since the important

article by Newbury and Kanya-Forstner, it was an enthusiasm
in the French metropole for a rail line across the Sahara
that rekindled,
Senegal.

38

in 1879, French colonial expansion in

Scorned in this century because it was so

ill-conceived at the time, the Transsaharan project has
not received the attention it deserves,

for the contem

porary debates on this project, occuring as they do on the
eve of the "scramble for Africa," offer certain absorbing
insights into the nascent French colonial party.

39

Sparked itself by an enthusiastic public response
to the engineer A. Duponchel's book Chemin de fer
transsaharan, a serious study of the Transsaharan had been
undertaken in 1879 under the auspices of the Ministry of
Public W o r k s . T h e
Charles de Freycinet,

leading actor in this effort was
the Minister of Public Works, who

had been preparing since entering this post in 1878 an
ambitious program for 4500 kms of new rail lines in
metropolitan France together with proposals for extension
of the Algerian rail network.

What was more natural than

the study of a Transsaharan railroad as w e l l ? ^
Freycinet first formed a preliminary study commission
on the Transsaharan in May 1879; and when this body issued
a favorable report, he formed a full commission,

seating

parliamentary and ministerial representatives alongside
explorers, railroad managers, geographic society members,
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and such "personalities” as Ferdinand de L e s s e p s . ^

The

full commission was divided by Freycinet into four s ub
commissions, whose members were soon at loggerheads over
which route should be followed into the Sahara.

Commission

meetings continued inconclusively into 1881, when the
massacre of the Flatters expedition in the Sahara exposed
more clearly the drawbacks and perils of the enterprise.

43

It is in the various arguments raised during debates
on the Transsaharan that one can see a fascinating mixture
of motives:

the already archaic humanitarian concerns of

an earlier generation mingling with the prophetic stirrings
of a coming,
ment,

harder imperial age.

One humanitarian a r g u 

soon also invoked to justify occupation of the Congo,

was of the need to interdict slave caravan routes in
Africa--a function that the Transsaharan would presumably
perform as it traversed the Sahara.

But the main thrust

of the Transsaharan lay elsewhere.
Designed to overleap the barrier of the Sahara desert,
which separated Algeria from the Sudan and blocked French
access to the interior from the direction,

the Transsaharan

was only one of a number of bold concepts conceived by the
fertile imaginations of French engineers
century.

The reconstruction of Paris,

Alpine tunnels, and the ports

in the 19th

the piercing of

and railroad nets built in

France and elsewhere testify indisputably to their t echni
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cal v i r t u o s i t y T h e

creation o£ the Suez canal,

in

particular, was a glorious triumph, and even the abortive
Panama canal scheme was vindicated later on as a general
concept.

A Transsaharan railroad was even more imagina

tive than the canals since it aimed,

like the contemporary

American Transcontinental and the future Trans-Siberian,
at transforming the nature of a vast continental region.
Unfortunately,

as logically seductive as the

Transsaharan might be,
on two mistaken ideas.

it was based at the time largely
European explorers had indicated

earlier that parts of the Sudan were rich and thickly
populated.

Speculation extrapolated the observed riches

into an imagined opulence covering all of the Sudanese
interior,

although prudent observers realized that only

the Hausa country in the east was known to be prosperous.
Far more serious was the mistaken notion--which persisted
until disproved by Binger's mission of 1886-1889--that
the Sudanese heartland was isolated from easy access to
the West African littoral by a chain of high mountains
paralleling the coast:
(see Figure 3).

the mythical mountains of Kong

In accordance with this idea, the

possession of bases in Algeria, as well as at other coastal
springboards at Senegal and Gabon, gave France an immense
positional advantage over other European nations.

A bold

advance from Algeria would presumably deliver this rich
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Sudanese heartland into French hands.
move quickly,

The French need

it was argued, because rival powers were

supposedly preparing to outflank a French Transsaharan
with their o’.vn railroad projects--from Morocco to Timbuktu
(a British scheme supposedly), from Tripoli to Bornu
(German), or from Liberia to the Upper Niger

(American

and British).^5
The Transsaharan enthusiasm was, of course, strongly
permeated by an underlying anxiety shared by Frenchmen at
this time over the apparent decline of French power.
in the 1860's,

Even

some Frenchmen had already been uneasy

about the greater potential strength of such powers as
Britain, Russia,

and America, which controlled much larger

masses of land and people than France.

These fears were

generalized within France and intensified acutely by
the military defeats of the Franco-Prussian war and the
subsequent humiliating territorial losses to a newlyborn German empire.

A vivid demonstration of the nation's

vigor seemed necessary to restore confidence; but renewed
warfare in Europe was unthinkable at the time.
overseas,

however, might serve the same purpose.

Expansion
46

In this sense, an expanded Algeria could be r e g a r 
ded not only as a replacement for the lost Alsace-Lorraine,
but also as France's equivalent of the American frontier,
with the potential to create new fields of opportunity
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fov French enterprise while expanding the nation's power
base.

A bold stroke of technical ingenuity by French

talent might restore French eminence by opening up a
new continental frontier or a new African India.
It is not surprising,

therefore,

to find the

Transsaharan enthusiasts insisting on a French, and not
an international complexion to the enterprise.

A scheme

outlined by one enthusiast, the engineer Alphe de Beau
Rochas, would have had the Transsaharan opening up an
immense French imperium in the.center of Africa,

extend

ing down from the Sahara to embrace the entire Sudan
and generous portions of the equatorial hinterland,
cluding the northern Congo basin.

in

A network of new

Transsafrican railroads crisscrossing this empire would
even have spanned the continent to link up with the Frenchheld east African port at O b o c k . ^
Railroads had been a great boon to commerce and
industry in Europe and America.

The common supposition

of the Transsaharan enthusiasts was that railroads would
generate a comparable phenomenal growth of peaceful
commerce in the interior of Africa.

The railroad was

expected to bring not only a new prosperity to the region,
but also peace as it curtailed and supplanted the slave
trade--the major source of chronic,

endemic warfare in

the interior.
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There were, however,

important differences in

opinion over the manner in which construction would be
undertaken.

For example,

in his advocacy of reconnoiter-

ing possible rail traces for a Transsaharan with unarmed
individuals dependent on local African authorities and at
their mercy, Paul Soleillet was clinging to an earlier
vision of the European explorer in Africa as the heroic
figure on which metropolitan Europe had lavished so much
adulation inthe recent past.

Soleillet's approach,

however, also had the merit of making rail construction
in Africa hinge on the assent and cooperation of local
48
African authorities.
Others, even while paying lip service to the p r i n 
ciple of peaceful penetration in cooperation with Africans,
were obviously inclined to more forceful methods.
for one,

Duponchel,

in roundly opposing Soleillet's gentler projects

and methods, clearly heralded a new, harsh era in EuroAf ri c a n relations.

When poor Soleillet advocated his

contrary opinions too openly and too indiscretely, he
was summarily ejected from Senegal by the French governor and obliged to do exploring elsewhere.

49

Even

Duponchel was elbowed aside in Algeria by others,

includ

ing ambitious military officers eager to lead the large
armed parties sent to reconnoiter likely traces for the
railroad into the Sahara.
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Few tears, however, need be shed for Duponchel,
whose work hardly merited the attention it received.
Though his credentials as an enginner could lend credence
to the practicability of the project, Duponchel had, as
he himself admitted, drawn up his Transsaharan scheme
on the basis of sketch/accounts of earlier explorers of
the Sahara and Sudan instead of making personal surveys
of the interior h i m s e l f . ^

He had not been above making

misleading comparisons with the American Transcontinental,
and when his proposed trace was criticized,
abandoned it to advocate a n o t h e r . ^
fact,

he easily

Duponchel was, in

less interested in the technical difficulties of

a Transsaharan than in assuming command of a special
’’Direction" charged with constructing the railroad, and
he pressed for the immediate opening of construction work
on the Transsaharan without waiting for precise information on the terrain beyond.
It was fortunate,

52

of course,

project was not undertaken.

that the Transsaharan

Aside from the geographical

m isconception about the mountains of Kong and the obvious
economic weaknesses of a long railroad passing through a
desert,

it is probable that a reliable Transsaharan rail-

road was never really technically feasible.

53

The exaggerated faith of the promoters in the
potential of the Transsaharan,

of course, was a common
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vice of railroad advocates in the 19th centur y. 54
theless,

Never

it is important to note that the project had

beenfoundering even before 1881, not so much on the
impracticalities, but because its advocates were h o p e 
lessly divided into three irreconciliable factions,

each

based on a different department of Algeria--Oran in the
west, Algiers

in the center, and the Constantine-

Philippeville area in the east.

The central trace o r i g i 

nally proposed by Duponchel and Soleillet was of little
interest to the eastern railroads

(the B0ne-Guelma and

East-Algerian), which had no rail line with Algiers at
this early date, or for the ardent partisans of Oran,
eager to make their region the terminus of an expanding
frontier.^

Each Algerian region could marshall friends

in the metropole,

and the choice of a departure point

soon deadlocked the Transsaharan commissions.
About the best chance for a rapid solution came
during the July 29th session of the 2nd sub-commission,
which recommended a line of departure from Biskra to
Ouargla--a trace equally accessible from Algiers or C o n 
stantine.^

However,

led by military officers sympathetic

with a trace from Oran,

the first and third sub-commissions

soon rallied against the proposal, and it was quashed in
c7
a plenary session of the full Commission.
Henceforth,
studies were pursued along a multitude of traces,
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until the debacle of the Flatters expedition quenched
the Transsaharan enthusiasm.

The divisions of the

Transsaharan enthusiasts, however, presented an ideal
opportunity for exponents of another scheme for r e a c h 
ing the Sudan from a different direction--from the colony
of Senegal.

Jaureguiberry

The arrival in Senegal of Louis Bri^re de

l'Isle, colonel of marine infantry, as governor in 1876
is often cited as opening the second period of expansion
of the colony.

Bridre's governorship from 1876 to 1881

was a period of intense activity during which the contours of the future Senegal began to take shape.

58

Briere was indeed intent on resurrecting Faidherbe's
dreams of military expansion, and he proceeded in short
order to initiate military actions in two widely separated
areas--on the Upper Senegal and in the coastal "Southern
cq
rivers."
Ineffectively restrained by a not always wellinformed Ministry of Marine and Colonies in Paris,

Briere's

scope for aggressive action was, nonetheless, very limited
until the appointment in January 18 79 of Admiral Jean
Bernard Jaureguiberry as Minister of Marine and Colo nie s-a key figure, as Newbury and Kanya-Forstner have pointed
out, primarily responsible for initiating the rebirth of
colonial expansion in S e n e g a l . ^
On taking office in 1879, Jaureguiberry was r e a c h 
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ing the pinnacle of a career in which he had already
distinguished himself as a commander in Vietnam and China
during the Far Eastern c a m p a i g n s R e w a r d e d

afterward

in December 1861 with the governorship of Senegal, re p l a c 
ing Faidherbe,

the young Jaureguiberry had erred badly in

a treacherously-complicated situation in Cayor, and the
situation was retrieved only with the return of Faidherbe.
As governor in 1862, Jaureguiberry had proposed subduing
Cayor by building a good road, then a railroad,
post of N'Dande in the interior.

62

to the

He can only have been

delighted 17 years later, when Briere submitted to the
ministry a new, updated and detailed version of a railroad
project into Cayor.
Bridre's project concerned only construction of a
railroad between Dakar and St. Louis.

But it was obvious

that the current enthusiasm for a Transsaharan provided
an excellent opportunity for more ambitious projects from
Senegal.

A glance at a map would immediately show that

a railroad of 1200 kms from Senegal to the Sudan made much
more sense than a 2400 km Transsaharan built across a
desert;

and a Senegal-Sudan project, as Duponchel for one

recognized, was in reality a dangerous rival to a
Transsaharan scheme

(See Figure 3 ) . ^

Rapidly,

Briere

was able to put together a plausible program calling for
exploratory studies of a long rail line consisting of three
major links:

one from Medine on the Upper Senegal to the
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Niger;

one between Dakar and St. Louis;

and one in ter

mediary link between St. Louis and Medine.

This was not

difficult, because the general idea had been entertained
in one form or another over the previous twenty-odd years.

The Senegal-Niger link

The origin of French ambitions

on the Upper Niger lay in Anne R a f f e n e l ’s observation in
1856 of the flat profile of the watershed between the
upper reaches of the Senegal and Niger rivers, whose
tributary systems seemingly stretch out to approach each
other closely at some points

(see Figure 4).65

Given

contemporary revelations about the richness of Hausa
country in the east,

it seemed as though a lucrative trade

might be established to this region from Senegal if only
a relatively short gap between the Senegal and Niger
rivers could be bridged.

With this in mind, Faidherbe

had sent a preliminary mission in 1863 under Lt. E. Mage
to reconnoiter the terrain between the upper rivers and
to negociate with the Segu Tukolor empire for an e x 
clusively French commercial route to the Niger, guarded
by five new posts.

f\f\

Little had come of it; but by the

late 1870's it was still thought that construction of a
railroad or a canal between the two riverways would form
a thin, but firm link from the coast into the Sudanese
heartland.

Speculatively wild as the notion of an i nter

river canal or railroad far in the interior may appear
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to the modern observer,

the not ion--bolstered as it was by

the misconception about the "mountains of Kong"--did not
seem unreasonable to contemporaries witnessing a phenomenal
tin
growth in the Americas along rails and canals.
Certain
ly these speculations could be used to justify previous
and’ ongoing French sacrifices to control the imperfect,
irregular Senegal river, which at least was situated more
closely to the Niger than the shorter, nautically superior
Gambia held by the British.
Despite the hostility of some members of the
Transsaharan Commission,

the Senegal scheme had,

in fact,

little trouble in obtaining quickly a strong measure of
acceptance on the commission.

Freycinet's benign attitude

certainly played a role in this acceptance, for the Senegal
rail project soon won an equal priority with the Tra nss a
haran.
Jaureguiberry made Inspector of Naval Works N. Legros
directly responsible for steering the Senegal-Sudan rail
project past administrative shoals on its way to approval
and funding,

and Legros was specifically authorized to

correspond directly with the governor of Senegal on this
question.

68

It was Legros who,in expounding the merits

of a Senegal-Sudan rail link

(claiming notably a gap of

only 18 0 kms between navigable portions of the Senegal and
Niger river systems), obtained full recognition for the
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-37Senega 1 project in the resulting decree of July 13,
1879.®^

This decree, which set up a full commission to

study the Transsaharan not only implicitly legitimized
future exploratory studies of a Senegal-Sudan route, but
specifically turned over responsibility for these studies
to the Minister of Marine.

70

Likewise, the full Transsaharan Commission posed few
problems for Legros.

One of the advocates of an easterly

Transsaharan even issued a report recommending that the
Transsaharan should be directed eastward toward Hausa
country and Lake Chad, while leaving Timbuktu and the
upper Niger valley to a railroad from Senegal.

71

A n east

erly Transsaharan, unlike the original goal of Timbuktu,
would certainly have been complementary to a Senegal rail
scheme, and perhaps a conjunction of interests between
advocates of an eastern Transsharan and those of a Senegal
link may have been translated into political cooperation.
It may not have been entirely coincidental that the parent
company of the east Algerian B 6 ne-Guelma railroad later
became the builder of the Dakar-St.
Senegal.

Louis railroad in

In any case, Legros was able to obtain res olu 

tions favoring the Senegal project during the July 29th
and August 14th sessions of the second sub-commission and
the August 18th session of the first sub-commission.

72

He even hoped to obtain funding for exploratory studies
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from the Ministry of Public Works, but Freycinet declined,
73
even while approving the Senegal scheme in principle.
Jaureguiberry's precipitous occupation of Bafoulabe,
a strategic point 100 kms east of Medine, during the
parliamentary recess did not fail to arouse adverse comment
from members of the third sub-commission; but Legros
74
merely shrugged it off.
Foes of the Senegal scheme on
the Transsaharan Commission were able to draw blood only
in obliging Legros to abandon plans for an intermediate
rail link along the heights paralleling the Senegal river.
A minor flaw then in the general picture,

it unfortunately

forced postponement of plans for any intermediate r a i l 
road after a reconnaissance in 1879 of an alternative
route across the Ferlo to Bakel revealed that this barren
region was entirely unsuitable for a rail line.
mately,

75

Ulti

the omission of this part of the overall project

was to cripple severely the construction of an Upper
Senegal rail link inadequately supplied by the unreliable
Senegal river.
In February 1880, nevertheless,

Jaureguiberry

deposited a bill with parliament calling for authorization
and funding of construction on two rail links: a MedineBafoulabe line as the first leg of an Upper Senegal railroad; and a Dakar-St.

Louis rail line.

76

Only the Dakar-

St. Louis rail link had ever been the object of an e xten
sive studies.
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The Dakar-St. Louis railroad

The Dakar-St.

Louis rail

project of 1880 embodied two strategic concepts.

To begin

with, a rail line to Dakar would remedy the disadvantages
of a difficult entry to the port of St. Louis by p r o v i d 
ing a direct link between the two ports.
hand,

On the one

this would simplify political and administrative

control of the colony by assuring communications between
its two major centers.

On the other hand, this rail line

would also seemingly assure St. Louis and the Senegal
river basin a more reliable commercial link to the sea at
Dakar by allowing through transhipment by rail.

This

concept had been the driving force behind the coastal rail
line proposed by Pinet-Laprade in 18 56, at a moment when
the political division of the two wings of the colony
into independent units from 18 54 to 1859 was already prov77

ing unsatisfactory.

Though recognized as overoptimistic

in its cost estimates, P ine t- L a p r a d e 's proposal was indeed
favorably received by the Minister of Marine in Paris,
who was prepared to go as far as endorsing a scaled-down
effort with rail transport on horse-drawn carts.
proposal,

78

The

however, apparently met with stiff opposition

from Faidherbe himself.

The governor of Senegal was in

fact reversing an earlier call that he himself had made
in 1853 for an overland rail link between St. Louis and
Gor£e.^

In 1857, however,

it had been plain that a
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-40possible diversion of river trade to Dakar from St. Louis
would imperil the commercial prosperity of the town that
Faidherbe had selected as the principal base for his
dreams of imperial expansion.
A second strategic concept--that of the military
dominance of Cayor--was however also emphasized increasing
ly in subsequent proposals for a Dakar-St.

Louis railroad.

Already in 18 62, Jaureguiberry had proposed for military
reasons a narrow-gauge animal-drawn railroad detouring
from the coastal trace at Potou towards a post a t N ’Dande
in central Cayor.

80

Hippolyte Vaubourg,
Dakar-St.

In 1872, a colonial official,
came up with a similar version of a

Louis railroad penetrating deeply into Cayor.

Beginning with a coastal trace at St. Louis, V a u b o u r g ’s
line would also have veered sharply inland at Potou and
passed via Tiari M'Baouar to Kelle, a caravan junction
not far from N ’Guiguis.

From Kelle the trace ran s outh

ward via Belgor to rejoin the coastal trace at M'Bidjem
before reaching first Rufisque,

then Dakar

(see Figure

Vaubourg hoped to astound the Africans of Cayor
with a locomotive clipping along at 35 to 40 km per hour
and belching fire and smoke.

But clearly it was the

military and strategic aspects of the railroad that in ter
ested him.

A railroad for one thing, he noted, would

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

FI6 UR E

lake

5

g\jAV -0

VARIOUS
TRACES FOR
A DARARSt. LOUIS
RAILROAD

§»>

$

,_ +

N^""

M * KKOR
+■
» E * B£ 7
*t«g“++

rA
L'2 “

,

+

d 'a n d c
w 0^ a | *M'DN
\\n£*

^ K ^ ^ a a u s i
-4+ +

p\R£&oy^
TIVtfboAH^

irr
ebikotane

W ALTER T R A C E S 878

1 H 1 11 I H

~

-+■ + +

+ +

oau.

tN'WBcanE

O T H E R RAIL PROTECTS

CAYOR'S f i ASTERN ANb
NORTHERN BOPPERS

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

- 4 2 -

weaken the political influence of the Moors in Cayor
by ending their dominance of the carrying trade in that
country.

"Next," he wrote,

an immensely weighty advantage of the first order
arises; that is, the immediate and inevitable end
of all our wars with Cayor . . . that we would
dominate by the rapidity with which we would throw
our expeditionary columns into the area where the
darnel would be found in case he tried to interfere
with the operation of the railroad.
Vaubourg also vaguely predicted a doubling of p e a 
nut production in Cayor, but neglected to advance any
figures.

He estimated instead that the railroad's main

revenues would come from goods shipped from St. Louis and
Rufisque

to Dakar and vice-versa.

In any case during that

era of budgetary restraint, Vaubourg's project received
scant attention from the incumbent governor and even
82
failed to arouse much enthusiasm from the local merchants.
The Dakar-St.

Louis rail project was taken more

seriously by Bridre as soon as he arrived in the colony.
Aside from the strategic advantages of assuring the colony
a reliable access to the sea from St. Louis, Briere was
plainly intent, despite skepticism encountered in the
colony,

on using the railroad to dominate

During his governorship

Cayor.

^3

(1876-1881), Bri&re enjoyed good

relations with the darnel of Cayor.

But in relaying

his railroad project to the ministry in Paris,

in 1878,

Briere wrote,
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It is to be feared that either by the progress of
Islam or under the press of events that cannot be
foreseen . . . that the administration of the colony,
tied down on the Upper River or the countries of the
middle Senegal, finds itself on a given day very
embarrassed by Cayor--this turbulent country of
difficult access--while it would always be at our
discretion, if it were traversed by a r a i l r o a d . 84
Indeed as early as 1876, renewed studies of a DakarS t . Louis rail project were calling for a trace passing
even more deeply into Cayor with military domination the
obvious intention.

This was evident in a report of 1876

rejecting a proposed direct,

linear rail trace between the

villages of Rao and Kebemer in favor of another plunging
much farther inl an d .85

First of all, this report remarked,

a linear Rao-Kebemer trace, passing through areas a l t e r 
nately uninhabited or creased by deep ridges, would have
been "placed too near the maritime zone, a depopulated land,
without commerce, without agriculture, and without a
future

. . . too far from the rich eastern countries of

Cayor;

it will leave unserved the most populous centers,

and their transports to St. Louis will be lost."8^
continued the author,

Then,

turning to his primary concern,

The combats that have had important results always
took place in the east where the wealth of the
country drawn from the countryside would permit i n 
digenous armies to subsist freely and from which these
same armies could flee after defeat to the forest of
Bounoum, which would conceal them from any serious
pursuit by us.
A n army of Cayor is not going to put
itself so close to the sea where it could be trapped
and consequently destroyed.
Besides /”our_T columns
will always avoid operating in a country so o v e r 
grown . . . . Thus a /“direct Rao-Kebemer_7 rail line
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could be used only for a special case--the trans
port of troops from St. Louis to the south of
Cayor.
A trace detouring into populated areas farther to the east
therefore not only had certain commercial and technical
virtues, but would enable French troops to seize quickly
Cayor's major centers of resistance and granaries in case
of war.
When a full technical study of a railroad trace was
issued in 1878 under Briere*s watchful eye,

it barely

alluded to these strategic principles, but indeed clearly
incorporated them.

Drawn up by Walter,

the chief of the

colony's Ponts et Chaussees service,

this project called

for an inexpensive,

single-track r a i l 

one-meter gauge,

road on a p ath well to the east, roughly through the
geographical center of Cayor.
this 260 km trace is evident.

87

The strategic value of
Starting from Dakar,

the

trace ran through French territory, passing Rufisque to
reach Thi&s, a military post overlooking the strategic
OO
junction between Cayor and Baol.
At its northern end,
the line ran eastward from St. Louis to M'Pal, a military
post overlooking,

on Cayor's northern border, the main

routes for Djolof to the east and Lake Guiers to the
north.

Between Thids and M'Pal,

the railroad trace would

imbed in Cayor nine stations or w a y - s t a t i o n s , spaced 10
to 22 kms apart

(out of a total of 18 stations for the

entire rail l i n e ) .

While this trace missed many large
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villages of Cayor--notably Niomre, Coki,

Soguer, K.

M a n d o u b 6 Khary--the inflection of the line as much as 30
kms inland from the earlier projects

(the Rao-Kebemer

detour alone adding some 27 kms of extra track) brought
the line mu ch closer to those centers, while closely
approaching such well-sized villages like Louga, Mekhe,
Kelle, and Pire.
The Walter project,

largely a technical analysis

of construction specifications and cost estimations based
on on-site surveys of the terrain,
Vaubourg project,
with Cayor.

asserted,

like the

that the railroad would develop trade

Nevertheless, Walter estimated that only 3%

of the railroad's revenues would come from passenger
traffic within Cayor, and he made no estimate of freight
traffic with the interior.

Like Vaubourg, Walter based

his optimistic estimates for rail revenues almost entirely
on the movement of goods and passengers to Dakar from the
towns of St. Louis and Rufisque,

Selling a railroad

and vice-versa.

The Transsaharan commissions had

posed relatively few problems for the Senegal-Sudan rail
project but the National Assembly was to prove another
matter.

One major,

consistent theme of later imperialist

hagiographic literature

(and publicity) was the supposedly

shortsighted parsimony of the metropolitan parliament,
for indeed budgetary problems lay at the crux of the
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French colonial problem.

It had been budgetary frugality

that had stifled a budding French expansion in the region
in the 1 8 6 0 ’s; budgetary restrictions were to mold the
shape of colonial policy forcefully later in the 2 0 th
century.

In the late 187 0 ’s, the promoters of French

imperialism were still trying merely to wedge open the
coffers of a closed French treasury,

and it was their

distinction that they succeeeded in large measure.
Although the cynicism of the principal actors m a y
be difficult to gauge in the unfolding drama,

Kanya-

Forstner certainly seems correct in asserting that it was
(at least in part) a question of officers seeking promotion by provoking "glorious" combats and conquests.

89

An unavoidable part of this process involved obtaining
the funding--and the specialized personnel and equipment
that would be acquired along with the funding--to enable
the "glorious" actions to take place.

It was a matter of

that well-known bureaucratic game of justifying an expanded
budget and staff, even in the face of government frugality.
Provoking incidents and misrepresenting them as
defensive was,

of course, one method of obtaining funds.

90

But Briere's complaints about the "anarchy" in nei g h b o r 
ing Af rican states or about alleged British encroachments
from the nearby Gambia into the interior could have had
only a limited appeal at the time;
before in the 1860's.

it had all been said

A project for peaceful penetration
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by rail had a more appealing ring, and subsequent
correspondence between the ministry and the colonial
government in Senegal was indeed drafted to bolster
assertions that this was what was taking place in the
colony.
The decree of July 1879 authorizing studies of a
railroad had already been enough to justify a spate of
new reconnaissances throughout the Senegal-Sudan region,
and even some armed expeditions.

91

It was indeed because

Soleillet had protested too loudly about the military
nature of these expeditions that he had been tossed out
of the colony in 1880.
Legros'

attitude is revealed succinctly in his h a n d 

ling of budgetary estimates for the costs of rail const ru c
tion.

Walter's optimistic estimate of 1878 for a 260 km,

narrow-gauge Dakar-St.

Louis railroad was the bargain

price of 6,500,000 francs, or 25,000 francs per kilometer-but then, Walter was known for overoptimism.

92

The m i n i 

stry's Council of Naval Works had revised the estimate
upward radically to 12 million francs,

or 46,200 Fr/km,

and in November 1879 Legros was estimating construction
costs at 50,000 Fr/km for the Dakar-St.

Louis link,

60,000 for a St. Louis-Medine link, and 80 to 90,000
Fr/km

for the Medine-Niger link.

^

By December 20th,

Legros had hiked his estimates for the two former lines
to 62,440 Fr/km and 71,800 Fr/km respectively; but these
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estimates,

as incorporated in a note of the ministry's

Director of Colonies, were rejected as too optimistic by
Jaurgguiberry h i m s e l f . ^4

Replying in a note of Ja n u 

ary 8 , 1880, Legros merely rounded off previous estimates
to offer an overall cost estimate of 12 0 million francs
total for all three rail links.

Legros confessed that

only his figures for the cost of transporting materiel to
Senegal might be accurate.

"I refrain," he wrote,

"from

being as affirmative about the other items of evaluation,
for it is manifest that my calculations only rest on
hypothetical data,

except for the DSL line, which was

studied on site."

But, he asserted,

it would be difficult, if not impossible, to indicate
in advance even approximately a figure for additional
expenses . . . and besides it does not seem to me
that it is worthwhile being obsessed with it, consider
ing that for most lines under construction today in
the metropole, the cost of putting in the substructure
reaches 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 to 150,000, and even 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 /""Fr/km_7;
which does not impede parliament from voting 7j"the
creditsJ7 on the recommendation of the Minister of
Public Works, although from the viewpoint of the ge n e r 
al interest of the country, they undoubtedly have m uch
less importance than the lines projected in Senegal. 95
Thus,

the Senegal-Sudan rail link was, like its c o n 

temporary rival,

the Transsaharan,

a leap into the unknown

carrying with it patriotic dream-.; and personal career
ambitions.

But would the rest of the country go along?

Legros hoped to convince a skeptical parliament
with a careful orchestration of information arriving from
Senegal.

Like the Transsaharan,

the Senegal scheme was
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presented as an eminently pacific project designed to
reduce internecine warfare in the African interior by
promoting commerce.

It was asserted that the terrain to

be crossed was flat
comed the railroad

(largely true),

that Africans w e l 

(untrue), that cheap African labor

could be recruited easily (untrue), and that materials
for construction could be found in Africa

(misleading).

On the other hand, there was virtually no serious d i s 
cussion of the colony's malignant sanitary problems,

al

though the recent yellow fever epidemic of 1878 had killed
fully half the whites then residing in the colony.

96

For one thing, Bri£re was ordered to elicit a
nominal subsidy for the Dakar-St.

Louis rail project from

the colony's elected General Council,

in order to d e m o n 

strate publicly the willingness of the colony's citizenry
to participate in financing the railroad.

This was r e l a 

tively easy to obtain, despite some local skepticism,

since

the rail projects would obviously have stimulated local
business activity.

97

Senegal's deputy to parliament was

an ardent partisan of the railroads, and one local c o m m e r 
cial house even offered to undertake construction of a
rail link between St. Louis and Medine.^^

The ministry's

solicitation of this subsidy was however something of a
sham, for the ministry was also dead set on p r e v e n t 
ing the General Council from having

a voice in setting

railroad policy as a subsidy would have entitled it.
When the General Council asked,

a short time later,to be
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released from its commitment, the ministry consented
willingly.

99

Likewise another piece of useful publicity for the
railroad was the treaty of September 10, 1879 signed by the
darnel of Cayor to authorize construction of the line through
his realm along with a second convention promising aid in
obtaining labor locally for construction w o r k . ^ ^
surface,

this would tend, along w ith other treaties being

obtained on the Upper Senegal,

to corroborate ministry

claims that Africans were welcoming the railroad.
reality,

On the

101

In

the darnel Lat Dior had probably only signed the

treaty, without really understanding its terms,

simply in

order to obtain French support during coincidental domestic troubles in Cayor.

i0?

The treaty's vague references

to the "route commercial" and way stations for travellers
to be built in Cayor

(there were no references to rails

and only one to locomotives) were certainly not designed
to enlighten Lat Dior too much.

Perhaps colonial a u t h o r i 

ties really did hope to beguile the darnel as well as the
French public.

However, when Lat Dior perceived the colony's

true intentions in 1881, he promptly repudiated the treaty
and forbade construction of a railroad through his domains.
It is doubtful that Jaur£guiberry himself really
believed the optimistic assessments

that he was receiving

from Briere or ministry officials.

As a former governor

of Senegal, Jaureguiberry would have been well aware both
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of the pitfalls of treaties in this region of confused
internecine warfare and of the difficulties of c o ns tru c
tion in a tropical climate.

Certainly Jaureguiberry was

also being warned of some of the risks of the undertaking.
by skeptical correspondants in Senegal.
however,

103

He chose,

to discount these warnings while merely a dm o n i s h 

ing Bridre mildly to temper his more optimistic forecasts.
Bri^re frequently asserted that his difficulties with
adjoining African states and in Paris had really originated
from the secret machinations of prominent Senegalese
merchants against his administration, and ministry officials
apparently accepted these assertions to some degree.
At any rate,

the rail projects soon came to grief against

increasing difficulties.

The Dakar-St.

Louis blocked

Legros, who had probably

believed Bridre's assurances about the ease of recruiting
African laborers for construction work on the Upper Senegal,
had hoped to start railroad construction early in 1880 by
building a good supply road from M^dine to Bafoulab€ on
which the tracks would later be laid.

105

However,

recruiting workers was difficult in a labor-scarce region
where those working at menial tasks for the white would
be scorned as servile.

Some chiefs on the Upper Senegal

might have promised facilely to supply workers; but few
workers appeared.

By March,

little had been done on the
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road.

Never one to admit errors, Bri&re tried to use

the unpromising start to get more technical personnel
assigned to the colony, and he finally blamed the debacle
on the luckless engineer charged with the project.'*'^
But,

it was henceforth evident that recruiting laborers

for road or railroad construction was going to be a
major stumbling block in this region.
A n episode occuring shortly thereafter in May had
even more serious immediate consequences.

A combined

exploratory and diplomatic mission to the Segu Tukolor
empire was ambushed enroute and its baggage taken.

The

members of the mission managed to reach Segu safely; but
its ruler was so irate at the mission's attempts enroute
to treat with his enemies that he confined its members to
a small, nearby village instead of allowing them to enter
Segu.

Eventually, a treaty was arranged

(the treaty of

Nango of November 1880), but meanwhile the mission's
plight was embarrassing for proponents in parliament of
a "peaceful" Senegal-Sudan railroad.

107

Legros, who had already agreed to whittle down to
40 kms the earlier project request for a 100 km line to
Bafoulabe, was startled in June 1880 when the Budget
Commission of the Chamber of Deputies rejected this
compromise.

Members of the Commission had expressed

surprise at the "novelty, audacity,

and breadth" of the
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ministry's projects, and at "the insistence with which
108
it had set out to obtain a quick vote."
Legros was
furious.

The Commission's "rapporteur" had forgotten,

Legros wrote,

that

if one wishes to advance to the Niger, it is of the
highest import to pursue the enterprise with no delay,
with no hesitation.
If . . . the minister is not
assured of parliament's support under the conditions
he specified, if he is begrudged the necessary credits,
there will be no choice, except to leave the bill
deposited with parliament while disclaiming all
responsibility, until the program is accepted without
restriction. 109
It was not an approach that would win many friends;
and in the interim only a meager appropriation of 1.3
million francs was granted, much of it for funds already
s p e n t . W h e n

the railroad bill finally reached p a r l i a 

ment in November 188 0, Jaureguiberry had been replaced
as minister by Admiral Georges Clou 6 , whose bumbling
support of the bill during parliamentary debates did not
help its passage.

The questionable practicality of the

railroad from MSdine drew much criticism during p a r l i a 
mentary sessions in November 1880 and February 1881; but
opponents of the measure,

including some advocates of the

Transsaharan, preferred the tactic of amending important
financial details of a proposed concession of the more
practical Dakar-St.

Louis rail l i n k . ^ *

As a result,

there

were successive delays in adopting the measure despite
nominal majorities in its favor, and the opposition was
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even able to force a technical review of the Dakar-St.
Louis project in March 1881.
maneuver, however,

112

In a neat parliamentary

the project's supporters detached from

the bill those unamended provisions concerning only the
Medine line;

and these were quickly passed, while the

Dakar-St. Louis provisions were sent back to committee.

113

By a strange quirk, the government was able to undertake
the least accessible,

least practicable portion of the

Senegal-Sudan rail project.

With only the Senegal river

as a connecting link, the two separate wings of the
Senegal rail scheme were henceforth to pursue their own
separate destinies.

That in the Sudan was to form a major

part of the rationale for the opening campaigns of military
expansion into the S u d a n . B u t ,
Dakar-St.

for about a year the

Louis project marked time.

Jaur£guiberry returns

Although the ministry remained

interested in Senegalese railroads under Cloue's a d m i n i 
stration,

the question was pursued with much less resolve.

In Ma rch 1881, Cloue summarily relieved BriSre of his
command in Senegal and Legros was also obliged to retire
from involvement with the rail p r o j e c t s . I n

July 1881,

the Senate passed a modified form of the bill authorizing
a Dakar-St.

Louis railroad;

it on to the Chamber.

but it was too late to send

On the Upper Senegal, yellow fever

and transportation snarls completely ruined the first
railroad construction campaign of 1881-1882.

In Cayor,
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the darnel Lat Dior, apprised in the spring of 1881 by an
indiscrete interpreter that the railroad would allow steamdriven "land-ships" to roll through the middle of his realm
(and thereby dominate it m i l i t a r i l y ) , chased surveying
parties from the countryside and threatened war in case
1ir
the rail project was undertaken.
Only Lat Dior's own
precarious domestic situation prevented him from warring
with the French colony, which was badly weakened at the
time by a reappearance of yellow fever.

117

The situation changed decisively with Jaureguiberry's
reentry into office as Minister of Marine in Freycinet's
1 "I8
second government in February 1882. ±

department,

The colonial

briefly annexed to the Ministry of Commerce

during Gambetta's ministry, was transferred back to the
Ministry of Marine.

In Senegal, Vallon,

sympathetic to Jaureguiberry's views,

a naval officer

replaced an incum

bent governor too pessimistic about plans for Senegalese
railroads or military expansion;
to doubt, he too was replaced.

119

and when Vallon also began
Once again Legros was

also consulted about technical aspects of the Dakar-St.
T
• railroad.
J 120
Louis

Jaureguiberry also moved decisively in parliament
to clear the way for a Dakar-St.

Louis railroad.

This was

to be no m ean feat, for the recent demise of the Union
General bank in France heralded a period of financial c o n 
traction and,

thus, resistance from the Ministry of Finance
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to additional governmental expenditures.

1 2 1

Perhaps

Jaureguiberry now found the atmosphere in parliament more
congenial than a year before simply because the rival
Transsaharan scheme no longer competed with the Senegal
scheme for the divided attention of a nascent colonialist
party.

Several details on the bill already passed by

the Senate in 1881 were clarified by M a y 1882, and this
bill authorizing construction of the Dakar-St.

Louis

railroad passed in the Chamber on June 29th.
The darnel of Cayor, of course,
an obstacle.

still remained as

Jaureguiberry had hoped at first to persuade

Lat Dior to accept the railroad once again by appeasing
122

the darnel on other issues.

But Lat Dior,

a proud,

battle-hardened warrior, was firmly decided against a
railroad that posed such a clear military threat.

In May

1882, ever as the railroad bill was about to be sent to
the Chamber,

the darnel staged a military demonstration

of 1000 cavalry and 300 infantry.

17 3

He pitched another

rally in August with an even greater host and was observed
reknitting ties to Djolof and the Trarza Moors.

124

Lat

Dior's domestic enemies had been assuring the colonial
government in secret correspondence that they would
welcome a railroad; but those of the strongest of these
mutinous factions --the chiefs of the crown bondsmen with
their candidate for darnel, Samba Laobe--were playing a
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double game, and would fight the French when they invaded
C a y o r .125
Jaureguiberry had urged that all means of concilia
tion be exhausted first, but French officers were planning
a campaign in Cayor as early as July 1882, and Jaureguiberry
assured the governor of Senegal in October that reinforce1 7 fa
ments would be sent to the colony.
° Jaureguiberry was
happy to ratify, on December 20th,

the governor's decision

to end Lat Dior's interference by launching a military
force from St. Louis into Cayor.
Cayor taken

Thus,

12 7

on December 26th a flying column of

horse cavalry and camel-mounted infantry entered Cayor,
its maneuverability and speed increased by new, sturdy
supply carts.

1 78

The column swept easily through the

length of Cayor, reaching the capital of Soguer by Janu
ary 3rd without encountering opposition.*29
taken,

With Cayor

the French promptly carved its three northern

provinces into two new protectorates of N'Diambour and
N*Guick-Merina under the command of reliable chiefs.
Over the remnant of Cayor they installed the pretender
Samba Yaye Fal as the new darnel Amadi N ’Gone Fal II, and
then undertook to build new posts within the conquered
area--first at Louga, then N ' D a n d e . ^ 0
Taken by surprise,

the darnel and his supporters had

fled immediately from Cayor toward the Saloum.

Mass w i t h d r a w 

al from the vicinity of a more powerful enemy,

leaving wide
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stretches of territory empty in order to deny his armies
food and labor, was a basic,
precolonial Africa.

1 31

sound milita ry strategy in

Lat Dior had,

in fact, repeatedly

warned Sen e g a l ’s governors that if a railroad entered
Cayor,

he would lead all of his people from the realm.

13 2

The French colony, with its interest in trade within the
interior, would seem particularly vulnerable to the
strategm; and indeed with much of Cayor emptying out in
1883

(partly in fear of the war raids to come), the

merchants of St. Louis were already complaining of the
impending loss of next year's crops.

133

But a mass exodus from ancestral lands was only
possible if the leadership of Cayor displayed a firm
unity of purpose.

At first the French strategy seemed

indeed to be breaking down, as raiding parties led by
Samba Laobe and the crown bondsmen in Ma rch easily compel
led N ’Gone Fal to flee to the French for safety.

But

soon mobile French columns crisscrossing Cayor were
harrying Samba Laob&'s raiders badly.

Frustrated, Samba

Laobe and his chief supporters chose to come to terms in
return for readmission to Cayor;

134

and the French were

well repaid for this leniency as the returning warriors
induced many peasants to reenter Cayor for the summer
planting.
This desertion badly undermined Lat Dior's in
creasingly untenable position.

Unable to settle in the
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Sal oum or to check desertions in his dwindling host,
the darnel was finally forced to seek refuge in nearby
Djolof with a few loyalists.

Neither his appeals to the

French government for clemency nor his raids into Cayor
were s u c c e s s f u l .

Lat D i o r ’s plight became even more

hopeless as the French chose to reward Samba Laobe in
August 1883 by recognizing him as darnel in place of the
137
weak N'Gone Fal.
Thenceforth, if Lat Dior dared to
enter Cayor, he would be faced with the tough cohorts of
the new darnel's supporters and compelled to leave.

138

For a time, Lat Dior found refuge at a village on the
Djolof-Cayor border; but the peace treaty of April 1885
between the French and Djolof ousted him from even this
haven.

Lat Dior reentered Cayor, begging French authori

ties for permission to stay, but was expelled again in
September 1885 . ^ ®
By then a finished Dakar-St.
tride Cayor.

Louis railroad lay a s 

This thin, binding steel cord of rails had

been encased, moreover, within a wider protective sheath
of land yielded to the French by Samba Laobe and his
supporters in August 1883 as the price for the crown;

then

widened in December 1 884--a narrow strip 50 meters on
either side.of the track with 300 meter perimeters around
each rail station.

140

Now, under these conditions, Cayor

lay open indeed to French penetration and domination.
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Conclusions

The inception of Senegalese railroads

reveals more about conditions in metropolitan France than
about Senegal itself.

Certain military officers serving

or having served in Senegal played crucial roles in
launching the project; but they had done so within the c o n 
text of France's role in the world and of their own p r o 
fessional careers,

rather than the needs of the peoples

of Senegal, or even of the tiny colony already there.
imposing the railroad on the colony,

In

they were projecting

their dreams on the distorted picture that they had of
Africa and revealing their ignorance of it.
The Senegal-Sudan railroad was based on the same
geographical misunderstanding that had spawned the
Transsaharan;

namely that a rich Sudanese heartland was

cut off from the southern coast by the imagined barrier
of the Kong m o u n t a i n s .

And by following the line of

the upper rivers to avoid a nonexistent barrier,

the

colonial enthusiasts were saddling France with a huge,
but underpopulated and relatively unproductive empire.
It is possible to see,

in this bizarre imperialist

venture that yielded few overall profits to the metropole,
the fine hand of selfish, narrow interests profiting at
the expense of French taxpayers--namely certain colonial
officials and officers who reaped promotions as well as
honors.

But in so doing, one must not overlook the
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psychological and social dimensions of the situation--the
fact that it is in blending personal ambitions with id eo
logical fervor that the more potent elixirs for driving
social movements are created.
Georges Balandier's observations on apparently
economically-irrational behavior among the Fang and
Ba-Kongo* interestingly enough,

suggest one mechanism that

seems to apply to societies in general under the stress
of rapid economic and social change.
that certain ritualized,

Balandier divined

competitive gift-giving ceremonies

among these people not only served as therapeutic outlets
for antagonisms and created new bonds of cooperation between
potentially rival parties, but that the ceremonies t he m
selves in dramatizing economic and social relations,

"pro

viding as it were a summary of a society as a whole," e n 
abled the participants to grasp the nature of their own
social system.

142

Without reading too much into B a l a n d i e r ’s

particular example, a similar mechanism can also be seen
as operating in a wider sense in French society.
It must be remembered that imperial expansion b e 
came popular in France at a time when this country was
not only being challenged abroad, but badly rent by
multiple political and social fissures at home.

It was

a time when Opportunist politicians and Gambettists were
groping for the grounds of a fraternal, national reconci-
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liation with such projects as the industrial exhibition
of 1878 and Freycinet's railroad program.

143

If garbed

in the colors of patriotism and humanit ari ani sm , colonial
expansion could also become a terrain for national r e c o n 
ciliation, particularly since the colonies could serve as
arenas where certain trusted "verities," new and old,
could be displayed and validated;

in which soldiers and

technologistscould be seen not as conquering oppressors,
but in their roles as explorers and builders, as b e n e 
factors bearing moral truths as well as material benefits.
It was an arena in which order and the military virtues
could be explicitly reconciled with the forces of n a tio na l
ism and industrialism.
It would be ridiculous, of course, to dismiss E u r o 
pean imperialist acts as merely part of an imperfectlyenacted gigantic dramatic device.
efforts were definitely,

in part,

each of the European competitors,

But the imperialist
shadow plays used by
like the modern space

race, to act out basic inter-European antagonisms--demon
strating the national vigor and the validity of its social
verities, while avoiding direct confrontations in Europe.
The play would never be allowed, as Fashoda showed, to
spark war between the colonial powers.
However psychologically pleasing these activities
might be, they were producing material results.

Momentar

ily, at least, the treasury's isluicegates had been pried
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open

to pour cash into the colonies; pieces of terri

tory were being collected to form an empire; a railroad
was being installed in Africa.

How were the imperalists

going about this, and what were they to do with it?
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trans. by Douglas Garman (New York,1970), pp. ZTff.;
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A classic example is the enhancement of the importance
of Paris by barring any interconnection between the
lines terminating in Paris.
See Pierre Dauzet, Le
si&cle des chemins de fer en France, 1821-1938
(Fontenay-aux-Roses, 1948), and especially Marcel
Blanchet, Geographie des chemins de fer (Abbeville,
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Herbert Frankel, Capital Investment in Africa
(London, 1938), pp. 375-3 16.
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8 . Blanchet, l o c . c i t . , for instance, emphasizes the dis 
tinction between the American and European experiences.
Local communities and interests could influence r a i l 
road construction in America as well (as in Charles
Glaab, Kansas City and the Railroads j_ Madison, 1962_7;
n e ver th e l e s s , there does seem to have been a difference
in kind as well as degree between the American Far West
and European experiences.
9. The French classified their African railroads either
as railroads of ’’penetration” designed to reach deeply
into the interior or as railroads of "exploitation”
for promising areas near the coast.
But in both cases,
they were clearly thinking in terms of "pioneering"
ra i l r o a d s .
10. The latter point was made explicitly by the first
Director of Operations on the Dakar-St. Louis railroad:
Alexis Bois, Senegal et Soudan, travaux publics et
chemins de fer (Paris! 1886), p. 39.
The Pinet-Laprade
railroad project of 1856 referred explicitly to the
American example (see Jacques Charpy, La Fondation de
Dakar, 1845-1857-1869 /~Paris, 1958_7 pp. 106-108).
11. On the imagery of railroads, see Leo Marx, "The Impact
of the Railroad on the American Imagination . . .,” in
The Railroad and the Space P rog r a m , ed. by Bruce Mazlish
(Cambridge, Mass., 1965), pp. 202-216.
An example of
French hopes of astonishing Africans is voiced in
V a u b o u r g ’s railroad project of January 18, 1872, Na ti o n 
al Archives of France, Section Outre-Mer (henceforth
F O M ) , Senegal X I I,40 (cited in Julian Witherell, "The
Response of the Peoples of Cayor to French Penetration,"
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1964, p.
93) .
12. Paul Marty, Etudes sur 1*Islam au Se ne g a l , Vol.
(Paris, 1917), pp. 10-11, 17-18.

I

13.

See R. J. H. Church, West Africa: A Study of the
Environment and of Man's Use of It (New York, 1968).
The African continent's rivers generally rush to the
sea through rapids from an inland plateau only a few
miles from the coast.

14.

I b i d ., pp. 14-78; see especially the maps on pp. 47,
64.
There are local variations,
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See Raymond Mauny, Tableau
geographique de l'ouest africain au moyen age
(Dakar, 1961), pp. 356±'f.
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15.

Frederic Riembau, De Dakar au Niger (Paris, 1908),
pp. 72-75, notes the high mortality of horses and
camels in such areas as Bondu, the "cercle" of
Bakel, and Niani-Ouli.
Donkeys, however, had a
better resistance than horses or camels, Cf.,
Mauny, pp. 276ff.

16.

The general problem of water scarcity in Senegal
and the use of subterranean water is covered in
Gerard Brasseur, Le probl&ne de l'eau au Senegal
(St. Louis, Sene ga l, 1952), pp. 12-15, 65-73.

17.

West Africa is a region dotted with markets, both
local and long-distance.
A. G. Hopkins, An
Economic History of West Africa (London, HF73) ,
p p . 51-71, argues effectively concerning the
importance of markets for precolonial West Africa.
He also argues perceptively that low trade volumes
were a question not simply of the low value of
products, but also of the low density of potential
customers in the region ( o j d . c i t ., pp. 72-72).

18.

One of the more famous routes passed northward via
the Bani river, a confluent of the Niger river,
to Djenne and beyond to Timbuktu.
See Mauny,
pp. 406-409.

19.

The rivers would draw settled agricultural p o p u l a 
tions that would exploit the seasonally renewed
fertility brought by river innundations. In the
case of the Senegal river, for example, cultivation
would then shift seasonally (see e.g., Abdoul.aye
Bara Diop, Soci^tle toucouleur et migration [_ Dakar,
l D O S ^ , p p . 36-39).
Migratory Peul herdsmen in
Senegal would also be locked into a migratory cycle
of t ran shumance, alternatively approaching or a v o i d 
ing the river valleys seasonally.

20.

See Hubert Deschamps,
L'Europe decouvre 1 'Afrique
(Paris, 1967), pp. 15-24; Robin Hallett, The
Penetration of Africa (New York, 1965), pp. 125-133.

21.

Hopkins, Economic H i s t o r y , pp. 150-151, notes the
key role of the steamship; on the military aspect,
see Michael Crowder, ed., West African R e s i s t a n c e .
The Military Response to Colonial Occupation
(London, 19/1), especially the Yves Person a r t i c l e ,
"Guinea-Samori," pp. 111-143.
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22.

The Hobson-Lenin thesis, which ascribed modern
imperialist expansion in great part to the need
of European capital for colonial investment is not
sustained in the case of French expansion in West
Africa, where even the Dakar-St. Louis railroad
was largely funded by government subsidies rather
than private capital.
It is argued here instead
simply that the earlier imperialism, of necessity,
had to be remunerative in order to be self-sustain
ing (India, for example, easily comes to mind).
The new imperialism could afford to be more p rof l i 
gate.-- For the questionability of the Hobson-Lenin
thesis, see Martin Wolfe, ed., The Economic Causes
of Imperialism (New York, 1972), p p . 1-18.

23.

See inter alia, Abdoulaye Ly, La Compagnie du
Slnegal (Paris, 1958); Georges Hardy, La miscT en
valeur 'du Senegal de 1817 d 1854 (Paris, 1921);
John Hargreaves, Prelude to the Partition of West
Africa (London, 1965); Oloruntimehin, TukolorE m p i r e ; Yves St. Martin, L'empire toucouleur et la
F r a n c e . Un demi-sidcle de relations diplomatiques
(1846-1895) (Dakar, 1966)7

24.

E.g., A. Aumont, pamphlet for the National Colonial
Congress, Paris, March 10, 1889, first galley proof
in ANF, 148AP2, pp. 3ff.

25.

See A. S. Kanya-Forstner, The Conquest of the Western
Sudan (Cambridge, 1969), pp"I 2 8 f f . One token of
subordination was the payment by the colony--until
1855 when the practice was stopped by Faidherbe--to
the chief of the village of Sor for the land occupied
at St. Louis itself.
See copy of report by Director
of Political Affairs accompanying the "arrete" of
January 24, 1865, FOM, unclassified cartons on
colonial public works (henceforth T P ) , (Rawane Boye
affair).
Cf., R. Rousseau, "Le Senegal d'autrefois.
Etude sur le Toube-Papiers de Rawane Boy,"
B.C.E.H.S.A.O.F. XIV (July - Sept. 1931), no. 3,
pp. 351, 361-364.

26.

Kanya-Forstner, Western S u da n, p. 29; Faidherbe
specifically referred to Senegal as a new Algeria
in a memorandum on Senegal, August 18 56, FOM,
Senegal 1,43.

27.

Oloruntimehin,

Tukolor E m p i r e , pp. 85ff.
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"Rapport sur le defense de la presqu'ile du Cap Vert,"
April 15, 1856, in Charpy, Fond ati on , pp. 95-106; see
also Moniteur du Senegal, June 17, 1856, no. 62

29. Like the events related in Suret-Canale, Civil is ati ons ,
pp. 296-304.
In his provocative essay on imperialism,
Joseph Schumpeter (Imperialism-Social Classes
r Cleveland, 1955_7, pp. 6 8 ff.) asserted indeed that
^capitalism" was intrinsically peaceful, whereas
imperialism was caused by "atavistic" elements in s o ci
ety; but one could argue just as forcefully that the
industrialism and technology that are generating
modern forms of capitalism also bear inherently ag gr es
sive features.
In essence, however, Schumpeter seems
correct in pinpointing those elements of society
likely to be attracted by these aggressive features.
30. A contract for electrical municipal lighting was
concluded by the commune of St. Louis in 1887.
See
contract of November 30, 1887 with H. Vaubourg, copy
in unclassified "fonds du Senegal" in the National
Archives of Senegal (henceforth S A R S ) , unclassified
railroad dossiers (henceforth D C F ) . On the auto in
the Sudan, see interview with General Berdoulat,
doc. no. 41, National Archives of Senegal (henceforth
A R S ) , 0244.
On an attempted flight over the Sahara
from North Africa
in 1918, see Georges Hardy, Le
Sahara (Paris, 1930), pp. 170-171.
31. See Theodore Zeldin, "Higher Education in France,
1848 t 1940," in Education and Social Structure in the
Twentieth C e n t u r y , ed. by Walter Laqueur and George
Mosse (New York, 1967), pp. 75-77; Rondo Cameron,
France and the Development of Europe, 1800-1914
(Princeton, 1961), pp. 4 6 f f .
32. The role of the engineers in promoting colonial
expansion has yet to be studied.
Henri Brunschwig
called attention to the importance of the subject
in "Note sur les technocrates de 1'imperialisme
francais en Afrique noire," Revue Frangaise d'Histoire
d 1Ou tre -Me r, LIV (1967), no. 194-197, pp. 171-187.
33. Report of April 15, 1856,

in Charpy,

Fondation, p. 98.

34. Kanya-Forstner, Western Sudan, pp. 45-57; John
Hargreaves, Prelude to the Partition of West Africa
(London, 1963), p . 165.
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35.

Kanya-Forstner, Western S u d a n , p. 47, notes that
Medine was almost abandoned in 18 70.

36.

Lt. Colonel Barratier, A travers I ’Afrique
/ 1 9 1 0 j ) , p . 21.

(Paris,

37.

The sense of isolation for residents of the colony
was captured by Pierre Loti in his novel, Un roman
d'un spahi (published 1881) based on his personal
sojourn m Senegal.

38.

C. W. Newbury and A.S. Kanya-Forstner, "French Policy
and the Origins of the Scramble for West Africa"
Journal of African H i s t o r y , X (1969), no. 2, pp. 253276; see also Kanya-Forstner, Western S u d a n , pp. 6072, 84-94.
Although Newbury and Kanya-Forstner have
done a thorough expose on the reasons for a resurgence
of French imperialism in West Africa from 187 9, it
is necessary to cover much of the same ground in this
study in order to bring some railroad aspects of
the story into focus.

39.

Principally dossiers of the Public Works ministry,
ANF, F14/12436 through F14/12439; and FOM, Afrique
XII, 2.

40.

Hanotaux had proposed a Transsaharan as far back as
1859.
See G. Saint-Yves, "Le transit entre l'Algerie
et le Soudan et le projet du T r ans sa har ie n," R e v u e ,
Soci^te de Geographie de T o u r s , September 188(TJ
n o . 9, p p . 285-29/; Jules Gros, Les voyages de Paul
Soleillet dans le Sahara et dans le Soudan en vue
d'un projet d*un chemin de fer transsaharien (Paris,
1881).
See also Agnes Murphy, The Ideology of
French Imperialism (Washington, 1948), pp7 76-80.

41.

See Charles de Freycinet, Souvenirs, 1878-1893
(Paris, 1913), pp. 7-18, 78-86.
The project eventu
ally expanded to cover 8,8 00 kms of rails.
Cf.,
E. Beau de Lomenie, Les responsabilit 6 s des dynasties
bourgeoises, Vol. II (Paris, 1947), p p . 2 6 ± f .

42.

See the report of the Director of Railroad Construc
tion to Minister of Public Works (henceforth M T P ) ,
May 7, 1879, ANF, F14/12438, on the formation of the
preliminary commission; see also "Note sur le chemin
de fer transsaharien propose par M. Duponchel ... "
April 25, 1879, ANF, F14/12437.
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43.

See P. V., first plenary session of the Transsaharan
Commission, July 21, 1879, ANF, F14/12437; P.V.,
2nd sub-commission (henceforth S/Com), November 25,
1879, I b i d . The report of the Commission of Public
Works, June 8 , 1881, Ibid., concluded that the p r o 
ject was premature.

44.

Cameron, Economic Development, pp.
24 0ff .

45.

See ANF, F14/12437, especially P.V., 1st S/Com,
August 12, 1879, and P.V., 1st S/Com, September 8 ,
1879.
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Raoul Girardet, L ’idee coloniale en France,
1962 (Paris,1972), pp. 18-23, 24ff.

47.

See the map labeled "Imperium fran^aise d'Afrique"
for the Association des Deux Mondes by A. Beau de
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48.
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chemin de fer d*Alger d St. Louis du Senegal, par
Tombouctou," Cercle Rouennais de la Ligue de
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49.
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Paul Soleillet (Rouen, 1886), p p . 2d-31.

50.

See Adolphe Duponchel, Le chemin de fer trans-saharien
(Paris, 1879), p. 303; letters by Duponchel to MTP,
March 20, 1877 and April 16,1877, ANF, F14/12436;
report of February 22, 1878, I bi d. Ironically the
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priorite d'idee du chemin de fer Trans-Saharien,"
May 26, 1879, ANF, F14/12438.
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56. P.V.,
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P.V., Plenary session, August 1, 1879, ANF, F14/12437.

74.

Legros Resume, August 10-16,1879, pp. 5-7; same,
August 25, 1879, pp. 7-10; same, September 22, 1879,
pp. 10-12; report by MMC to President of the French
Republic, September 25, 1879, FOM, Afrique X I I , 2;
P.V., 3rd S/Com, October 24, 1879, ANF, F14/12437;
Legros Resume, November 7, 1879, pp. 13-14.

75.

The valley trace for the railroad was given up because
of the reputed unhealthiness of the air around the
river for Europeans.
See report of the 2nd S/Com
through October 27, 1879, ANF, F14/12437; P.V., 2nd
S/Com, August 14, 1879, I b i d .; note of December 11,
1879, Legros Resum£, pp. 17-18.
On the Monteil
mission, 1879-1880, see P-L. Monteil, Un voyage
d*exploration au Senegal (Papeete, 188 2), and ARS
dossier 1G47, which contains his journal of march
and other papers.

76.

Kanya-Forstner, Western S u d a n , pp. 69ff., follows the
fortune of the bill of 1 88 0 in some detail.
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77. Memorandum on the colony o£ Senegal, October 1, 1858,
by Faidherbe, FOM, Senegal I, 45. - "But St. Louis
can undertake nothing against Cayor unless the
Commandant of Goree will receive the order to coo p e r 
ate so that this state cannot lean on one of our
colonies in order to resist the other--that it could
not trade with Goree while at war with St. Louis.
This
already happened somewhat with the Trarza, who not only
traded with Goree during the war with St. Louis, but
even bought war munitions there."
78. MMC to High Commandant of Goree and Dependencies,
December 30, 1856, in Charpy, Fo n d a t i o n , pp. 111-113.
79. See Faidherbe to MMC, March 4, 1857, FOM, Senegal
XII,40; it refers to an earlier "Plan d'occupation
de la presqui'^le (1853-56), "Faidherbe to GS,
March 15, 1853, in Charpy, Fon d a t i o n , p. 8 8 ;
Faidherbe had written in 1853: " S t . Louis astride the
river, Goree at Dakar, a good route between, seems to
us the goal to pursue.
The Americans would have built
a railroad a long time ago . . . it is incredible
that France has possessed for two centuries two points
as important as Goree and St. Louis . . . and there
not be the least land communications between them."
80.

GS to MMC,

March 8 , 1862, FOM,

Senegal 1,48.

81. Avant-projet of January 15, 18 72 by Vaubourg, FOM
Senegal XII,40(b); cf., Vaubourg memorandum of
April 4, 1872, Ib id.
82. See GS to Vaubourg, January 16, 1872, FOM, Senegal
XII,40.
83. GS to MMC, April 8 , 1879, FOM, Senegal XII,41; GS
to MMC, January 23, 1878 and March 22, 1878, Senegal
1,61; GS to MMC, April 21, 1878, ARS, 2B74.
84.

GS to MMC,
April 8 , 1879, FOM, Senegal XII,41.
In
their review of the project, the ministry's Council
of Naval Works commented: "it seems incontestable
that we will be led sooner or later to establish
this railroad, which will put us in possession of
Cayor without striking a blow and would be the first
section of a line directed to Medine and towards the
Niger (P.V., Council of Naval Works, August 12,
1879, FOM, TP).
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85. Draft of report by Lt. Buquet,

(n.d.)

1876, ARS,

033.

86 . Buquet specifically mentioned Coki as one important
center.
87. Walter report, November 25, 1878, signed copy in FOM,
TP, Walter asserted that, "The stations serve the
most populous, the best cultivated,_and the most
productive part of Cayor, and the (_ r a i l _ 7 line seated
in the middle of this kingdom will assure our domina
tion over these black peoples, turbulent it is true,
but naturally given to cattle raising and agriculture."
--Walter began surveying in French colonial territory
in 1877 (Walter to Chief of Interior Service of Senegal,
November 27, 1877, ARS, 033).
8 8 . On the strategic position of Thies,

sur le Diankhine," by G. Binger,
in ANF, 1 4 8 A P 3 .

see "Renseignements
October 12, 1883,

89. See particularly Kanya-Forstner, Western S u d a n , pp.
87ff., on Borgnis-Desbordes 1 motives.
90.

I am grateful to T. T. Winant for having pointed out
a similar development in the case of the Mukden
incident of 1931 in which military officers were
initiating a policy of imperalist expansion with
mixed ideological and budgetary motives.
See T.T.
Winant, Tokko Keisatsu, Social Control in Interwar
J a p a n , delivered at the Annual Convention of the
Association of Asian Studies, Boston, March 1974;
Sadako N. Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria: The Making
of Japanese Foreign Policy, 1931-1932 (Berkeley,
1964), pp. 2 5 f f .

91. Missions by Gallienni, Bayol, Pi£tri, Jacquemart,
Monteil, Laude, ValliSre, Pol, and later by
Dr. Colin and others.
92. Copy GS to Ordonnateur du Senegal,
FOM, Senegal 1,62.
93.

June 10, 1878,

Excerpt P.V., Council of Naval Works, August 12,
1879, FOM, TP; note by Legros, November 8 , 1879,
no. 1, AMMP, GGl-carton 45; Legros note for Direction
des Colonies, December 20, 1879, no. 2, Ibid.
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94.

Note by Director of Colonies Michaux for MMC,
January 6 , 1880, AMMP, GGl-carton 45, bears
J a u r e g u i b e r r y fs comments.

95.

Note by Legros for Direction des Colonies,
January 8 , 1880, AMMP, GGl-carton 45 (more complete
than same in Legros R e s u m e ) .

96.

Out of 1474 Europeans at Goree, Dakar, and St.
Louis, 749 died in 1878.
The figures are in Jean
Su re t-C a n a l e , Afrique noire, L'dre coloniale,
1900-1945 (Paris, 1964), p. 491. and a higher death
rate is noted in A n n a l e s d 1Hygiene et de Medecine
C o l o n i a l e s , July-August-Sept. 190l, no. 3 published
by France.
Ministry of Colonies, p . 336, published
excerpt in FOM, Affaires Politiques (henceforth A P ) ,
3236.

97.

Note the skeptical comments by de Montfort, a member
of Senegal's General Council, excerpted from the
General Council session of February 6 , 1882 in
Moniteur du S en ega l, December 26, 1882, p. 22.

98.

Gascon! to Engineer £ “Legros_7> October 7 , 1879, FOM,
TP, wrote:
"you have understood Senegal.
Be our
defender; the Algerians will have to admit that we
are better placed to reach the Sudan."
On the St.
Louis-Medine railroad, see letter with attached
memorandum, Marc Merle 8 Robert to MMC, August 27,
1879, FOM, TP; copy Marc Merle 8 Robert to MMC,
September 15, 1879, SARS, DCF.

99.

In a note for the Direction des Colonies, December 20,
1879, no. 2, AMMP, GGl-carton 45, Legros stated: "it
is an enterprise of national interest of which the
government of the metopole ought to reserve the high
direction exclusively; the interference of the colony
ought to be dismissed; besides, its aid in a task
so considerable would be absolutely ineffectual for
lightening the burden on the budget, and it is proper
to renounce it." --See also, GS to MMC, February 23,
1880, FOM, Senegal XII, 41.

100.

Taken up later in this chapter, the story of Lat
Dior and the railroad is considered in detail by
Germaine Ganier, "Lat Dyor et le chemin de fer de
l'arachide, 1876-1886," Bulletin de l'I F A N , XXVII
(1965), Series B, pp. 223-281, based on a thorough
examination of archival records in Paris, and also
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analyzed by the excellent article
by Vincent
Monteil MLat Dior du Kayor et 1' islamisation des
Wolofs," Esquisses s^negalaises, (Dakar, 1966), pp.
71-113.
The text of the treaty is found in
Ganier, "Lat Dyor," pp. 261-265.
101.

E.g., Paul Bourde, "La France au Soudan. Le chemin
de fer du Senegal au Niger," Revue des Deux M o n d e s ,
VI, December 1, 1879, pp. 659-688, displaying
proudly the text of the treaty.

102.

Primary sources for the domestic situation in Cayor
are in ARS: dossier 13G260 and the political reports
in 2B74 ( e n t r i e s from August 7, 1879 through May 8 ,
1879); in FOM; reports in Senegal 1,63 for December 7
and 24, 1879 and January 8 , 1880.

103.

See GS to MMC, February 7, 1880,c o n f i d e n t i a l , FOM,
Senegal 1,63.

104.

Draft MMC to GS, February 4, 1880, FOM, Senegal 1,63;
note to MMC, February 8,1880, Legros Resume, pp. 28-29.

105.

Entry of August 25, 1879, Legros Resume, pp. 7-10;
draft MMC to GS, January 13, 1880, FOM, Senegal 1,63.

106.

GS to MMC, December 1, 1879 and December 7, 1879,
FOM, Senegal 1,63; drafts MMC to GS, January 13, 1880
and February 4, 1880, Ibid.;
GS to MMC, March 23,
1880, I b i d .; note to M M C , March 25, 1880, Legros
Resume; note to MMC, July 1, 1880, Legros Resume.

107.

Oloruntimehin, Tukolor E m p i r e , pp. 230-259, KanyaForstner, Western S u d a n , pp. 72-83; JORF -Debats
P a r i .-C hambre, November 28, 1880, p . 12974; JORF
-D 6 b a t s ~ P a r l .-S enat, February 17, 1881, pp. 102-112;
the ministry eventually rejected the treaty of Nango.
GS to MMC, November 24, 1880, FOM, Senegal 1,63.

108.

Note to MMC, Ma rc h 24, 1880, Legros R e s u m 6 , pp. 3435; same, June 13, 1880, Legros Resum 6 , pp. 38-41;
same, June 29, 1880, pp. 41-43; same, July 5, 1880,
Legros Resume, pp. 44-46.

109.

Note to MMC, July 5, 1880, Legros Resume, pp. 44-46.

110.

Though meager,the appropriation was sufficient, as
Kanya-Forstner points out (Western Sudan, p . 72), to
launch French imperialist expansion in this region;
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-78see also note to MMC, September 10, 1880, Legros
Resume, pp. 47-49; Senate bill no. 225, December 28,
1880, copy in FOM, Senegal XII, 69, in promoting the
project used the reasoning that without a railroad,
French troops would have to be withdrawn from
BafoulabS, in which case France's African allies
would turn against French forces--a curious rationale
justified by saying: "avec le caract&re des indigenes,
les choses se passeraient certainement ainsi."
111.

Georges Perin for one took an active role in fight
ing the Senegal railroad bill (JORF -Debats Pari.
-Chambre, November 28, 1880, p. 12979), asserting
notably that the Ministry of Marine was racing not
a foreign nation to the Sudan, but the French M i n i 
stry of Public Works.
See also Kanya-Forstner,
Western S u da n, p . 8 5 n .

112.

JORF -Debats P arl .- S§n at, February 17, 1881, p . 105;
JORF -Debats Pari. -Ch am bre , February 20, 1881,
^
p . 298; note to M M C , March 11, 1881, Legros Resume,
pp. 68-69.
The feasibility of the project was u p 
held in the report of the Special Commission of
Algeria, April 2, 1881, ANF, F14/12439.

113.

MMC to Senator Freycinet, President of the Senate
Finance Committee, FOM, Senegal XII,39; Freycinet
to MMC, March 10, 1881, Ibid.; MMC to M T P , March 11,
1881, I b i d .

114.

There are many general histories covering the
construction of the Kayes-Niger railroad; inter a l i a .
see Government General, AOF, Le chemin de fer de Thies
au Niger (Paris, 1931), pp. 5ff.; Raymond Godfernaux,
Les cnemins de fer coloniaux frangais (Paris, 1911),
p p . 188ff.

115.

Kanya-Forstner, Western S u d a n ,pp. 86-87; note to
Direction des Colonies, February 11, 1881, Legros
Resume, pp. 66-67; note to MMC, June 17, 1882,
Legros Resume, pp. 70-71.

116.

GS to MMC, June 7, 1881, ARS, 2B55; translation Ibra
Fatim Sar to GS, received September 4, 1882, ARS,
13G261; two letters from Lat Dior to GS, nos. 10 and
11, translated on April 27, 1881, Ibid.; GS to MMC,
May 7, 1881, FOM, Senegal 1,64; translation of Lat
Dior to Emir Goree, n.d., no. 15, I b i d . G. Ganier
offers the alternative explanation ("Lat Dyor,"
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p . 2 29) that the colony's change of governors had
encouraged sovereigns of states neighboring the
colony to revise their relations with it.
117.

Monteil, Esqui sse s, pp. 85, 95-07, 101-112; Pathe
Diagne, Pouvoir p ol i t i q u e , p. 142; ValiSre report,
August 9, 1879, ARS, 1G48; GS to MMC, December 8 ,
1879, ARS, 2B 74.

118.

In Freycinet, Souvenirs, p. 213, the author signaled
his appreciation in 1882 for J au reg uiberry's loyalty
in 1880.

119.

Kanya-Forstner, Western S u d a n , pp. 91-93; GS to MMC,
January 6 , 1882, ARS, 2B55; GS to MMC, March 20, 1882,
FOM,Senegal 1,66; draft MMC to GS, M ay 12, 1882,
FOM, Senegal 1,67; GS to MMC, November 1, 1882, I b i d .;
Oloruntimehin, Tukolor E m p i r e , pp. 253-254.

120.

Note to MMC, June 17, 1882, Legros Resume, pp. 7071.

121.

Copies of letters: Minister
MMC, March 6 , 188 2, no. 12,
1882, no. 16, I bi d.

of Finances Leon Say to
SARS, DCF; same,March 18,

122.

MMC to GS, May 2, 1882, ARS,

2B54.

123.

translation of Lat Dior to GS, received May 15,
1882, ARS, 1 3 G 2 6 1 ; GS to MMC, May 20, 1882, ARS,
2B74; same, May 28, 1882, ARS, 2B54.

124.

Ganier, "Lat Dyor," p . 231; translation Lat Dior to
GS, received July 25, 1882, ARS, 13G261; GS to MMC,
October 23, 1882, ARS, 2B74; GS to MMC, August 1,
1882, ARS, 13G26L; GS to MMC, political report,
June 20, 1882, ARS, 2B74; same, July 20, 1882,
I b i d .; same, September 23, 1882, Ib id.; MMC to
GS, July 28, 1882, ARS, 2B54; same, September 18,
1882, Ibid.; same, October 11, 1882, Ibid.; see
also ARS dossier 1D40.

125.

As Monteil remarks in E s q u i s s e s , p. 96: "tout le
monde £crit a St. Louis pour se plaindre de tout
le monde."
See, e.g. : "People of Diambourg" to
GS, received May 11, 1881, ARS, 13G261; Serigne
Koki to GS, April 4, 1882, I b i d .; translation of
Silly-Makha-Sal to N'Dyor S a r , May 16, 1881, I b i d .
GS to MMC, Ma y 8,1881, ARS, 2B55; same, August 23,
1881, FOM, Senegal 1,65; GS to MMC, March 21, 1882,
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ARS, 2B74; GS to MMC,
13G261.

September 8 , 188 2, ARS,

126.

Lt. Colonel Wendling to GS, July 31, 1882, ARS,
1 3 G 2 6 1 ; MMC to GS, Qctober 6 , 1882, ARS, 2B54.

127.

Prompted by lat Dior's injunction against railroad
construction, even in French colonial territory.
See Ganier, "Lat Dyor," p. 233; translation Lat
Dior to Emir N'Dar, November 17, 1882, FOM, Senegal
IV,98; GS to MMC, November 23, 1882, FOM, Senegal
1,68; MMC to GS, December 20, 1882, ARS, 2B54.

128.

A cting GS to Cabinet du Ministre, September 24, 1883,
SARS, DCF.
These carts had been tested first in
the sand dunes of N'Diago during the maneuvers of
187 9, then during the campaigns in the upper rivers.
The employment of these light, impermeable supply
carts enabled the French to conquer the Sudan w i t h 
out the railroad.

129.

Ganier, "Lat Dyor," p. 234; report GS to MMC,
January 8 , 1883, FOM, Senegal 1,68; GS to MMC, J a n 
uary 23, 1883, Ibid.;
See also the ARS dossier
ID43.

130.

translation Samba Yaye to GS, December 23, 1881, ARS,
13G261; GS to Diambor Samba Yaye, January 5, 1883,
SARS, DCF; GS to Colonel Wendling, January 6 , 1883,
Ibid.; same, January 22, 1883, Ibid.; same, January 26,
1883, I b i d .; MMC to GS, February 5, 1883, ARS, 2 B 5 4 ;
GS to MMC, political report, February 8 , 1883, ARS,
2B74; GS to MMC, political report, Marc h 24,1883,
SARS, DCF; see also the report by Colonel Wendling
on Cayor, January 8 , 1883, ARS, 1D43; GS to MMC,
June 15, 1883, ARS, 2B54.

131.

A strategy applied dramatically on a very large
scale by Samory in the 1890's.
See Yves Person,
" G u ine e- Sam ori ," in West African R e s i s t a n c e , ed.
by M. Crowder (London^ 1971), p p . 111-143.

132.

E.g., translation Lat Dior to GS, April 27, 1881,
no. 10, ARS, 13G261; translation Lat Dior to GS,
August 18, 1882, I b i d .
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133. Ganier, "Lat Dyor," pp. 234, 239-240, mentions a
host of 4000 people following Lat Dior to the
Saloum; see excerpt of P . V . , Administrative Council
of Senegal, January 9, 1883, FOM, Senegal IV,98;
GS to MMC, March 24, 1883, SARS, DCF.
134. Ganier, "Lat Dyor," pp. 236-239; but see also GS to
MMC, political report, April 9, 1883, SARS, DCF; same,
May 9, 1883, Ib i d .; Victor Ballot to GS, April 9, 1883,
FOM, Senegal IV,98; same May 7, 1883, Ibid.; report by
Le Boucher on the palaver of May 9, 1883-"Sur les
negociations entamees avec Samba Laobe et les captifs
de la couronne," Ib i d .
135.

GS to MMC, political report, May 20, 1883, ARS, 2B74;
same, June 19, 1883, I b i d .; same, September 24, 1883,
FOM, Senegal 1,70.

136. GS to MMC, political report, June 16, 1883, ARS, 2B74;
same, July 2, 1883, Ibid.; same, July 8 , 1883, I b i d . ;
same, July 24, 1883, Ibid.; GS to MMC, August 9, 1883,
ARS, 2 B 5 4 .
137. MMC to GS, March 19, 1883, ARS, 2B54; same, June 5,
1883, I b i d .; "Note sur le Cayor," June 10, 1883, FOM,
Senegal IV,98; GS to MMC, political report, May 24,
1883, SARS, DCF; MMC to GS, August 27, 1883, ARS,
2B54; GS to MMC, September 7, 1883, Ibid.; MMC to GS,
September 19, 1883, I b i d .
138.

GS to MMC, political report, October 24, 1883, ARS
2B75; same, November 23, 1883, Ibid.;
same,
December 23, 1883, Ibid.; same, January 23, 1884,
Ibi d.

139. GS to MMC, political report April 11, 1885, FOM,
Senegal 1,73; same, May 4, 1885, I b i d ; same, July 12,
1885, I b i d . ; same, September 12, 1885, I bid.
140. A copy of the treaty of August 28, 1883 with the names
of the signers is found in Annuaire du Sene gal , 1887,
pp. 87-88.
The question of ceding land around the
stations was broached to darnel N'Gone Fal in July
1883 (Victor Ballot to Commandant N'Dande, July 2,
1883, ARS, 033).
141.

See Louis Faidherbe, Le Soudan frangaise-chemin
fer de Medine au Niger (Lille, 1881), p. 13^

142. Balandier, Sociology of Black A f r i c a , pp.
(quote on p . 493).

de

486-498
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143.

National reconciliation is a dominant theme in
Freycinet, Souvenirs; see especially pp. 6-14, 269.

144.

Jaureguiberry was not a stranger to the world of
engineering and machinery.
See his personal dossier,
no. 702, AMMP.

145.

This is in line, to a degree, with Carlton Hayes,
A Generation of Materialism 1871-1900 (New York,
1963), pp. 220ff. But Hayes ascribes imperialism
largely to an irrational nationalism.
The n a t i o n a 
list component was very strong of course; but
nationalism was only one aspect--a convenient
vehicle for more fundamental emotional u n c e r t a i n 
ties and cultural imperatives in a world disrupted
by a new industrial technology.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-83APPENDIX 1
The various "ethnic” groups of the Senegambia, whose
ruling clans were often closely related to each other, and
which intermingled racially and geographically through m i 
gration, marriage, and acclimatization can be distinguished
on the basis of language, cultural traits, and historical
traditions.

(See the works listed in footnote 3 of this

chapter especially: Lombard, G e o g r a p h i e ; Diagne, Pouvoir
p o l i t i q u e .)
Important here as elsewhere throughout West Africa,
the seasonally-migrating, pastoralist Peuls were scattered
throughout the Senegambia and the Sudan, but formed
majorities only within isolated pockets,

such as the barren,

sparsely-populated Ferlo plain, which provided ample pastureland during the rainy season.

The other principal

peoples of the Senegambia--Wolof, Tukolor, Manding, and
Serer--all sedentary agriculturalists--were settled w i t h 
in roughly distinguishable territorial blocs in the 19th
century.

Following the Senegal river, one would find

Wolof occupying the south bank from the river's mouth up
to Dagana in a portion of the once-considerable kingdom
of Oualo, whose north-bank territories were now in
Moorish

(Mauretanian) hands.

From Dagana, extending u p 

stream to Dembankane, below B a k e l , lay the heartland of
the Tukolor, a Pular-speaking people like the Peuls, but

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

- 8 4 -

settled agriculturalists with a long Islamic tradition
going back to the 11th century state of T e k r u r . Farther
upstream were concentrations of Sarakole.
agriculturalists,

Sedentary

the Sarakole combined a fervor for

Islam with a penchant for long-distance trade, as well as
for hiring out their labor abroad.

Even farther upstream

lay Khassonke country--a people of mixed Malinke and Peul
origins--and beyond them the Tukolor-ruled state of Bondu.
Much farther to the south, near the coast, lay the Futa
Djallon,

its Malinke population conquered by Islamized

Peuls in the 1 7 2 0 ’s.

To the east and northeast of the

Upper Senegal river lay intermingled Bambara and Malinke
peoples,

the latter generally subject to Bambara or to

Peul overlords.
Penetrating over 300 kms into the interior,

the

Gambia river acted as the axis for other groupings, with
the Manding in particular forming the majority around the
river, as well as in large territorial blocs to the south
and east.

Between the Senegal and Gambia rivers,

in the

vicinity of the Atlantic seaboard and its immediate
hinterland,

lay two major groupings.

The Wolof peoples,

forming several states--Oualo, Djolof, Cayor--still lay
in a fairly compact bloc west of the Ferlo
offshoots in the Gambia,

(though with

Saloum, and B a o l ) , from Oualo

in the north down to Cape Verde and Rufisque in the south,
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where they met their near kinsmen,

the Lebu.

The Serer

people were concentrated to the south, notably in the
kingdoms of Sine,

Saloum,

and the half-Wolof B a o l .

Sovereignty and political power among the Wolof
were traditionally dispersed on a collegiate basis with
all social classes--nobility, freeborn peasants,

special

ized artisan castes, and slaves--playing at least a s y m 
bolic, and often a concrete role in the selection of a
ruler and in the exercize of power.

Pathe Diagne has

noted, for instance, the decay of the dyarchic political
system of Cayor by the 19th century to the advantage of
the darnel,
vants,

its leader in war, and to his erstwhile ser

the crown bondsmen ("captifs de la c o u r o n n e " ) ,

forming the largest and most professional group in the
"tyeddo" milit ary forces
pp.

102-118,

125-144).

(Pathe Diagne, Pouvoir p o l i t i q u e ,
Eventually the chiefs of these

bondsmen could rise to the command of large territorial
divisions of the realm, despite their servile origin, and
even take a disproportionate part in the selection and
deposition of darnels.

The freeborn peasants would resent

the depredations of the undisciplined tyeddo and also
resent their overlords,

the darnels, who tolerated the

violence.
Islamic influences had, meanwhile,
in the region since the 1 1 th century,

been spreading

especially by means

of itinerant traders and teachers, and by the migration
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of some heavily Islamized groups--Manding,
Sarakole.

Tukolor, and

The courts of the rulers of various states had

been major centers for the propogation of Islam.

But

many Africans, particularly rulers, were willing to accept
the precepts of Islam only to a degree consistent with t r a 
ditional fetishist ritual and practice.

There was a g e n 

eral retardation and even regression in the spread of Islam
during the period coinciding roughly with the heyday of
the Atlantic slave trade, and such states as Cayor, while
accommodating large Muslim minorities and even prestigious
schools of Islamic science, were dominated by rulers and
tyeddos proud of an adherence to fetishism.
From the mid-18th century on, Muslims in the region
were able to challenge fetishist rule with increasing
success.

A series of revolts led by reformist "marabouts"

throughout the region and elsewhere in West Africa led to
the overthrow of fetishist or superficially-Islamized r u l 
ing strata and to the establishment of rule by Muslim t h e o 
cracies over large pockets of territory.

Widespread d i s 

satisfaction with decayed political and social structures
undoubtedly attracted much support to the reformist cause.
It would be a mistake,

however,

to consider the reformers

as aiming at an egalitarian society.

Dependent as they

were upon military success, and therefore on fielding
large bodies of cavalry as strike forces,

the reform
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movements were almost inevitably commanded by notables
of good family;

and slave raiding, which translated into

wealth and more manpower, was a common feature of these
religious wars
57).

(Oloruntimehin,

Tukolor E m p i r e , pp.

51-

The reform movements aimed at a puritanical purging

and purifying of local religious practices, although
this could mean political and social practices as well.
The wars nevertheless created new opportunities not only
for material gain, but for access to political power for
dissident factions within dominant aristocracies.
The religious jihad of El Hadj Umar from the 1850's
was of prime importance for the Senegambia.
later by an impressive set of erstwhile,
ful imitators wlsewhere in the region
Cheikou,

Followed

if less success

(Ma Ba, Ahmadou

Fody K a b a ) , this purist reformer,

in leading a

mainly Tukolor conquest of the Upper Senegal-Upper Niger
region, apparently aimed at hegemony over the entire
Senegambia

(Oloruntimehin,

Tukolor E m p i r e , pp.

85-90,

120-121).

Particularly skillfull at obtaining the support

of dissident factions in each state--K hasso, Bondu,
Masina,

Kaarta,

Segu--El Hadj U m a r ’s conquests spread rapidly and

threatened to extend to the lower Senegal.

It was the g r o w 

ing imperialist advance of the French colony of Senegal in
the 1 8 5 0 ’s that frustrated U m a r ’s designs in this direction,
ousting him from his forward positions on the Upper Senegal
and restricting his access to major reserves of manpower on
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the Senegal river.

Umar then turned inland toward the

Upper Niger, carving out an impressively-large territorial
empire that was, however, unconsolidated at his death.
Before it could be consolidated under his son,

it had the

ill-luck to be a primary target of a newly-expanding
French imperialism in the 1880's and 1 8 9 0 's.
The expanding French colonial hegemony frustrated
the militant jihadists, who had hoped to spread Islam by
force of arms.

Paradoxically,

the French conquest,

in

dislocating existing African social and political struc
tures, was to accelerate, not retard the spread of Islam.
This was most apparent in Cayor where even the darnel Lat
Dior became a Muslim under the shock of the conquest.
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CHAPTER II
Construction of the Dakar-St.

Louis

It is also by its mass and power of destruction that
the locomotive imposes itself upon the natives.
There
were indeed at the end of the 1883-1884 season acts of
mischief against the DSL railroad.
The impotence of
these attempts have discouraged the authors for the
future.
The machine that cuts in two animals w a n d e r 
ing on the track commands respect.
- Alexis Bois, lSSS"*The SocietS de Construction des Batignolles was
probably one of the more intriguing examples of the type of
French engineering firm more interested in expatriating its
talents to labor on foreign construction projects than on
domestic work in France.

First active in works in France,

then in Italy, Austria-Hungary,

Spain, Holland, Rumania,

and even Russia before 1871, concentrating more on Africa,
Russia, and even Indochina after 1871, and in Poland,
Yugoslavia, Africa, and South America after 1920, the
company's activities seem to have matched closely the
permutations of the French government's foreign policy i n 
terests.

A detailed study of this company would doubtless

ly yield a fascinating glimpse into the interlocking r e l a 
tions between the worlds of French engineering and banking,
and perhaps that of government.

2

The founder, Ernest Gouin, a graduate of the Ecole
Pol yt ech ni que , had supervised the construction of British
-89-
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locomotives for the Paris-Orleans line and then worked on
the St. Germain-Versailles railroad, that breeding ground
of future French rail magnates.

Founding his own company

as a family concern in 1846, then converting it to a jointstock company in 1871, Gouin had begun with locomotive
construction, had introduced iron bridge construction short
ly thereafter into France, and then proceeded to building
rail lines on his own.
of Paris from 1860,

A member of the municipal council

the president of the Paris Chamber of

Commerce from 1873 to 1876, he rose a few years before his
death in 1885 to the position of Regent of the Bank of
France.

Ad mi ttedly a lesser light in the brilliant galaxy

of French finance and industry, Gouin could count n e ver th e
less as investors in his firm, such luminaries as Gustave
d'Eichthal,

the Rothschild brothers, Philippe and Henri

Hottinguer, Francois

Wilbrod-Chabrol, Emile P^reire and

Abraham Rodrig ues -He nr iqu es.

Perhaps some of the talented

young e n g i n e e r ’s success can be traced to his marriage to
Ro dr igues-Henriques' daughter, Anne Mathilde,

for

Rodrigues-Henriques held almost one quarter of the Society's
shares in 1871.

Moreover, many a shareholder,

director or

responsible engineer of the firm--a Gustave d'Eichthal,
Wilbrod-Chabrol,

LeBret, Eugene Brun, de Bellanger, Lorieux,

or Roland-Gosselin--turns out to have been married to or
borne by a daughter of the Gouin or Rodrigues-Henriques
families.

Indeed,

the meetings of the board of directors
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of the firm must have had the character of family g ath e r 
ings,^
Jules,

Ernest Gouin was ably seconded by his son and heir,
also trained as an engineer; and Jules was to be

succeeded in turn by his sons, Gaston and Edouard.
In 1874, the French government granted to the
Batignolles the concession for construction and exploita
tion of the B 8 ne-Guelma railroad in eastern Algeria,

the

very railroad whose extension into Tunisia was to form part
of the basis for French intervention in 1881.

The profits

from this line came initially not so much from operation of
the line, but from the generous guarantee of the French
treasury.

Private capital invested in the Bftne-Guelma was

guaranteed a 6 % return by the French government because of
the supposed risks of the venture.
bore a return of only 4^% at most,

Since contemporary bonds
the concession offered a

lucrative opportunity for immediate large profits.

The

Batignolles promptly formed an operating company--the BftneGuelma railroad company--to assume the risks of construction
and operation of the line, although the actual construction
work was done by the Batignolles.^
To raise the necessary capital required by the c o n 
cession agreement with the government, the Gouins turned to
respected financial circles that could market the shares.
In the case of the ill-fated contemporary Panama Canal
Company,

financial consortiums marketing Panama Canal shares

were to extract such immense fees for their services that
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the finances of the Panama Company were gravely impaired
from the beginning.^

The government guarantee not only r e 

lieved the B$ne-Guelma of this concern, but with interest
on its securities guaranteed at a high rate, the marketing
consortium could sell them at a price far higher than par
value.

To gain easy access to sources of capital,

the

Batignolles did indeed surrender three quarters of the
marketing profits to participating banking circles, but
kept the remaining one-quarter for itself.
It is apparent that the Gouins hoped to ream similar
financial advantage from a Dakar-St. Louis railroad c o n 
cession.

In June 1879, Ernest Gouin had been nominated for

membership on the Transsaharan Commission by a pivotal f i g 
ure in its formation.^

Nothing had come of that, but by

November 7th, Legros was recommending that a Dakar-St. Louis
be built by a private entrepreneur backed by a governmental
guarantee.

By early January 1880, Batignolles engineers

were already on site in Senegal, reconnoitering Walter's

q
route for the railroad.
The doubts expressed by the parliamentary Budget
Commission in June 1880 about the seriousness of Jauregui
b e r r y 1s projects, only led the minister to take more d e 
cisive measures demonstrating his resolve.

To answer doubts

that reliable construction firms could be found to carry out
the project,

the minister followed Legros'

suggestion in

soliciting competitive bids from reliable industrial c ompa
nies for a preliminary contract award, conditional on par-
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liamentary a s s e n t . ^

But only companies with acceptable

standing were admitted to this competition. Of the three
acceptable companies presenting themselves on October 12,
1880--the Batignolles, Joret
Lavally and Molinos

(builder of the East Algerian),

(builder of the Reunion railroad)--the

Batignolles submitted the low bid and won

the contract.

Veiled accusations of collusion in the bidding did surface
during the subsequent parliamentary debates, but there is
no evident of substance pointing to c o l l u s i o n . I t
clear though,

is

that the Batignolles was seriously interested

in this project from the first and retained its interest in
it, maintaining storage space in St. Louis even with the
bill blocked in the National Assembly.

12

A report of the

board of directors to Batignolles shareholders in late 1881
confessed,
The enterprises of the type that we seek are difficult
to find in France, where the state has monopolized
work of all kinds--railroads, ports, canals--since the
Freycinet law; it is necessary therefore to continue to
thrust ourselves abroad where we have solid connections,
and where the work that we have done gives us an
excellent reputation.13
The preliminary contract signed October 30, 1880
between the minister and the company, with its annexed
stipulation sheet

("cahier des charges")

specified c o m 

pletion of the line before April 30, 1883 if parliament
approved the agreement by January 31, 1881.

But target

dates for provisional contracts only made legislative
opponents of the project bristle at the ministry's pre-
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sumption. 14
Moreover,

having already been burnt on the B^ne-Guelma

concession guarantee,

the lawmakers were in no mood to a c 

cept similar terms for a Dakar-St.

Louis.

Gouin's winning

bid had committed the company to construct the single-track,
1 meter gauge line at a maximum price of 6 8 , 0 0 0

km.

francs per

The company would raise a quarter of the necessary

capital

(an approximate total of 68,000 Fr/km times 260

kms = 17,680,000 Fr) by issuing shares; the remaining 3/4
in issued bonds to be raised later as the line was built.
In return, the state was to guarantee the company a d i v i 
dend of 3400 francs above operating costs for each section
of track accepted by the state and placed in service--which
amounted in essence to a guarantee of roughly 5% annual
return on the presumed invested capital once the line was
completed; provided,

of course,

that construction costs did

not exceed the maximum.
A number of objections were raised immediately.
of all, a maximum forfeit price

First

("construction a forfait")

meant that the state would have no real idea of the actual
construction costs

(or investment), which the entrepreneur

had no obligation to divulge.

Secondly, the guaranteed in

terest rate of 51, with government bonds now selling at 3%
to 4% meant that a consortium successfully marketing the
concession's securities at a higher price corresponding to
5%
a 3.51 return could gross a total of 3 “5 \ x 17,680,000 Fr =
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25.260.000 francs in round figures;
gering total profit of

thus garnering a stag

7,580,000 francs

on stocks and bonds.

The costs of this profitable operation would be borne in
directly by the state through its obligation to guarantee
for 99 years an annual

profit of 260 km

884.000 francs for the

completed line.

x 3,400/km =
It would have been

all the more profitable for the original shareholders, who
were actually allowed by the 1880 contract to put up only
one-half of the par value of the shares.
in the operation of the completed line

A n y deficits
were, moreover,

effectively assumed by the state's blanket guarantee.

The

contract arranged for maximum operating expenses to be set
for the rail line; but the specific means for setting the
ma ximum were to be worked out later only at an undetermined
date.

Indeed in November 1880,

concluding that:
state.

the Minister of Finance was

"All the risks are

. . . charged to the

The concessionary can gain less.

He cannot lose.

It will be advantageous to the state, which can obtain the
funds at much less than 5%, to build the railroad
/ 7 i t s e l f _ 7 . " 16

Legros strongly disagreed.

He had already decided in

187 9 that the government was assuming too heavy a burden
with the Upper Senegal railroad to undertake a simultaneous
effort on a Dakar-St. Louis line.

The entrepreneur, he

felt was taking a substantial risk in agreeing to c o n 
struct the line at a set maximum cost, while the terms
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concluded were not much different from those granted earlier
17
for Algerian railroads.
During the February 1881 debates, parliamentary oppo
nents of these financial arrangements attacked several i m 
portant details,

such as the failure to specify full p a y 

ments for shares in cash, and the failure to set out a
proper arbitration procedure in case of disputes between
the company and the state.

They particularly hammered,

however, at the methods of raising the cash for the venture,
since plainly the state could do it at less expense by
issuing government bonds.

The Senate finance committee,

chaired by Freycinet, proposed a solution in July 1881.
The entrepreneur was taking a substantial risk after all,
justifying a good return,

concluded the committee;

but

they recommended that the state rather than the company
ought to raise three-quarters of the cash with its own
bonds; and the Senate accepted a bill revised on this
basis in July 1881.^

But it was only after the Ministry

of Finance's objections were satisfied on all points in
March and May 1882,

that the Chamber approved the bill on

June 29, 1 8 8 2 . ^
This revised October 1880 convention still specified
construction of the Dakar-St.

Louis line at a set maximum

price by an entrepreneur capitalized at some 5,000,000
francs, raised by an issue of stock--thisstock to be
guaranteed an annual return of 1,154 francs per kilometer
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of line put into service.

The remaining 12,680,000 francs

needed would be supplied by a state subvention, paid in
installments proportional to the length of line placed in
service.

This subvention would be repaid with interest in

the future; but only after the railroad's operations b e 
came p ro f i t a b l e .^
The agreement was far from perfect.

That the

guaranteed interest on invested private capital for the
completed line was now effectively set at 6 % was not the
issue.

The entrepreneur indeed was assuming a c o n s i d e r 

able risk in constructing the first railroad line in
tropical Africa at an agreed maximum price.

21

For it was

apparent by now, that with local African labor difficult
to recruit,

experiencedrailroad laborers would have to be

imported from France at considerable expense.

The major

flaw lay rather in the very arrangement of a set forfeit
price for construction and guaranteed operating costs.

As

one deputy had remarked during the debates of February 20th
in the Chamber,
You know how our engineers . . . to their credit have
always refused contracts on a forfeit basis which
makes surveillance difficult . . . The company will
build at a forfeit price; the less it spends, the more
it will gain, its guaranteed return already being
fixed . . . When a railroad is badly built, what are
the results?
It is that the operation and m a i n t e n 
ance are expensive.22
The stage was set wherein the railroad would be built.
That stage was supposedly designed to facilitate coopera-
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-98tion between the governmental organs, ministerial and
colonial,

and the contracting entrepreneur.

In fact, it

would often make them sharp adversaries.

Construction of the DSL

By prior agreement between the

company and the government,

a special company was to be

formed immediately to raise the required capital of
5,000,000 francs and to fulfill the contract terms.

In

reality,this company would confine itself to operating the
rail line after construction, while the actual construction
would be undertaken on its behalf by the Batignolles with
its engineers, materiel, and expertise.

Thus, even while

Batignolles management undertook construction work on the
rail line in Senegal as early as December 1882, formation
of the nevr DSL operating company was delayed, obviously in
order to postpone the cash outlays involved, until the
ministry sharply warned in May 188 3 that this oversight
was in violation of the contracted agreements.
Finally,

23

on May 26, 1883, Batignolles management

capitulated, and formed the "Compagnie du Chemin de fer de
Dakar a Saint Louis," or DSL for short, with an issue of
10,000 shares.

A Monsieur Edouard de Traz was selected as

president and a board of directors chosen.

The Dakar-St.

Louis Company was, however, as a government official noted
in 1886, merely a subsidiary of the Batignolles itself.

24

On June 9th, a contract concluded between the Batignolles
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and the DSL turned over to the Batignolles all the liquid
assets of the n e w company,
government subsidies,

including the anticipated future

in exchange for the original 1880

concession franchise and an agreement by the Batignolles to
construct the line.

The Batignolles itself retained a su b

stantial bloc of shares in the DSL, and at least one officer
of the Batignolles always sat on the DSL board until 1927.
A central office was set up in Paris for the new
company at 35, Rue de Rome, while headquarters in Senegal
was set up at Dakar.
tions in Senegal,

For their first DSL Chief of O p e r a 

the entrepreneurs shrewdly chose Alexis

Bois, a military officer who had already served in Senegal
in 1869.

On leave from the army till his retirement in

February 1884, Bois was trained for railroad management
in a rapid orientation course on the Bone-Guelma railro'ad
in the spring of 1883, and he arrived in Senegal on
June 5th, not long before the official opening of the new
line's first rail section.

25

Though the severity of the climate was sometimes
exaggerated by the company, the hazards of the "hivernage"
rainy seasons did effectively limit heavy construction work
in Senegal to the period between December and May.

The

Batignolles, although continuing work in practice into
July,felt obliged at the end of each work season to
evacuate its construction workers for a rest in France in

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

- 1 0 0 -

order to avoid the health dangers that the hivernage
generally brought.
The first work campaign began badly in December 188 2
because of a new outbreak of yellow fever in Dakar.

Five

of the six Batignolles agents sent to Dakar in November were
dead by the end of December.2^

A shipload of construction

workers bound for a newly-quarantined Dakar was hastily
diverted to St. Louis and set to work on that end of the
projected line.

On hearing news of the epidemic,

300

construction workers already hired at Marseilles walked out,
and workers could be brought into Dakar only on January
26th.27
Given these handicaps it is hardly surprising that
the first season did not go well.

Blondelet, the Batignolles

engineer charged with construction, had predicted that the
season would end with the northern branch completed from
St. Louis to M'Pal,

and possibly Louga, and the southern

branch from Dakar to Rufisque
March,

(See Figure 6).

But by

only 13 kms of roadbed and 4 kms of track had been

completed in the north,
track in the south;

and 15 kms of roadbed and 2 kms of

even by May 24th, only 8 kms of track

had been laid from Dakar.

Hopes of opening the northern

branch for service to M'Pal were dashed that year as pieces
essential for a bridge at Leybar were lost in an accident
in the waters of the sand bar at the entrance to St.
T
. 28
Louis.
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In the south, however,

the 30 km section linking

Dakar to Rufisque seemed just advanced enough to open
service between these towns, connected previously only by a
packboat cruising between Goree and the mainland.

This

section was proudly inaugurated on July 23, 1883 to the
delight of the inhabitants of Dakar, who spontaneously
climbed onto the inaugural train, over the protests of
authorities, and remained aboard or clung to its sides for
the maiden voyage to Rufisque.

29

Service, however, had

been opened hastily on this line without construction work
completed.

Only 15 days after its opening,

seasonal rains

cut parts of the new line, and it could barely be reopened
for service on November 10th.
The next campaign of 1883-1884 went much better.

A

larger more proficient work force was put to work from
December to July.
M'Pal section

By January 29, 1884,

the St. Louis-

(32% km) was opened for service, and as the

season advanced,

a Rufisque-Pout section was opened on

May 7, 1884, an M ’Pal-Louga section on June 21 and a PoutTivaouane section on July 24th.

An impressive total of

over 134 km had been delivered, with the rails reaching
beyond Louga in the north and approaching Piregourey in the
south; with less than 100 km to go.

During the final,

thiid

season, with a work force of similar strength working from
two ends toward a common goal, completion was rapid.

A

20% km section from Louga to Gueoul was put into service on
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February 1, 1885, and two sections,Gueoul-Kebemer and
Ti vaouane-N’Gaye Mekhe, were opened simultaneously on
March 16th.

A line of 21.9 kms from N'Gaye Mekhe to

N'Dande was opened on May 1st.

Finally on Ma y 14, 1885,

the ceremonial driving of a silver spike to connect the
last rail on the Kebemer-N’Dande line signaled the bridging of tl a last gap between Dakar and St. Louis.

Defects

30

Unfortunately, as had been predicted, construc

tion had been pursued with an eye to speed rather than to
solidity.

The governmental subvention of 12,680,000 francs

(actually 48,769.23 francs per kilometer) would only be
paid, and the guaranteed dividend applied to operations,
only as successive sections of the line were accepted.
Thus,

the immediate problem for the entrepreneur was to

obtain acceptance of rail sections quickly.

Of course,

the

accepted sections of line had to be sturdy enough to handle
the flow of materiel and crews to construction sites at
the ends of the line, as well as to carry the rail traffic
that might develop.

But there was a temptation to cut

corners, to risk that the embankments holding the rails
would endure under adverse weather,
service temporarily in shacks.

and to house station

Regular service would r e 

quire a sturdier infrastructure; but the s t a t e ’s blanket
guarantee of operating costs could be abused in this r e 
spect by writing off reconstruction costs later on as
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operating repairs and maintenance, or as expansion of existing facilities.

31

In April 1884 a government

inspector was warning the

governor of Senegal of the weakness of the ra i l r o a d ’s e m 
bankments because of the c o m p a n y ’s use of inferior soils
and questionable excavation and construction practices.
August,

By

the same inspector had noticed that rails were not

always held by standard-sized spikes, but sometimes merely
fixed in grooves cut into the wood traverses by inadequate
spike nails that could loosen under slight stress.

32

The ministry had arranged for inspection and sur 
veillance of the DSL's financial accounts only by December
31, 1883, with a decree modeled on experience in Algeria.
The decree provided for an interministerial commission
(the Commission de Verification des comptes du chemin de
fer de D S L ) , on which both the Ministries of Finance and
Marine were represented,

to verify the financial accounts

of the company in Paris, while an Inspector of Naval A d 
ministrative and Financial Services in Senegal verified the
D S L ’s financial records in the colony itself.
1883,

In late

the technical surveillance of completed sections of

line was entrusted to the director of the colony's Service
of Public Works, doubling as the Technical Surveillance
Engineer of the DSL at an extra salary of 5000 francs.

33

The official acceptance of sections of completed rail
line for service--a key formality authorizing payment of
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the governmental subsidy and operations guarantee--was less
precisely regulated.

The line would first be inspected by

ad hoc commissions formed locally, whose favorable c on c l u 
sions would then be ratified by the governor.

It was

strange, given the pivotal role of these commissions, that
the governors generally selected members lacking in techni
cal competence.

Even stranger was the reception of u n 

finished and incompletely-equipped sections, for none of
the sections accepted during the period of construction was
finished at the time of acceptance,

and all were received

on condition that the unfinished work be completed later.
This procedure made sense in the case of the Dakar-Rufisque
section in July 1883, because it had been the government's
indecisiveness in choosing the sites for the terminal
facilities and the railroad's right of way in Dakar that
was to blame for construction delays in that town."^
acceptance of other incomplete sections,

The

however, was less

reasonable, particularly after the washouts of the hivernage of 1883 on the Dakar-Rufisque line.

The DSL, of

course, welcomed the early reception of rail sections,
because it thereby received governmental payments all the
sooner.

But the state's financial

interests were suffer

ing.
Although expressing a few misgivings about the rail
line's obstruction of the main caravan route from St.
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Louis,

a commission o£ January 17, 1884 complacently

ratified acceptance of a still-unfinished St. Louis-M'Pal
7c
rail section.
However, a like reception on April 28th
of the Rufisque-Pout rail section by another commission
was challenged by the Inspector of Finances, Friocourt.
Friocourt was scandalized by the apparent weakness of the
line in many places, and the numerous resulting derailments.
Already,

the Inspector had concluded that some of the

personnel and material charged to the DSL's exploitation
accounts were actually being used for initial construction
work,

although verification was almost impossible with

Batignolles records closed to government inspection.
accepting uncompleted rail sections,

By

the reception commis

sions were making it even easier for some construction
work to be charged to the D S L ’s maintenance account, which
the state was than obliged to subsidize since the DSL was

•Z(L
operating at a loss.
Despite skepticism voiced by officials of the M i n i 
stry of Marine, most members of the Accounts Verification
Commission for the DSL in Paris were impressed by the
inspector's energetic protests, and this body tended
thereafter to scrutinize the DSL's accounts with great
care.

37

But the inspector's efforts had little practical

immediate impact in Senegal.

Overriding his objections,

the governor authorized immediate reception of the Rufisque-
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Pout line on May 6th.

Friocourt seemed to have better luck

with the commission meeting in early June 1884 to consider
reception of M ’Pal-Louga line.

This ad hoc body,

taking

exception like Friocourt to the ommission of drainage
ditches and other works,
line.

refused to accept the uncompleted

But during Friocourt*s absence and despite his t el e

graphed protest,

the governor overruled his own reception

commission and formally accepted the section.
Alfred Razy,

38

the c o l o n y ’s Director of Public Works

played a pivotal role on these reception commissions.
Surveillance Engineer,

As

Razy would be responsible not only

for inspecting the operation of lines put in service, but,
from January 1884, he was the only member on the reception
commissions really competent to judge the technical merits
of the lines and equipment.

Indeed,

later investigations

of technical defects on the lines were to accord Razy a
major share of the blame.

Razy consistently accepted the

rosy estimates of DSL management and supported conditional
reception of unfinished sections regardless of Frioc our t’s
objections.

Friocourt complained to Paris about Razy's

indifferent surveillance over the DSL.
pains,

39

But for his

Friocourt received only soothing words from the

ministry while neither he nor his successors go much
practical support in tightening surveillance of the DSL.^®
A later investigation concluded that perhaps the
various Surveillance Engineers had been misled by regulations
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inadequately defining the E ng in eer ’s role in verifying
construction work.

In fact, Razy had probably been

carrying out the wishes of his superiors.

On December 5,

1883, not long after becoming Public Works Director, Razy
had directed acting Governor Bourdiaux’s attention to
irregularities in the transverse profiles of rail embank
ments and cuts; but had been told in reply to allow the
company more latitude in building according to the topography of the site and climate.

41

When Razy urged that the

reception of the Rufisque-Pout section be delayed until
certain works, such as the telegraph line, were completed,
a reception commission was appointed to receive the line
over his head.

Razy protested his exclusion, but when his

own reception commission met later to reconsider the line,
Razy was arguing for reception--without the telegraph line.
In a report on the M'Pal-Louga line, Razy recognized that
in accepting unfinished lines early he was putting an extra
financial burden on the state; but by this time he was
balancing the fiscal loss against the "strategic advantage"
of opening the lines for s e r v i c e . ^
Policy was decided ultimately, not by the Surveillance
Engineer, nor even the governor.

The dispute between Razy

and Friocourt over the Rufisque-Pout section had been r e 
layed to the ministry,

and the answering dispatch of June

5th deciding firmly against F r i oco urt ’s views settled the
issue not simply for that section, but for the M ’Pal-Louga
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and subsequent sections as well.

It was only after re ce i v 

ing this dispatch that the governor overrode the M'PalLouga commission's

veto.

43

Razy had argued as late as

April 6th that the Pout-Tivaouane section not be opened for
service--even if completed--until that section's earthworks
had a chance to settle over the following hivernage.

Never

theless, on July 9th, a reception commission approved
reception of this incomplete section on Razy's recommenda
tion.

Quick reception of rail sections, despite the f inan

cial risks, was now definitely the policy of the colonial
, . .
.
44
administration.
The shortsightedness of these procedures was amply
demonstrated during the hivernage of 1884 when sudden
tornadoes on August 8 and 16 cut the rail lines between
Rufisque and Tivaouane.

Another storm then cut the D a k a r -

Rufisque section on August 29th, and rail service was only
restored along temporary tracks on November 15th.

The DSL

was to claim that the abnormal ferocity of the storms
absolved the company of responsibility.

It was a wise

claim under the circumstances for it enabled the company
eventually to recover half the repair expenses from the
government.

But it was questionable.

The severity of

storms did vary widely from one hivernage to another; but
the storms that caused the washouts were not uncommon for
the region.

Razy's report, not surprisingly, upheld the

company's claims.

But Bois,

in communicating privately
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with his superiors in the DSL in Paris,
storms,

admitted that the

though severe, had not really been exceptional.

But who, he asked, had known the local climate well enough
before the railroad was b u i l t ? ^
The washouts were an example of the difficulties of
erecting and maintaining permanent structures in the
Senegambian region.

The sharp contrast between the dry

season and the hivernage could be particularly deceiving,
since many apparently suitable areas,

solid and apparently

high during the dry season, could be innundated under
torrents of water during some of the sporadic,
storms characteristic of the hivernage.

tempestuous

Two successive

innundations occurred in Rufisque during the hivernage of
1884 because that rapidly growing municipality had c a r e 
lessly allowed new buildings to block the natural drainage
of the l o c a l e . ^

St. Louis was also plagued by floods

whenever the Senegal river reached high levels during its
annual innundation, and many an enticingly attractive
nearby island of the dry season would be submerged by the
river during the hivernage.
There were other difficulties as well.
of the dry season,

The aridity

the humidity of the hivernage,

and the

heat of both could crack or erode building materials
rapidly.

Termites were a trying nuisance,

especially when

they ate up the wood traverses holding the tracks, and most
of the small wood buildings put up at stations in the in-
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terior were destined to crumble rapidly.
course,

Too much,

should not be made of these difficulties,

was in the DSL's interest to do so.

of

though it

Construction and m a i n 

tenance in the tropics had their problems; but the company
did not at least have to deal with the ravages of ice and
snow, or the wide swing in temperatures of northern
c l i m e s .47
The washouts of August 1884 ought to have been a
personal disaster for Razy,

since he had vouched for the

technical solidity of the line during the

receptions.

In

deed, the ministry did order Razy's suspension in October
1884.

It seems though,

that Razy was really removed from

his post because of a longstanding feud with his superior,
the colony's Director of Interior,
to June 1884.

Moreover,

dating back at least

in spite of his removal from office

and his unremitting insubordination, Razy continued on as
Director of Public Works and Surveillance Engineer until
March 1885 while the ministry ostensibly searched for a
replacement.

Tn March Razy was finally sent back to Paris

to face charges,
Guiana,

and was shipped from there to French

dying shortly thereafter.

48

at least, was sorry to see him go.

49

The DSL's management,
His departure in any

case made no difference in the procedures of receiving in
completely-equipped sections of rail line.
If there was a possible safeguard remaining in the
procedure of conditional receptions of line sections,
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lay, as Razy had once pointed out,

in a final review for

the general and definitive reception of the entire line at
completion

(contract annex, art.

28).

By the end of April

1885 only one, short unfinished section of 13.3 km between
N ’Dande and Kebemer remained,
1st.

and this was ready by June

Like all previous sections,

some work remained to be

done; but the reception commission of June 5 and 6 was
willing to open the section, though without payment of the
final portion of the subvention until completion of all
works.

DSL officials, however,

It was not simply the subsidy.

flatly refused the offer.
The DSL was also demanding

general and definitive reception of the entire line.

Full

acceptance of the line was ludicrous when some stations
were still unbuilt, when important accessories were not in
place,

and when some parts of the line were on temporary

tracks.

But the DSL threatened to keep the N'Dande-Kebemer

section closed, blocking long-haul traffic between the two
ends of the line unless its terms were m e t . ^
The n e w Director of Public Works,

Chapron, proposed a

solution decidely favorable to the company.
definitive
ately,

General and

reception of the line would be declared immedi

conditional upon completion of unfinished work later,

and the final subsidy would be paid on completion.
governor,

The

following Chapron*s advice, overrode a still-

resisting commission to adopt Chapron*s solution.

But,

unexpectedly, DSL officials refused to accept all of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-1 1 3 -

Chapron's conditions.

While a perplexed governor was w r i t 

ing the ministry for new instructions, ministry officials
in Paris were already striking a new bargain with top DSL
officers.

It was essentially the Chapron solution, but

with immediate payment of the subsidy.

A ministrial t e l e 

gram of June 27th ordered the governor to accept the line
under these conditions;

and so, on July 3rd, the governor

declared full reception of the line.

As of July 6th,

service between St. Louis and Dakar was begun, and on
July 26, 1885,

the complete, though not completed line was

inaugurated at S. Louis.

51

The ministry's haste in accepting a badly-built line
is curious, but understandable.

Ministry officials had

certainly been aware of the defects of the line, at least
since the disastrous breaks of 1884; and there were indi ca
tions of a cooler attitude toward the company from that
time.

52

Yet ministry officials were apparently entangled

in a trap of their own making.
approval earlier,

To obtain parliamentary

they had prepared a project for c o n 

struction of the railroad at the lowest possible p r i c e . ^
Their objective had been to obtain a rudimentary line as
quickly as possible, and there is reason to believe that
they had deliberately allowed the entrepreneur to build
cheaply and poorly, knowing that the necessary improvements
for a commercially viable line were to follow later--at the
state's expense.

There was no point in stopping just short
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of completion, when the state was already obligated to
assume any deficits in receipts for the other 95% of the
line.

Certainly, there was no point in provoking a serious

dispute that might lead to embarrassing public di sc l o 
sures .54

Construction Wrangles

The Batignolles Company had g e ner 

ally followed the Walter project in laying out the D a k a r St. Louis rail line, but not exactly.

Company engineers

had resurveyed the original trace on-site in 1880 and 1881,
and, after approval of the concession law in June 188 2, the
Batignolles submitted for ministerial approval a comp re 
hensive set of definitive plans specifying the route, g r a d 
ient, profiles, and construction works along the line, as
well as sketches of many station b u i l d i n g s . ^

These plans

of September 30, 1883 naturally differed in many details
from the original plan, compelling review and reapproval
by the ministry; but this meant that colonial authorities
in Senegal and the citizenry of the colony became a c 
quainted with the project's details at the last m i n u t e . ^
It was possible for Paris to disregard the impact of
the rail line's trace on local conditions in the rural
interior, where passage followed by right of conquest.

But

the route followed by the railroad at the approaches to the
colony^s ports did raise some important legal and economic
questions.
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In the case of Rufisque, Walter had projected a trace
passing 2 kilometers outside the town, with the implicit
intent of rerouting long distance traffic around it, and
even of draining local commerce away from that town to
Dakar.

The lusty,

spontaneous growth of the m e r c h a n t ’s

commune of Rufisque at the expense of Dakar,

some 30 km

away, had been jealously resented by colonial officials
rm
since Pinet-Laprade.
Briere de 1 ’Isle had explicitly
informed the ministry that his railroad plan was indeed
designed to transfer Rufisque's commercial activity to
Dakar by bringing the latter town with its superior harbor
into closer contact with the interior.

58

When the projected railroad plans were revealed in
late 1882, however,

they raised a storm of protest from the

communal government and merchants of Rufisque.

With large,

essentially vacant areas just outside the immediate p e r i 
meter of the town, a colonial governor,

less hostile to

Rufisque than Briere had been, found it easy enough to
satisfy the irate citizenry of the town.

With the B a t i g 

nolles also willing, modified plans were quickly drawn up
to bring the station much closer to R u f i s q u e . ^
It was much harder to deal with the approaches into
St. Louis and Dakar.

Proponents of the project in the

colony and the ministry had made muc h of the colonial r a i l 
road's purported advantage over metropolitan railroads
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obtaining land for the right of way through territory
supposedly vacant and free.

But land within the communes

of the colony was not necessarily unfettered under French
law, even if it was vacant, for even colonial authorities
had been selling or conceding plots within them for some
years.
The problem at Dakar was serious and complex.

The

original plans had called for establishing the Dakar rail
stations, passenger and freight, on the bay of Dakar toward
the northern limits of the town.

In September 1882 ,

Batignolles engineers, not wishing to wait for the sub
stantial sea defenses that the colony was to build at this
site, suggested withdrawing both terminals into the empty
sand dunes farther north beyond the town's outskirts.
Legros, who was consulted on this question,

To

it seemed as

though the freight terminal might indeed be located in the
dunes, but that the rail line should also be run down to
the quais and piers of the port and the passenger terminal
located centrally in the port.

Whereas the precise site

for the passenger terminal was left to further studies,
Legros drew up in October a tentative trace for the track
leading to the piers

(the Mtrac§ b l e u " ) , and this was

promptly accepted by the Batignolles,

which needed immedi

ately a track leading from the port to unload construction
material coming by sea from F r a n c e . ^
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With construction work scheduled to start in November
1882, this, however, was a late moment to begin revising
construction plans, at a time when expropriation procedures
ought to have been under way.

Furthermore, when the commune

of Dakar-GorSe learned of the revised plans,
land owners,

its citizens,

and merchants protested bitterly.

The rail

line's approach into Dakar, coming as it did so close to
the shoreline from the north, meant that the track leading
to the piers would parallel the quais, blocking or at least
hampering access to the port.

Moreover, a passenger t erm i

nal in the port would congest an already overcrowded
commercial area,squeezing out some m e r c h a n t s . ^
the commune was divided, of course.

Opinion in

Some wished to see

both rail terminals at their original site at the edge of
the port; others wished both out in the sand dunes, with
no track along the quais.

Others were in favor of the

trace b l e u , and still others proposed siting the passenger
terminal well inland in the plateau area to the west of
the commercial area.

f\?

But opposition was strong enough

to pass strong resolutions against the trace bleu in the
commune's municipal council and chamber of commerce, while
such important firms as Maurel and Prom, the Compagnie du
Senegal et de la C8te Occidentale d'Afrique, and the
Messageries Maritimes,

and even Senegal's deputy to

parliament attacked the government's plans.
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Batignolles engineers naturally protested against
the delays blocking occupation of terrains needed for the
railroad's main terminals in Dakar--terrains that the state
was obliged, according to the 1880 contract, to deliver
free.

W it h an uneasy military situation at the time in

Cayor the incumbent governor was also anxious to speed up
work on the railroad, and he was determined not to let
Batignolles officials use the delays in the delivery of
terrains

to blame him for any shortcomings

the rest

of the line.

in constructing

He therefore authorized the B a t i g 

nolles in late February to lay track along the trace b l e u ,
and ordered expropriation to begin.

Expropriation p r o 

cedures in this colony were slower than in the metropole;
but the entrepreneur impatiently took possession of
terrains

as yet unexpropriated to lay down much of his

track along

the quais, to the outrage of the adversaries

of the trac£ b l e u . ^
At this point, the ministry tardily recalled that
parliament had not appropriated any funds to cover e x 
propriation costs for the railroad, and Senegal's General
Council refused to let the colony cover the discrepancy,,
even t e m p o r a r i l y . ^

Apprised by new of the mounting local

opposition to the trace bleu, of the inconveniences of
the trace, and of its own financial embarrassment,

the

ministry promptly suspended expropriation in early April,
and called for further studies.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-1 1 9 -

It was already too late.

Much of the "permanent”

track already lay along the quais, and the purported costs
of removal exceeded the costs of expropriation.

Moreover,

a newly laid foundation for the freight terminal blocked
any relocation of the passenger station in the dunes.
Unfortunately,

the Batignolles track was now also occupying

unexpropriated land illegally.
by one irate landowner,
in turn.

Promptly hauled into court

the Batignolles sued the government

After a long, tortuous series of legal and p o l i 

tical maneuvers too complicated to relate here, the m i n i 
stry finally chose to retain the trace b l e u .^
The strong will of acting Governor Bourdiaux forced
a solution.

Local oppotition was eroded by placating some

(such as the Messageries Maritimes) and by such stern
measures as dissolving the commune's municipal council.
Terrains expropriated for both terminal and line were
reduced to the bare minimum, while the deviations of the
Batignolles track from the trace bleu at some points were
used to whip the company into line on this question.
Nevertheless,

£\ 7

it took until December 1883 - January 1884

before the extent of expropriation was settled, until
March 1885 before all terrains were delivered to the
company,

and until January 1886 for the expropriation

procedures to be concluded, with one proprietor holding
out until late 1 8 8 7 . ^
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Batignolles officials were naturally annoyed at the
deliberate pace of expropriation procedures and at the g o v 
ernment's procrastinations, wh i c h slowed and hampered their
construction efforts.

It was a bad beginning, but the c o m 

pany was able to turn it to account as an argument for the
reception of unfinished rail sections, beginning with the
Dakar-Rufisque.
The access route into St. Louis,and the sites for its
rail terminals were resolved more easily.

The terminals

were not to be placed on the island of St. Louis since that
would have required building a costly metal bridge parallel
with the wooden "pont Faidherbe."

The passenger and freight

terminals were slated instead for sites well removed from the
bridge in the sparsely populated suburbs on the continental
"island” of Sor.

69

In partial compensation for the termi

nal's remoteness, an additional riverfront freight terminal
was destined to be installed downriver from the pont F a i d 
herbe; but this supplement to the original plans would be
built after completion of the railroad.

70

Mu c h of the property on Sor was not privately owned;
but only a small portion of this marshy island was solid
enough to hold the tracks and rail stations.

To save time

and expense the ministry had proposed that the tracks simply
be placed on the existing public road leading out of St.
Louis into the interior.

Local merchants were unhappy with

the siting of the terminals so far from the city center, but
even more concerned about clearing the road for commercial
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traffic by removing the tracks from it.

To please them, the

track was shifted to one side by 12 meters; but since this
shift entailed expropriation of a few properties along a 6
meter wide strip, more expense was involved than originally
a n t i c i p a t e d .?1
The Batignolles had been anxious to start work at this
end of the line quickly, but they were unable to occupy some
needed properties until March 1883 after the colonial govern
ment belatedly started expropriation.

As in Dakar, the m i n 

istry, finding itself without the necessary funds, attempted
in April to halt the expropriation procedure.
this case,

However,

in

the expropriations were too far advanced in the

courts to be halted.^2

procedures were slow, n eve r t h e 

less, with some land for the town's passenger station turned
over only by December 1 8 8 3 . ^
More awkward problems were encountered on the access
route only 5 kilometers outside St. Louis.

At that point,

the public road crossed the marigot of Leybar by means of
a small bridge.

By agreement in Paris,

the railroad company

was scheduled to built a 120 meter, metal bridge for the
railroad at Leybar after tearing down the colony's wooden
bridge.

Since this was the only structure of any s ignifi

cant size in the Dakar-St.

Louis project,

the company was

anxious in December 1882 to dismantle the old bridge and
pour concrete supports for the new as quickly as possible.
Unfortunately, with the only other usable road between St.
Louis and the interior flooded and impassable until the
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following February,

the demolition of the Leybar bridge

would not only hinder St. Louis' commerce, but also e n 
danger the military expedition about to be launched into
74
Cayor.
The Batignolles was, nevertheless,

entitled by prior

agreement in Paris to proceed with demolition, and the c o l 
ony had little choice except to organize a temporary ferry
service quickly in order to assure pedestrian and caravan
traffic across the marigot.

A resentful colonial govern

ment hoped that the entrepreneur would at least share the
expense for this unforeseen ferry service.

75

This was only the first of several wrangles to dog the
passage of the railroad at Leybar.

Colonial officials were

soon at odds w it h company officials over the width of a
passageway on the bridge to carry pedestrian and carrier
traffic.^

Frustrated in its initial efforts to be refunded

for the ferry,

and forced to pay for a widened bridge passage

way, the colonial government hoped at least to make the
Batignolles reconstruct the unusable pedestrian approaches
to the bridge.

Ultimately they were indeed able to get both

the Batignolles and the ministry to share in the costs.

77

The relationship between the railroad and the colony
it served was obviously influenced by the circumstances and
variations of local political and economic conditions.

But

the discords over access routes, as well as the methods of
construction illustrate the surprising extent to which the
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ministry was attempting to insulate the DSL from the v a g a r 
ies of local conditions.

The terrain on which the company

would operate, with which its officials would be most c o n 
cerned, was the legal and financial terrain laid out in the
revised contract of October 30, 188 0.

Operating conditions

in Senegal would be a primary concern of the entrepreneur,
but only within the context of the convention and s ubse
quent agreements that had carved out paths leading into
the French treasury.
Paris, not Dakar.

Company management was centered in

Contacts between officers of the company

and ministry officials, or regulatory bodies overseeing
colonial railroads, would mean that railroad policy could
be set above the heads of colonial officials in Senegal,
sometimes to the latter's surprise,
.

•

chagrin.

and often to their

78

Ministry officials in Paris would often be annoyed
when they felt themselves at a disadvantage with DSL
executives, who were better informed by company agents on
the scene than the officials had been by technically lessproficient colonial bureaucrats.

Nevertheless,

the m e t r o 

politan authorities basically wanted this arrangement.
The Dakar-St.

Louis had been inserted into Senegal on the

ministry's initiative for strategic reasons, but at great
expense to the state.

Government officials would aim now

at minimizing the railroad's financial burden on the m e t r o -
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pole's budget, or at least to avoid the appearance of a
needless drain.

Attempts by colonial administrators or

merchants to expand railroad services at metropolitan e x 
pense would be regarded from this viewpoint as serving
narrow interests in disregard of the common good.

The

metropolitan interest was to terminate the tax cash flows
to the colonies,
ity was pitted,

and in this sense the metropolitan aut h o r 
to a degree, against leading elements of

its own colony and the colony's well-being.

That this

fundamental conflict between the metropole and its colony
did not develop into more open discord in this era, was due
not only to a growing rail traffic that reduced the gov ern 
ment's fiscal losses, but also to the sharp tactics of the
company itself.

The local colonial government and m e t r o 

politan officials were induced to form a common defensive
front in the face of suspicious DSL actions and operations.
Local merchants, defending their own commercial interests,
would also keep the government informed of any DSL errors
or abuses that might arise.

But, later on, the three-

sidedconflict would emerge again, with the metropolitan
treasury officials and the DSL allied, often as not, against
the local interests of the colonial government.

Africans and the DSL

There is less information about the

initial relations between the railroad and the Africans who
were served by it, or simply lived near it.

The abuses of
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either party against the other, moreover, were more likely
to attract attention than any mutual satisfaction.

Both

the entrepreneur and the colonial officials were deeply
concerned about the possibility of armed attacks by African
warriors,

especially the "tyeddo" of Lat Dior, against

railroad facilities or personnel.
encountered few troubles in Cayor.

But railroad construction
First of all,

the tracks

did not enter Cayor until the hivernage of 1884, and then
the vigilance of Samba Laobe and his supporters prevented
serious incidents.

The most notable incident in Cayor,

in

1884, was the disappearance during the hivernage of 1200
meters of pickets marking the railroad trace.

79

Far more serious incidents occurred in territory
long-annexed to the French colony,
tween Rufisque and Thies.

in Serer country b e 

The area had long been r e p u t e d 

ly dangerous for travellers and caravans enroute to or
from Rufisque, and, as such, an embarrassment to a French
administration incapable of mastering it.

One June 15,

1884 a fight broke out between railroad agents and an
African at the well of Pout.

Soon thereafter,

large rocks

and other obstacles were found lying on the tracks in
obvious attempts to derail moving trains.
railwaymen to seize suspects

Attempts by

in the vicinity of the

sabotaged lines only increased the seriousness of the
incidents, with an armed band trying to free a prisoner
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in one instance, and projectiles or even shots fired at
trains in

others.

The company quickly withdrew European

workers from the a r e a . ^
The news of the incidents alarmed French colonial
authorities.

Their first reaction was to make an example

of two presumably guilty villages by razing them; but the
colony's chief military officer counseled against an armed
expedition in this densely wooded area during the h i v e r 
nage.

Military action was wisely confined to escorting

trains through the area aid patrolling the line.

81

Colonial authorities investigating the incidents
soon found that m a n y had been instigated by railroad p e r 
sonnel.

Railroad agents had tried to bar Africans from

the well at Pout.

In other cases they had seized apparently

innocent bystanders near sabotaged tracks.

The acting

governor complained to the ministry of these acts in a
letter of August 9th, and the ministry asked the DSL to
make sure that their personnel respected Africans
neighboring the rail line.

82

The DSL reacted peevishly to these charges.
imputation of the incidents to their personnel,
answered, was preposterous.

The

they

These charges arose,

they

claimed, because the inquiries had been conducted without
DSL participation,

and they asserted that the actions of

the railroad agents seemed reasonable.

Moreover,
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added,

in a separate note:

It appears to us that precise orders ought to be given
so that the railroad and its environs are respected in
fact as properties of the company and the state.
To
this effect, it would be necessary in our opinion that
the black be persuaded indeed (and only an example
would persuade him) that he cannot attack with impunity
the property and agents of the company.
For that, it is
henceforth necessary to treat seriously the official
reports drawn up by company agents against the blacks,
and to take appropriate actions . . . When an aggression
occurs, an immediate and serious repression is n e c e s 
sary and not an inquiry two months after the events.83
It is probable, however,

that the allegations against
oa
the railroad agents were true.
Railroad laborers of the
era,

it should be noted, were generally notorious for their

tough behavior and devil-may-care antics.

85

Moroccan

laborers hired for work on the Upper Senegal, for example,
quickly gained a reputation for resorting readily to
knives.^

Most of the construction workers brought in by

the Batignolles were Italian, though a few hundred Africans
were also recruited locally for clearing brush.

87

As early

as February 1883, municipal authorities in Rufisque were
asking for a larger police force to handle visiting
construction workers.

In St. Louis the death of an African

in a brawl with laborers, led the. mayor of that town in
January 1884 to prohibit workers of Italian nationality
from entering St. Louis--a measure withdrawn after energetic protests by the Italian consul.

88

This kind of rough-hewn arrogance ma y also have been
carried over into the countryside.

In one recorded i n c i 
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dent of December 1884,

laborers at KM 37.5 reported an

armed attack by a band of Serers.

A careful police i n 

vestigation later showed that the "band of 8 armed Serers"
was really two unarmed Lebus who had been beated by the
laborers after the latter refused to pay for provisions
brought them by the Lebus.

89

The presence of civilian railroad personnel residing
at stations in the interior of Senegal was also a new f a c 
tor, and it was unclear what the relationship between railwaymen and the inhabitants would be.

But it is clear that

colonial officials considered the newcomers a nuisance to
some degree.

In September 1886,

the stationmaster of Kelle,

witnessing a pettytrade dispute, mistakenly took the m e d i 
ator of the dispute, a trader from St. Louis,
ous agitator.
a fight,

for a d a n g e r 

After foolishly provoking the trader into

the stationmaster spread the alarm about the

imagined a g i t a t i o n . U n i m p o r t a n t

in itself,

the incident

illustrates the arbitariness and suspicion which could
arise with isolated agents thrust into positions of
authority in a culturally alien milieu.
The tendency of some stationmasters to give shelter to
escaped slaves also roused the apprehension of colonial
officers.^

In fact the insertion of a thin ribbon of

French-controlled territory in Cayor, with commercial
centers beginning to form in the perimeters about each
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of the stations, had brought a host of new political
problems.
The year 1886 had started out with good relations
between the darnel of Cayor, Samba Laobe, and the colonial
government of Sfcnegal.
signal services.

The darnel had rendered the French

He had kept the rail line relatively

trouble-free in Cayor, and when a rail paymaster's car was
ambushed by some Africans --disgruntled former employees-the darnel ordered his men

to track them down.

When Cayor's

peasants refused to sell their peanuts at low prices .in
1885-86, Samba Laobe dutifully encouraged peanut sales.
Despite a strong initial reluctance,

the darnel had also

consented to extend the perimeter of French holdings
around tail stations from 100 to 300 meters in December
1884.

He had hoped to receive in compensation some

rights over the lost northern province of N'Diambour or
the right to collect taxes at the rail stations; but had
finally settled merely for a free pass for himself and
an entourage on the railroad.

92

The abortive attempt by the darnel to conquer Djolof
ended the era of good feelings.
in turn from Djolof,

With Cayor facing invasion

the new governor of Senegal intervened,

restoring peace at the price of a heavy fine on Samba Laobe.
According to Governor Genouille's later account, a h u m i l i 
ated Samba Laobe had ungratefully vented his spleen by
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maltreating French subjects and permitting outrages against
French territory.
annoyance.

93

There is no doubt of the darnel's

Nevertheless, the colonial government had not

played an entirely innocent role.
ers,

Despite later disclaim

it m a y actually have had a hand in Samba Laobe's in

vasion of Djolof in the first place.

Moreover,

the new

governor had tried to profit from the darnel's embarrass
ment by again expanding the perimeter around the rail
stations

in Cayor from 300 to 500 meters, while forcing the

darnel to accept a permanent French resident at N'Dande.

94

The darnel was obliged to accept these terms with an army of
Djolof entering Cayor; but he avoided implementing them
later.

Perhaps he really was encouraged,

as the governor

suspected, by important merchants of St. Louis who were
Genouille's political enemies.

95

Many of the growing disputes centered on the new
commercial nuclei growing next to the rail stations in
Cayor.

On the one hand, the colonial government was c o n 

cerned over generous grants of land by the darnel to favored
merchants just outside the French-controlled perimeters around the stations.

Closely linked to this question was

the problem of taxation, with some merchants complaining
about having to pay taxes to both the darnel and the French
administration.

It was not that commerce was hostile to

Samba Laobe; on the contrary.

Maurel and Prom's agent at
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Tivaouane for one, favorably contrasted the darnel's prompt
assistance to the administration's inaction.

Probably some

traders were simply using an ambiguous situation to avoid
paying colonial t a x e s . ^
question.

It was a minor jurisdictional

But it touched on fundamental issues of s o v e r 

eignty, and Genouille took it seriously enough.

He began

to consider deposing the darnel, and breaking up the remainder of Cayor into 4 or 5 provinces.

97

That the colonial government was following a hard
line toward the African populations after the start of
Genouille's administration is evident from an incident of
some gravity on the railroad line.

On September 10, 188 6,

a train had run over some cattle near the village of
Diarmeo Gueye in N'Diambour not far from Louga.
villagers beat up a train's crewmen.

Furious,

Irate
the officer

commanding the fort of Louga ordered that the village pay
a heavy fine,
of nonpayment.

the two principal culprits to be hung in case
The obliging chief of N'Diambour promptly

hanged the hapless wretches publicly in Louga, while levying the fine as well.

98

Another serious incident relating to the railroad
occurred during Genouille's temporary absence from the
colony, as a body of horsemen

menaced the station of

Tivaouane in August to recover a pair of escaped slaves
taking refuge there.

The incident was not taken seriously
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by the French Commandant nearby at Thids, who chose to
ignore the problem.

Indeed it is likely that had no force

been used, French authorities would have returned the f u g i 
tives and reprimanded the stationmaster.

But officials in

St. Louis were horrified by the impression that this armed
action against the station might make.

The Commandant of

Thi§s was reminded that Tivaouane's station lay in French
territory, not Cayorian.

"By your action," he was informed,

"you have sanctioned a violation of this right."

A platoon

of "spahis" was dispatched to N ’Dande on the railroad,
officers changed with obtaining satisfaction.

99

its

The in

fluence of the chiefs of the crown bondsmen, Demba War
and Ibra Fatim Sar, on the darnel was particularly deplored.
Demba War,

the perpetrator of the Tivaouane incident in

deed was to be arrested if possible.
From the arrival of the spahis at N ’Dande, archival
sources are inconveniently meager.
nor,

According to the g o v e r 

Samba Laobe began to threaten to expel traders from

Tivaouane if they did not pay him taxes by October 6th.
Recently returned, Genouille sent an officer to N'Dande
with orders to interview the darnel.

But when this officer

reached Tivaouane by train w i t h the troop of spahis,
Laobe refused to meet him.

Samba

Tempers grew short and the

officer ordered a mounted charge into the darnel’s camp.
While the darnel’s men were caught dismounted,
taken by surprise,

Samba Laobe fled.

obviously

Pursued, he was o v e r 
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taken and cut down.

Ambush, charged a St. Louis newspaper

linked politically to the darnel, despite the governor's
denials
In any case,

Samba Laob^'s death created a major

political crisis in Cayor.

To secure the rail line, the

governor had two special trains outfitted with replacement
rails and Hotchkiss machine guns--a sight, he noted,
produced a visible impression on the populace.

102

that

But the

Cayorian notables and the governor quickly came to terms
in this crisis in order to bar from power their common
enemy, Lat Dior,

a logical successor to the deceased Samba

Laobe.
With a completed railroad bestriding Cayor, the
political imperatives of the situation were altered s u b
stantially.

It was not simply that the railroad had opened

up that country to direct French military and political
domination.

The railroad now represented an expensive and

vulnerable fixed investment that needed protection, and the
incompatabilities of French and African interests persuaded
French officials that African interests had to be strictly
subordinated to their own.
Direct annexation of Cayor was unpalatable, because
legal and political problems relating to slavery and tax a
tion were then currently stirring up turmoil in rural
districts long-annexed to the colony.

That was why no part
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of Cayor had been annexed in 1883; and if anything these
I f)T

domestic turmoils had grown worse by 1886.

A weak darnel,

like the deposed N'Gone Fal, would only invite ambitious

9^
pretenders; a strong darnel, like Lat Dior--or even like
Samba Laob§ despite his cooperativeness--would remain a
possible source of autonomous dissension in a new political
dispensation calling for chiefs to serve as effective, but
obedient subordinates.
The solution,

as imposed by the governor and ratified

by an assembly of Cayorian notables at N'Dande on October
19th was to divide Cayor into six provinces.

Despite the

objections of the leading hereditary notables of Cayor, the
territorial command of each of these provinces was given
to the chiefs of the crown bondsmen--leaders of the only
significant military forces in Cayor.

Ironically, Demba

War, only recently under a cloud, was given command of the
province of Saniokhor and appointed "President of the
Confederation of Cayor.
It was the end of an independent Cayor.
Dior tried to interfere, he was pursued,
an armed encounter.

When Lat

then killed in

Attempts by other pretenders to assume

the crown were also quickly s q u e l c h e d . D e m b a

War and

the other appointed chiefs certainly retained a share of
the power.

But if the French resident now installed at

N'Dande gave an order, they were henceforth expected to
obey.
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DSL construction under fire

As for the Dakar-St. Louis

railroad, the tranquility of its operations now seemed
assured.

Its employees no longer reported manifestations

of hostility,

and its agents could concentrate on operation ,.

of the line in Senegal and on legal and contractual battles
in Paris.

Construction of the entire line had officially

been completed in October 1885; but massive repair and r e 
building of the rail lines and facilities were also u n d e r 
taken by the DSL after the line opened.
Unfortunately for the DSL, this initial phase of
construction could not be closed easily or quickly.

The

enormous annual deficits of DSL operations and maintenance-deficits guaranteed effectively by the state according to
the contract--aroused a great deal of concern in Paris.
Most members of the governmental Account Verification
Commission were shocked by the size of the payments by the
state to the DSL, and they were trying vainly to pare down
the DSL's massive operations expenses.
In November 1886, Paul Etienne, an engineer of roads
and bridges on loan from the Ministry of Public Works, was
finally sent to Senegal to check conditions on the line.
Etienne's report of March 1887,

impressive for its t e c h n i 

cal thoroughness, was a severe indictment of the original
construction of the line to which he attributed the blame
for the washouts of 1883 and 1 8 8 4 . The line's trans-

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-136-

verse profiles, he found, did not generally conform to
profile types of the approved plans.

Confirming Friocourt's

earlier observations on roadbed and track construction, he
noted that soil for embankments and ballast had simply been
taken from the vicinity of the line, much of it entirely
unsuitable and unstable, despite the supply nearby at
Rufisque of excellent stone for a proper ballast.

10 8

Soil

extracted from cuts had simply been cast to the rear by
shovel and was easily blown back by the wind.

Etienne

found many of the short spans along the line defective,

and

a short bridge at Hann, badly damaged in 1883, was still
only propped up unsteadily and needed to be redone.

After

reading local records on the construction, he had par t i c u 
larly harsh words for the role of the Surveillance Engineers
and the functioning of the reception commissions.

Neither

the state nor the DSL, he concluded, had properly defended
its interests against those of the Batignolles.
The report of 1887 was politically embarrassing.
was therefore permitted,
in the dossier."

as the phrase goes,

It

"to slumber

Nevertheless by the end of the p a r l i a 

mentary session of November 1888,
apprised of the report's contents,

a deputy, Adolphe Turrel,
read some choice excerpts

in the Chamber to the outraged deputies, while the U n d e r 
secretary of Colonies could only reply with embarrassed
evasions.

Although no enemy of colonial expansion,

Turrel

raised the question again in November 1890, with even more
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revelations, but nothing was done.

109

With the 10 year

limit on a builder's responsibility about to expire, Turrel
again took to the floor of the Chamber in M a rc h 1895, d e 
manding that the builder be held to account for any m i s 
deeds.

The result of his demand was a new investigation

by a 3-man commission, headed by the engineer Chaper.’*’^
This commission's report, obviously designed as an
attack on the Etienne report of 1887 and as a defense of
the builder,
issue.

111

effectively closed the affair as a political

The line's transverse profiles,it admitted,

often did not conform to contract specifications, but this
stemmed,

it claimed,

from the use of inferior soils, whose

employment had been specifically permitted in the annex to
the concession contract of October 30
this inferior soil,

(article 18).

With

the profiles used were more stable

than the regulatory profiles.

In any case,

the builder

was legally covered by the government's official reception
of the line.

Construction expenses,

it noted,

had certain

ly entered the DSL's operations accounts, but at this late
date it was impossible to know by how much;
was also legally secure on this point.

so the company

It might be said

that the entrepreneur's agents had acted high-handedly and
deviously, but they had not acted fraudulently

according

to the contract's terms and the tolerances permitted by
agents of the state.

The crucial faults lay instead,
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they concluded,

in the defects of the original Walter

project calling for unrealistic economies,

in the defects

of a contract annex copied blindly from those of Algerian
railroads, and in the poor defense of the s t a t e ’s interest
by governors and Surveillance Engineers.

112

This report is a fascinating document, as much for
its apparent blindness to the key responsibilities of top
ministry officials in neglecting the state's financial
interest,

as in some remarks on the builder's construction

methods that were in some ways more damning than Etienne's
report of 1887.

The final trace of the line,

it noted had

been laid out by company engineers with an eye to reducing
construction time and cost to a minimum by turning the
least volume of soil.

As a result,

the tracks were located

in man y places on the lower part of slopes,

so that flood

waters cascading down the slopes into rail embankments
of unstable earth easily washed out the roadbeds during
the hivernages of 1883, 1884, and 188 5.

Sufficient drainage

would have solved the problem; but the works had been
accepted as they were by the state, absolving the company
of blame.

One of the major defects in the structure of

the line was the over-extended spacing between traverses
along the rails, which (while saving the company 600,000
francs)

left the track unstable under stress, causing

numerous derailments.

Once again the builder was absolved,
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because the ministry had specifically granted a variance
117

on the spacing of traverses in February 1881.

The

short masonry spans, seemingly defective in 1886, now
seemed solid enough.

But the bridge at Hann was still as

delapidated as in 1883.

Furthermore the metal Leybar bridge,

the one structure which Etienne could praise in 1887, had
developed dangerous cracks, owing to defects in the original construction. 114
A careful analysis of the results of this report by
a high official of the new Ministry of Colonies in 1896
drew more judicious conclusions.

The fault, he wrote, did

not lie with Razy or Chapron, however poorly they had p e r 
formed, but with higher governmental authorities
ministry who failed to give the necessary orders.

in the
These

officials apparently had thoughtthat,
it was a matter of a sort of provisory line, const ru c
ted at little expense and designed ultimately to r e 
ceive complementary installations and successive
improvements.
But if it were thus, duty required inform
ing parliament and offering it the alternative: either
to construct a railroad under normal conditions with
a slightly higher immediate expense, or to sketch out
a rail line, put hastily into service and completed by
the concessionary company by means of an annuity during
the period of concession.
In fact, it is the latter
result which was attained.115
The company then had only followed its contract, and
if it had profited, perhaps even unduly,

it could not be

sued for illegal acts or for most of the defects o f the line.
All that could be done at this point were some minor legal
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actions compelling the company to advance an additional
80,818 francs of capital to match an extra governmental
subsidy covering an extra Ah kilometers of constructed
rail length on the line, and to force it to pay for repairs
on the bridges of Hann and Leybar.
In fact, this was all that was done.

X16
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of Director of Colonies, May 19, 1883, Ibid.; no. 269.)

35.

A description of the P.V. of the ad, hoc commission is
in the draft of the Chaper report of August 6, 1895,
pp. 245-255.

36.

Friocourt to GS, April 28, 1884, SARS, DCF; report by
Friocourt, M a y 10, 1884, FOM, Senegal X I I , 68; Frio
court to MMC, May 10, 1884, Ibid.; DSL to S/Sec, May 29,
1884,Ibid.

37.

Friocourt1s complaints were discussed in the Verifica
tion Commission's session of June 27, 1884, Reg. 31,
pp. 10,11; see also the annex, I b i d . , pp. 13-19.

38.

Extract P.V., Administrative Council of Senegal,
May 6, 1884, SARS, DCF; P.V., Commission of reception,
M'Pal-Louga, June 4, 1884, I b i d .; DSL (Bois and
Vieuxtemps) to GS, Ibid.; Legros approved of the
governor's action in overruling the commission-Note
for S/Sec, July 12, 1884, Legros Resum€, p. 154.

39.

Friocourt to MMC, August 22, 1884, FOM, Senegal XII,68.
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Friocourt quoted from a letter by Bois to his s u p e r i 
ors at the DSL in Paris, December 13, 1883: "the
Surveillance Engineer appears to forget completely
the interest of the State that he is charged to d e 
fend."
40.

Draft S/Sec to GS, June 4, 1884, no. 160,congratulated
Friocourt for his zeal, in FOM, Senegal X I I , 68; draft
S/Sec to GS, June 4, 1884, no. 161, Ibid., while
commending Friocourt, suggested that the documentation
he requested was superfluous.
Felix Faure suggested
that Friocourt stick to a verification of DSL r e 
ceipts, not expenses; and that any further r e c o m m e n d a 
tions on construction methods would not be "useful,"
since the company was living up to the c o n tr act :-the draft S/Sec to GS, October 18, 1884, I b i d ., s u g 
gested only minor changes in surveillance.

41.

Razy's copy of the conference of December 5, 1883 in
the Cabinet of acting governor Bourdiaux, FOM, TP: the
Chaper report of August 6, 1895, Ibid., p. 242, was
trying to throw the blame on Razy by taking his remark
out of context.

42.

Report by Razy, M arch 14, 1884, SARS, DCF; report by
Surveillance Engineer, M a y 30, 1884, I b id.

43.

6S to MMC, May 9, 1884, ARS, 2B58; same, June 23, 1884,
Ibid.; Director Interior, Senegal, to Chief Public
W o r k s , M a y 17, 1884, SARS, DCF; draft S/Sec to GS,
June 4, 1884, FOM, Senegal X I I , 68; according to the
Chaper report of August 6, 1895, pp. 183-184, a d i s 
patch of June 5, 1884, no. 169,decided in favor of
Razy.
Friocourt kept up his complaints, as in his
letter to MMC, September 5, 1884, FOM, Senegal X I I , 68,
which bore a ministry official's notation "This is the
business of technical . . . surveillance, not f i n a n 
cial surveillance."

44.

Razy's report of April 6, 1884 on the Pout-Tivaouane
line is mentioned in the note to S/Sec, May 15, 1884,
by Legros, FOM, Senegal X II, 43.
Legros agreed that
the section not be opened until after the hivernage;
A series of incidents occuring in rural districts of
the colony in June made the colonial government jittery.
War was feared in case Samba Laobe chose to betray them.
The acting governor wrote in the political report to
MMC (August 23, 1884, ARS, 2B75):
"The essential
thing is to construct the line,whose completion will
permit us to regulate this question finally as we
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please.";

see also same,

September 9, 1884,

Ibid.

45.

P . V . , Verification Commission, November 6, 1885,
Reg. 31, pp. 98-105; the DSL had already protested
suspension of the interest guarantee for the period
in 1883 when the Dakar-Rufisque had been cut, and
officials of the Ministry of Marine had sided with
the DSL (P.V., Verification Commission, January 31,
1885, Reg. 31, pp. 38-49); but an early report by
Razy for the Director of Interior, August 22, 1884,
SARS, DCF, actually blamed the company for the w a s h 
outs; See also the copy, arret of January 13, 1888
of the Conseil d'Etat in Reg. 31, pp. 216-221; and the
useful
"R^ponse aux pourvois formes par la Compagnie
DSL concernant le r^glement de ses comptes d' e x p l o i t a 
tion 1883-85," by Houette-February 1891, copy in FOM,
Senegal X I I , 65.

46.

Mayor Rufisque to Director Interior, August 10, 1884,
SARS, DCF; Director of Public Works to Director I n 
terior, August 13, 1884, Ibid.; Municipal Council of
Rufisque, P.V., seance of November 21, 1884, SARS, DCF.

47.

See "Rapport sur l'€tat des postes du fleuve et sur les
reparations nfcessa ire s," by Constant, doc. 26 (Plans
1870-75) ARS, P 3 ; the climate's effect on wood is d i s 
cussed in a report on the functioning of the "voitures
systeme Labastie," A R S , 0243.

48.

A n unsigned, undated note in the acting governor's
handwriting (the Director of Interior, Quintrie)
accompanying a Razy letter of December 22, 1884, SARS,
DCF, said: "Besides, M. Razy has entered into open
warfare with his bosses from the moment he received
his notification of recall.
He refuses requests for
service addressed to him from the Director of the I n 
terior, and if I were not tied by your instructions,
I would make him leave without waiting for his
successor, as his attitude is becoming intolerable.";
a letter of Razy to Director Interior, September 25,
1884, SARS, DCF, refers to the earlier quarrel in
June 1884; a copy of Director Interior to Director
Public Works, December 1, 1884, I b i d ., refers to the
ministrial dispatch of October 21st relieving Razy
of
his functions.; Legros was furious with Razy on
hearing of the innundations--Note to S/Sec, Legros
Resume pp. 156, 157; Razy's death was mentioned in the
P.V., November 6, 1885, Reg. 31, p. 99.

49.

DSL to S/Sec, March 30, 1885, FOM, Senegal X II, 43;
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was a particularly quarrelsome fellow who undermined
his boss in the Haute Fleuve railroad campaign of 18821883, and who unsuccessfully attempted to seduce the
wife of a subordinate in 1885 shortly before being
shipped out to Paris.
50.

Definitive reception of the entire line was first
broached in Blondelet to GS, May 19, 1885, SARS, DCF;
and it was apparently welcomed in Director Interior to
GS, June 1, 1885, Ibid.; see also the Chaper report,
August 6, 1895, pp. 294-304.

51.

See Chaper report, pp. 309-317; Director Interior to
GS, June 9, 1885, ARS, 035; copy DSL response to
Chapron offer,June 12, 1885, and copy Chapron offer,
FOM, TP; copy Felix Faure to DSL, June 27, 1885, I b i d .;
copy GS to MMC, June 27, 1885, I b i d . ; excerpt P.V.,
Private Council, June 13, 1885, FOM, Senegal XII ,57.

52.

Report annexed to seance of October 1, 1884, Reg. 31,
pp. 20-21, 25-27; from note to S/Sec, September 16,
1884, Legros Resum£, pp. 1 5 6 f f .; the Chaper report,
pp. 280-281 notes a critical dispatch, S/Sec to GS,
September 19, 1884.

53.

Kimon D o u k a s , The French Railroads and the State (New
York, 1945), p~ 4 5 n . , remarked that the construction
costs of rail lines in the metropole averaged around
200,000 to 250,000 Fr/km. A. Picard, Les chemins de
f e r , Vol. VI (Paris, 1885) indicates that these
figures are typical, although citing (pp. 37-39)
the case of a 170 km, 1 meter line to be built in
France at 69,713 Fr/km.
The price of 68,000 Fr/km
for the DSL in distant Africa, even though it was a
narrow-gauge, 1 meter line, was thus clearly a bargain
price.
On the other hand, company records indicate
that the company did not pay out even the full amount
of the government subsidy on the DSL.
The accounts
presented in the reports to Batignolles shareholders
(registry entries in ANF, 89AQ11, for June 30, 1882,
November 29, 1882, December 15, 1883, December 6, 1884
and December 12, 1885) show total Batignolles expenses
for "etudes diverses", July 1882 through June 1885 as
totaling 772,794 francs, and total Batignolles "depenses a l'exterieur" for the same period of 11,772,542
francs.
To this should be added the expense of o u t 
fitting the DSL in Senegal, which includes 110,000
francs of equipment sent in 1883, and the cost of
required rolling stock, which I estimate from other
purchases as 1,800,000 francs.
This amounts to a
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total of 15,345,336 francs of expenses on outside work
at a time when the Batignolles was also involved in
constructing the Tunis-Algeria railroad and the
Pierrelatte Canal in France. Total Batignolles d i v i 
dends and bonuses, Dec. 1883-Dec. 1885, amounted to
6,875,000 francs.
54.

See Note of Director of Surveillance, July 1, 1896,
FOM, Senegal XII,73; note Legros' strong defense of
the company in the January 31, 1885 session of the
Verification Commission, Reg. 31, pp. 38-46; -- B e 
sides the Ministry of Marine was already entangled in
other, disastrous and expensive colonial campaigns
in Tonkin and Madagascar, and had finally been
obliged to admit the failure of the Kayes-Niger r a i l 
road building program earlier in mid-1884.

55.

A copy of these plans and cost estimates is contained
in FOM, Senegal XII,42 bis (a).
Details of the
projected station emplacements in FOM, Senegal X I I , 42
bis (b).

56.

Informed of the final plans in November, the colonial
government arranged for an expropriation inquiry with
an arr£t£ of November 22, 1882 [in Moniteur du Senegal,
November 28,1882, p. 222.)

57.

Commandant Goree to GS, May 9, 1862, with added f o o t 
note of 1865, in Charpy, F o n d a t i o n , p. 328.

58.

GS to MMC, April 8, 1879, FOM, Senegal XII,41; See also
GS to MMC, political report, July 20, 1876, ARS, 2B73.

59.

GS to MMC, January 25, 1883, FOM, Senegal XII,45;
Mayor Rufisque to Director Interior, January 27, 1883,
SARS, DCF; Blondelet to GS, February 12, 1883, ARS,
033.

60.

Copy note for Direction des Colonies, by Legros,
October 14, 1882, FOM, Senegal X I I , 45; copy note for
Direction des Colonies, by Legros, October 7, 1882,
FOM, TP.

61.

The FOM dossier Senegal XII, 46 (a) is concerned with
this question; see also GS to MMC, February 23, 1883,
FOM, Senegal XII,43; GS to MMC, January 25, 1883, FOM
Senegal XI I , 45; Notes to Direction des Colonies,
February 14, 1883, and February 13, 1884, Legros
Resum£, pp. 108, 147; see also P.V., local commission,
June 11, 1883, FOM, Senegal XII, 46; same, June 18,
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1 8 8 3 ,

I b i d .

62. GS to MMC, March 23, 1883, ARS, 2B57; Note of July 21,
1883, Legros Resume, pp. 135-136.
63. Maurel 8 Prom to MMC, M a y 1, 1883, FOM, Senegal X II ,46;
Gasconi to S/Sec, March 1, 1884, Ibid.; same, March 13,
1884, Ibid.
64. The history of the authorization is recounted in GS to
MMC, September 9, 1883, FOM, Senegal XI I, 46; see also
GS to MMC, June 9. 1883, Ibid.; Blondelet to GS,
February 12, 1883, ARS, 033; Director Interior to
Blondelet, April 5, 1883, SARS, DCF.
65. GS to MMC, February 23, 1883, FOM, Senegal X I I , 43,
calculated an outlay of 200,000 francs in Dakar and
about 52,000 francs in St. Louis; the ministerial di s
patch of April 5, 1883 (copy in Bull Admin du S e n e g a l ,
1883, pp. 140-141) suspended expropriation in Dakar;
see also GS to MMC, April 24, 1883, ARS, 2B57; same,
May 24,1883, FOM Senegal XII,43.
66. Ministerial dispatch, M a y 4, 1883, Bull Admin du
S € n € g a l , 1883, no. 258; same, May 5, 1883, I b i d ., no.
260; same, May 19, 1883, Ibid., no. 270; excerpt P.V.,
Administrative Council, Senegal, June 30, 1883, FOM,
Senegal XII,46; draft S/Sec to GS, October 18, 1883,
Ibid.; GS to MMC, October 24, 1883, I b i d .
67. GS to MMC, September 9, 1883, FOM, Senegal X I I , 46; same
September 24, 1883, I b i d . ; note to S/Sec, November 2,
1883, by Legros, Ibid.; GS to MMC, January 8, 1884, ARS,
2B58; same, March 23, 1884, I b id. ; Delegate Interior
(Dakar) to Director Interior, November 14, 1883, SARS,
DCF.
Bourdiaux, an important figure in the Ministry of
Marine, was in Senegal temporarily as acting governor
in order to rectify administrative and political
problems.
68. An arret£ by Bourdiaux, October 22, 1883 (Bull Admin du
Se n e g a l , 1883, no. 739) designated terrains for expro
priation for the rail line in Dakar; the arr§te of
March 5, 1884 (Ibid., 1884, no. 224) fixed the compensa
tion; the terrains for the passenger terminal were
chosen in an arr§te of May 6, 1884 (I b i d ., no. 441); an
arrete of July 7, 1884 fixed compensation for those
terrains (Ibid., no. 407); the letter Blondelet to GS,
Ma y 19, 1885, SARS, DCF, indicated that the terrains
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for the Dakar passenger terminal were turned over
March 24, 1885 to the DSL; see Director Interior to
proprietors, Dakar, January 20, 1886, SARS, DCF; Chief
of Operations, DSL to Director, Public Works, August 4,
1887, I b i d .
69. Sor became an island during the annual innundation of
the Senegal river, but with relatively easy access to
continental ground.
70. Plans had called for the tracks leading directly up to
the vicinity of the Faidherbe bridge, but the company
had rejected that solution.
(DSL to MMC, September 4,
1882, FOM, Senegal X I I , 43); note for Direction des
Colonies by Legros, September 5, 1882, FOM, Senegal XII,
46; same October 14, 1883, FOM, Senegal XII,45.
71. P.V. inquiry, December 6, 1882, FOM, Senegal X II, 46
(b); GS to MMC, January 23, 1883, FOM, Senegal X I I , 45;
report by Dupre, January 27, 1883, SARS, DCF; estimates
by Couteau, February 10, 1883, Ibid.; Blondelet to
Director Interior, February 26, 1883, Ib id.
72. Director Public Works Service, Dupr£ to Director In
terior, March 5, 1883, SARS, DCF; draft MMC to GS; April
16, 1883, FOM, Senegal X I I , 46; note for Direction des
Colonies, April 5, 1883, I b i d . ; GS to MMC, May 24, 1883,
FOM, Senegal XII, 43; there was an altercation over the
occupation of unexpropriated land by the Batignolles in
March 1882--see Director Interior to Blondelet, April
5, 18 83, SARS, DCF.
73. Director Public Works to Director Interior, March 5,
1883, SARS, DCF; Director Interior to Blondelet, April
5, 1883, SARS, DCF; Director Interior to GS, April 30,
1883, I b id. ; J. Hubler to Director Interior, December
19, 1883, SARS, DCF; G. d'Erneville to Director Interior,
December 19, 1883, I b i d . ; see also DSL (Bois and
Vieuxtemps) to GS, June 7, 1883, SARS, DCF, complaining
of the non-delivery of some terrains at St. Louis.
74. The other road ran across the marigot of Khor.
See
Director Interior to Chief Public Works Service, D e c e m 
ber 9, 1882, SARS, DCF; GS to MMC, December 23, 1883,
FOM, Senegal XII,43; GS to Director Interior, January
25, 1883, SARS, DCF.
75. GS to MMC, December 23, 1883, FOM, Senegal XII,43; GS
to MMC, political report, December 26, 1883, SARS,
DCF; S/Sec to GS, June 4, 1883, SARS, DCF.
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76.

Razy's copy o£ the conference of December 5, 1883, in
the Cabinet of acting governor Bourdiaux, FOM, TP; GS
to MMC, December 23, 1883, FOM, Senegal X I I , 43; GS to
MMC, January 8, 1884, FOM, Senegal X II ,45; draft S/Sec
to GS, February 4, 1884, FOM, Senegal X I I , 43; GS to
MMC, February 8, 1884, ARS, 2B58.

77.

Response administrative note, Director Public Works to
Director Interior, September 1, 1884, SARS, DCF.;
S/Sec to GS, January 29, 1885, I bi d.; same, August 29,
1885, I b id., with report of July 3, 1885 by Chapron;
see also Note to S/Sec, September 16, 1884, Legros
Resum€, p. 156.

78.

See report no. 564 bis by the Surveillance Engineer,
Sallenave, August 24, 1886, FCM, Senegal XII,.50, in
which this capable official complained; "Often the
Chief of Operations of Dakar (DSL) asks us to approve
certain projects, basing /^his request_7 on aut hor i
zations already given by the ministry to the central
administration of the company at Paris.
The Service
of Surveillance at Dakar knows neither
the spirit
nor the letter of these authorizations, so it m ay be
indecisive in responses which it makes to the company's
demands, and even in contradiction with the orders
given Jby the ministry.
We ask, therefore, /~to be
given_/
the orders or observations that /~the ministry_7 addresses the company . . . The task of the
Surveillance Service will be better defined, if this
service will be able to stay in touch with the ideas
of the ministry on the subject of the affairs of the
Dakar-St. Louis Company."
See also the note to S/Sec
by the Inspector General of Naval Works, October 26,
1886, FOM, Senegal X I I , 50.

79.

Blondelet to GS, April 10, 1884, ARS, 033; GS to MMC,
political report, December 8, 1884, ARS, 2B75, e x 
pressed pleasure at the good relations between rail
road workers and the inhabitants of Cayor; see also:
same, August 8, 1884, Ibid.; same, March 11, 1885,
Ibid.

80.

The letter by Blondelet to GS, June 26, 1884, SARS,
DCF, informed the governor of the evacuation of
European workers, and added: "I am confident . . .
that you will seek out and punish without delay the
culprits, for a too great forbearance on your part
will only encourage the blacks to multiply their
aggressions."
See also: GS to MMC, political report,
ARS, 2 B 7 4 ; GS to MMC, July 8, 1884, SARS, DCF.
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81.

Actin g High Commander to GS, July 19, 1884, SARS, DCF;
instructions on security measures to Capitaine, JulyAugust 1884, ARS, 033.--The DSL used the situation to
get the colony to open the Pout-Tivaouane line for
service.
See, e.g., Bois to Chef de bataillon
Troismaison, June 27, 1884, I b i d .

82.

Delegate Interior (Dakar) to Surveillance Engineer,
June 17,1884, SARS, DCF; GS to MMC, August 9, 1884,
ARS, 2 B 5 8 .

83.

Copy note by DSL (Paris) to S/Sec, attached to letter
of October 25, 1884, SARS, DCF, which went on:
"It
is necessary that black police agents not be permitted
to arrest without warrant one of our foremen in the
performance of his duties, on the simple complaint made
to them by a Negro as happened in Dakar on June 21,
without the police agents being reprimanded."--See also
copy DSL to S/Sec, October 25, 1884, I b i d .; Director
Interior, Senegal to Surveillance E n g i n e e r , October 27,
1884, SARS, DCF.

84.

Despite the conflicting testimony on the incidents,
the conclusions of investigating French officials, who
were not generally favorable towards the inhabitants
of this area, suggests that the African version of
events was closer to the truth.

85.

Terry Coleman,
pp. 93-114.

86.

GS to MMC, June 7, 1881, ARS, 2B55.
See also, Director
Interior to Director of Public Works, March 20, 1883,
ARS, 3G2/9.

87.

A brief reference to the working party in 1883-84, at
the St. Louis side of the line, in "Notes g^ographiquss"
Bull. S G C B , 1883, 15, August 6, 1883, p. 464, broke
down the laboring work force into 50 French, 50 Spanish,
150 Italians, and 300 Africans.

88.

See arr£te of January 14, 1884, in Moniteur du S e n e g a l ,
January 15, 1884, p. 13; Mayor St. Louis to police
superintendent, January 20, 1884, SARS, DCF; Mayor St.
Louis to Director Interior, April 5, 1884, Ibid.;
GS to MMC, April 7, 1884, ARS, 2B58.
Mayor Rufisque
to Director Interior, February 14, 1883, SARS, DCF.

89.

Delegate Interior (Dakar) to Director Interior, J a n u 
ary 18, 1885, ARS, 035.

The Railway Navvies,

(Harmondsworth, 1969),
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90.

The incident at Kelle was covered in a report by
Chauvet, commanding spahis at N'Dande, September 17,
1886, ARS, 033; and Chauvet to ? (Minet of Political
Affairs), September 17, 1886, I b i d . See also:
Stationmaster Tivaouane to Operations
(DSL), Dakar,
December 1884, I b i d .; Commandant in Cayor to GS,
October 4, 1886, Ibid. ; GS to Chief of Operations
(DSL), May 21, 1886, S AR S, DCF; GS to Commandant at
N'Dande, Ma y 21, 1886, lb i d .; in a letter by Minet
(Political Affairs) to Commandant M'Pal, September 3,
1886, I bid . , the latter was enjoined to treat r a i l 
road agents as fellow Frenchmen in a foreign setting.

91.

GS to Chief of Operations (DSL), May 21, 1886, SARS,
DCF; GS to Commandant at N'Dande, May 21, 1886, Ibid.

92.

On the railroad attack, see: GS to MMC, political
report ARS, 2B75; report by Commandant cercle Diander,
October 12, 1885, to Director Interior, SARS, DCF.
On peanut sales in Cayor, see: GS to Director Interior,
February 25, 1886, SARS, DCF; GS to MMC, political r e 
port, March 12, 1886, ARS, 2B75.
On the station p e r i 
meter extension, see: Report by the Director of Politi
cal Affairs of Senegal, December 30,1884, FOM, Senegal
X I I , 45; GS to MMC, January 22, 1885, Ibid.;
GS to MMC,
political report, January 8, 1885, ARS, 2"B7 5; P.V.,
Administrative Council, January 20, 188 5, ARS, 033;
copy S/Sec to Chief Central Service (DSL), March 10,
1885, ARS, 035.
On the demands on N'Diambour; GS to
MMC, November 7, 1884, FOM, Senegal I, 72; GS to MMC,
political report, June 15, 1885, ARS, 2B75.

93.

See Ganier, "Lat Dyor," pp. 248ff. on the events of
1886; GS to MMC, political report, July 12, 1886, ARS,
2B7 5; same, October 14, 1886, I b i d .

94.

The French indicated knowledge of Samba Laobe's plans
in the political report GS to MMC, May 12, 1886, ARS,
2B7 5.
It was only later that they claimed that there
had been no way to stop him from invading Djolof by way
of N'Diambour.
Genouille was, by the way, very pleased
that Aliboury had not realized that his treaty with
the French colony (April 1885) had never been ratified
by the French and
Ltherefore technically invalid.
See also GS to MMC, political report, June 12, 1886,
I b i d .; same, July 12, 1886, Ibid,.,

95.

See the unsigned letter of August 12, 1886, ARS,
pp. 127, 128.
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96.

Copy of letter of agent Maurel § Prom to Director
Interior, July 23, 188 6, SARS, DCF; Stationmaster
Tivaouane to Director Political Affairs, January 6,
1886, ARS, 033; on the other hand there were bitter
complaints against Samba Laob€ in President, Chamber
of Commerce of Rufisque to Director of Interior,
August 3, 1886, ARS, 035.

97.

GS to MMC, political report, August 12, 1886, ARS,
2B75; same, August 13, 188 6, ARS, 2B64.

98.

In the political report GS to MMC, October 14, 1886,
ARS, 2B75, p. 135, the governor commented with barely
concealed satisfaction, "This _terrible example will
bear fruit and the /^railroad_/ company agents will
henceforth be able to circulate f r e e l y ."--see also
district chief, DSL to Commandant fort of Louga,
September 11, 188 6, ARS, 03 5; Commandant Louga,
Marchand to Director Political Affairs, September 12,
1886, I b id.

99.

See Ganier, "Lat Dyor," pp. 250-251; on freeing slaves,
see footnote 90 above, especially Minet to Commandant
M'Pal, September 3, 188 6, SARS, DCF; See Minet
(Political Affairs) to Commandant Thi£s, September 3,
1886, no. 479, I bi d.; GS to MMC, political report,
September 15, 1886, ARS, 2B75.

100. Acting GS to Commandant Spahis, N'Dande, September 8,
1886, SARS, DCF; three letters and a report by the
officer commanding the spahis of N'Dande, Chauvet,
dating September 12 to 19, are found in ARS, 033.
101. Genouille's one-side and inadequate version are given
in the political report of October 14, 1886 (ARS, 2B75),
and in GS to MMC, October 12, 1886, FOM, Senegal 1,76;
besides Ganier's article, see also "Historique de la
Mission Catholique de Thi§s," (extracts of the mission
journal, 1G-192, typewritten copy in ARS), entry for
October 6, 1886 quotes a letter of 2nd It. Chauvet to
1st It. Spitzer on the death of the darnel at Tivaouane;
the version in the anti-administration newspaper, Le
Reveil du Senegal, October 10,1886, pp. 1, 2
("Execution de Samba Lawbe") is not enlightening.
102. Extract GS to Admiral of Naval Division, October 8,
1886, FOM, Senegal IV,99, on the aremed trains:
"I do
not attack, but I wish to demonstrate to the country
that I am so prepared, that it is best to be on good
terms with me." (Italics in text); see also, Admiral
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Ribell, Commandant o£ South Atlantic Naval Division
to MMC, October 10, 1886, FOM, Senegal IV,99.
103. See Klein, Islam and Imperia li sm, pp. 165-167; note
by acting Director Interior, August 28, 1886, ARS,
1 3 G 4 1 ; GS to MMC, M a y 14, 1886, ARS, 2B64; same,
April 28, 1886, I b i d .; same, August 13, 1886, I b i d .
104. GS to MMC, November 13, 1886, FOM, Senegal 1,76; a
copy of the g ove r n o r ’s proclamation of October 21,
188 6 is in SARS, DCF.
105. Ganier, "Lat Dyor,” p. 255; GS to High Commandant,
St. Louis, October 25, 1886, SARS, DCF; circular
Minet to Commandants cercles, November 3, 1886, I b i d .;
Minet to Political Affairs, Louga, November 6, 1886,
Ibid.; GS to Commandant N ’Dande, November 15, 1886,
Ibid. ; GS to MMC, political report, November 14, 1886,
ARS, 2B75; same, labeled November 15 to December 15,
1886, Ibi d .
106. P.V., Verification Commission, November 5, 1886, FOM,
Senegal XII, 69 (also in Reg. 31); same, November 12,
1886, I b i d .; same, October 7, 1886, Ibid.; bill no.
1037, session 1886, FOM, Senegal X I I ,69.
107. Report by Paul Etienne, March 31, 1887, FOM, Senegal
XII ,69.
108. The ministry had been well aware of the stone available
at these quarries.
See Senate bill no. 225, annex to
seance of December 28, 1880, p. 3, alluding to the
commercial possibilities of the stone.
Copy in FOM,
Senegal XII,69.
109.

See JORF-Debats P a r i .-C hambre, November 20, 1888, pp.
2592-2596; JORlF-D6bats P a r i .rC h a m b r e , November 28,
1890, pp. 2310-2596; the report, or at least parts of
it, did excite some critical comments against the DSL
during a session of the Verification Commission, see
P.V. of June 24, 1887, in Register no. 32, FOM, TP,
pp. 183-184.

110. Chaper was a member of the Permanent Committee of
Colonial Public Works.
See JORF-D^bats P a r i .-Chambre,
March 1, 1895, pp. 635-639.
by i»y4 the total outlay
advanced by the state for the railroad, including c o n 
struction, operating deficits, and guarantees, was
almost 31,000,000 francs (Chaper report, p. 366); the
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DSL had been forewarned about the Turrel speech (DSL
to Haussman, Ministry of Colonies, January 4, 1895,
FOM, T P ) .
111. A 384 page draft of the report of the Chaper mission,
dated August 6, 1895 and signed by all three on the
commission is in FOM, TP.
1 1 2 - I b i d ., pp. 26, 88, 153-169, 176-190, 193, 205, 206,
209, 276, 304-308, and especially pp. 374-383.
Cheap
shots were thrown at Etienne throughout; e.g., pp.
193, 197, 198, 203, 211.
113.

I b i d .; see especially pp. 25-27, 56,202-203, 211, 335,
355-354, and summarized in pp. 367-372.
On page 185,
it was claimed that Friocourt's letter of April 28,
1884 could not be found, but the letter is in SARS,
DCF.

114.

Ibid., pp. 62, 66-90.
The decks of spans more than 1
meter long, being of wood, however, could be set on
fire by the sparks from a locomotive; See also DSL
to Minister of Colonies, July 10, 1895, FOM, TP.

115. Note by Director of Surveillance, July 1, 1896, FOM,
Senegal XII ,73; see also note by Inspector General
Bricka for the African Direction of the Ministry of
Colonies, July 9,1896, I b i d .
116. Note for Minister of Colonies, June 13, 1895, by the
Director of Political and Commercial Affairs, FOM, TP.
DSL report to stockholders, June 27, 1899, FOM, TP.
A decision of the Conseil d'Etat of June 21, 1907 held
the DSL liable for repairs on the bridge at Hann.
A
decision of the Conseil d'Etat of November 3, 1916 also
settled the Leybar bridge question by rejecting the
DSL's application for reimbursement of the costs of
repairs.
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C H A P T E R

I I I

THE DSL'S IMPACT,

1885 to 1911

je vous assure que, pour un vieux Senegalais comme moi
... ce n'est point petite joie que de cheminer 5 la
remorque d'une locomotive ^ui^siffle alldgrement et
d^roule son panache de fumee a travers ce Cayor naguere
fermee.
--anonymous, 18841
It is not surprising that the railroad's promoters,

so

unreliable in their estimates of construction costs for a
Dakar-St.

Louis railroad,

should also prove equally inaccur

ate in their rosy predictions of traffic and receipts for
this rail line.^

Both Walter and Vaubourg had based the f i 

nancial viability of a projected DSL on rail service between
the ports of Dakar and St. Louis

(and Rufisque to a lesser

extent) without that much regard for traffic in between.
It is true that the rail express running daily in both
directions between Dakar and St. Louis quickly replaced the
slower, more expensive maritime passenger service between
the two ports; but there was little profit in this element
*Z
of traffic alone.
Freight traffic between the ports could
have been more lucrative.
predictions,

However, unlike the promoters'

freight was generally not transhipped by rail

from St. Louis to Dakar or vice versa,

despite St.

157
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-1 5 8 difficult access to the sea.

The cost differential b e 

tween freight sent directly by sea between France and
St. Louis and that detouring by the railroad and the port
of Dakar was at first simply too great.

Even the go v e r n 

ment of Senegal, for example, preferred importing coal
from France into St. Louis by sea at a cost of 35 francs
a metric ton, rather than via sea and railroad at a total
cost of 54 francs a ton.4

Even if the sand bar at the

mouth of the Senegal river blocked larger ships from en ter
ing the port,

it was still often cheaper to load the cargo

onto schooners at Dakar for transshipment to St. Louis by
sea, rather than taking the railroad.^
Nor was it easy for the DSL to capture this traffic
by creating special,
ports.

low freight rates between the two

The railroad terminal facilities at both ends of

the line were plainly inadequate for substantial traffic,
especially at St. Louis where the freight terminal was
too distant from the port and where the poorly-constructed
riverfront terminal was reached only with difficulty.^
When special low rates were indeed essayed from 18 97,
they had little initial success.

Even as late as 1909,

after creation of an improved port at Dakar and s u b 
stantial improvement of rail facilities at both ends of
the line, only 12,000 tons of freight was sent from Dakar
to St. Louis by rail as compared to 33,000 tons imported
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-1 5 9 to St. Louis by sea; and only 2000 tons were sent out by
7

rail from St. Louis in the other direction.
lude,

In the i n ter 

the DSL had found it convenient to transfer its

scant freight business at Dakar to the small passenger t e r 
minal near the port, while converting the freight terminal
g

into a dormitory for its personnel.

Political impact

Vaubourg and Walter had undoubtedly been

so careless in their economic and financial estimates of
the railroad's prospects because of a more abiding concern
for its strategic potential; and in this respect they were
certainly justified by subsequent events.

Not only had

the French been able to master Cayor quickly during the
crises of October 1886, but local resistance faded rapidly
in the aftermath.

French dominance in that country was

never seriously challenged again by an military action or
insurrection, and the DSL railroad also served subsequently
as a useful springboard to subjugate the neighboring k i n g 
doms of Djolof and Baol, as well as to assure a rapid
passage of troops and military supplies by rail to the
Senegal river

(and thence to the Upper Senegal) from bases

and entry points at Dakar (see Figure 7).
Nevertheless,

even though the railroad had been e f 

fective in assuring a rapid, almost painless conquest of
regions adjoining the littoral between St. Louis and Dakar,
it certainly had not been absolutely necessary for this
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French expansion toward the upper and middle

Niger was proceeding at the same time with only minor a s 
sistance from a jerry-built, uncompleted Kayes-Niger r a i l 
road.

To be sure, both this railroad and the DSL provided

some useful logistical services.

However, much of the

credit for the rapid, wide-ranging movement of French
military forces should go instead to the humble, but
versatile "Lefebvre" supply carriages, which made possible
reliable supply transport over long cross-county distan9
ces.
Within Senegal itself, the events in Cayor had been
paralleled by deep French advances farther inland into
areas--Niani,
road lines.

Ouli, and parts of Saloum--far from any r a i l 
The occasion for expansion in this direction

had been the suppression of a formidable Sarakole jihad on
the Upper Senegal from M a r c h 188 6 . ^

The pursuit westward

in 1887-1888 of its defeated leader, Mahmadou Lamine,

link

ing up to a French advance in Rip, extended the colony's
frontiers well southward--without benefit of direct rail
support--into areas hitherto part of the economic sphere
of the British Gambia and sealed the fate of Djolof and
Baol, both now encircled and destined for absorption after
1890.11
The French conquest of these areas, unlike Cayor, owed
little to the railroad directly.

Nevertheless,

as Villard

so perceptively noted, the creation of the DSL was playing
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-1 6 2 a major role on a more general political plane by assuring
the unity of the colony of Senegal.

12

St. Louis and Goree-

Dakar had each been serving as the staging areas for two
radically different directions of French expansion into
West Africa--a continental axis penetrating from St. Louis
into the Sudan along the Senegal river and a coastal e x 
pansion down the A frican coast from GorSe as far as Gabon.
The administrative severance from Senegal in 188 2 of the
outreaches of each of these tendencies--an autonomous Upper
Senegal military command in the Sudan and a coastal
"Rivieres

du Sud" where the future French Guinea would be

formed--was an important step in assuring the continued
unity of the two base colonies of St. Louis and Gor6eDakar.

13

This unity was strongly affirmed by the DSL, which

now assured an easy political communication between the two
ports while also opening the intervening hinterland to
direct, mutual economic exploitation.

Despite some later

variations in the colony's frontiers, Villard's Senegal-the populated ring enclosing the barren central Ferlo
desert--was now firmly stitched together by the iron band
of the railroad between its two principal links.
Closely associated to the DSL's political impact was
its expanding economic role as a major carrier of peanuts
from the interior for Senegal's export trade.

Both Vaubourg

and Walter had waxed enthusiastic about the trade supposedly
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to be generated by the railroad in the interior.

But the

vagueness of their estimates casts doubt on their serious
ness in this respect.

Indeed contemporary government

officials were skeptical about the commercial value of the
railroad until the volume of peanut traffic that rapidly
developed on a newly-opened DSL line pleasantly surprised
them.

Export volume and economic geography

The contemporary

drop in market prices for Senegal's trade unfortunately
obscures the precise impact which the DSL railroad might
have had on peanut exports from its completion in 1885.
One set of figures shows peanut exports dropping from a
peak of 53,498 tons in 1880 down to a low of 18,714 tons by
1887.

During this period the once thriving peanut trade

of the Damga and Galam on the upper Senegal river vanished,
and it remained moribund around Matam as late as 1904 d e 
spite a subsequent recovery in commodity p r i c e s . ^
be inferred, on the other hand,

It may

from the continuing trade

activity along the DSL that the railroad had indeed a r 
rived in time to save a good deal of the shrinking volume
of trade by reducing transportation costs in the area near
the railroad corridor.
Almost from its inception,

the railroad captured a

major share of Senegal's peanut export traffic, and as the
trade began to expand again from 1892 the railroad con-
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-1 6 4 sis tently carried about 70% of S e n e g a l ’s peanut exports
(see Table 1).

With even greater peanut exports in r e 

sponse to higher commodity prices after 18 98, the DSL
prospered with greatly swollen freight loads; but its
share of total peanut exports dropped closer to 50% of
total exports,

indicating an extension of peanut cultiva

tion into areas remote from the railroad

(notably the

Saloum)
The interplay of external market price and local
transport costs was molding the geographic contours of the
export trade in Senegal, and it may be assumed that without
a railroad and with lower prices, peanut cultivation for
export would have hugged areas bordering the coast and
rivers for easier exportation.

But two of the more a ccess

ible areas--the lower and middle Senegal river basin and
the "niayes" coastal region between St. Louis and Dakar-were unsuitable for peanut cultivation.
ductive regions,

18

Other more p r o 

such as coastal and fluvial areas of

Diander, the Sine-Saloum, and the Casamance, of course?
might have expanded their production somewhat in the absence of a railroad.

19

Improvements in river navigation

might have saved some of the shrinking peanut trade on the
Upper Senegal.

But one ought to rule out any significant

compensating spread of the perimeter of marginally pr ofit
able land in response to higher prices--as that suggested
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-1 6 5 by Fogel for American farmland near river valleys--because
falling peanut production in Senegal apparently made little
impact on prices in a European commodity market fed by
other areas competing with Senegal.

20

The railroad had certainly expanded the zone of profit
ably cultivable land by creating a new inland corridor,
along which agricultural products could flow cheaply and
rapidly to the colony's ports while imported trade goods
travelled in the opposite direction.

This was most obvious

in terms of the land immediately bordering the rail tracks.
The zone was also expanded,

less obviously, because of an

effective increased capacity of domestic means of overland
freight transportation.
Even before the DSL railroad's inception,

the export

trade in this region had been well served by freight-haul
ing pack animals rented by local entrepreneurs during the
trade season.

As the peanut trade had grown from m i d 

century, Mauretanian owners of camels and donkeys had been
lured seasonally from the vicinity of the Senegal river
southward to hire out their animals for hauling peanuts
from the interior to the ports.

Other Africans, p a r ti cu 

larly those of Gandiole, had also joined in renting their
pack animals in this profitable carrying trade.

21

These

herds of animal porters had spared Senegal from transport
by human porterage--that curse of much of tropical A f r i c a - -
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but hauling rates for animal porters were generally high,
and the routes followed from many inland centers could be
very long.

22

Caravans from Baol and southern Cayor, for

example, would avoid the direct route to Rufisque via the
dangerous "ravin des voleurs" between Thi&s and Pout, with
a wide detour from Thi&s to the fort of M'bidjem on the
coastal telegraph road, and thence to Rufisque via the
Tamna bridge.

Often enough it was just as easy for trans

porters to bring their peanuts all the way to distant St.
L o u i s .^
The DSL railroad did not eliminate pack animal t r a ns
portation in the interior, but altered its employment.

By

bringing a number of new export outlet points closer to
producers in the form of the rail stations,

the DSL reduced

the distance necessary for hauling by animal porter, d i m i n 
ishing thereby the overall costs of pack freight and i n 
creasing the total seasonal volume that the pack animal
herds could haul.

24

Overall pack freight rates were p r o b 

ably reduced as well simply because this service also b e 
came thereby less critical; and the reduction in overall
hauling costs obviously extended the perimeter of m a r g i n 
ally profitable areas for cultivation and sustained a
higher level of export volume.
It can hardly be said, however, that the railroad was
optimally situated to stimulate maximum peanut production.
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-1 6 7 Two stations, Thies and Tivaouane, alone consistently p r o 
vided about half the peanuts shipped on the railroad
Table 1).

(see

Some of these peanuts came from southern Cayor.

A good many came, however, from nearby Baol, an important
center of production before construction of the railroad.
But the railroad was placed too eccentrically with respect
to Baol to serve that region well, wi th much of B a o l ’s
consequently-diminished production escaping the railroad
entirely via the small ports of Nianing, Joal, and even
Fatick.25
As early as 1885, Alexis Bois was
half of the DSL,

advocating, on b e 

construction of a ne w branch line from

ThiSs into Baol and Sine--as a first section for a future
rail line penetrating into the Sudan.2^

Indeed, when the

engineer P. Etienne made his inspection of the DSL line
in 1886, he spent much of his time accompanying a DSL
official on a reconnaissance of a possible trace for a
rail spur through Baol to Fatick.

27

By 1892,

the colonial

government, now also keen to see a rail line built in this
direction, dispatched a military engineering officer to
explore a trace in the area.

Although nothing came of this

officer's project at that time, his detailed report p i n 
points areas of Baol and Sine already being exploited
(such as the Diarring-Gate region).28

Full exploitation

of Baol and the Sine-Saloum's productive potential, however.
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had to await higher market prices and construction of the
Thies-Kayes railroad in the 20th century.

Ports and rail

The upgrading of Dakar into the major

seaport for the interior's export trade had, of course,
been one of the primary goals of the promoters of a DakarSt. Louis railroad.

These expectations, unfulfilled in the

case of traffic from St. Louis, did not materialize to any
great extent for peanut exports either.

It was the port

of Rufisque instead that harvested the major share of this
traffic, rather than Dakar.

Merchants and traders from

Rufisque were establishing posts at rail stations even as
the line was being built, and Rufisque quickly captured the
peanut trade up to N'Dande.

29

Poorly endowed with an in 

adequate wharfage and an occasionally turbulent anchorage
that forced tedious offshore loading of ships from small
boats, Rufisque nonetheless possessed the adequate space
for commercial activities that Dakar lacked.

30

While Dakar

received only a few hundred tons of peanuts by rail a n n u 
ally until 1906, Rufisque consistently drew 80 to 90% of
the railroad's peanut freight after 1888
3).

(see Tables 2 and

Dakar had to await construction of a special c o m m e r 

cial port, undertaken from 1904, before it could c a p it al
ize on its excellent harbor.

In the meantime, Dakar served

as a major coaling station for maritime shipping, as well
as an administrative center both for government services
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31

St. Louis at first drew the peanut freight of the
northern stations of the railroad line, occasionally even
from as far away as N'Dande.

Nevertheless, after 1890

St. Louis generally attacted no more than 10 to 151 of the
peanuts shipped by rail.

This came about partly because

the more northerly stations feeding St. Louis lay near
areas apparently less productive than those closer to
Rufisque.

32

But the marked tendency after 18 94 for peanuts

from northerly stations,
Gueoul,

such as Kebemer and even Goumbo

to exit via Rufisque

St. Louis'

(Table 3) also indicates that

inadequate rail terminals and relatively d i f f i 

cult access to the sea were playing a role in this respect.
The higher costs of shipment through St. Louis would, of
course, also shrink the zone of marginally profitable
land whose produce could exit from the northern rail s t a 
tions via St. Louis.

Structures of trade

Senegal's external commerce was c e n 

tered principally on the export of gum and peanuts.

Gum

procured along the Senegal river, mainly by barter with
Mauretanians for imported European "trade" goods, was the
more ancient commerce of the two and the major basis for
the commercial prosperity of St. Louis.

Earlier,

the trade

had officially been confined by the government to d esi gn at
ed riverain trading posts called "escales."

But enter -
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-1 7 0 prising small traders had succeeded so well in evading
government restrictions from 1853 that a liberalized
statute in 1880 finally permitted trading at any point
along the river.
wholly free.

33

The river trade was, nevertheless, never

It was restricted by law to French citizens--

a profitable monopoly so jealously guarded by St. Louis'
merchants that they strongly resented even the few Moroccans
and African British subjects who tried to trade on the
river.

34

This marked conservatism of St. Louisian merchants?

more concerned with preserving an acquired position on the
river than in entering new fields on the Upper Niger,

indeed

exasperated French colonial officials and military officers,
who were complaining before the conquest that Sierra Leone's
African traders were outpacing the complacent Senegalese
7C

merchants even on the Upper Senegal.
From the 18 5 0 's a growing demand for oils in Europe
encouraged increased cultivation of peanuts by individual
peasants in the Senegambia.

St. Louis profited from the

cultivation of the product in its suburbs, from caravans
bearing peanuts from Cayor and Baol, and from a s hor t
lived peanut trade with the Upper Senegal.

However,

it

was the coast of Diander and Baol that became major sources
of peanut exports.

Nearby Goree,

largely somnolent after

the end of the slave trade, revived to some extent because
of this trade; but the trade also showed some tendency to
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-1 7 1 shift to less-cramped coastal ports instead--to Nianing,
Joal, Dakar, and above all Rufisque.

The advent of the DSL

decisively confirmed this shift by dramatically transfering
the greater part of Goree's commercial activity in peanuts
to mainland Rufisque.

36

The larger expatriate merchants, mainly of Bordeaux,
owed their commanding position in Senegalese commerce to
their shared virtual monopoly in maritime freight transport,
which enabled them,

if they curbed mutual competition,

to

manipulate the local price relation between imported goods
and produce bought for export.
together,

Obviously if they acted

they could give the peasants less for their

produce in terms of the trade goods imported from Europe.
On the other hand,

they could also freeze out of the trade

any interloping small merchants by contrarily paying the
peasant high prices
his produce.

in terms of imported goods bartered for

A small interloper obliged to pay shipping

rates set by his larger competitors could be whipsawed,
especially in a barter system, between the maritime freight
costs extracted by the shippers and the direct competition
from the shippers themselves, who could better afford to
pay the peasant with more imported goods for a given amount
of produce.

37

Hardly less important to the position of European
merchants was the development of networks of credit in
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-1 7 2 Senegal that allowed a wide geographical distribution of
trade through intermediate African and creole traders,
while sparing the Europeans, based at coastal ports--St.
Louis, Goree, and later Rufisque and Dakar--from the t r o u 
ble of venturing inland for commerce.

The merchants would

lend goods to a trader, who might in turn lend them to a
host of lesser traders.

The cultivator to whom the goods

were ultimately sold might also borrow the goods on credit
from a trader in anticipation of delivering his harvested
70

produce later.
Newbury has uncovered a very valuable clue to the
nature of this credit system in a contemporary account
describing the huge debts that European firms would allow
•z g

their traders to incur.

A trader might return from the

interior with produce worth only a fraction of the value of
the trade goods previously lent to him.

Nevertheless,

since

these goods had been pegged at artificially inflated prices
to begin with,
profit,

the lending firm would in fact garner a tidy

even while the trader remained in its debt.

The wise European merchant,

it must be surmised, would

also be shrewd enough to play on occasion the part of
magnanimous patron--in tune with local African notions of
generosity--by "forgiving" the debts of his trader, and
thereby earning the trader's gratitude and loyalty cheaply.
This credit system would also be a factor in excluding un-
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-1 7 3 inf ormed European interlopers, who in failing to adapt to
local social conventions by granting generous credit terms
would find it difficult to buy produce or market goods.
Despite their mutual dependence, relations between
the larger European merchants and the African traders were
nonetheless inherently unstable.

European firms used

their monopoly in shipping at times to set low purchase
prices in common for export crops,
profits.

thereby squeezing trader

The trader might cheat his patron in many ways,

in

some cases simply absconding into the bush with his trade
goods.

40

European merchants in turn would often compete

with their own traders by sending regular firm employees to
trade directly with producers in the interior.

The rivalry

between merchant and trader was probably a major reason for
the efforts in the 1 8 8 0 ’s to limit trade on the Senegal
river once again to fixed escales, where established c o m 
mercial houses had decisive advantages over the independent
small trader.4 '1'

It was certainly a major factor in the

formation of a political party in the 1 8 8 0 ’s around J. J.
Crespin and the DevSs family, who claimed to stand for the
economic interests of the petty traders against the dominance
of the Bordeaux houses.4 ^
In the eyes of the merchants,

the independent petty

traders might be viewed after all as troublesome,

super

fluous intermediaries, whose interference only diminished
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4 3

Yet even the most annoying of these traders--

the "maitres des langues," who diverted road caravans to
particular patrons in trading centers--performed a useful
function in the trade.

44

The African trader had a superior

knowledge of the market and client preferences.
count on old political,

economic,

nections in the interior.

He could

and perhaps family c o n 

Most importantly, he would o p e r 

ate easily and willingly in the interior, which most Europeans would care to visit only occasionally,

if at all.

45

Contemporary documents seem to detail few outward
changes in the structure of trade in Senegal with the c o m 
ing of the railroad.

There was indeed some initial c o n 

fusion about its future role in the trade.

One prominent

merchant of St. Louis, for instance, was surprised and
deeply distressed that traders and merchants were going to
the expense of setting up branch operations in new centers
forming near rail stations in the interior instead of l e t 
ting African cultivators themselves haul the peanuts by
rail to St. Louis for direct trading with European commercial houses right in the city.

46

In reality, by affording

Europeans an unprecedented easy access into the interior,
the railroad had tipped the economic "balance of power"
decisively in favor of the European commercial houses.
Even as rail stations were being opened on the DSL, the
larger firms were rushing to open branch operations for
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-1 7 5 direct trade with cultivators in the interior in the new
an

trade centers that were mushrooming next to the stations.
The implications of this movement were obscured at
the time by the continued prominence of the independent
African trader in the trade.

European firms often employed

Africans in these branch operations,

and African traders

had their own operations in these new trading centers, which
seemed to resemble the riverain escales so much that they
AO

were promptly dubbed "railroad escales."

Even while

keeping a respectable share of the escale trade, the African
trader still remained indispensable in nearby centers of
production unserved by the railroad- -Ba ol , Sine, and east
ern Cayor.

Moreover, contemporary resistance in Senegal to

projects in the 1 8 9 0 ’s for a new DSL rail spur into Baol
indicates indeed that many European merchants were satis
fied with the existing trade a r r a n g e m e n t s . ^
Trading conditions had, nevertheless, been fundamental
ly, if not overtly altered by the railroad.

It now became

much easier for European merchants to check their traders’
activities frequently on the spot.

It was easier and

simpler for European merchants or European employees of
expatriate firms to trade directly with African producers
in the interior.
highway,

Moreover,

in contrast to a river or a

the DSL railroad was not equally accessible to

all users at all t i m e s . A c c e s s

to it was confined to a
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and it was controlled and r e g u 

lated according to rules set by a foreign-based admi ni str a
tion, which would be more responsive to the wishes of E u r 
opean merchants than to African traders or producers

(e.g.,

by lowering freight rates for larger shipments of p e a n u t s ) .
Unlike even French-controlled maritime shipping, where the
creole commercial house of the Dev^s, at least, could with
its own ships compete on equal terms against the expatriate
Bordeaux firms, Africans could never hope under ordinary
circumstances to capture control of the railroad f i n a n c i 
ally or to compete with it co mme rc i a l l y .^
In time, a merchant exercizing a more effective s u r 
veillance of his African traders, could reduce them to the
status of firm employees, while a concerted effort of the
European firms would allow elimination of the more u n 
cooperative traders during period of commercial c o n t r a c 
tion.

This apparently happened after about 1900, when the

rise in the market price for peanuts probably made the
employment of salaried agents, European and African,

in the

interior more remunerative and when the collapse of the
market in gum drove a surplus of traders into the peanut
trade.

52

Unfortunately,

growing profits in the peanut trade

did not necessarily shore up the position of the African
trader in the face of this general threat, because even a
temporary decline in market price could easily ruin those
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who had extended credit too freely.
The cardinal role of the railroad in the eclipse of
the once-prosperous independent African trader was even
more clearly illustrated from 1908 in nearby Baol, Sine,
and points east as a new ThiSs-Kayes railroad was being
constructed,

enabling the larger commercial firms to e s 

tablish new branch operations at the new rail escales g r o w 
ing along this new l i n e . ^

The independent African trader,

though surviving as a significant factor in the trade
until the 1930's, was able to do so largely by his a b i l i 
ty to move out farther into areas remote from the rail lines
and their e s c a l e s . ^

Population distribution

The DSL's impact on population

distribution,though difficult to assess,

is one of the most

intriguing aspects of change under colonial r u l e . ^
surface,

On the

the railroad's role in remolding the contours of

Senegal's social and economic geography seems most i m 
pressive.

The growth of the ports subsequent to the r a i l 

road's construction, for instance, was dramatic
4).

Rufisque,

(see Table

especially, mushroomed.during the period

that the DSL was being built, probably drawing most of the
population leaving Goree between 187 6 and 1885, though
apparently Dakar drew some also.

57

The line of French

military posts along the coastal telegraph could also be
abandoned as a new telegraph line was built along the rail-

R eproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the military posts at M'Pal and Pout.
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Some villages

near stations on the new line mushroomed almost immediately
(see Ta.ble 5) .
The line,

it should be noted, was passing through a

section of Cayor, which had already been well pop ula te d-a map drawn by Walter for the rail project of 1878 showed
some 15,000 people of Cayor living within a band of 1 km
on each side of the projected trace.

59

Nevertheless, many

important villages of Cayor--Niomre, Coki,

Soguer,

K.

Mandoube Khary, N'Diagne--were located well east of the DSL
trace, along the old main caravan routes from Baol and
Djolof toward St. Louis.
The growth of Tivaouane, which quickly became the most
active commercial center on the line, was one sign that the
railroad was drawing people.

T i v a oua ne,which had 650 in

habitants in 1878, according to the Walter map, boasted
1,178 people by: 1885 .

By 1897, the perimeter of Tivaouane,

which had been expanded to cover a square of 2 km on a side,
enclosed some 3,135 inhabitants--almost double the 1,670
in the same 4 square kilometer space shown on the Walter
map in 1878.61

Thies also grew abruptly from two small

villages totalling 260 people in 1878 to 1,003 people in
1885.

After a slow start,

the escale of Mekhe also grew

. ,.
.
62
to a respectable size.
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in other cases, however.

Already listed in W a l t e r ’s 1878

report as the "largestmarket of Cayor," Louga did not grow
m u c h beyond the 1000 inhabitants shown in 1878 on the
Walter map, until the turn of the century.

fi^

Kelle and

N'Dande seem not to have grown very much either; while M ’Pal
certainly,

and perhaps Piregourey as well, seem to have
64
actually declined in population.
The growth of T h i e s ,
though due in part to the railroad's passage,

also owed

something to its choice as an administrative center, and to
the fort and Catholic mission that were installed there.
Nor does the size of these escales seem impressive if it is
remembered that villages of 2000 and even 5000 people had
been observed by Mollien and Caille in the interior in 1818
and 1824.65
This is not to deny that railroads had an important
influence on the growth of urban and semi-urban towns in
Senegal, nor to imply that these agglomerations did not
differ fundamentally from the large agricultural villages
common in the region before the conquest.

It is rather

that both the redistribution of population and the growth of
urba n areas were more complex processes subject to the in
fluence of other factors--some of which were also acting
through the railroad.
A comparison of Tables 3 and 5, for instance,
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-1 8 0 cates that, as might have been expected,

the growth of

each of the escales was closely related to the volume of
peanuts shipped out of the escale.

The volume of peanut

freight at an escale would be related to the location of
the escale relative to productive areas--Louga with respect
to Djolof;

Thi^s and Tivaouane with respect to Baol and

southern Cayor--and to the cost of shipping from station to
port.
The problem of water availability during the dry
season was also one of the most important factors in limit
ing the size of an escale--or any village for that matter.
N'Dande, for instance,

seemed destined for a bright future

in 1886 when the colonial administration designated it as
the headquarters of its colonial resident in Cayor and when
the DSL also decided to install a central repair shop for
its locomotives and a midpoint rest stop for the daily e x 
press trains there.

Unfortunately,

the wells of N'Dande

were incapable of supplying the railroad's needs, much less
those of an increased number of villagers;

so that the r a i l 

road was sometimes obliged to haul in additional water by
rail.

The colony's administrative headquarters soon moved

to Tivaouane, while the railroad's refreshment stop and r e 
pair shop were also eventually transferred to the more
favorable site of K e l l e . ^

The contrary case is best ill

ustrated by Thiks, whose abundant,

clear water figured

largely in its selection later on as the junction point
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A steady supply of water for steam locomotives along
the rail line of course was a particularly acute problem
in a hot,

semi-arid, tropical climate, and the Batignolles

had been especially diligent in digging wells for su pp l y 
ing water at each rail station when the line was built.
Any surplus well water, as both the DSL and the colonial
government realized, could also serve to bring more A f r i 
cans to settle and stay in the vicinity of the escale.

Pre

occupied as it was in the 1880's and 1 8 9 0 's with solving the
water supply problems in St. Louis, Rufisque,
however,

and Dakar,

the colonial government itself did little for the

rail escales.

In the period 1892 to 1897, the new P r o t e c 

torate budget financed a paltry total of only 66 wells
(895 meters total) of w hich 25 wells
in near the Senegal r i v e r . ^

(416 meters) were put

A n extensive governmental

program of well-drilling designed to use abundant water to
attract and fix African populations in Certain favored areas
had to await the 1 9 0 0 's and was only undertaken seriously
when construction of the Thi§s-Kayes railroad began.
Lateral roads were another factor in tying escales to
nearby areas of production.

With few serious physical

obstacles encountered near the rail line, except for the
narrow Thies scarp and an occasional marigot bed, roads for
caravans could be built equally well in most directions.
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there was little governmental planning of road

systems except in the major communes, where only less than
50 kms of streets and roads were kept up by the colony's
Public Works service.

69

Road building in rural districts

was largely left to the discretion of French colonial a d 
ministrators stationed on the spot--generally the co mm a n d 
ants of the McerclesM --who would do it by means of annual
corvees

(called "prestations")

the routes.

70

of villagers living near

But since these officials were usually

stationed only for short periods in any one area,

the

efforts of one administrator were often negated by his
successors.

71

An 1897 survey of rural roads, most of them

little more than trails,

shows a total of only 1400 to 1500

kms, of which some 286 kms led out from Tivaouane alone.77
Around 1895,

it was suggested that a network of light,

narrow-gauge rail lines

("systeme Decauville")

branching

out from the DSL be built deep into Djolof, Baol, and
Sine--but northing ever came of the proposal.

73

Interestingly enough, the DSL line itself immediately
became popular--to the annoyance of DSL officials--as a
well-cleared major highway along which caravans and travel
lers could pass.

The company's efforts to cordon off its

tracks with barriers of thickets along the edge of its
property proved fruitless as the rail line became,

in

effect, a convenient "royal highway" for the interior.
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-1 8 3 Unfortunately this traffic also resulted in numerous
accidents in which herd animals or unwary travellers were
run over by trains.

DSL officials were particularly u p 

set about several train derailments that occurred when
livestock wandering on the tracks were hit, and there were
attempts to impose heavy fines on the owners of errant
animals straying in the vicinity of the track.

75

Ultima

tely, however, DSL officials became resigned to the use of
their line as a major highway.
The DSL's influence on population settlements and
movements can only be properly appreciated within the c o n 
text of the general problem of population distribution and
mobility in the Senegambia.

The Senegambia was a region

relatively rich in land, but sparsely populated.

Moreover,

these populations--at least as it struck French observers-seemed to move about in the region with a marked mobility.
Outside the river basins,

76

the sedentary populations--though

m u c h less mobile than the region's pa storalists--were
obliged to leave soil untilled for long periods of fallow.
The variations in scarcity of subterranean water during
the dry seasons also would often force the shifting of
village sites or the thinning of village populations.
Sentiments of attachment to ancestral soil could be strong;
but it was not uncommon for young m e n to migrate tempor
arily to distant regions,

such as the European ports,
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of trade goods.

Political di sagree

ments would also often be solved or a tyrant's misrule a n 
swered by mass migration.^7
The successful and prosperous states of the region
were those that could extend their control over sources
of manpower--perhaps simply by attracting people to move
into their sphere of control--and then benefiting from the
fruits of the toil and military support of these people.
The French colonies were no exception, particularly since
they needed a labor supply for construction work and for
the handling of goods in commerce, as well as an assured
supply of foodstuffs.

French colonial governments, even

before the period of imperial expansion, were very sensi
tive to any actions, political or economic,

that might

attract A f r i c a n populations toward European centers--or
conversely repel them.
Europeans,

The trade goods and arms sold by

the opportunities to sell products or learn

trade skills, and the relative immunity of French-con
trolled districts from petty warfare were solid advantages
attracting many Africans.
At the same time, the vexations of French law and
taxation or simply the annoyance of truckling to foreign
rule repelled many other Africans.

French officials had

to exercise constant vigilance from 1886, for instance, to
prevent an exodus of slave-holding Peul pastoralists, many
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Tukolor empire, because these herders feared that new
colonial legal measures would free their slaves.
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The

turmoils raised by the issue of slave emancipation only
ceased when rural areas of the colony were removed from
the trammels of French law through disannexation in
1890.

79
The colonial conquest of the 1890's altered the

situation in one sense by absorbing some of the states
hitherto competing with the colony for manpower
the Segu Tukolor empire).

Nevertheless,

(e . g .,

eager as they

were to show that the colonial venture would pay, and
saddled as they were with a substantial and growing in
vestment in such fixed installations as ports, rail lines,
and trading escales, French colonial officials were even
more keenly interested in drawing Africans

into cultiva

tion for export and in fixing them in locales where they
could best support the export trades.

In essence, the

French colonial administration was engaged in redistrib
uting the scarce labor resources of the conquered regions
spatially as well as into certain economic sectors, and in
so doing,

it was fixing a rigid geographical framework

upon the preexisting fluidity of the region's social g e o 
graphy .
Conditions had been transformed, of course, by the
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It now became possible to legislate

rural slave emancipation and to impose previously
o n

uncollectable taxes, without provoking mass emigration.
The imposed colonial peace also conversely permitted
greater dispersal of population--as witnessed in the rapid
decay of M ’Pal, which had boasted 2,500 residents
1878.

81

in

The railroad, of course, played an important role

in drawing Africans into certain areas by providing trade
activity, water supplies and road facilities.
less,

Neverthe

it was only one of number of factors in the picture.

From the 18 90's the need to earn a head tax in cash, for
instance, may well have been far more effective in impel
ling Africans toward certain favored areas in order to
raise agricultural produce more profitably or to labor for
wages.

An export enclave

In his excellent study of railroad d e 

velopment in the former Belgian Congo, Huybrechts observed
that railroads in that region had been used to distort
domestic trade patterns by reorienting commerce toward the
exterior while neglecting domestic traffic.

82

This point

merits attention in the case of the DSL, all the more b e 
cause of recent problems encountered by developing former
colonies in promoting more equitable dispersals,

spatial

and sectoral, of economic activities within their borders.
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-1 8 7 It does seem strange--perhaps even perverse--that
the DSL, though a major transporter of peanuts,

should have

played such a small direct role in transporting domestic
commercial products.

This is apparent from the figures in

Table 6 on annual rail haulage of millet,
staple grown in the region.

the basic food

Some millet did enter the

ports by rail; but much apparently bypassed the railroad
overland.

Livestock,

a major item in domestic markets, al

so avoided the railroad,
on foot.

and were driven overland instead

The DSL moreover

never did try seriously to

develop these lines of domestic traffic, although it did
carry large volumes of imported foreign

rice, which re-

placed millet in local diets to some extent.

84

This evidence, though strongly suggestive,
less conclusive,

however,

seems

if argued from a different angle.

Local domestic trade, after all, must have been stimulated
to some degree by the profits from the export trade, even
if the goods did not move by railroad to any measurably
significant extent

(e.g., the growing ports created a

larger market for meat).
all,

85

Even without a railroad, after

the peanut trade and rice imports would have developed

to some extent in narrower enclaves in coastal and fluvial
areas, and it may be asked whether a significantly heavier
domestic traffic in the relatively small area covered by
the DSL could have been generated by rail

in millet,
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salt, kolas, or any other products of local c o n 

sumption, given the relatively low value of these products
locally.

A factor in inducing some local sectoral d i s 

locations

(as in the substitution of foreign rice for

millet),

the DSL had in fact redressed certain prior

spatial disparities by inserting a corridor of trading
escales within the interior.
Of course

the DSL, as one of the factors involved

in a redistribution of population in the region, was h e l p 
ing to drain some of the substance from more remote regions,
while benefiting a relatively small e n c l a v e . ^

But this

was unavoidable given the modest area that the line could
service by itself.

The distortions due to rail systems

designed to encourage export trade to the neglect of
domestic trade become more pernicious and more apparent
within a wider interregional context,

as in the case of

the regional network of rails for French West Africa,

dis

cussed in the next chapter.

DSL traffic, rates, and fares

The DSL served principally

then, aside from its strategic role, as an instrument to
integrate Cayor and adjacent areas into a colonial "open
economy" by carrying a cash crop to port and conveying
back in return imported goods--cloth, rice, and diverse
manufactured items.

Like rail systems elsewhere,

the DSL

discriminated among classes of passengers and freight.
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-1 8 9 The so-called "slow" freight formed the bulk of commercial
freight carried by this railroad,

in contrast to a more

costly express freight comprising excess passenger baggage
as well as perishables that had to be transported quickly.
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The slow freight was classed in turn, according to

the nature of the goods transported,

into three different

categories, each of which was subject to different rates
generally proportional to weight and distance.

88

In

addition, a multitude of preferential "special rates" were
introduced at various times for particular types of goods
according to the size

(weight or volume)

of the shipment,

season of the year, or stations of passage

(e.g., St. Louis

to D a k a r ) .
Peanuts, finally treated as third class slow freight
after some initial hesitation, generally accounted for most
of the freight carried by the DSL--usually around two-thirds
of the annual freight volume on the DSL

(see Table 1).

In

addition, receipts from the traffic generated directly by
the trade in peanuts--that is, from imported trade goods
and a portion of passenger traffic as well as peanuts--must
have accounted for a plurality of the railroad's annual recaipts,

although receipts from peanut freight per se

constituted only about a third of the DSL's annual receipts
(see Table 7) .
The economics of rate setting for a variety of goods
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-1 9 0 could be complicated.

Ideally each product would be

charged enough to cover not only the operating costs of
transportation, b u ^ also a s har e of fixed costs and
reasonable profit.

Unfortunately,

shipping costs of p a r 

ticular items can be extremely difficult to calculate since
costs are based partly on the total volume of traffic for
this type of item and indeed partly on the total pattern
of traffic on the line.®®

Competition with maritime s h ip

ping and with animal porters in some cases could, moreover,
force lower rates on some products.

A low-priced product,

such as peanuts, would also be charged relatively low rates
to encourage a larger volume of peanut sales in the hope of
generating a compensating flow of imported goods that could
be charged the higher rates.

In practice,

therefore, rates

were set or modified haphazardly according to whether a
given rate promised to generate a respectable volume of
traffic and whether profits in more lucrative elements of
traffic seemed to be balancing losses in critical, but
less-profitable goods.

The art of rate setting, which

obviously required sound managerial judgment in predicting
changes in various elements of traffic as well as in c o m 
puting costs, would also clearly have a political side, b e 
cause the juggling of rates would favor the commerce of
some merchants and some locales.
The freight rate structure on the DSL,

it should be
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tremities of the line over points on the central parts of
the line.
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Freight rates on the DSL, general or special,

were almost all based on a kilometric rate per weight
shipped,

so that shipping from stations located far from

ports would pay higher freight charges.

For instance, the

railroad would charge 9.95 francs a ton for a shipment of
peanuts from Tivaouane to Rufisque;
Mekh£ to Rufisque;

13.8 5 Fr/ton from

and 18.40 Fr/ton from Kebemer to

Rufisque--a spread that could influence the volume of trade
and production along the line in the 18 90's, when a ton of
peanuts was priced typically at 150 francs a ton in
Rufisque.

91

Table 3 indeed confirms the point by showing

an upsurge of peanuts exported from north-central stations
of the line,

from Kelle to Goum bo- Gu eou l, after about 1904,

when increased commodity prices in Europe raised prices at
Rufisque into the 200 to 250 Fr/ton range and above--reducing rail costs to a much smaller percentage of the price.
Perhaps the regions near the center of the railroad
might have developed their export cultivation even sooner,
had the DSL utilized either sliding-scale kilometric rates
that decreased with distance or fixed rates that would
apply uniformly over wide zones on the line.

Rufisque's

chamber of commerce repeatedly suggested introducing flat
zonal freight rates for peanuts in the mid-1890's;

but St.
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-1 9 2 Louisian merchants, fearing that a zonal system would work
against their interests,

opposed it.

DSL management, p e r 

haps realizing that zonal freight rates could mean the
loss of traffic out of ThiSs and Tivaouane with higher
rates at these stations,
rate structure.

stubbornly opposed changing the

92

The predominance of peanut freight on the DSL also
aggravated operating problems for this railroad by intro
ducing a pronounced seasonal variation in the rhythm of
its traffic.

Because the peanut crop unfortunately needed

to be shipped almost entirely during the dry season from
harvest in November until the rains of the following May
or June--after which aiyunshipped peanuts risked being
spoiled by the rains--a heavy tempo of rail traffic during
this season would be followed by a long slack period during
which rolling stock and personnel would lie idle.

Attempts

to cut down on the fixed costs of this idleness by buying
less rolling stock or hiring a smaller work force would
only cause long delays and provoke customer complaints d u r 
ing the busy season--a chronically recurring problem on
the DSL.

This could be particularly acute on the single-

track DSL line,

since one late or stalled train would tie

up a string of other trains at stations behind or at c r o s s 
over points ahead.
Ideally rail traffic needed to be spread more evenly
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-1 9 3 over the year; but no appreciable rainy season freight
traffic ever developed.

Government shipments of building

materials or troop supplies by rail were too sporadic to
assure a steady slack-season traffic, and domestic freight,
as noted earlier, formed no significant part of rail
93
traffic.
On the other hand,
vice,

the magnitude of passenger s e r 

an element of traffic with a steadier year-round

demand, pleasantly surprised DSL and government officials
from the beginning.

The railroad immediately became a

popular mode of transportation in the interior, with p a s s 
engers accounting for over one-half of the railroad's
receipts at first, and between a third and over two-fifths
of the line's receipts from 1892 to 1910

(see Table 7).

As intended, the DSL railroad's daily express trains
replaced the dispatch-boat service previously carrying
passengers between St. Louis, Rufisque, or Dakar.

Yet, a

breakdown of company statistics for the years 1885 to 1895
(Table 8) shows that 3rd class passengers with short
journeys of only 54 kms one-way on the average

(compared

to 100 kms for 1st

class) accounted for about 90%

of all

passengers and 85%

of passenger traffic receipts.

statistics testify

to the popularity of the railroad with

Africans, who made

up virtually all the 3rd class

The

pass

engers; and also indicate that, given the rudimentary com-
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paying a disproportionate share of the railroad's receipts.
Thus, African 3rd class passengers were effectively s u b 
sidizing lower peanut freight rates, as well as a more
comfortable service for first class passengers

(who paid

a relatively low 0.12 francs per km as compared to 0.055
94
Fr/km for 3rd c l a s s ) .

The DSL company

Relations between the DSL company and the

colonial government of Senegal became smoother and more
amiable in the period after construction.

In 1890, the

governor wrote that he considered the DSL's Dakar-based
chief of operations as virtually a loyal member of Senegal's
colonial administration,

and this cordial spirit of c o 

operation seems to have persisted for about the first
Q C

twenty years of DSL operations."

Most important were

the efforts of the colony on the DSL's behalf in promoting
the company's project for a new branch line into Baol--a
venture that was almost approved in 1898-99.
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The DSL's relations with the government in Paris, on
the other hand, were far less congenial during this period.
For one thing, unresolved litigation left over from the
period of construction remained as irritants--the last
being resolved only in 1917.

Of far greater moment were

the company's struggles with the metropolitan government
over the financial conventions governing the DSL's profits
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During the period 1885 to 1900, government officials
and members of the National Assembly were particularly i n 
censed over the large, recurring operating deficits being
run up by the company,

since the state--as agreed in the

1880 convention--had to make substantial outlays covering
these deficits as well as the statutory minimum dividend.
The detailed,

informative annual reports of government in

spectors and the monthly technical surveillance reports
were basically directed at reducing the size of these d e 
ficits, which soon assumed alarming proporations
9)-
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(see Table

Commenting that the railroad had been created,

after

all, for strategic rather than commercial purposes, g ove r n 
ment officials were urging in 1886, for instance, that
costs be reduced by cutting down sharply on company staff
and rail services.

It was suggested that some way stations

be shut down, that passenger runs be reduced, and the
c o m p a n y ’s medical service be eliminated.
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These short

sighted economies seemed less necessary as rail traffic
picked up sufficiently to allow all but one way-station
to collect enough receipts to cover expenses.

But with

the DSL still showing annual operating deficits until 1898,
the metropolitan government was even asking the DSL to raise
freight rates for peanuts--a measure that the DSL wisely
99
resisted.
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-1 9 6 One means o£ reducing the massive annual government
al subsidies was to end the government's blanket guarantee
of operating deficits by pegging DSL costs at artificial
maximum levels that the company could exceed only at its
own expense--a procedure already envisioned in the c o n 
vention of 188 0 and strongly advocated by the joint-minis
terial Verifications Commission.

This in fact had been

one of the main reasons for sending the engineer P.
Etienne to Senegal in 1886.
set, however,

A workable formula could be

only after experience taught what "normal”

operating conditions for the line would be; so the DSL,
not surprisingly, balked at accepting any formula until
1 8 9 1 - -a precaution that allowed the DSL to get by the
costly initial period of operations
tion).^®

(and line r eco nstruc

The 1891 arrangement, however, proved u n s a t i s 

factory.
A compromise hammered out by a panel of experts, the
"Sentence Arbitrale" of April 10, 1891 pegged costs per
kilometer of track in service according to the formulas:
n

4,500 Fr/km + * for operations

(where R was the annual

receipts per kilometer); and a fixed 1,650 Fr/km for
maintenance.101

Mindful of these limits,

the DSL company,

as was intended, curtailed its real expenses,

trimming

staff and waste for a more streamlined operation;

but

governmental outlays continued at a high rate under this
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From 18 92,

the DSL's volume of freight shi p

ments and receipts jumped significantly and remained at
high levels throughout the 1 8 9 0 ’s. This reduced the gap
between real expenses and receipts, but inflated the c a l 
culated nominal operating costs, which rose directly as a
function of receipts.
(ultimately 101)

Now it is true that only a part

of the difference between calculated and

real operating expenses could be kept by the company as a
bonus for its economizing efforts; the larger part of the
difference was set aside in a reserve fund to be used for
emergencies arising on the DSL.

But government officials

were scandalized by the growth of this reserve, which
totaled 8 million francs by 1900 even while the cumulative
governmental outlay for DSL operations since the inception
had swollen by 1900 to a total of over 43 million francs.

102

DSL officials had hoped to use these reserve funds
to build a new rail spur from ThiSs.

103

But this was not

to be, as a new convention of December 21, 1900 replaced
the 1891 arrangement, and the old reserve was broken up
and its funds divided between the DSL and the state.

The

new 1900 arrangement ended the limitless accumulation of
large reserve funds, at least, by creating two smaller
funds restricted to 1.25 and 1.5 millions respectively,
with any excess difference between calculated and real
expenses to revert back to the state.

104

The old 1891
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-1 9 8 expense formulas were replaced by a more reasonable single
equation of: 3,250 Fr/km + | + 0.015 V + 0.05 T (with R as
receipts per kilometer and w ith V and T respectively the
equivalent annual total of passengers and freight tonnage
traveling the entire length of the line).

The DSL's old

economy bonus was retained, however, and lifted up to its
old levels by doubling the company's share of expense
"economies" from 10% to 20%.
Fairer than the 1891 arrangement,

the 1900 c onv e n 

tion soon became much more profitable for the DSL than
expected.

A mushrooming freight traffic from 1900 brought

prosperity to the line: receipts soon far exceeded real
expenses, even while the company reaped additional profits
from an economy bonus based on a calculation of fictional
expenses.
The growing prosperity of the DSL was soon reflected
in the attention increasingly paid to its stock in m e t r o 
politan financial markets.

Up until 1900, DSL shares had

been valued at a stable 650 francs per share, reflecting
the nominal 500 franc investment and the government's
guarantee of an annual dividend of 29.60 francs per share
(on slightly more than 10,000 shares outstanding).105

In

1901, the DSL's directors were able to declare an a d d i 
tional dividend of 5 francs per share for the first time
because of burgeoning receipts and,

in 1902, raised the
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-1 9 9 dividend by 8.40 francs to a total of 38 francs per share.
After fluctuating between 660 and 710 francs per share in
1901, DSL stock prices shot up to the 706 to 785

range in

1902; to the 788 to 860 range by 1903; and to the 845 to
925 franc range by 1 9 0 5 . ^ ^
The economy bonus played a key role in the DSL's
profitability;

in 1907, for example, the DSL's board was

able to declare a larger extra dividend of 16.40 francs
(making a total of 46 Fr/share)

even though receipts had

fallen in 1906, because the bonus had more than compensated
.!.
J
107
tor «tne
drop.
£

Prospects for the line seemed exception

ally bright because the government had undertaken constr uc
tion of a new rail line branching the DSL from ThiSs t o 
ward Kayes, where it would link up with the Kayes-Niger
railroad,

and the DSL had obtained in 1908 a franchise for

2 years to operate the first section of this line to
Diourbel--a lucrative arrangement in which the DSL received
40% of the new line's receipts even as the new traffic
swelled the old line's receipts and economy bonuses.
For 1908 the DSL dividend reached 50 francs;
1909 and 1910 it rose to 55 francs.

in both

In 1908 the stock

sold above 900 francs; by mid-1909 it was at 1165 francs,
by mid-1910 at 1218 francs.

Even the government's decision

in 1910 to exclude the DSL from participation in operating
the Thies-Kayes line depressed stock prices only temporar

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-2 0 0 ily, since it also fueled rumors of governmental plans to
buy the DSL railroad outright--in a settlement that would
be decidely advantageous to the company.

108

in 1911,

the stock price reached a peak of 1415 francs a share: but
then the bubble burst as the government unexpectedly
denounced the convention of 1900, ending speculation that
the railroad would be purchased or that its profits would
be as high in the future.

109

Why was the 1900 arrangement denounced?

Perhaps it

was due to political changes in the Ministry of C o l o n i e s ,
which was increasingly reflecting the local government's
growing coolness toward the DSL.^"^

It was certainly due

in part to the very success of the DSL in economizing in
its operations despite a growing traffic load.
With the extra burden of assuring service on the
Thi^s-Diourbel rail branch, DSL railroad operations were
put under a severe strain.

Frequent breakdowns of an

overworked rolling stock and the resulting long delays
evoked strong protests from local m e r c h a n t s .

Stung by the

criticisms voiced in a session of the colony's General
Council, DSL management unwisely called for an official
inquiry to clear the company of these charges.

The result

ing inquiry only prompted a new flood of criticisms that
tarnished the company's image.

Dakar's chamber of commerce

commented, for instance!
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Operations are defective from all points of view.
Passenger trains never arrive on time, or rarely, and
often delays are over one to two hours, and more.
These delays are caused generally by the considerable
time lost in stations from loading and unloading freight
so as to leave empty wagons behind while taking only
full wagons, and from a scarcity of personnel.
This
wouldn't happen if passenger trains were only p a s s e n 
ger trains and not also freight trains.
The rolling stock, locomotives as well as freight
cars, is defective and insufficient.
Passenger cars
are badly kept / ^ a n d "7 of a repulsive filthiness--the
seat cushions staineoT with grease spots.
Passengers-some women--he e been seen standing for the entire
journey of 10 hours rather than sit on the cushions
that repel them.
One must note that the cars are old
and badly assembled.
The insufficiency of personnel
and materiel has often been signaled by this Chamber
with r e s u l t . m
Unfortunately for the DSL, moreover,

an official in

vestigation of the charges led the governor of Senegal to
conclude, "that the complaints formulated by the General
Council of Senegal

. . . are in great part justified."

The DSL's equipment was found to be old and insufficient
and obviously in need of replacement,
in some circumstances

its passenger service

in violation of conditions set out in

the convention of 1900; and many of the operational defects
resulted from the company's exploitation of overworked and
underpaid European agents, who in turn took it out on the
public.

112

The DSL only compounded its difficulties by

asking in September 1910 to be allowed to extend the
maximum statutory shipping delay for peanuts from the
regulatory three days to five days.

The request evoked a

storm of protest from local merchants and even earned a
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-2 0 2 rebuke from the influential Union Colonial Francaise.

113

Conditions were no longer as favorable for the
operation of a government-subsidized private company in
the French colonies.

The National Assembly was unwilling

to pay for these ventures, and the Ministry of Colonies
had itself finally turned away from this method for
developing an empire.
even prosper.

The DSL was indeed to survi/e and

World War I suspended governmental efforts

to nullify the convention of 1900, though with the DSL's
economy bonus reduced from 2 01 to 151 as of January 1915.
However,

in retrospect,

the position of the DSL had

suffered one damaging blow from which it never really did
recover.

That lay in the failure of the company to obtain

the options to build or operate the Thi^s-Kayes railroad,
which not only lost it the profits that could come from
managing the new line and from-the profitable traffic
patterns that could have been developed to the advantage of
the old line, but henceforth also embroiled it in inter min 
able, often bitter controversies with the colonial g o v e r n 
ment over coordination of the two lines.

Inevitably,

role of theDSL company was thenceforth to diminish
considerably,

first politically and then eventually

economically.
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Notes
1. Anonymous, "Chemins de fer au Senegal," Bull.
no. 4, February 18, 1884, p. 106.

SGCB,

2. Vaubourg avant-projet, January 15, 1872, FOM, Senegal
X I I , 40: Walter report, November 25, 1878, FOM,TP.
Overoptimism was, of course, a common foible of r ai l
road promoters.
See H. Craig Miner, The St. Louis-San
Francisco Transcontinental Railroad (Lawrence, 1972).
3. See below, page 193.
Indeed the company was required by
its concession contract to maintain the daily two-way
express service between Dakar and St. Louis.
4. GS to MMC, February 28, 1886, ANF, DD-2/ 2434. At Dakar
it took three separate operations in handling to bring
coal from ship to depots.
At that time the railroad
lacked even the rolling stock necessary to haul the coal
to St. Louis.
5. Jacquerez report, September 15, 1901, FOM, TP.
The rate
by schooner from Dakar to St. Louis was 13 to 15 francs
per ton plus a 2% ad valorem charge for insurance.
Com
petitive special rates on the DSL reduced charges on
stone, wood and iron for construction down to 20 Fr/ton
in 1894 and for coal down to 21.90 Fr/ton in 1899.
6-

Inspector L. Petyt's report on the DSL for 1888-1889,
FOM, Senegal XII,69, p. 24, noted that the freight termi
nal at St. Louis opened for service only on January 9,
1888; but the lack of any path leading to it from the
city, made it unusable until 1890.
The note by Fournie,
May 8, 1890, FOM, TP, remarked that the wooden pier built
for the riverfront rail station at St. Louis had been
devoured by worms within two years.
Traffic from Dakar
to St. Louis by sea would be governed by the state of
the bar, which would be easy to pass in some years,
difficult in others.
(see "Summary report on increases
and decreases in the traffic of the French Sudan in
1898," February 1, 1899, ARS, Q 4 9 ) . Even in 1912, the
municipality of St. Louis preferred to ship construction
stone by sea from Dakar rather than by rail (P.V.,
Municipal Council of St. Louis, February 13, 1912, SARS,
DCF).
According to the Jacquerez report, September 15,
1901, FOM, TP, a November 1897 special freight rate on
imported goods shipped from Dakar to St. Louis brought
1,686 tons of traffic to the DSL in 1900; but by 1902 the
DSL was asking that it be rescinded because it generated
too little traffic (P.V., CC-St. Louis, February 28,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-2 0 4 -

1 9 0 2 ,

A R S - L ) .

7.

Report by Meniaud,

September 1, 1910, ARS, P244.

8.

copy of note on_maritime rail station at Dakar, n.d.
r 189 7 or 189 8_/ , FOM, TP.

9.

A brief early description of the famous Lefebvre c a r r i 
ages is in "Senegal," Bull, S G C B , no. 20, October 15,
1883, pp. 588-589.
See also Denise Bouche, Les
villages de liberte en Afrique noire frangaise, 1887 1910 (Paris, 1986), p p . 58-59.

10. B.O. Oloruntimehin, "Senegambia - Mahmadou Lamine,"
in West African Re si stance, ed. by Michael Crowder
(London, 1971), pp. 80-110.
11. See Martin Klein, Islam and Imperialism in Senegal
(Edinburgh, 1968), pp. 134-145; A. Dessertine, Un port
secondaire de la cOte occidentale d'Afrique-Kaolack
(Chamber of Commerce of Kaolack, 1967), pp. 14-15;
Villard, S enegal, pp. 141ff, especially p. 146.
12. Villard, pp.
13.

175-179.

I b i d . , p. 152; report by Jaureguiberry to the French
President, October 12, 1882, printed in Moniteur du
Se ne g a l , November 7, 1882, pp. 199-200.
The difficul
ties for residents of Dakar and Rufisque to reach St.
Louis by sea for regular visits, such as for sessions
of the colonial General Council, are noted in GS to
MMC, April 25, 1887, ARS, 2B61.
See also Yves St.
Martin, Une source d l'histoire coloniale du S£n£gal.
Les rapports de situation politique, 1874-1891
(Dakar, 1966).

14. Bouchet to S/Sec, November 15, 1887, Senegal XII,69,
stated: "The DSL was conceived as a strategic route.
If one uses it to favor and develop commerce, so much
the better.
But one ought not to exaggerate JT itsJ7
commercial character in making too great sacrifices for
this secondary objective."
As noted in the Chaper r e 
port of 1895, FOM, TP, p. 128 ministry officials had
not - even bothered to set freight rates for peanuts in
the rate clauses of the annex to the convention of
October 30, 1880.
15. These figures derive mostly from Ministry of Marine,
Tableaux de population, de culture, et de commerce dans
les co l o n i e s , 1878-1880, and Ministry of Marine,
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X Guiraud,
L*arachide s§riggalais (Paris, 1937), p. 37, tabulates
a variation m peanut exports from Senegal going from
a high of 43,500 tons in 1883 down to 21,729 tons in
1886.
His figure of 16,086 tons in 1882 seems more
reasonable than the figure of Jean Ad a m ,L *ar achide
(Paris, 1908), p. 118, of 83,000 tons for 1882.
16.

Adam, pp. 19-20, "Notice sur ... Matam," 1904 ? ARS,
1G-292, which said: "Autrefois le Damga fournissait
beaucoup d'arachides au commerce du Senegal, mais
depuis la construction de la voie ferree, qui relie St.
Louis a Dakar, la culture de ce produit a ete presque
abandonee en raison du manque de debouches commerciaux.
... vu les frais de transport, le cours n ’en est plus
suffisamment remunerateur pour les cultivateurs du
f l e u v e ."

17.

Report of Customs Service, Senegal, 1st semester 1903,
ARS, 2G3-22 commented on the extension of commerce
into the interior in response to higher prices.
"Des
maisons nouvelles, de nombreux comptoirs ont ete
recemment crees.
Elies ne se bornent plus, commeprecedement d attendre des indigenes dans les escales
grincipales de la Cote, mais envoient
des agents
et
etablissent des succursales un peu partout et principalement dans le Baol, le Badane, le Sine-Saloum et la
Casamance." - The tastes of the customers were changing
also with significant increases in the importation of
cloth, rice, and kolas.

18.

Adam, pp.

19.

Peanuts in coastal areas south of the Saloum and those
of Galam, however, were judged inferior to those of
Cayor; even those of Sine and the Petite Cote brought
slightly lower prices.
See Adam, pp. 47-48,126, 136141.

20.

R. W. F o g e l , Railroads and American Economic.Growth
(Baltimore, iyb4)7 PP* 4 9 - n u , especially pp. b3-55.
Fogel*s express assumption that the demand for produce
was inelastic and his implicit assumption that the
supply of wagon-hauling animals was elastic were both
clearly inapplicable to Senegal.

21.

As early as 1881, an estimated 8 to 9,000 camels might
be seen inthe town during the busy trading season
(Noirot's journal on the Baol mission, entry of April
19, 1881, ANF, 1 48AP2); see also the Noirot report of
November 28, 1892, FOM, Senegal X I I , 82; commercial

18,

20-21.
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report, "cercle" of Louga, 1st trimester 1903, ARS,
2G3-28; Exposition of 1900, Le Senegal (Paris, 1900),
pp. 399-400; report in Journal Official du Sen ega l,
February 1, 1900, pp. 45-46.
22. On porterage in the Congo see Jean S ur et- C a n a l e , L *Sre
coloniale, 1900-1945 (Paris, 1964), pp. 42-52; for
porterage in G u i n e a s e e the Payn report of September
1903, ARS, 0250; for some isolated examples of p o r t e r 
age in Senegal, see the political report for January
1906, ARS, 2G6-4, and the political situation report
for Niani-Ouli, May 1909, ARS, 2G9-36.
Estimates
for the rates for animal porters varied from onequarter to one-half of the value of the peanuts at the
trade center, depending on the distance covered.
Some
useful information on rates is covered in the Noirot
report of November 28, 1892, FOM, Senegal X I I , 82; the
Marmier report of June 5, 1893, FOM, Senegal X I I , 81;
handwritten note, doc. no. 2 2, ARS, 085, report of
Director Public Works, September 23, 1907, I b i d . ; see
also Adam, p. 105.
Cf., Bouche, pp. 5 9 f f ., for the
situation, in the Sudan.
23. GS to MMC, political situation, April 7, 1877, ARS,
2B73, p. 122 r e c t o ; Bois, Senegal et S o u d a n , p. 17.
Broken during the hivernage of 1884, the bridge was
still one way to bypass the railroad: Commandant in
Cayor to GS, January 29, 1887, ARS, PI; Sallenave r e 
port for January 1889, FOM, Senegal X I I , 71; Assistant
Mayor of Rufisque to Director Interior, December 14,
1890, SARS,DCF.
24. Transporters would generally first move peanuts from
areas close to ports and railroad stations and then
gradually work their way out to more remote areas -obviously in order to make as many trips and thereby
earn as many fees as possible.
Cultivators distant
from trade centers therefore not only paid more for
transportation, but had to sell their produce late in
the trade season.
25. Petyt report on DSL receipts, 1888-1889, FOM, Senegal
XI I , 69; report of DSL's chief of operations, March 1891,
FOM, Senegal X I, 68; Marmier report of June 5, 1893, FOM,
Senegal X I I , 81; Noirot report, November 28, 1892, FOM,
Senegal X I I , 82; Gouvernement General de l ’AOF, Chemins
de fer en A O F , Vol. I: Chemins de fer du Senegal (Paris,
1906), (henceforth: DSL-TK) , pp. 160-162 , 174.
26. Bois, Senegal et S o ud an, pp.

46ff
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Etienne report, March 31, 1887, FOM,

Senegal X I I , 69.

28.

See also note by Fourni£, May 8, 1890, FOM, TP;
Marmier noted the rich land farther east near M'Bambey,
and suggested a Thi&s-Fatick rail spur passing by way
of Diarring (report of June 5, 1893, cited in .'oot
note 25).

29.

President of CC-Rufisque to S/Sec, September 8, 1884,
SARS, D C F - - MLe commerce de Rufisque, des les derniers
coups de pioche a detach^ sur ces derniers
points A~Sebikotane to T i v a o u a n e J 7 , remontant vers
St. Louis, des agents europeenes pour y faire du
commerce et encourager ainsi les indigenes I augmenter
leur culture."

30.

Rufisque also received peanuts brought in directly by
pack animals or transshipped by small boats from
nearby coasts.
E.g., see Exposition of 1900, Les
colonies frangaises »I -Le Senegal (Paris, 1900), pp.
399ff.-A report of the police at Rufisque to GS,
January 29, 1904, SARS, DCF, lists the largest firms
in Rufisque in 1904 as:
Invested
Firm
Capital (fr)
Exports (Fr) Imports (F
2,000, 000
Maurel § Prom
3,000,000
6,000,000
CFAO
1,000, 000
550,000
6,000,000
1,200, 000
1,800,000
Maurel Freres
4,000,000
Vezia
1,500, 000
2,250,000
1,000,000
If
700, 000
1,200,000
Assemat § Cie
ft
2,000, 000
Pascal § Buhan
2,500,000
If
2,000, 000
Philippe
3,000,000
f1
500, 000
E. Chavanel
1,000,000
II
J. Blanc
1,200,000
300, 000
If
200, 000
DevSs § Chaumet
1,000,000
II
200, 000
Delmas 6 Cie
500,000

31.

E.g., see R. Peterec, Dakar and West African Economic
Development (New York, 1967) , p p . 42-43.
The DSL
company w ould also have preferred that the peanuts
be exported via Dakar where the company maintained
its main offices and repair shops (see report of DSL
board of directors to stockholders, June 30, 1893,
FOM, TP).

31.

A rough estimate of which stations were feeding which
ports may be obtained from Table 3 by summing the
annual shipments from each station starting from the
nearest station and proceeding progressively up the
line until the sum shipped into the port that year is
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Cross-shipments of peanuts and shipments
of seed wo uld probably produce only minor errors for
that estimate.
33.

An interesting description of the gum and peanut trade
is contained in the highly informative pamphlet by
A. Aumont, President of the Chamber of Commerce of
St. Louis for the National Colonial Congress, March
10, 1889, first galley proof in ANF, 148AP2, es
pecially pp. 3ff.
Gum was particularly used in Europe
for textile manufacturing, in pharmaceutical drugs
and in confectionery.
On the gum trade, see Genevieve
Dgsir£-Vuillemin,Essai sur le gommier et le commerce
de la gomme (Montpellier, 1962j .

34.

I b i d .; P . V . , CC-St. Louis, January 8, 1889, SARS, DCF;
President, CC-St. Louis to Director Interior, December
20, 1889, SARS, DCF.

35.

See Laude report, May 1880, ARS, 1G44. The Delegate of
the Government General of French West Africa to GG,
March 15, 1900, ARS, Q49, wrote that before 1890 the
important merchants of St. Louis had no agents in the
region except for one European working for Maurel 8
Prom at Medine for a few months a year.
One merchant
was still complaining in 1898 that the Sudan was full
of African traders from Sierra Leone underselling the
St. Louis merchants.
See the Raba report, June 20,
1898, I b i d .

36.

The shift is implicit in the population transfers r e 
vealed by the censuses of 1876 and 1885 (see Table 4);
note also the observations by J. Hubler in his two
visits to Rufisque in Hubler, "Rufisque," Bull. S G C B ,
no. 13, July 2, 1883, pp. 377-381 and "De S t . Louis
zt Joal par terre," Bull. S G C B , no. 11, June 1, 1885,
p. 321.

37.

The excellent study by P. T. Bauer, West African Trade
(Cambridge, 1954) on commerce in colonial British
West Africa places greater emphasis on the advantages
of larger firms in obtaining credit (pp. 108ff, 180ff)
and in arranging for exclusive marketing rights (pp.
130f f ) ; but a shared monopoly over shipping really
seems the key
factor.

38.

The system is described by Adam, pp. 103-113.
Several
of the larger Senegalese traders of the Sudan are
mentioned in Delegate of the Government General to
GG, March 15, 1900, ARS, Q49.
It was Faidherbe

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-2 0 9 apparently who broke the monopoly of the river trade
by creole and African traders.
See GS to Minister,
August 28, 1855, FOM, Senegal 1,43, and the Faidherbe
memorandum, October 1, 1858, FOM, Senegal 1,45, which
underlined the position of the creole families of St.
rLouis as intermediaries between the colony of Senegal
and neighboring states.
" ... les commergants europeens n'avait pas le droit d'aller commercer dans
l'interieur.
La traite €tait livr£e d'une manidre
absolue et sans contrOle aux indigenes ... La majority
du commerce europeen ... sollicita vivement des
reformes ..."
39.

Colin Newbury, "Trade and Authority in West Africa
from 1850 to 1880," in Colonialism in A f r i c a , Vol.
The History and Politics of Colonialism, ed. by L.
Gann and P. Duignan (Cambridge, 1969), p . 81.

I:

40.

As Newbury noted, the high price of imported goods
was insurance, to some degree, for lost or stolen
goods.

41.

GS to MMC, December 20, 1886, ARS,

42.

See the extremely interesting GS to S/Sec, March 3,
1893, ARS, 2B68; the actions of the Deves-Crespin
party are discussed and analyzed in Robert July,
"The Politics of Assimilation in Senegal," in The
Origins of Modern African T h o u g h t , ed. by R. July
(New York, 1968), p p . 234-253.

43.

The rivalry between European merchants and African
middlemen was only part of a more general process
going on to some degree all along the west coast of
Africa during and after the conquest.
Some European
traders preferred to continue dealing with long-time
African trading partners on the coast, but many others
were hastening to bypass these African intermediaries
for direct trade inland with producers.
In other
parts of West Africa, such as the Niger delta, the
economic clash of importer and intermediate trader
was translated into dramatic and military conflicts
because African intermediaries were defending their
interests with the apparatus of politically indepen
dent local states.
In Senegal, where trader and i m 
porter were generally both French citizens or subjects
owing a common fealty to the same political entity,
the conflict was more subtle--less open or bloody-but real nonetheless.
E.g., see C. Newbury, "Credit
in Early Nineteenth Century West African Trade,"
Journal of African H ist o r y , XIII (1972), no. 1, pp.

2B64; Aumont, p . 3.
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44.

On the maitres des langues, see e.g., Bois, Senegal
et Soudan, pp. 51-52.
The persistence of the maitres
des langues in the trade is verified by the many
arretls against the practice.
E.g., arrete of
Mayor of Rufisque, October 29, 1883, SARS, DCF; Presi
dent, CC-St. Louis to Director Interior, March 16,
1893, SARS, DCF, complaining that the arr§te of
May 24, 1862 against the maitres des langues be
enforced; also President, CC-Rufisque to Director
Interior, December 5, 1896, SARS, DCF.

45.

See Jean Robin, "Fondation d'une marche. Le Marbat,"
Senega l . 56, September 1943, pp. 307-315, on the role
of the " n ’diatiguis" in the market of Louga.
See also
Dr. Colin, "Le commerce sur le Haut Senegal," B u l l ,
SGC de P a r i s . 5, October 1882-October 1883, pp. 165166. (article quoted by Newbury as cited above fo ot
note 39). Cf., Bauer, pp. 22ff.

46.

Aumont, pp. 3-4 who wrote:
"II semblait naturel au
debut que les indigenes auraient
charge leurs graines
sur la voie ferree et qu'ils n'auraient eu qu'st se
presenter dans les diverses maisons de commerce oil on
leur aurait achete leurs produits sur le rec£pisse du
chemin de fer, ils y auraient eu avantage car ils
auraient &vite les frais enormes de charrois par b£tes
de somme qui suivant la distance des lieux de pr od u c 
tion leur coutaient le quart, le tiers ou la moitie
des graines transportees, de plus ils £taient toujours
certains de vendre d un prix plus £lev& leurs produits
& St. Louis oil le negociant exportateur les leur
achetant sans frais pouvait leur offrir davantage.
Ainsi cultivateurs, negociants y trouvaient
leur
avantage et le petit commer^ant detaillant profitait
de cette situation qui jetant 1'argent sur la place
de St. Louis lui permettait l ’gcoulement de ces
marchandises ... Mais h€las.'
La concurrence a fait
que chacun a voulu et a cru s'emparer de la proie et
que tous ceux qui pouvaient attendre se sont pr^cipites
sur tous les points oil existe une gare, y ont i n s t a l l s
des comptoirs, divisant ainsi leurs forces, decuplant
leurs frais generaux, 6parpillant les esp&ces et se
rendant impossible une situation exceptionnelle dont
il leur *etait si facile de profiter.
Le petit commerce
a ressenti le contre-coup de cette tactique et est
oblige de suivre cette mauvaise voie.
II faut esp^rer
qu'un jour viendra ou cessera cette situation qui ne
profite ni au commerce ni a l 1indigene." Aumont wrote
these lines when he was president of the Chamber of
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Commerce of St. Louis in 1889.
47.

See above footnote 29.
An auction of 99 plots of land
at M'Pal in 1883 delighted colonial officials since
they raised 65,525 francs thereby (excerpt, P.V.,
Administrative Council of Senegal, November 20, 1883,
SARS, DCF).
Sales of lots at Thies followed in 1886,
and merchants were clamoring for similar sales of
lots at Tivaouane as early as 1884 (acting GS to MMC,
September 9, 1884, ARS, 2B58) .

48.

Adam, pp. 103-110.
To some extent the position of the
African trader was associated with the barter system,
which persisted in the Senegal gum trade and in more
distant areas for the peanut trade.
A growing t e n 
dency to use specie instead of barter in the peanut
trade did not necessarily lead to separate sale and
purchase transactions in the trade because of the
widespread practice of loans to cultivators secured
with pawned valuables (see Aumont, p. 108; Adam,
pp. 105-107).

49.

The proposed Baol rail spur to Fatick, of course,
might also have weakened the position of commercial
operations already based in the DSL escales or even
diverted business to Fatick.
See Robert report,
August 14, 1894, ARS, 036, report by Valantin, June
12, 1889, FOM, TP; comments by Noirot in a report to
GG, March 1, 1909, ANF, 148 A P 5 .

50.

Interestingly enough there was some general uncertainty
in the early years of railroading as to whether or not
a railroad could be managed much like contemporary
turnpikes and thus be available to users at all times
(see Stephen Salsbury, The State, the Investor, and
the Railroad.
The Boston and Albany, 1825-1867
/Cambridge, Mass., 196 7_/ , pp . 63 - 64, 82-85) . In
reality, safety requirements precluded running the
railroad like a toll roadway.

51.

Of course, the Deves family of Senegal also had r e l a 
tions with the Bordeaux branch of the family.
A Deves
incidentally did become a member of the seven-man DSL
board of directors in 1910.
Henceforth, a Dev§s was
always seated on the board until 1929.

52.

See especially Samir Amin, Le monde des affaires
senegalaises (Paris, 1969), pp. 15-21.
As noted earlier, there was a general movement of commerce into the
interior after 1900.
E.g., as noted in a political
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-2 1 2 report of January 1906, GS to GG, ARS, 2G6-4,calling
attention to the installation of new commercial o p e r a 
tions in both eastern and western Baol, "la conc ur
rence formant les negociants a
s'etablir dans les
centres de production au milieu meme des indigenes!'
53.

As in 1903, when low prices led cultivators to hold
back sales.
At Louga, merchants who had granted
long-term credit since the famine of 1901 were
deserted by debtors who preferred to sell at higher
prices to traders at other escales (commercial reports
for the "cercle" of Louga for the 1st and 2nd tri
mester of 1903 to GG, April 1903, ARS,
2G3-6).
A
report by the Customs Service in Senegal, for 1903,
ARS, 2G3-22, noted that an entente existed between
the major firms to keep prices low in 1903, because
prices had been too high the previous year.

54.

The Thibaud report on a Casamance railroad project,
dated 1914, copy in FOM, TP, p. 54, is explicit on
this point in reference to the TK and the projected
Casamance railroad.
It is the key piece of evidence
which led to the general argument, presented in the
text.
After this, more indirect remarks, as in Adam,
pp. 104, 150, take on more meaning.

55.

X. Guiraud,

56.

Each urban center had large seasonal floating p o p u 
lations, in which many would try to evade census rolls
out of fear of taxation.
At the same time frequent
shifts in the administrative boundaries of urban
centers, as well as rural districts, greatly reduce
the value of the limited statistics available,
particularly since extension of a boundary could add
in long-time residents not previously counted.
In
reality, some long-time residents of the absorbed area
might also have moved away because of the change,
thereby decreasing the local population rather than
increasing it as the next census might suggest.

L'arachide s e n e ga lai se , pp.

115-120.

57.

On the growth of the ports in Senegal, see especially
Roger Pasquier, "Villes du Senegal au XIXe siecle,"
Revue Frangaise d'Histoire d ' O u tr e-M er , 47 (I960),
p p . 387-426.

58.

On the proposed suppression of all military posts,
see GS to MMC, July 26, 1885, ARS, 2B64.
On the new
telegraph line, see GS to MMC, July 28, 1885, ARS,
2B59.
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A map by Walter, November 14,

1878,

is in FOM, TP.

60.

See the copy of the 1865 map of "Diambour, Cayor et
Saniokhor" by Regnault, FOM, Senegal XII,41; and the
June 1883 "Carte du Cayor et du Diambour, 1858-1883"
by P. Famin, map BD-4, ARS, map files.

61.

Walter map, November 14, 1878, FOM, TP; the Walter
report, November 14, 1878, FOM, TP, described
Tivaouane as a "grand marche des produits du Baol
et du Cayor." A note by Inspector General Bernard
for S/Sec, May 28, 1887, FOM, Senegal XII,71, sig
nalled the growing importance of Tivaouane as a
caravan junction, which he felt was natural because
Tivaouane "est le point central de
culture des
archides dans le Cayor."
See also Paul Vigne, "La
question du Soudan-Le chemin de fer de DSL," B u l l .
SGCB, 15, August 1, 1887, pp. 449-465.
Up to 1897,
a perimeter of 300 meters around each rail station
in Cayor belonged to the French state.
In 1897 this
was expanded to a square of 2km x 2 km for Tivaouane
and squares of 1 km x 1 km for all other escales in
Cayor (see copy of treaty of M arch 23, 1896, SARS,
D C F ) . In 1902 the size of the squares were increased
to a 4 km x 4 km for Tivaouane and 2 km x 2 km for
the other escales.

62.

P. Etienne noted in his report of March 31, 1887
that Mekhe's receipts barely covered expenses in 1886.
Apparently some of B a o l ’s peanuts also exited via
Mekh€.

63.

See Table 5 Walter report,

64.

Pire, centered in a lush forest, might be the same
village mentioned in some sources as a center of Muslim
scholarship in Cayor.

65.

Mollien, L'Afrique O c c i d e n t a l e , pp. 59, 135, 147; Rene
Caille, Voyage 3 Temboctou et 3 Jenng, I, (Paris,re
printed T965)T~pir 34-35; GS to Minister, March 13,
1858, FOM, Senegal 1,43 estimated that Niomre had held
a population of 5,000 before its recent conquest.

66.

A continual run of 264 kms without a break was too
long for the train engineers, so N'Dande was selected
as a stop although it was not exactly
half-way between.
(Note by Inspector General Bernard for S/Sec, January
10, 1885, ANF, DD-2/1094).
A private entrepreneur ran

November 14, 1878, FOM,TP.
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-2 1 4 a buffet for express train passengers from 1888 until
1891.
The water problem at N ’Dande became acute d u r 
ing the trade season of 1888-1889 (Petyt report on
DSL expenses, 1888-1889, FOM, Senegal XI I , 69, pp.
45-56) . Transfer of the crossover point and workshops
from N ’Dande to Kelle was suggested as early as 1890
(Sallenave report of December 1890, FOM, Senegal XII,
71). but this was done only after 1899 (Chief of
Public Works service to GG, January 11, 18 99, SARS,
DCF) .
67.

The poor quality of Tivaouane*s water as compared to
that of Thies was noted in the Etienne report of
March 31, 1887, FOM, Senegal X I I , 67, p. 36.
This^was
one of the main reasons that Marmier selected Thies
over Tivaouane as the junction point for a spur into
Baol and Sine (report of June 5, 1893, FOM, Senegal
XII, 81, Chapter II,
since locomotives would need
the purer water available at Thies.

68.

See report by the Chief of the Secretariat of the
Government General, 1897, with the attached list of
July 12, 1897, ARS, P40.

69.

Rapports d*ensemble, GS to GG, 1912, folder 4, on
public works by the Chief of Public Works. ARS, 2G12-8.
Streets and roads maintained in and around St. Louis
totalled 24.5 km; in and around Dakar there were 22 km.

70.

See the joint report of 1912 on public works, ARS,
2G12-33, on the question of converting the administra
tors trails into good feeder roads for the railroads,
and Adam, p. 148.
Roads predating the railroad are
mentioned in Bois, Senegal et S o u d a n , p. 17, as:
a coastal road from St. Louis to Rufisque via Gandiole,
B£t£te, and M'Bidjem, a "route du Cayor" built in
1864 by Pinet-Laprade from Rufisque to Thi£s and e x 
tended to N'Dande later by the Batignolles and a road
from St. Louis to Loumpoul.

71.

Noirot wrote in a report of March 1893, ANF, 148AP3,
for instance, that the roads built by an administra
tor in Cayor in 188 9 had already disappeared.

72.

Report by the Chief of the Secretariat of the Go vern
ment General, 1897, with attached list of routes built
in the protectorate in the period 1892-1897, dated
July 12, 1897, ARS, P40, (210 kms in Cayor, 369 kms
in T h i £ s , 146 kms in Louga).
There were, of course,
many other routes less formally established in the
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-2 1 5 interior, such as a route of 12 days journey noted by
Noirot from the Futa to the Saloum via the Ferlo and
Niani (by OuarnSo)--Noirot report of 1890 on the
Djolof campaign, ANF, 148AP3,
73.

Project by R. Eckman, n.d. £ ”circa, 1897J7> with
cover letter Descemet to "Mon cher Raymond," SARS,
DCF.

74.

The lines of thickets were also intended to stop sand
dunes from encroaching onto the track.
Later b a r r i 
cades of old traverses served for this purpose.
See
Etienne report of March 31, 1887, FOM, Senegal X I I, 67;
note by Inspector General Fourni6, May 8, 1890, FOM,
TP; draft report by Petyt for 1892 through 1897, FOM,
TP.

75.

See Petyt report on DSL expenses, 1890, FOM, Senegal
X I I , 69, pp. 48-49; DSL Chief of Operations to GS,
August 20, 1891, SARS, DCF; project of arrete-1891;
I b id.; Director of Political Affairs to Director
Interior, December 21, 1891, I b i d ., especially sidenote.

76.

Report by Surveillance Enginner for May 1889, FOM,
Senegal X I I , 71, commenting on an influx of war r e f u 
gees from the Saloum into Cayor, wrote:
"Of our
civilization the natives only appreciate one benefit,
that of peace . . . but it is necessary to consider
these groupings entirely transitory, except for some
centers such as St. Louis . . . On the one hand, the
natives don't make permanent and fixed structures that
they could leave to their descendants; on the other
hand, they don't adapt to the habitat that they have
chosen so as to live here indefinitely.
They do not
have a love for planting over a long duration, which
among civilized agricultural people attaches man to
the soil.
They live from day to day, and a small
influence can arouse their nomadic or warrior instincts."

77.

Majhemout Diop, Histoire des classes sociales dans
l'Afrique de l^Ouest-Le Senegal CParis, 1972), p . 63,
terms this act, the "Douki," a method of typically
African for solving problems.

78.

See Klein, Islam and Imperialism, pp. 165-167; note by
acting Director Interior, August 28, 1886, ARS,
13G-41; Chief of Native Bureau to Director Interior,
April 5, 1887, Ibid.; discourse of governor to General
Council, in Mohiteur du Se n e g a l , December 19, 188 9,
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no. 1774, p. 431.
79.

The arr£te of January 15, 1890 only disannexed rural
areas of the 1st arrondissement near St. Louis.
Other rural areas were attached in 1902 to the
Sen£gambie-Niger in exchange for a strip of territory
of one kilometer width on either side of the railroad
track and large square zones around the escales.
Attempts to collect the head tax in rural areas of
Senegal--Gandiole, Bargny, and in Serer None and Dioba
country--led to all kinds of turmoil.
Collections
were resisted in some cases and had to be forgiven in
others.
E.g., see GS to S/Sec, December 7, 1889, ARS,
2B67.

80.

E.g., see Klein, Islam and Imperialism, pp.
------------- ---------168ff.

160-164.

81.

Paul Pelissier,

139-142.

82.

Andre Huybrechts, Transports et structures de d e v e l o p pement au Congo (Paris, 1970), pp. 72-76, 287-290.

83.

There is a massive literature on this point.
The
pioneering work is Gunnar Myrdal, Economic Theory
and U n d e r -Developed Regions (London, 1957), see pp.
51-57.
"K good recent work is Thomas P. Melady and
R. B. Suhartono, Development-Lessons for the Future
(Maryknoll, N.Y., 1573'j , see pp. 78-7 9, 1 8 7 - 2 1 4 .

84.

The political report, GS to GG, 1st trimester-1908,
ARS, 2G8-10, complained that shipments of millet
needed in Salde went overland by means of dioula t r a 
ders rather than by railroad and then by the fiver.
Into the 1970's herdsmen still preferred to drive
livestock overland by foot to Dakar rather than using
the railroad.

85.

Altho ug h the D S L ’s categories for traffic statistics
were too broadly defined to affirm this, one c ont e m 
porary observer wrote that the kola trade flourished
in Cayor only after the r ailroads1construction (see
Paul Vigne, "La question du Soudan-Le chemin de fer de
DSL," Bull, S G C B , 6, August 15, 1887, p. 483).
For
the general argument, see A. G. Hopkins, An Economic
History of West Africa (London, 1973), pp“ 245-253.

86.

E.g., see political report, Niani-Ouli, April 1909,
ARS, 2G9-36; monthly reports for Kedougou, 1912, ARS,
2G12-57.

Les Paysans du S e n e g a l , pp.
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For rail rates and fare structures in the French
metropole, see Kimon A. Doukas, The French Railroads
and the State (New York, 1945) , pp. 1 4 7 - 1 5 8 .

88.

The original 1880 "cahie^j des charges" put s u H l items
as spirits, oils, wood, and sugar in 1 st class at
0.24 francs per ton and per kilometer; wheat, rice,
charcoal and wine in 2nd class at 0.20 F r / f k m ; coal,
stone, salt, and sand in 3rd class at 0.13 Fr/t*km.

89.

Arthur Hazelwood, Rail and Road in East Africa
1964), pp. 83, 8 8 -94, gives a good idea of the
plexity involved.

90.

From 1892 the north-central stations of the line Kelle
to Goumbo-Gueoul sent out a respectable 16% of total
production shipped on the railroad.
But the potential
of that area became more evident after 1904 in response
to higher prices (see Table 5).

91.

According to a schedule ("bareme") approved December 4,
1897, copy in FOM, TP.
This applied to shipments of
at least 1500 kgs.

92.

See excerpt P.V., Chamber of Commerce (henceforth C C ) Rufisque, April 24, 1894, SARS, DCF.
(The two zones
were to be Rufisque-N'Dande and St. Louis-N*Dande) ;
P.V., CC-St. Louis, June 2, 1894, Ib id .; same,
April 1, 1897, Ibid.; copy of DSL (Paris) to H^laut,
Ma rch 10, 1895, SARS, DCF.

93.

A problem commonly confronting enterprises with busy
seasons or busy hours (such as a telephone company,
to use another example with heavy investment in
technical equipment). The solution is to spread out
business more evenly with time.
In the case of the
DSL, the slack season served, at least, to repatriate
European agents for long recuperative vacations in
France.

94.

Inspector B i d e a u ’s report of September 23, 1886, FOM,
Senegal X I I ,66 compared the kilometric fares in
Senegal with those in France andReunion and recommended
unsuccessfully that 1 st and 2 nd class fares be raised
in Senegal to levels comparable to the fares in c o l o n 
ial Reunion.
The fares were:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

(Oxford,
com

-218-

1st class
2nd class
3rd class

Fraric e
0.123 Fr/km
0.092
0.067

Reunion
0.25 Fr/km
0.15
0,06

Senegal
0.12 Fr/km
0,08
0.055

First and second class passengers were also more
likely to. benefit from reduced (military, clergy*
etc.) and round-trip fares,
95.

GS to S/Sec, March 9, 1890, ARS, 2B67, which re commen
ded the DSL Chief of Operations Helaut for the Legion
of Honor.
In 1897, the DSL helped the colony to p r e 
pare the new approaches to a new, metallic pont
Faidherbe at St. Louis.
In 1907 the government accorded a contract for an electrical generating plant in
Dakar to a company run by DSL officials.

96.

See draft of note by Binger to Inspector General of
Public Works, Ministry of Colonies, November 7, 1899,
FOM, Senegal XII,111; note by Bricka, October 5, 1899,
FOM, TP; report by Valantin to General Council,
June 12, 1899, FOM, TP.

97.

The report by Bideau, September 23, 1886, FOM, Senegal
X I I , 6 6 , noted that DSL expenses were six times as
high than the predictions of the Walter report.
The
report by Petyt
on DSL expenses 1888-1889, FOM,
Senegal X I I , 69, exposed that the Batignolles, for
instance, was still drawing money from the French
treasury indirectly by charging the DSL high rates for
renting a short rail spur on the large jetty at Dakar.
Members of the interministerial DSL Verification
Commission were particularly incensed that the
Batignolles had not furnished its subsidiary, the DSL
company, with a reserve fund for current expenses out
of the government-furnished subsidy.
Instead, the
Batignolles was covering only a small part of the
D S L ’s cost of borrowing; the government covered the
rest through its guarantee of DSL operating expenses
(see Reg. 31, FOM, TP, especially annex to May 17,
1886 session of Verifications Commission, pp. 1 24 ff) .

98.

See Bideau report, September 23, 1886, FOM, Senegal
X I I , 6 6 ; Etienne report, M a r c h 31, 1887, FOM, Senegal
X I I , 69; Petyt report for 1887, Ibid.
But by 1890,
Petyt felt that the number of DSL agents in Senegal
was too small for effective service CPetyt report on
DSL expenses, 1888-1889, I b i d .).
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100.

Note by de Traz to S/Sec, June 23, 1890, FOM, TP,
pp. 17-18.
On reconstruction of the line, see Petyt report for
1887, FOM, Senegal X I I , 69, pp. 60ff; Petyt report on
DSL expenses, 1888-1889, I b i d ., p. 55.

101.

The Sentence. Arbitrale and the guidelines followed
by the arbitration panel are in a booklet published
by the French Ministry of Colonies, Documents relatifs
au chemin de fer de Dakar eL S t . Louis (Paris, 1914),
pp. 45-46.

102.

Draft report of the Commission on the DSL, October 1,
1900, FOM, Senegal XII,75bis.
The company's economy
bonus was applicable only to the operations formula
(4500 + R/2) and not to maintenance; the company
received only 2 % of any economies in thefirst year;
the bonus then rose by an additional 2% each succeed
ing year until a maximum of 1 0 %, henceforth applicable,
was reached.

103.

draft of note by Binger to Inspector General, N o v e m 
ber 7, 1899, FOM, Senegal XII,111 (cited above).

104.

Boutteville report to Minister of Colonies (henceforth
MC) August 4, 1900, FOM, Senegal XII,75bis; the text
of the convention of 1900 is in Ministry of Colonies,
Documents ... D S L , pp. 57-62.

105.

See the newspaper clippings on DSL stock in ANF,
65AQ/ E-267; e.g., Guide du C a p i t a l e , December 25,
1902, and Pour et C o n t r e , October 23, 1904.
Original
ly there were exactly 10,000 shares of DSL stock of
a nominal value of 5 million francs of investment.
On technical grounds, the government forced the
company to ante up an additional 8 0,818 francs of
investment capital, so that now there were 10,161.6
shares outstanding.

106.

Le Re nti er , December 27, 1907, ANF,
Le G l o b e , October 25, 1906, Ibid.

107.

"Notes Utiles," Le Mouvement Financier, August 24,
1907, p. 540, ANF, 65AQ/ E-267.

108.

"Etudes Financieres," Revue M i n i e r e , September 24,
1908, ANF, 65AQ/ E-2677~L~a Revue FTrianciSre, Septem
ber 1, 1910, Ibid.; Revue MiniSre, November 9, 1911
Ibid.

65AQ/ E-267;
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"Etudes F inane ieresj' Le Bulletin F in a n c i e r . M a y 15,
1910, ANF,-65AQ/-E-267; "Dakar a St. Louis,"
Finance C b lo ni ale , February 25, 19 11,I b i d .; Journal
des Mines et-' des Travaux Publics, February 24, 1912,
Ibid.; Revue Ecoriomique et Firian c i h r e , May 10, 1913,
Ibid. ; F. Jourdier, "Le rapport sur 1 ‘emprunt de
1 ’A0F- II," La Depeche CoToniale, Ma rch 29,1913, no.
573, p. 1.

110.

By late 1908, the Minister of Colonies was already
unhappy with the arrangement allowing the DSL to run
the newly-opened section of the Thies-Kaye line.
See
copy of MC to Governor General of French West Africa
(henceforth G G ) , December 23, 1908, FOM, TP.

111.

Excerpt of P.V., CC-Dakar, Ma y 20, 1910, ARS, 043.
See also Conseil General, 1909, December 19, 1909,
pp. 616-620; MC to GG,March 10, 1910, ARS, 043; P.V.,
CC-St. Louis, May 21, 1910, ARS-L; Conseil G g n i r a l ,
1910, May 31, 1910, pp. 68-74, June 8 , l$l0, pp. 241249.

112.

GS to GG, April 11, 1911, ARS, 043.
See also the
report on DSL workers, January 20, 1911, I b i d .

113.

DSL to MC, September 8 , 1910, SARS, DCF; Director
General of the Union Colonial Fran§aise, Chailley
to MC, January 11, 1911, I b i d .
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C H A P T E R

I V

PENETRATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT-THE THIES-KAYES
If the Sudan is still today Ma beautiful house without
doors," our duty is to give it the doors it lacks and
not to destroy the h o u s e .
-J. Van Vollenhoven, 1917
The completion of the colonial conquest in West Africa
by 1900 heralded a new era of railroad building in the
French colonies of the region.

To some extent,

the projects

of this new phase of railroading in the decade before World
War I were simply the outgrowth of previous efforts.

An

easy access to the Niger river valley from the littoral,
expansion of the a r e a ’s export commerce, political c onsoli
dation under French rule, and aggrandizement of the port of
Dakar-- targets already set during the period of inception
from 1878 to 1882--were also the major objectives pursued
in this era, while the already existing DSL and Kayes-Niger
railroads, moreover,
plans.

had to be taken into account in future

The railroad promoters of the earlier era had been

recklessly overoptimistic about the prospects for dev e l o p 
ment through railroad building.

Having been fed for a g e n 

eration on colonialist propaganda glorifying the pioneering
colonial railroad builders, many of the officers and a d m i n i 
strators of the new era also clung, at least at the outset,
-

221

-
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-222to m u c h of the earlier confidence in the ability of the
railroad to foster--indeed create--rapid economic growth.
Nevertheless,
feasible,

in this new era it was no longer

or at least as easy, to finance railroad c on s t r u c 

tion from tax money raised in the metropole.

According to

the financial law of April 13, 1900, the colonies themselves
became responsible for their own budgets--meaning that any
new rail construction and rail operations would have to be
funded ultimately from revenues collected in the colonies.^
Even more significant for West Africa was the transformation
from 1902 to 1904 of the Government General of French West
Afri ca into a powerful federal agency of administrative and
political authority interposed between the metropole and the
individual colonies of the region.

Itself assuming direct

control over certain key federation-wide matters,

the G ove r n 

ment General--jealous of its custody of the federation's
general interests and potent in its budgetary and a d m i nis tr a
tive powers--became the main driving force in designing and
implementing an ambitious series of public works programs of
port development and railroad construction aimed at p e n e t r a 
ting into the hinterland of French West A f r i c a .4
In this era of colonial consolidation and fiscal r e 
sponsibility,

any proposed railroad projects would be

scrutinized m uc h more carefully than during the earlier era
of military expansion,

especially for their financial pru-
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-223dence and their prospects for carrying commercial traffic.
Thus,

it becomes more difficult in this era to distinguish

in contemporary documents advocating a particular course of
action between overlapping economic and political m o t i v e s -although political considerations seem in reality to have
always been foremost.

An official interest in economic

development and political consolidation could and did shade
off into a genuine concern for the social well-being,
immediate and future, of the African populations who were
being directly affected by the government's policies.
Nevertheless,

in line with the dominant colonialist belief

that an expanding export commerce would form the basis of
African prosperity,

governmental efforts to foster regional

development concentrated on developing the overseas trade-efforts which if successful would also swell the customs
receipts that funded the Government General itself.^
As in 1880, governmental authorities held that the
key to regional prosperity lay in opening up the Sudanese
heartland to the export trade with a network of railroads
linked to coastal ports.

As a vital,

integral part of this

new venture in colonial railroad building, a projected
railroad between Thi^s and Kayes was intended by government
planners to perform a variety of functions both locally and
regionally.

Unfortunately, these ambitious plans for a

grandiose regional network of railroads

into the interior
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-224were to be carried out only partially— leaving a scattered
handful of unfinished,

isolated rail segments lancing in

land from several points on the littoral.

The Thi^s-Kayes

railroad, although forming an impressive portion of the
longest and most important of these segments, also proved
to be a more fragile economic instrument than the planners
had anticipated.

The "Grand Transversal"

Formed at the crest of military

conquest in 1895 to oversee a loose federation of French
colonies, the Government General of French West Africa
truly became the primary agency directing political and
economic affairs in these colonies only after it had
acquired its own autonomous,
1904.^

stable financial footing in

Aside from its crucial role as the chief political

authority of French West Africa,

the Government General

also attended to functions of general interest to the
entire federation,
works.

such as education, justice, and public

The Government General's monopoly of the federation's

customs receipts enabled it to redistribute essential services
and developmental projects more equitably among richer and
poorer colonies,

and it could finance public works requir

ing heavy investment of capital far more easily than any
individual colony because of a superior ability to raise
large consolidated loans in the metropole for these projects.
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-225Featuring some programs o£ drainage and sanitation, of
public building construction,

and of riverway clearance,

the successive major public works loans floated by the
Government General concentrated particularly on the c o n 
struction of commercial ports along the coast and on rail 
roads of penetration leading from these ports to the
vicinity of the Niger valley deep in the

Sudanese inter

ior.^
A master plan for a comprehensive program of r a i l 
road construction in the territory, apparently originating
in the M inistry of Colonies around 1902 and henceforth
associated with the incumbent Governor General Ernest
Roume

(1902-1907), centered primarily on construction of

a long strategic railroad of penetration starting from the
Dakar-St.
Senegal;

Louis railroad and running eastward through
then over the Kayes-Niger railroad to Bamako; and

then straight across the region within the Niger bend to
g

Ansongo, a point on the Niger below Gao. (see Figure 8 ).
Designed perhaps partly in reaction to renewed c o n 
temporary speculations about a Transsaharan or T r a n s african from Algeria to West Africa,

this Transsudaniian

"grand transversal" was intended to the the primary line
of French penetration into the Sudan, opening up the
Niger bend region,
tation.

especially,

to French economic exploi

Other rail lines penetrating inland from several
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-227French colonies on the southern littoral would be attached
at different points to this grand transversal,

thereby w e l d 

ing the disparate parts of French West Africa together
politically and economically into a solid unity.

This

grandiose network would bind together the colonial feder a
tion by facilitating operations of the government's
administrative machinery in the interior and by enabling
troops to be transported rapidly in case of need.®

The

scheme, however, was also designed in large measure as
a major weapon for economic warfare with rival powers.
A railroad already begun by the colony of Guinea
from Conakry,
in Dahomey,

a railroad also begun already from Cotonou

and a line projected to be run from the littoral

of the Ivory Coast toward Mossi country--all of which were
slated to be grafted onto the main tr ansversal- -had been
deliberately traced in such a manner as to compete with the
railroads and rivers of foreign colonies

in attracting the

products of border areas toward French p o r t s . T h e

mini

stry also contemplated a "petite ceinture" railroad nearer
the coast linking Senegalese railroads to those of Guinea
and the Ivory Coast in such a way as to closely encompass
the frontiers of the foreign colonial enclaves lying between.
A ministerial letter of December 1902 to Roume explained
that:
The foreign colonies would be narrowly hemmed in by
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-228the network in such a way as to paralyze their
economic development in their respective hinterlands
and to drain the products of the soil . , , to the
French c o a s t s . H
At the same time the grand transversal was clearly
designed to magnify the role of Dakar as the political and
economic linchpin of the federation by making it the main
port for exporting products from the Sudan.

Dakar had a l 

ready been designated in 1898 as the site of a major
strategic base for the French fleet and had become the seat
of the Governor General after 1902.
General and naval authoritiesi

Both the Government

were now interested in see 

ing Dakar change from a mere port of call for ocean liners
into an active commercial port, attracting thereby the
accessory facilities and amenities that would facilitate
the smooth functioning of the naval base and the administraV.
txve bureaus.

12

At first glance, prospects for expanding shipping
traffic at Dakar appeared bright because the impending
completion of the Kayes-Niger railroad,

in 1904,

seemed to

promise more commercial traffic for Dakar as the railroad
funnelled a much larger flow of exports from the Niger
valley via the Senegal river toward the Senegalese ports.
Yet, on the one hand,

it was by no means certain that this

traffic would indeed bypass the decaying port of St. Louis
to flow down to Dakar via the DSL railroad.
hand,

On the other

it was not that certain that the KN could really
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-229generate that great a volume of traffic from the Sudan as
long as the unreliable,

intermediate link of the Senegal

river was utilizable for only four months of the year at
best.

Indeed, despite the outlay of so much blood and

treasure since 1881 to complete the KN, despite the personal
efforts of so many prestigious colonial officers

(among them

Gallieni and J o f f r e ) , even the economic viability of the
K N ’s operations seemed questionable as long as its longhaul export traffic was dependent on the capricious
river.

13

An all-year grand transversal railroad that linked

Dakar directly to the KN, via the DSL, and even entered
deeper into the Niger bend, promised to resolve both
problems.

But, there were certain drawbacks to this

approach.
The projected junction at Bougouni of the grand
transversal and the Conakry-Niger railroad, for instance,
would have been 1400 kms from Dakar and only 950 kms from
Conakry.

Even before this junction was made, produce trans

ported on the Niger river might easily be exported south
ward to Conakry from Kouroussa via the Conakry-Niger

(CNj

railroad rather than passing westward toward Senegal via
the KN line.

To prevent this from happening,

the cost

of

freight shipped from Bamako to France via Dakar was equal
ized to that shipped to France from Kouroussa on the Niger
via Conakry.

This was done by lowering freight rates on
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-230the KN to unremunerative levels, while rates on the CN
railroad were deliberately raised despite the difficulties
the CN was having in generating sufficient traffic for its
line.

Ostensibly, this arrangement was meant to assure the

KN and CN railroads their "respective spheres of attraction
on the Niger river."

But obviously the real motive was to

secure passage of KN exports westward toward the coast of
S e n e g a l .^
The choice of the longer rail line as the main axis
of penetration to the Sudan, however, added to the admini
stration's burdens.

Successful growth of the export trade

by means of a long rail line of penetration would really
depend on the rates that the railroad would charge for
delivering produce to the coast and vice-versa.

Rates set

low enough to ship exports profitably over long distances
might be too low to cover the railroad's transportation
costs.

To solve this,

the administration intended to

resort to the versatile expedient of a "degressive" freight
rate structure,which, unlike rates strictly proportional
to distance

(such as on the D S L ) , would let rail charges

for certain goods rise more slowly as the shipping distance
increased by means of a sliding-scale of levies for differ
ent mileages travelled by rail.
concerned, degressive rates

In so far as commerce was

( k n o w n as

"tapering" in England)

would telescope long export distances into apparently

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

"shorter" runs.

But since in reality the railroad had to

cover its own transportation costs,

the viability of a

degressive rate scheme would depend either on any compen
sating economies arising from long distance traffic or on
the balancing of any losses incurred in low-rate l on g
distance traffic with surpluses earned on other, more
profitable elements of traffic on the line.

The problem

was not as simple as the planners i m a g i n e d . ^
The Thies-Kayes project

A rail line bridging the gap

between the DSL and the KN was an obvious first step in
creating the projected grand transversal.

But first, this

proposed railroad link had to be justified as more pr ac ti
cable than the existing connection via the Senegal river,
and once it was justified a particular path through
Senegal would have to be selected, and a builder would
have to be chosen.
The scheme for a railroad link passing through Senegal
had to contend at this time with a rival plan for simply
improving the navigability of the already-utilized Senegal
river link.

Of obvious direct benefit to St. Louis at the

mouth of the river, this longstanding idea found substantial
backing among St. Louis's merchants and from Senegal's d e p u 
ty to the National Assembly, while also enjoying support in
the metropolitan p r e s s . ^
than a railroad,

Considered a cheaper investment

the river plan also promised to assure
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-232cheaper freight hauling rates by water than was possible
by rail; and at first the new Governor General Roume
appeared to be giving equal consideration to this Senegal
river scheme.

17

Studies of a barrage and lock system on

the Senegal river were indeed undertaken by m ilitary
officers during the period 1902-1904, and an initial p r o 
ject for a short rail spur from Kayes downriver to Ambidedi
was approved in 1904 with little question since it could be
used equally well for a mixed river-rail or an all rail
route.

18

Despite governmental disclaimers, the two projects

were of course competing for the same limited construction
funds and the same potential export traffic--a rivalry
underlined by the sharp criticisms penned by the officer
in charge of the river project

against the railroad.

19

Studies for the railroad began modestly enough with
Roume*s simple request to Paris in June 1902,

shortly after

his arrival in Senegal, for a loan of two military engineer
ing officers to reconnoiter possible traces for a connecting
railroad between the KN and either Louga or Thies on the
DSL.

20

The ministry apparently saw the question in wider

terms, for it assigned the duty of exploring a possible trace
between the DSL and the KN to no less a figure than the
director of the Kayes-Niger, Colonel Rougier,

then visiting

n

Par i• s .2 1
The shortest trace to Kayes would have started from

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-233Louga, but

in a letter of January 1903 Roume ordered

Rougier to explore only a line of penetration starting i n 
to Baol from Thies, which, unlike one from Louga, would
probably generate a substantial local traffic.

22

Not only

would the export trade itself therefore undergo further
local development in Senegal, but the railroad of p e n e t r a 
tion would be assured a profitable local traffic that
generated sizeable receipts to help finance other railroad
operations.

Roume chose Thils over Tivaouane partly for

the advantages of the site and partly because this juncture
would bring the new line closer to Dakar.

23

After f o l l o w 

ing Marmier's trace of 1893 to Bambey and extending it to
the vicinity of Diourbel,

the direction of the projected

line and its junction point on the KN was left to the
explorers'

findings, with neither a direct-line trace to

Kayes nor one to Bakel ruled out at that point.
urged, nevertheless,

Roume

that beyond Diourbel the rail trace

ought to dip southward in order to avoid the Ferlo barrens
and to penetrate into border areas that, at the time, were
conducting most of their trade with the British Gambia.
purpose was, of course,

to siphon

The

the products of these

regions toward French ports; but Roume also cautioned Rougier
not to allow the trace to pass so close to the border that
traffic on the railroad could be diverted inversely toward
the Gambia r i v e r . ^
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-234The exploratory studies of the railroad trace went
well.

Rougier himself scouted ahead, making a rapid

reconnaissance of the most likely potential route from
Thies to Kayes while a larger expeditionary party slowly
followed in his track surveying the trace carefully.

25

The so-called Rougier-Belle trace crossed through wellpopulated parts of Baol, passing by Diourbel and N'Gahayes;
then swung sharply southward toward Tambacounda skirting
areas bordering the Gambia; and then turned north in a
direct bee-line to Ambidedi

(see Figure 9).

This trace,

which was favorably received in Paris by the governmental
Committee of Colonial Public Works in July 1905, also
prevailed over the river project when it became apparent
that the waterway would be usable for only part of the year
even after extensive, costly construction work.
This decision having been taken,

26

it seemed natural

that the DSL company, which had almost been granted the
concession for a Thi^s-Fatick spur only five years before,
should now be awarded the franchise for building at least
the first 140 km section of the projected line from Thies
to the vicinity of N'Gahayes.

27

Construction by a private

firm like the DSL also seemed logical, given the precarious
condition of the new Government General's financial situa
tion at a time when it was floating its first major loan.
N e ver t h e l e s s , discussions between the DSL company and
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-236the French government did not go well.

The DSL was demand

ing that the Government General guarantee a bond issue to
finance construction, agree to a very favorable financial
formula governing rail operations,

and give the company a

?8
virtual veto over rates and fares. °

Negotiations had

not advanced very far when the Government General's Conseil
du G ou ve rne me nt, meeting in May 1906 to consider a second
public works loan for French West Africa,

essentially

scuttled the DSL's bid by voting to borrow an additional
10 million francs

for construction of the first section

of the railroad with the federation's own resources and
pe rso nneil.29
Seemingly a contradiction of conventional theories
about the role of private investment capital in developing
the colonies,

this action provoked a lively debate in

French colonial circles.

30

It was, nonetheless,

a logical

outgrowth of past difficulties that had cropped up whenever
private firms had undertaken colonial railroad building in
such diverse places as Indochina and French Guinea.

The

colony of Guinea, for instance, had been obliged in 1902 to
take over construction of the Conakry-Niger railroad,
begun only in 1900, even while compensating the inept private
71

builder with almost 2.8 million francs.

In Dahomey,

the

railroad's concession contract had to be revised radically
in 1904 with an outright payment to the entrepreneur of
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almost 12 million francs.

32

One common problem was the

difficulty of recruiting African labor for construction
work, opening the colonial government to litigation in
case insufficient government recruitment was blamed for
construction delays.

Not less important was the G o v e r n 

ment G e n e r a l ’s determination to retain control over rail
freight rates, which might be manipulated to spur the e x 
port trade more easily if not limited by a private firm's
need to show a given profit on invested capital.

•7T

The DSL's exclusion from construction of the new line
was certainly also due in part to the successful efforts
of groups of military engineering officers formerly
associated with construction of the KN in the Sudan and the
railroad in Guinea to secure an important role in co ns t r u c 
ting the Thies-Kayes.

With the conquest accomplished and

a civilian Government General firmly in control of the
federation,

the political ascendancy of the military in

important parts of West Africa was over.

34

Colonial m i l i 

tary officers, however, were apparently still not prepared
to relinquish the enterprise of colonial consolidation
entirely to civilians.

35

Previously,

only those u n p r o f i t 

able colonial construction projects, where private capital
did not care to venture,

like the KN railroad, had been

entrusted to the military engineers.

Now these officers

were arguing that the government should also undertake the
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-238more profitable colonial projects,
Thies,

such as the line from

the fruits of which could be used later to finance

less profitable projects.

Mod ifi ca tio n of a projected

rail trace while construction was

in progress,

it was also

reasoned, would be far easier if there were no prior c o m m i t 
ments to a given route because of a contract with a private
...
36
firm.
Construction of the first part of the line from Thi£s
to Diourbel was begun enthusiastically by the Government
General in late 1907 along the Rougier-Belle trace.

37

With

few physical obstacles intervening to limit the ultimate
direction of the trace between Thies and the KN, however,
alternatives were soon being considered.

A trace to

Kayes over barren terrain by w ay of Bakel had been rejected
easily in 1903, and a trace going directly to Rufisque
without using the DSL line had also been considered and
rejected in 1 9 0 6 . ^
Calmel's suggested variant aroused much more interest
from 1907.

The first part of the variant, from Diourbel

to Tambacounda, passed south of the Rougier-Belle trace
with a straighter line--shortening the track mileage s lig ht 
ly while dipping into regions where water was presumably
easily available.

From Tambacounda Calmel's trace ran

directly eastward to Kita via Talary,
from Kayes to Kita on the KN line,

bypassing the section

and thereby shortening
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-239the distance to the Niger by 69 km.

39

The direct line to

Kita would have actually entailed more construction expense
because more new track would have had to be laid and a
chain of hills would have had to be crossed at Tambaoura
beyond the Faleme river.

On the other hand,

it would have

also reduced future railroad operating costs and freight
charges with a shorter line to the Sudan, while bringing
the railroad into more fertile territory near the goldfields of the Faleme.

The adoption of this trace was r e 

sisted energetically, however, by both the governor of
Upper Senegal-Niger and the director of the KN, who were
defending the commercial importance of the town of Kayes
and of the section of the KN that would have been bypassed
by the Calmel trace.

Eventually,

the ministry agreed with

them and rejected the Tambacounda-Talary variant.

40

Smaller modifications made on the trace between D i o u r 
bel and Tambacounda,

however, were highly significant.

The

final line adopted for this section dipped even farther south
than Calmel's trace, bringing the railroad closer to the
Gambia river and only 22 km from Kaolack on the Saloum r i v e r .
While some merchants were concerned that the railroad's
traffic could be diverted to the nearby British Gambia, the
DSL and some merchants were also surprised to find that it
might now exit by way of Kaolack.

41

Engineering officers

charged with construction of the railroad explained that
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-240the trace had been redrawn southward in order to pass
through areas where water was easier to find.

A diversion

of railroad commerce into the Gambia, was unlikely,
claimed,

they

because the high mortality of the pack animals

near the river limited the volume and range of traffic to
it.

Rail traffic exiting

via Kaolack admittedly now b e 

came inevitable, but it was argued that Dakar and Rufisque
would lose little traffic since maritime shipping to
Kaolack was limited by the difficulties of navigation along
the Saloum r i v e r . ^
In reality,

the new trace profoundly altered the c h a r 

acter of the r a i l r o a d . ^

The argument about water a va il

ability seems specious in retrospect in view of the d i f f i 
culties which the government experienced later in supplying
water at Gossas and G u i n g u i n e o T h e

trace was almost

certainly redrawn to attract more trade from areas bordering
the Gambia; but at that the government was only able to stem
the flow of produce from the vicinity of the rail line
toward the Gambia itself by introducing special, low freight
rates for produce shipped to Kaolack from the rail stations
between Kaffrine and Tambacounda.^

It is indeed hard to

escape the notion that the rail trace had really been
displaced toward Kaolack not so m u c h for any water supply
problems as to reduce the new railroad's dependence on a not
always cooperative DSL management, by giving the Th ies-
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-241Kayes its own direct access to a coastal port.
By 1909, plans were being drawn up to expand Kaolack's
port facilities and to link the port to the Thies-Kayes with
a short rail spur from Guinguineo.

By virtue of its

geographic position and the new railroad,

Kaolack was in

a position to become the natural port for the rail line
from Diourbel to the Niger.
The problem might have taken an even more interesting
turn economically had France only controlled the Gambia,
enabling a even shorter rail line from the Niger to t e rm i
nate on a superbly navigable exit to the sea.

However,

various French attempts to obtain the Gambia never succeeded.
The Anglo-French treaty of 1904 had indeed accorded to
France navigation rights on the Gambia,

inspiring various

projects for a major French port on that river; but the port
and a Gambia-Niger rail link were rejected finally as too
advantageous for the

Construction of the T K

economy of the British colony.

46

The initial section of the Thies-

Kayes within Baol was an immediate success as soon as it
opened.

Merchants flocked into Baol to open business at

the escales forming near the new TK stations,which were soon
shipping out large volumes of peanuts.

The DSL company

particularly benefited with this development, not only from
the additional traffic flowing on its old line but from a
two-year contract with the Government General that turned
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-242over operations on newly-opened sections of the TK line
47

to the DSL.

Entranced by the profits from its share of

the new line's revenue,

the DSL and its parent company,

the Soci£t€ des Batignolles,

indeed hoped for a time to

obtain the concession to build succeeding portions of the
Thi^s-Ambidedi beyond the first 140 km section already
undertaken by the colony.
However,

48

these hopes were soon disabused.

Buoyed by

the striking commercial success of the first section of the
Thiks-Kayes and by the solidity of the federation's f i n a n 
ces, Governor General Ponty decided instead in late 1909
that the government itself should continue to build s ucceed
ing portions of the line.

A new loan of 14 million for

constructing the second section was proposed, and it was
duly authorized by the National Assembly in February 1910.

49

Moreover, with criticism mounting against the DSL
company's deteriorating service,

it was also decided in

early 1910 that the company's two-year contract for o p e r a 
ting the Thies-Diourbel rail section would not be renewed.
To run the TK line the government created instead,

in 1910,

its own special agency with headquarters and supporting
services at ThiSs.

Placed ostensibly under the command

of the governor of Senegal,

this ne w government service,

whose budget formed a special annex to the general budget
of French West Africa, functioned autonomously,

in reality,
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-243under the guidance of the Governor G e n e r a l . ^
Ponty was already asking
of 150 million)

By 1911,

(within a new public works loan

for 25 million francs to complete the last

section of the Thil's-Kayes line and even for 15% million
francs to start on the next section of the grand transver
sal from Bamako to B o u g o u n i . ^
However,

subsequent construction of the Thies-Kayes

proved more difficult than anticipated.

Originally it was

thought that the entire Thi^s-Kayes line

(62 5 kms to

Ambidedi) would be completed with in seven years, and indeed
the station at Diourbel

(Km 79) was opened as early as

J anuary 1909.
Unfortunately,
ceeded,

the farther inland construction p r o 

the more slowly it seemed to go and the more

costly construction expenses became.

The first section of

140 kms. was only completed at the end of 1910, and
Mal^me-Hodar on the second section at Km 211 was only
opened in Ma rch 1912.

Moreover, meager profits from a

disappointingly small traffic on operating

portions of

the TK in 1911 and 1912 provided few extra funds to finance
52
new construction.
The proposed loan of 150 million, which included
funding for further TK construction,

soon ran into d i ffi 

culties in the National Assembly, where voices were raised
against the management of both TK operations and new
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construction.
money.

Work on the TK had to be halted for lack of

Only a'fter William Ponty reluctantly satisfied some

parliamentary critics by including projects for improved
ports at St.Louis and Conakry in the omnibus public works
loan, was approval finally obtained in December 1913 and
work resumed on the TK in March 1914.

53

The outbreak of war in Europe found the TK track not
even as far as Tambacounda

(Km 395) ; but construction of

the TK line continued into 1917 with the meager resources
at the colony's disposal because the unfinished line was
also proving very useful in shipping recruited African
troops from the Sudan to the trenches

in France.

A system

of supply and mail convoys was organized to bridge the gap
between the end of the line and Ambidedi--a run made regularly by

automobile from 1917.

54

The Grand Transversal Unfulfilled

Nevertheless,

clear even before the end of the war,

it was

that the program

of railroad construction was a shambles.

Rail line c o n 

struction, other than on the TK line, had necessarily been
postponed during hostilities,

leaving at war's end only a

disjointed network of unconnected,

stubby limbs pointed

uncertainly toward the Niger valley.

The economic strain

imposed during the war on the metropole,

in obliging her to

draw more heavily on the colonial empire for support, had
exposed all the more clearly the economic backwardness of
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colonies such as those of French West Africa.

Thus, the

postwar period brought renewed interest in completion of a
consolidated rail system for French West Africa, not only
because it would allow greater access to the Sudan, which
officials perceived as a rich storehouse to succor a warweary France, but also because it promised to spur economic
development in the r e g i o n . ^

Some voices, however, were

already questioning the emphasis of the earlier program of
railroad construction on an east-west strategic transversal.
From at least 1917, a proposed major railroad of
penetration to the Niger bend from the Ivory Coast began
to attract increasing attention because its shorter length
promised lower rail shipping costs for Sudanese e x p o r t s . ^
Lines run inland from this direction would have had the
added advantage,

as Cosnier noted in proposing a great,

two-pronged "V" network of rail lines from Abidjan, of
linking existing population concentrations in the interior
in such a way as to capitalize upon and reinforce existing
local and long-distance currents of African domestic
57
co mm erc e.
Oriented generally in north-south directions because
of the greater possibilities of crosswise exchange among
the differing climatic and vegetative zones of West Africa
that lie east to west, the currents of domestic commercial
traffic presented a singularly favorable opportunity to
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Not only

might the growth of the domestic trade have fostered the
development of greater interegional exchange and greater
linkage between regional sectors of production (e.g., rice
grown in the Sudan replacing rice imported from Indochina
or cattle meat shipped to the forest r e g i o n s ) , but this
commerce would indeed have supported the growth of the
export trade rather than supplanting it.

In essence,

domestic rail traffic, whether passenger or freight, local
or long-haul, was likely to have generated additional rail
revenues.

With these additional revenues,

it would then

have been possible to set certain long-haul rail rates at
lower levels in order to stimulate a greater long-haul
export traffic.
Postwar plans did indeed pay increasing attention to
construction of a new port at Abidjan and a long rail line
of penetration from the Ivory Coast.

Nevertheless, with

so much already invested in the port of Dakar and in the
Thies-Kayes railroad--a project so near completion--colonial
authorities evidently opted to continue emphasizing this
east-west approach as the easiest and quickest way to reach
the Sudan.
Governmental efforts were necessarily limited in the
postwar era by budgetary considerations.

The Minister of

Colonies, Albert Sarraut, had indeed called in April 1921
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-247£or a renewed program of colonial public works for de ve l o p 
ment

(”mise en v a l e u r " ) , which included much of R o u m e ’s
r o

prewar program for West Africa.
West Africa realized, however,

Officials in French
that they would have to

settle for a scaled-down effort, w h ic h one official h o p e 
fully characterized as a "programme partiel et d ' a t t e n t e . " ^
The funds still authorized for the prewar loan of 167
million were applied only to the most urgent projects in
the program of 1913,

such as the completion of the TK and

port facilities at Dakar, while heavier emphasis was placed
on the extension of the Ivory C o a s t ’s railroad inland.
Other projects,

like the Bamako-Bougouni section of the

grand transversal, however, were postponed i n d e f i n i t e l y . ^
The scheme for a grand transversal was in effect
being shelved, never to be completed.

But the Government

General was nonetheless clinging to the notion of an eastwest line of penetration to the Sudan, while now con cen 
trating on the agricultural development of the great inter
ior delta of the Niger, whose products were to be exported
via Dakar by a completed Thies-Kayes r a i l r o a d . ^

Thus, the

great imperial route from Thi^s to the Niger continued to
be emphasized for political and strategic reasons, with
the l i n e ’s projected financial viability based on the
optimistic French expectations for quick successes in the
agricultural development of the Niger river bend.
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Work on closing the gap on the TK was again being
pushed in 1920, though with costs far exceeding the origi
nal appropriation of 25 million.

The completed TK rail-

road was fused with the KN in January 1924.

62

Nevertheless,

despite sustained governmental efforts in the Niger valley
in the 1920's and 1 9 3 0 's, the results in production were
disappointingly meager.

63

The agricultural potential of

the Niger region had been grossly misunderstood by govern
ment officials, and the completed Thi^s-Niger railroad of
penetration had itself become a source of difficulty.

Growing pains

Operations of the TK line by the colonial

government had never really gone smoothly.

When it took

over operations on the TK in late 1910 from the DSL, the
Government General had been obliged to purchase new rolling
stock quickly and to organize hastily a new government agency
for TK operations, whose top posts were soon largely staffed
by military officers.*^

It is understandable therefore that

initial operations on the TK were plagued with a number of
misadventures, which raised much criticism in 1913 during
the parliamentary debates on the loan of 150 m i l l i o n . ^
Merchants hastening to expand their commercial operations
along the new line particularly resented the TK's frequent
delays in moving freight.
During World War I, service on the line was re as on
ably well maintained, considering the economic dislocations
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-249due to the war

(loss of foreign markets for peanuts,

diffi

culty of obtaining replacement parts and c o a l ) ; but by the
end of the war, the TK's worn equipment was in a sorry
66
state.
The DSL railroad, facing similar problems, im67
proved its service noticeably by 1922.
However, with a
much longer line, with heavy construction underway at the
far end of the line, and with only inadequate, rudimentary
repair facilities available at Thies,
recover as quickly.

the TK was unable to

In 1921 the TK attempted to stimulate

commerce and traffic with lower freight rates, but from
1922 to 1924 the railroad's inadequate rolling stock was
unable to keep up with the growing traffic.

Merchants were

particularly irate that their peanuts were not being shipped
before the arrival of the season's rains spoiled the exposed
produce.

68

Already under fire for underestimating the costs

of construction of the final section of the TK, Pierre
Ballabey, director of the TK since 1910, was blamed for the
69
sad situation, and his ouster planned in 1924.
The fusion of the TK and KN in 1924 considerably
worsened the plight of the railroad, and led to a disastrous
transportation debacle in 1925.

The thin rails,

steep

gradients, and sharp curves of the KN section obliged the
railroad service to use four times as many locomotives to
haul a given weight load on the KN than on the better-built
TK section.

Thus, even though little produce could actually
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-250be shipped from the Sudan in 1924 and 1925, the burdens of
the new long-haul service on the TKN, requiring as it did
additional rolling stock (especially on the badly built KN
section), impaired the already-strained local service on
the Thies-Kayes section of the TKN.

70

The bumper crop of

1924 simply overwhelmed a now overextended TKN, forcing
some merchants to beat the rains in 1925 by shipping peanuts to port overland by slow-moving pack animals.

71

The TKN's immediate troubles stemmed largely from an
inadequate rolling stock and insufficient personnel,

and

these could be remedied with purchases of new equipment
and a vigorous recruiting campaign in France.
incoming director of the TKN

72

The new,

(from 1927 the Thies-Niger or

TN) proceeded to do just that, and to conduct a thorough
purge of the railroad's staff and workers as well.

The

railroad's painful process of recuperation was well begun
in 1926; but before it was completed in 1930, a growing
world crisis in the commodity trade hit the railroad hard,
diminishing its freight volumes and revenues just as local
commerce was clamoring for lower freight rates.
The TN was also suffering, however,

73

from a serious,

long-term predicament stemming from the unevenness of
productivity along the length of the rail lines.

The earlier

success of the TK in Baol along the initial Thi^s-Diourbel
section had indeed been misleading since it was not repeated

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-251to the same extent farther down the TK line.

From 1911 to

1922, before the fusion of the two lines, most of the r a i l 
road's receipts were generated by traffic on the 79 km
stretch of line from Thies to Diourbel, and to a lesser
extent from the 77 km Diourbel-Kaolack section
10).

(see Table

The longer section of line east of Guinguineo

(more

than 200 km long by 1913) produced only a small portion of
the line's total receipts.

A unified TN was in even worse

financial shape than the incomplete TK,

since the KN line

consistently produced a net operating deficit, which b e 
came extremely serious from 1930 on, when running costs
exceeded receipts for the entire line

(see Table 11).

The

lopsidedness in the distribution of receipts along the line
was all the more disappointing because of the government's
efforts to encourage production in the interior by means
of sharply degressive freight rates in use from 1913.

In

1913, for instance, peanuts on the TK could be shipped
at the rates of 0.13 francs per ton and per kilometer for
the first 50 km

(the normal flat rate), at 0.065 Fr/t*km

for the next 100 km, at 0.045 Fr/t*km for the next 150 km,
and 0.03 Fr/t-km for the following 200 km.74

Another

special rate allowed peanuts from stations between Kaffrine
and Tambacounda inclusive to be sent to Kaolack at even
lower prices.

At the fusion of the TKN, peanut freight

rates were set at 0.45 Fr/t*km for the first 50 km stretch
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-252in a sliding scale down to 0.04 Fr/t.km for distances
greater than 800 km.

75

Clearly the scale of degressive rates was not matched
by decreasing costs for long-haul freight since the costs
of shipping on the KN were much higher than on the TK--so
much so that reconstruction of the entire KN had to be
undertaken soon after fusion.

76

The deficits

lower freight rates for long-haul traffic,

involved in

thus, had to be

assumed by more prosperous elements of traffic on the
section of the line nearest the coast.

Unfortunately,

the

economic results of this sacrifice were disappointing.

Of

the total tonnage of products exported via the TN r a i l 
road during the trade seasons of 1928-29,

1929-30, and

1930-31, over two-thirds originated along the section
Thi^s to Kaolack, and less than 15% on the KN
12).

77

(see Table

The fusion of the two lines had brought only a

modest increase in combined freight tonnages, but an
enormous ballooning in the volume of traffic as measured
in tonnage times distance

(t»km)

(see Table 13).

78

Long

haul traffic sharply increased operating expenses, while
generating proportionately little additional revenue or
ex po rts .

TK impact in Senegal

The Thids-Niger of course had been

designed to function not only as a major axis of penetration
into the interior, but as a generator of local agricultural
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-253production. and a commercial rival to a major waterway in
the adjacent foreign colony of the Gambia.

In some of

these respects it was clearly a success.
For one thing,

it drew trade away from the Gambia.

Before construction of the new railroad,

some of the peanuts

of the Saloum and almost all shipped from Niani and Ouli
had been exported by French commercial houses via the
British-held Gambia river.

Now, as the railroad was built

into the northern parts of these territories, peanut traffic
shifted direction from such southern river escales as Oualia
and Guenoto to the new rail escales,

such as Koussanar.

The

shift was all the more strongly confirmed when the TK reached
Tambacounda in 1915 and when the government barred the export
trade via the Gambia after World War 1 . ^
Like the DSL, the TK had also rectified some of the
more irksome regional disparities previously afflicting
the region.

This was evident in the case of the Wolof of

the Saloum, who had often been obliged before the TK r a i l 
road was built to emigrate seasonally to farmland along the
DSL where cultivation was more remunerative.

The entrance

of the TK into the Saloum not only made these migrations
unnecessary, but induced a large seasonal counterflow of
cultivators from less productive or overworked areas of
northern Senegal into the rich, virginal land of the
Saloum.

80

It is also evident that groups of Mouride
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-254'.'talibes" were taking advantage of the new railroad from
the first to plant new agricultural colonies along the TK
in lands n o w made accessible for remunerative cash-cropping.

81
Mos t significant was the TK's rectification of the

DSL's earlier failure to serve Baol directly--a failure
which had severly hobbled the growth of the earlier export
commerce in that area.

The first three stations of the

TK--Khombole, Bambey and Diourbel--were quickly exporting
impressively large quantities of peanuts--some 53,084 tons
total for all three stations in 1909, and 48,788 tons in
1910.

82

Some of Baol's peanut tonnage had already been

exported previously via animal carriers to the DSL or
coastal escales, particularly with higher peanut prices from
1900.

83

But clearly the railroad accounted for significant

increases in local production.

84

The Baol escales quickly

became among the most prosperous trading centers in Senegal,
and accounted thenceforth for much,
peanut exports and rail receipts.

if not most of the TK's
About a third of the

peanut traffic carried on the DSL would also subsequently
originate on the TK, mo stly from these escales

(see Tables

14 and 20).
As some merchants had feared earlier,

the shift in

Baol's trading patterns impaired the prosperity of some
DSL escales formerly profiting from a proximity to Baol.
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-255After averaging shipments of 17,000 tons in the period 1905
to 1908, peanut tonnages exported from Tivaouane fell
sharply to 12,000 tons in 1909, and stayed below 10,000
tons for a number of years

(see Table 15).

Peanut shipments

from the escale of Thies held up better at first, but then
slipped to much lower levels.

On ports

85

The TK brought about dramatic changes

of export traffic toward the different p o r t s . ^

in the flow
St. Louis

was plainly the mai n loser in the competition among the
ports of Senegal.

Once completed,

the TKN railroad, of

course, had been slated to take the long-haul commerce of
the Sudan from St. Louis; but the TK also injured the port's
prosperity in a more indirect way.
St. Louis' problems stemmed fundamentally from the
sand bar that blocked and endangered ships trying to enter
the mouth of the Senegal river.

An inconvenient obstacle

for 19th century shipping,

the bar had become a major bar87
rier to the larger commercial ships of the 20th.
A pro
ject for fixing the sand bar and clearing a reliable channel
had been on file since 1886, and Senegal's public works
service prepared updated technical studies for the project
between 1904 and 1910.

88

Unfortunately,

the large sums

necessary for such a project could now only be raised by
the Government General, whose officials were plainly reluc
tant to invest in an undertaking that might divert some of
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particular,

Ponty,

in

flatly refused to use the federation's funds

for fixing the sand bar at St. Louis.

89

The colony's

General Council, man y of them St. Louisians already at
odds with the centralizing tendencies of the Government
General on other issues, took up the project's cause.
But the Council could do little against the federal govern90
m e n t 's obstinacy.
A split in the ranks of St. Louisian
merchants over the question did not help the city's case
91
either.
Momentarily St. Louis seemed to have won the issue
when the deputy of Senegal succeeded in forcing Ponty to
earmark and additional 10 million francs in the loan of
1913 for this project.

But the Government General managed

to stymie work on the sand bar indefinitely by insisting on
further, more extensive studies that were in fact never
92
carried out.
In 1920 and 1921, some political figures
tried to revive the project for this now commerciallymoribund port.

But almost all of the 10 million originally

allotted in the loan of 1913 was diverted instead in 1923
93

to projects of higher priority.

Proposals to pour new

peanut exports into St. Louis from a new rail spur into
Djolof were also frustrated since construction on this
railroad began far too late to help St. Louis' port.
its role as capital of Senegal and Mauretania allowed
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-257modern St. Louis a modicum of its ancient prosperity, as
traffic in its port dwindled to a thin trickle of river
trade.^
The TK railroad project had been designed with the
intention of augmenting the traffic of the new commercial
port being constructed at Dakar, and indeed the play of
degressive freight rates did funnel Sudanese exports all
the way to Dakar after fusion of the TKN.

Nevertheless,

it

was Kaolack, lying 182 kms closer to the Sudan along the
railroad,

that benefited most from the new rail line.

Despite navigational difficulties on the Saloum river,
exports through the port of Kaolack, already growing with
an upsurge in peanut exports from the Saloum after 1900,
increased dramatically after a rail spur from Guinguineo
linked Kaolack with the TN in January 1 9 1 2 . ^

In 1913 and

1914, Kaolack quickly captured the peanut shipments from
all TK stations east of Diourbel and most of Diourbel's
96
peanuts as well (see Table 16).
After a temporary concentration of maritime traffic
at Dakar during World War I, K a o l a c k ’s natural geographic
advantages soon made it the ma in port for the TK's peanuts
in the post war era.

97

Whereas peanuts exported via the

Saloum river had accounted for only 23.3% of the total from
Senegal in the
1925.

98

period 1909-1913,

it amounted to 36.7% by

Despite the predictions of colonial officials,
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-258almost all peanuts of the TK from Gossas eastward were
exported via Kaolack,

and from 1923 it again drew the

majority of Diourbel's produce as well.

99

Merchants based on Dakar and Rufisque were d i s co nte nt 
ed with the growth of a rival port at Kaolack, which would
oblige them to invest competitively in subsidiary operations
at that port.'*'^

Theoretically,

it was possible to channel

the flow of peanut freight all the way to Dakar or Rufisque
by instituting special degressive rates cancelling the cost
of the extra 44 kms involved in sending Diourbel's peanuts
to Rufisque or the 18 2 kms in sending peanuts from Guinguineo
to Dakar by rail instead of K a o l a c k . I n
cost of the extra mileage,

reality, the

if it were not subsidized by the

government, would have to be borne by the TK railroad s e r 
vice, whose financial situation as noted above was none too
bright.

Moreover,

the DSL, which controlled the 7 2 km run

from Thies to Dakar, resisted implementing a common unified
degressive rate for long-haul traffic on the TN since the
company would clearly gain little revenue while augmenting
costs w ith this arrangement.

102

Under the prodding of a

vigorous local chamber of commerce at Kaolack the g o v e r n 
ment decided by 1928,

to erect a modern, well-equipped port

at Kaolack, which from 1929 was to capture the major share
of peanuts shipped from Senegal.

103
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Population growth in the various

coastal ports of Senegal from 1908 to the 1930's clearly
reflects not only the redistribution of the export trade
among these ports but also a significant movement of
population in Senegal toward urban and semi-urban areas
(See Tables 17 and 18).

Dakar's population, which had been

reasonably stable at around 24,000 from 1908 to 1916, shot
up to over 37,000 by 1921,
by 1934.

to 54,000 by 1931 and to 76,100

Thi^s, whose losses in caravan trade from Baol

were more than compensated by its selection as a major
transportation crossroads and by the location of TK h e a d 
quarters nearby, bounded from a total of 1,7 50 inhabitants
in 1908 to 3,044 in 1914; and then to 6,427 people in 1921.
Towns that lost out in the new commercial dispensation-St. Louis, Tivaouane, and ultimately Rufisque--maintained
more stable population levels in contrast to agglomerations
such as Thies, Diourbel, and Kaolack, which mushroomed
spectacularly; but the disadvantaged towns also tended to
grow from the increasing urbanization of the society.
tabulation of population in 13 urban centers

A

in 1914

enumerated a total of 77,598 people in these locales at a
time when the total population of Senegal was estimated at
1,247,000.

There were a total of 139,635 people in 34

urban centers other than Dakar in 1930 at a time when the
total population of Senegal was still around 1.6 million.
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-260Whereas the ports of St. Louis and Rufisque jointly held
39,402 of these people in 1930 and Kaolack some 13,348
more, nine DSL escales including Thies boasted a r e s p e c t 
able combined total of 30,308 people, while eight of the
TK escales already held a total of 26,265 people--that is,
the larger rail escales alone accounted for over 40% of
the urbanized population in 1930, exclusive of Dakar.

The

European population in Senegal, an element almost e xcl usi 
vely urban, was also on the rise during this period, e spe c i 
ally in Dakar.
Construction of the TK railroad had contributed toward
urbanization in Senegal by nurturing a string of new escales
abutting the railroad's new stations.

The growth of these

escales seems all the more interesting considering that the
new rail stations had generally been located, regardless of
the size of nearby centers, at spaced intervals of 25 to
30 kms along the rail line at sites that promised sufficient
105
water.
The section between Thi£s and Diourbel,

at least, had

been deliberately traced through a densely settled area.
But even Diourbel had been chosen not for its size, but
because of a coincidental transfer of French resident's
quarters there from S a m b e . ^ ^

Beyond Diourbel, politico-

economic strategy guided the direction of the trace, which
bypassed m any of the larger villages in the corridor between
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Kaffrine with 226 people,

Koungheul with 191, Koussanar wi th 79, Koumpentoum with
111 were hardly of impressive size.

107

Even Tambacounda

with 320 people was mainly chosen because of its proximity
to a junction of four existing overland trading routes.

The social dimension

108

Although it is hazardous to infer

social attitudes from statistics,

the TK railroad,

like

the DSL, was apparently a source of much social satisfaction
to Africans.

Aside from the growth of population at the

rail escales,

this is clearly reflected in the heavy third-

class passenger traffic

(and fourth-class in the Sudan)

on

both railroads, as well as in the opportunity to farm new
land previously too remote for cash-cropping.
Myrdal's terms,

109

in

the railroad was extending the range of

the "spread effects" produced by the peanut export trade,
particularly by equalizing previously severe spatial
disparities.

Henceforth,

cash-cropping was diffused

over a much wider zone, and any incipient land shortages
were eased.

The extensive campaigns of well-drilling

deliberately undertaken in conjunction with the construction
of the TK,

in order to attract and fix populations in the

vicinity of the rail lines and other favored areas, were
also welcome boons to rural populations chronically suffermg

from water shortage. 111
The railroad, however, as an instrument of external
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-262market forces,

tended to increase sectoral disparities

by stimulating an overstressed export trade; and there were
drastic limits to the r a i l r o a d ’s ability to redress spatial
disparities.

The T K ’s impact on eastern parts of its line

had been disappointing,

and areas too remote from r a i l 

roads- -such as Kedougou and the Senegal river b a s i n - - s u f 
fered from "backwash

effects," in which the play of taxes

and prices would lure the young men for work,
or permanently,

to the favored areas.

112

seasonally

Furthermore,

there was still the question--raised by Frankel in c o n 
nection w it h African railroads in general--as to whether
the r e g i o n ’s population was really large enough to make a
long railroad of penetration financially viable.

113

This does indeed seem to have been a problem for the
Thids-Kayes

in the 1 9 2 0 ’s.

TK line were substantial,

Population increases along the
as indicated in census figures

for the cercles of the TK line

(Baol, Sine-Saloum,

Niani-

O u l i ) ; but these increases seem less impressive if matched
against comparable increases for Senegal as a whole
Table 19).

114

(see

Census figures on the basis of cercles would

not, of course,

reflect population movements within cercles

or seasonal sharecropper migrations toward areas along the
rail trace.

However,

the relatively low absolute increase

of population in Niani-Ouli indicates that the disappointing
agricultural production in the 1 9 2 0 ’s of areas east of
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-263Guinguineo indeed stemmed partly from the shortage of
settled population in these areas.
Thus,

as early as 1917 a governor of Senegal had

proposed that the government bring in African settlers from
the more remote areas of the Sudan to fill underpopulated
areas near the TK escales.

115

This particular suggestion

never got far; but by the 1930's the colonial government
was undertaking several actions that tend to confirm that
the existing population distribution was a major factor
in the weakness of productivity on the TK line.

One im

portant action was to formalize and encourage the habitual,
seasonal influx of share-cropping migrant farmers, or
"navetanes,” from the Sudan and Guinea toward coastal areas
of Senegal.

This seasonal migration,

antedating even the

French conquest, was now actively encouraged in the 1 9 3 0 ’s
by propaganda campaigns in the navetane homelands, and the
navetanes were organized rigorously for the round-trip
seasonal journey into large supervised groups travelling at
reduced train fares.

Even more significant was the

encouragement given to the Mouride brotherhood of Senegal,
whose earlier far-ranging drive to establish peanut-growing
colonies had been deeply distrusted by government officials
during a first period of expansion from 1907 to 1927.
The larger,

117

better-organized second period of Mouride e x pa n

sion was conducted from 1932 to 1945, with government approv-
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-264al, eastwards into the upper valleys of the Saloum and
Sine and along the "new territories" of the TK railroad.

1 1 8

Not entirely unconnected with the Mouride migrations, was a
government-sponsored program organizing a sometimes-forced
migration of Serer people from Sine into the new terrains
119
of the northern Saloum.
However effective these govern
ment measures may or may not have been, they were clearly
undertaken in response to perceived needs.

The core of

the economic problem for the TK escales farther in the
interior lay not in freight rates, but in the shortage of
manpower willing to settle there.

In any case, after the

1930's the center of gravity of Senegal's population did
shift eastward along the TK, and with it the distribution
of agricultural production.

Auxiliary railroads

The policy of moving people to

accommodate railroads was one that increased spatial d i s 
parities to some extent.

On the other hand,

construction

of auxiliary branches to serve productive or promising
areas of Senegal too remote from the DSL and TN railroads
seemed,

for a time an alternative solution.

laying down low-cost,

narrow gauge

The notion of

(60 cm) lines for freight

hauling between various points in Baol

(Bambey-Gaoune,

Diour bel -G ass ane , or Guinguineo-Gassane), from Kaolack to
Rip,

into the Upper Casamance,

or from Louga into Djolof
120

indeed enjoyed a certain popularity in the postwar period.
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-265At that time, a narrow-gauge rail enterprise would face
growing competition from motor truck traffic; but several
firms,

notably a consortium formed in 1927 by major

Senegalese commercial houses,
l'Afrique Occidentale,
projects.

121

the DSL, and the Banque de

seemed enthusiastic about these

One imaginative scheme would have combated

truck competition with a hybrid of road and rail--using
a rail-guided,

gasoline-powered truck as a locomotive, with

its weight on wheels rolling on the ground on either side
of the track.

122

However,

the colonial government itself,

in fact, not any private firm,

finally undertook these

auxiliary railroad projects.
The most promising of these lines was the LougaLinguere railroad, which promised to tap the productivity
of Djolof,

reputedly a major breadbasket in ancient times

and still an exporter of peanuts and millet despite its
remoteness from the coast.

The project had indeed already

been actively promoted from 1908 by a merchant of Rufisque,
Ferdinand Maury, who even won the colonial government's
backing for his scheme before the war disrupted his
123
plans.
After the war,

the project was taken up directly by

the government of Senegal, which constructed the entire 134
km railroad as a one-meter gauge single-track line branching
on the DSL at Louga by 1 9 3 1 . ^ ^

Construction of the line,
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begun in December 1926, was directed by French military
officers using locally recruited labor.

The government,

however, yielded the line's operation to the DSL company
in a 25 year lease granted in December 1928--a logical
arrangement since the Louga-Lingu^re's export traffic was
obliged to pass via the DSL railroad.
Unfortunately,

125

the line proved a dismal failure.

Construction costs were much higher than anticipated,
despite preliminary surveys,
severe water shortages.

and,

its new escales suffered from

The new line, which had the m i s 

fortune of opening just when the Great Depression was
beginning to strangle the peanut trade in Senegal, was also
penalized by the decay of St. Louis' port, obliging traffic
from Louga to exit at high cost at the more distant ports
of Dakar and Rufisque.

From 1929 through 1932,

the Louga-

Lingu^re took in 1,458,000 francs in receipts while chalking up 4,364,000 francs in expenses.

1 *7 f\

The Louga-Lingu^re had been built partly because the
influential "bourba" Djolof, Bouna N'Diaye,

among others,
127
had been campaigning on its behalf for years.
The
project for a Casamance railroad arose out of similar
efforts on the part of local political figures in the
Casamance.
get far.
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The Casamance project unfortunately did not

The ineptness of civilian and military personnel

assigned to the initial surveys and the governments indeci-
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strung the project at the planning stage.

By 1929 a study

commission recommended against a railroad because of doubts
that sufficient rail traffic could be generated in the
underpopulated Upper Casamance.

By then local merchants

were more interested in improving the navigability of the
Casamance river than in any railroad, and the colony of
Senegal ceased its studies.
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The one-meter single track

railroad built from

Diourbel to Touba stands out from the other two projects
as a notable commercial success.

Designed with the i n te n

tion of continuing beyond Touba to Taltal,
to the Louga-Linguere,

the Diourbel-Touba

and eventually
(or Sine) r a i l 

road had first been suggested only in 1924.

Senegalese

merchants apparently would have preferred rail lines in
other directions,

such as toward Gassane or the Gaoune

forest, and Diourbel's merchants especially feared that the
Diourbel-Touba would capture much of the produce then being
brought directly into Diourbel.
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It is clear, despite the paucity of pertinent d o c u 
ments,

that French authorities decided to go ahead with the

rail spur to Touba for political reasons connected with the
death in 1927 of the spiritual leader of the Mouride b r o t h e r 
hood, Ahmadou Bamba.

With the remains of Ahmadou Bamba

slated to be transferred for buriel at Touba, this village
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age for the Mouride faithful.

In any case, construction

of this 46 km line, branching directly from the TN at
Diourbel, began in November 1929 and was terminated in
1933 w i t h the aid of an ample labor offered by Mouride
volunteers.
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Despite the depression,

this new line was

immediately a striking commercial success--its new escales
of N'Doulo and M'Backe became two of the busiest shipping
centers in Senegal--and its success offers a useful object
lesson when taken together with the failure of the other
lines.
First of all, regardless of the economic issues in
volved,

all three of the auxiliary rail projects seem to

have been initiated for predominantly political reasons.
This is in line with Myrdal's observation that local
political action is often directed to equalize spatial
disparities,

and it also indicates a noteworthy capacity

of local political figures to influence colonial policy
at that time to some degree.
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Expectations that the

railroad in itself would actually increase total peanut
exports, however,

do not seem realistic,

and the optimistic

project studies seem calculated more to suit the political
needs of the moment than to tap genuine economic o p p or tun i
ties.

At the least,

it could be said that governmental

planners certainly entertained an exaggerated notion of
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The new Diourbel-Touba railroad was certainly a success.
But much of its new tonnage,

especially from N'Doulo, had

previously been shipped out via the nearby rail station
of Diourbel or by a fleet of truck haulers who had devel13 r
oped a heavy traffic in the area.
This is not to deny
that production expanded in the area subsequent to the
rail spur's construction; but much of this can also be
attributed to its favorable situation along a major axis
of future Mouride colonization aimed at the religious
center of Touba, rather than because of the railroad per s e .
At best,

the railroad to Touba had managed to tap pr od u c 

tion in an area already ripe for expansion, rather than
creating those conditions itself.
The disappointing failure of a railroad to stimulate
any significant production in Djolof reaffirms the point.
The factors supportive of production in that area,

though

similar to those present on the Diourbel-Touba line, were
unfortunately just too weak.
region,

The cost disadvantages of the

located so far from good port outlets,

and the

shortcomings of the Louga-Linguere line were all the more
painful at a time when a depression was choking down market
prices for peanuts.

If anything,

the railroad drew labor

away from the Djolof, by enabling local cultivators to
escape seasonally to other areas where cash crops could
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Later in the 1930's market prices

rebounded to levels that might have sparked productive
growth earlier along the Louga-Linguere.
lage.

By then,

But it was too

the government, which had taken over the

line from the DSL, was ready--perhaps all too ready--to
write off the Louga-Linguere as an unfortunate investment
of little potential,

Conclusions

and to leave Djolof a backwater.

134

Railroads were one of the proudest marks of

imperialist enterprise.

They fortified the imperialists'

perception of themselves as teachers and builders engaged
in an enterprise that would benefit the colonized as well
as the metropole and would justify thereby the European
presence in West Africa.

The French envisioned the r a il

roads as tools to free the Sudanese interior from a prison
of economic isolation,

enabling indeed a new major world

center to flower there.
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The Thies-Kayes formed only a portion,
essential portion,

though an

of a grand transversal railroad that was

to bring this about.

The Thi&s-Kayes had been designed

to fulfill several roles,

and it had certainly performed

well in bringing an added measure of spatial equalization
and prosperity to wide areas of Senegal.

However,

the

railroad's impact had been more feeble than expected, even
in Senegal itself.

It had stimulated production in areas

where human and material resources were already concentrated
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the export trade.

But the railroad had a disappointingly

meager impact in other places.
The reason for this failure--brought out clearly in
the case of the Louga-Linguere--lay in the interplay of
world market prices,

local productivity,

living, rail freight structures,
rail expenses with receipts.

the cost of

and the need to cover

At root, much of the problem

lay in the relative sparseness of population that made a
long railroad of penetration barely viable with insuffi
cient traffic.

Since the colonial government would not

subsidize rail operations,

the rail line could only stay

solvent if a sufficient, productive population could be
induced to move to the vicinity of the line--even if it
did leave some other areas,
rail line,

such as Djolof with its poor

in the "backwash" of progress.

Just as

fundamental a problem was the shortage of export

(or domes

tic) freight of high value per unit weight of volume--a
problem that had crippled the long-distance trade in p r e 
colonial Africa earlier.

The low value of goods transported,

such as peanuts, now also hobbled the financial viability
of the railroads and their reach into the interior.
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Another part of the problem lay in the east-west
orientation of the grand transversal project as the major
axis of penetration to the Sudan.

The longer distance of

the east-west trace selected and its crosswise orientation
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financial problems of the railroad, while only generating
3s

a feeble export and domestic traffic.

As the post-World

War II prosperity of the Ivory Coast indicates, an emphasis
on developing trade on north to south rail lines might not
only have encouraged the growth of a wider regional do m e s 
tic trade

(probably, with fewer consequent sectoral

dislocations),

but also might have stimulated a greater

volume of long-distance export traffic.
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French officials paid much lip service to the primacy
of economics as a justification for the colonial effort.
But despite the possible financial difficulties of an
east-west route, of which they were well aware, these
officials clearly subordinated economic development to
political and strategic considerations.

For them, commerce

was only one dimension of a general political struggle
with foreign powers.

These officials had hoped that the

inconvenience of economic geography could be redressed by
a simple manipulation of freight rate structures.

But

the railroad had proven a fragile economic tool in the West
African setting.

In the prosperous period 1927 to 1929,

the TN with a longer line was carrying about the same volumes
of total freight, peanuts,
DSL

(see Table 20).

expenses,

and passengers as the much smaller

While the Thies-Niger barely covered

the DSL was prospering.

Soon the economic health
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tested by the calamity of the Great Depression.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-274Note s
1. GG (Van Vollenhoven) to GS, September 10, 1917, SARS,
DCF, in reference to a suggestion that a migration of
Africans be organized from the Sudan to the areas about
the r a i l r o a d s ,
2. As an example of the colonial literature on railroads
in Africa, see Commandant Andry, Etude sur le chemin de
fer de Kayes d Bamakou du Senegal au N i g e r , 1893, copy
in archives of S enegal’s Regie des chemins de fer
(henceforth R A ) ; Charles Rotte, Les chemins de fer et
tramways des colonies (Paris, 1910), p. 14, claimed that
traffic on a railroad increased as the square of its
length.
3.

In principle anyway; see Suret Canale, L'.ere c o l o n i a l e ,
pp. 432-433; Georges Hardy, Histoire sociale de Ta
colonisation francaise (Parish 1953), p. 147; As
Suret-Canale noted, budgetary expenses were met by the
colony of French West Africa, but not by French E q u a 
torial Africa, which continued to receive metropolitan
su b v e n t i o n s .

4. See C. W. Newbury, "The Formation of the Government
General of French West Africa," Journal of African
H i s t o r y , I, 1960, pp. 111-128; Rheinhart report of
December 18, 1913, with Wm. P o n t y ’s response, ARS,
4G15; the Monguillot report of November 25, 1913, I b i d .,
details the evolution of the Inspection General o?
Public Works of French West Africa from 1905, when its
chief Inspector General (henceforth IGTP), only
counselled the Governor General,until 1913, when an
Inspector General kept an eye on the technical services
of the federation's colonies, reviewed their technical
plans, issued directives on organizations, and was
consulted on personnel matters.
5. In this case ideological beliefs and the self-interest
of the governmental bureaucratic structure reinforced
one another.
6. See C. W. Newbury, "Government General" cited above.
The key enactments in the formation of the Government
General were the decrees of October 15, 1902 and the
decrees of October 18,1904.
7. The colonies of Senegal and Guinea had contracted loans
earlier, but these debts were consolidated as part of
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-275the first general loan made by the Government General.
The Governor General would have to obtain approval for
each of the items on the proposed loan from the Ministry
of Colonies, which would then have to secure p a r l i a 
mentary assent in a bill approving the loan.
8. See copies of the letter MC to GG, December 12, 1902
in ARS, 0228 and 065, with map in 0228; the map in
A R S , 065 is dated May 1906; the apparent original of the
plan in Paris, in F0M, TP, is marked simply "Decembre,
1902-Plan Binger," which might indicate Binger as the
originator of the plan.
Salleses, Director of the
Guinea railroad, suggested modifications in his report
of July 3, 1903, with accompanying map in A R S , 065.
The
plans for a Transsudanian were given wide publicity in
1911 when the government of French West Africa proposed
constructing a new section of it from Bamako to Bougouni.
9. See GG to MC, July 22, 1909, ARS, 072.
The railroad
would be appreciated for rapid delivery of mail and
for easy transfer of officials into the interior, as
well as their rapid evacuation in case of sickness.
After the government began to recruit large numbers of
Africans for the French army, the railroads of p e n e t r a 
tion would be particularly appreciated for facilitating
the flow of recruits out of the interior, rather than
troops into it.
10. MC to GG, December 12, 1902, ARS, 065.
Construction of
a Conakry-Niger had been started in 1900.
See the
excellent article by Jacques Mangolte, "Le chemin de fer
de Konakry au Niger, 1890-1914,M Revue Frangaise d ' H i s toire d'Outre-mer, LV, 1968, n° 168, pp. 38-105.
Bahomey railroad concession was granted to private firm
in 1901 for a trace from Cotonou.
The Ivory Coast r a i l 
road was started in 1904 with funds of the loan of 65
million and reached Dimbroko by 1910,
11. MC to GG, December 12, 1902, ARS, 065,
There was a
significant danger though that these very railroads might
be used, contrary to the hopes of their builders, to
drain products into foreign colonies if they passed too
near a frontier area which was served more cheaply by a
shorter foreign railroad or waterway.
Because of this
problem, French authorities were particularly keen on
getting control of a railroad projected to be built in
Liberia.
See ARS,0230, especially Mouneyres to Chief
of Service of Civil Affairs, March 22, 1913; P o n t y ’s
response to Rheinhart report, December 13, 1913,
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-276A R S ,

4 G - 1 5 .

12. See Excerpt, inspection report of Rear Admiral Auvert
on the naval.establishment at Dakar, December 6, 1909,
ANF, D D 2 - 2 4 5 2 .
13. GG to MC,

September 24, 1902, FOM, TP.

14. See the Monguillot report of November 25, 1913, ARS,
4G15, which noted that rail rates had been arranged to
canalize freight toward the west, while disregarding
the costs of this diversion; also GG to MC, November 6,
1911, FOM, TP.
See also Ficatier report to GG,May 3,
1922, SARS, DCF; See P.V., Consultative Commission of
French West African railroads, August 21, 1911, FOM, TP.
15. The possibility of compensating economies for long-hauls
is discussed in Arthur Hazelwood, Rail and Road in East
Africa. (Oxford, 1964), pp. 82-141, especially pp. 8284.
Long-distance hauls on the Thies-Niger, however,
seem to have been more costly.
16. See Luneau's report to the Committee of Colonial Public
Works (Comite des Travaux Publics de Colon ie s), session
of February 2, 1903, with its negative reaction to a
railroad project.
See also Charles Duffart, "Le chemin
de fer S^negal-Niger et 1'amelioration du fleuve,"
D£p£che Co l o n i a l e , June 25, 1904, p. 2, and P.V., CC of
S t . Louis, June 6, 1902, in which Roume advocated
amelioration of the Senegal river.
17. The report by Director of Public Works (Gt.Gal.),
Ficatier, September 1902, copy in FOM, TP, on public
works for French West Africa noted the usefulness of a
study of a railroad to Kayes, but considered the
amelioration of the Senegal river indispensable.
See
also GG to MC, September 24, 1902, FOM, TP.
18. See report to and extract of P.V., Committee of Colonial
Public Works, July 11, 1904, ARS, 062; copy GG to M C ,
September 26, 1904, ARS, 085; Luneau report to Committee
of Colonial Public Works, October 24, 1904, FOM, TP.
19. Mazeran to GG, September 2, 1902, FOM, TP; Mazeran
report at the end of the mission, August 15, 1904, I b i d .
See also the article MLe S€n£gal, accessible et navigable
en tout temps," (continued) by Mazeran in Pep£che
Coloniale, n° 2604, December 9,1904, pp. 2-3.
20. See copy GG to MC, June 24, 1902, ARS, 062.
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-27721. Copy of report by Binger and Boutteville to MC,
November 27, 1902, ARS, 062.
22. GG to Colonel Rougier, Chief of Exploratory Mission,
January 9,1903, ARS, 062.
23. The observations of the Marmier report of 1893, cited
in the previous chapter, were useful to Roume at this
time.
24. River freight transportation, although slower than rail
transport, was inherently cheaper, so railroad planners
had to pay particular attention to the possible economic
interreactions of a projected rail line with a nearby
river.
In the case of the Gambia, whose river allowed
ocean-going vessels to penetrate easily 300 kms into
the interior, a cross-country pack animal transit in
formally improvised by merchants might easily drain
the commerce of the Sudan into the Gambia.
The French
commercial houses of Senegal already dominated Gambian
trade, but the diversion of trade would mean that a
French-built railroad was contributing to the tax base
of the colony of the British Gambia.
25. See Government General, AOF, Le chemin de fer de Thies
au N i g e r , (Paris, 1931), p. 37; copies of correspondence
and intineraries by Rougier and Belle, and Rougier's
report are in ARS, 062, 063 and in FOM, TP.
See also
Government General, AOF, D S L - T K , (Vol. I, in Chemins de
fer en A O F '/~Paris, 1906_/), p p . 77ff.
Most striking in
these various reports is the extent of French ignorance
of conditions in this part of the interior after 10
years of occupation.
26. Copy of GG to MC, July 7,1905, ARS, 062 and 072.
In its
natural state, the river was navigable at a convenient
time for the importation of European trade goods, but it
was too low at times when local agricultural products
had to be evacuated.
27. Director General, Union Coloniale Francaise to GG,
February 2, 1906, ARS, 085, recommended construction of
the first part of the new line by the DSL.
28. The project of convention, November 23, 1905 is in
FOM, TP; See also GG to MC, February 1, 1906, I bid . ;
Copy report "Embranchment du Baol,M Ma rch 13, 1906, Ibid.
29. A concession to the DSL was rejected on the motion of
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-278of the L t .-Governors of Senegal and Upper S ene ga l-Niger,
but plainly with the acquiescience of Roume.
Captain
Lotte, Commandant of the Navy in Senegal gave a brief
description of the sessions of M a y 8 and 9, in his
letter to Minister Marine, May 15, 1906, ANF, DD2/2447;
See also MC to GG, May 11, 1906, ARS, 075; same, May 18,
1906, I b i d .; GG to MC, M a y 19,1906, I b i d . The Pr esi
dent of the DSL pleaded for Roume to reconsider, but
he refused in GG to President DSL, June 1906, copy in
FOM, TP.
In an earlier "Note-propositions relative a
la construction et 1 ’exploitation du chemin de fer du
Baol," July 1905, FOM, TP, Roume had been interested
in according the DSL the concession for the new spur,
but only if it also agreed to split its own line into
Dakar-ThiSs and Thi^s-St. Louis sections.
30. See Director General, Union Coloniale Franfaise to G G ,
June 23, 1906, ARS, 085.
See also Pierre H a r d a n t ,
"Les Travaux publics au Ministere des Colonies,"
DSpeche C o l o n i a l e , n° 2894, January 24, 1906, p. 1;
nu 3008, February 7, 1906; n° 3018, February 17,1906,
p. 1; n° 3108, M a y 23, 1906, p. 1.
See Henri Lorin,
"Les chemins de fer du Senegal," n° 3156, July 13, 1906,
p. 1.
The editor of Dgp£che C o l o n i a l e , J-P.
Trouillet,
came out in support of Roume in an a r t i c l e - " L ’AOF et
son nouveau projet d ’emprunt," n° 3201, August 30,
1906, p. 1.
31. Mangolte, pp.

65-72; GG to MC, October 7, 1903, FOM, TP.

32. The original contract of June 26, 1900 with Borely and
Company of Marseilles had accorded that company an
outright grant of 295,000 hectares of some of the best
land in Dahomey.
The abuses resulting from this p r iv i
lege forced a hasty alteration of the contract.
See
Documents P a r l e m e n t a i r e s , C h a m b r e , November 22, 1906,
p"I 148.
33. GG to MC, October 7, 1903, copy in FOM, TP.
Mangolte,
pp. 67-73, noted the difficulties of recruitment result
ing from the mistreatment of Africans by agents of the
private contractor.
See also GG to MC, August 10, 1905,
ARS, 0228, in w h i c h Roume already envisaged forming in
French West Africa, a government railroad service simi
lar to the state-owned railroads in France; Roume's
report to the Conseil du Gouvernement, December 10,
1904, ARS, P12; M o u n e y r e s ’ note on the Monguillot
report of November 25, 1913, ARS, 4G15.
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-27934. See Newbury, "Government General," pp.

118-128.

35. The later quasi-monopoly of military officers over
construction work on the Thi^s-Niger is noted in
Government General, AOF, Thi£s au N i g e r , p. 42.
GG
Ponty noted in his response of January 17, 1914; ARS,
4G15, to the Monguillot report on French West Africa's
Inspection General of Public Works that Colonel Rougier
as Director of the KN had been " L ’initiateur d'une
serie de jeunes et brilliantes officiers du genie si
l'oeuvre chemins de fer africains."
One of these,
Captain Launay was indeed to become Inspector General
of Public Works later on.
Thomasset, another officer,
was likewise to become an IGTP.
See also Mangolte,
pp. 70-71.
36. The question of colonial railroad construction by the
state had been advanced by a number of military o f f i 
cers publicly since 1900.
See Charles Rotte, Les
chemins de fer et tramways des colonies (Parish T 9 1 0 ) .
p p . 2 l -49; Fernand Guary "Les chemins de fer africains
et la regie directe."
DgpSche Coloniale n° 2925,
November 14, 1905, pp. 1-2 and n° 2926, November 15,
1905, p p . 1,2.
37.

Details of construction of the Thies-Kayes line are
covered in Government General, AOF, Thids au N i g e r ,
pp. 37-51.

38. See report of the variant by Captain Friry, June 9, 1906,
ARS, 065; Report of Director of Public Works, Senegal,
July 2, 1906, I b i d .
39.

The Calmel variant was studied December 1906 to Ma y 1907.
Calmel's report is document n° 7 5 in ARS, 064.

40. M u c h of the argument turned on technical and budgetary
considerations.
See the report by Digue, director of
KN, March 6, 1908, ARS, 065; Lt. Governor of Upper
Senegal-Niger to GG, n.d. (document #22), Ibid. LtGovernor of Upper-Senegal-Niger to GG, M arch 24, 1908,
ARS, 08 5; P.V., Chamber of Commerce, Kayes, March 14,
1908, Ibid.; GG to M C , May 25, 1908, ARS, 07 2; MC to
GG, August 31, 1908, I b i d . The book by a former c o m 
mandant of the cercle of Upper Gambia, Frederic Riembau,
De Dakar au Ni ger (Paris, 1908), on the other hand,
strongly promoted the Calmel trace.
41. Copy letter Vieuxtemps

(DSL board of directors)
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-280(Dakar),April 7, 1909, ANF, 89AQ, unclassified
(Brazzaville) "Nous avons “et£ surpris d'appendre que
la ligne Thi5s-Kayes passe actuellement a 20 km
seulement de Kaolack!
Pour une ligne de penetration
elle a de la peine d s'§loigner de l'Ocean."
Seethe
CFAO note presented December 10, 1908 to the African
section of the Union Coloniale, copy in ARS, 065, and
the report by Delpit, Director of Public Works, Senegal,
March 6, 1908, ARS, 072.
42. See P.V., CC-Rufisque, March 4, 1909, SARS, DCF; Friry's
response to the CFAO note at the December 10, 1908 m e e t 
ing of the Union Coloniale's African section, copy in
ARS, 065, in w h i ch he indicated that Kaolack wo uld only
handle the overflow of rail traffic; Friry's discourse
in P . V . , Chamber of Commerce, St. Louis, March 13, 1909,
ARS-L; Noirot report to GG, March 1, 1909, ARS, 072.
43. The commercial bulletin for the Sine-Saloum, February
1911, ARS, 2G11-43 already reported the transport of
peanuts by pack animals from Guinguineo to Kaolack,
rather than by rail to Rufisque.
44. Friry was much more optimistic about finding water along
the original Rougier-Belle trace in his earlier report
on subterranean water, December 22, 1905, ARS, 085.
On difficulties of supplying water to Gossas and
Guinguineo, see Director TK to Chief of Public Works
Service, May 17, 1919, SARS, DCF; Launay Report on
the TKN for GG, June 3, 1924, ARS, 1P119.
45. See note by Friry to IGTP, October 6, 1908; Noirot re
port to GG on the Upper Gambia, n° 1, n.d. (1909), ANF,
148AP5; GS to GG, December 13, 1913, SARS, Confidential
registers, (henceforth Confid); report Director TK on
tariff projects, October 4, 1913, ARS, 076.
In 1914,
the price of peanuts at Oualia and Guenoto on the Gambia
ranged from 20 to 23 fr/100 kg, compared to 18 fr/100 kg
at Koussanar on the railroad (Political report, 1st
trimester 1914, ARS, 2G14-6).
46. French interest in a Gambian port in 1904 was soon o ver 
shadowed by the Thi£s-Kayes rail project.
The desira
bility of a French port on the Gambia connected by rail
to the TK was raised again during the immediate post-war
period.
See Ficatier report to GG, May 3, 1922, SARS,
DCF.
The suggestion was rejected in the note by IGTP
Mouneyres, June 19, 1922, Ibid. and the report by acting
Director TK, August 28, 1922, I bi d. See also John H a r 
greaves, Prelude to the Partition of West Africa (London,
1963), p p 7 347-348.

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-28147. From December 1908 to December 1910,
Ponty had a c c e p 
ted DSL operation of the new rail spur after a campaign
by elements of the colonial party on the company's b e 
half.
See Director General, Union Coloniale Francaise
to GG, September 15, 1906, FOM, TP; same, November 24,
1908, ARS, 072; copy MC to GG, December 24, 1908, FOM,
TP; Pherivong report, February 26, 1911, FOM, TP.
48. Note for MC by Boutteville, M a y 29, 1909, FOM, TP;
Project of concession by Batignolles, FOM, TP; Table
of advantages and disadvantages of Batignolles c o n 
struction, November 3, 1909, I b i d .
49. GG to MC, July 22, 1909, ARS, 072; Boutteville note
for MC, November 4, 1909, FOM, TP; Picquie note for
MC, November 11, 1909, I b i d .; Minister of Finances to
MC, December 6, 1909, I bid .; see also GG to MC, May 7,
1909.
50. The governor of Senegal admitted in a note of May 4,
1911 on the Le Conte inspection report of February 22,
1911, FOM, TP; that he was unable to oversee the TK.
See GS Levecque's complaints about the colony's in
ability to control the TK in his comments of Septem
ber 3, 1918 to the report by Tixier of August 1918 on
Senegal's Public Works Service, FOM, TP, and also GG
Angoulvant's sarcastic reply of September 18, 1918,
Ibid.
51. See Mouneyres report to GG in the Conseil du Gouvernement, June 27, 1911, Ibid., on the projected loan of
150 million francs, emphasizing the Dakar-Ansongo grand
transversal, P.V., Conseil du G o uv ern eme nt , session of
June 26, 1911, Ibid.; GG to MC, December 31, 1911, I b i d .
52. Overall receipts were up because of passenger traffic,
but freight receipts were sharply down.
See Table 10.
Also see the report for the 1912 session of the Council
of Government, ARS, P13, and GS to GG, June 4, 1912,
ARS, 087.
53. The Governor General's plans were strongly criticized
in the Committee of Colonial Public Works,
See report
by Pontzen to the Committee of Colonial Public Works,
February 14, 1912, Ibid. Note by Boutteville, July 12,
1912, Ibid.; Report #24^59, Chamber of Deputies, session
of December 23, 1912, copy in I b i d .; GG to MC, January 2,
1913, Ibid.
See also Lemaire and Picaron to_MC,April 11,
1913, I b i d . A variation of the Tambacounda-Talary
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-282trace was again being considered seriously.
See the
Pontzen report of February 14, 1912, and "A propos du
Thi&s- Kay es ,"' Dep’&c'he Coloniale, December 1, 1911, p. 1.
54. MC to Minister of Finance, August 26, 1914, FOM, TP;
Political reports, Senegal, 1st and 4th trimester
1916, ARS, 2G16-5, noted that the gap was already being
crossed by automobile for mail service at the end of
1916.
Also see Director TK to IGTP, November 12, 1914,
ARS, 088; same, November 15, 1914, I b i d .
55. See Henri Cosnier, L*Quest Africain (Paris, 1921)
pp. VIII, XIX-XXIIl"
Cosnier, who was a strong critic
of past French economic policy in the region in other
respects, strongly endorsed a renewal of railroad
construction.
56. Report of acting Lt.-Governor Upper Senegal-Niger,
December 1, 1917, ARS, 6P166-36.
The acting IGTP,
Thomasset, suggested in a report of February 10, 1919
to GG, ARS, 6P166-36, that the railroad nets in the
colony have two major axes of penetration: Dakar-Bamako
and Abidjan-Bouak6-Bobo-Mopti.
A u b ry had suggested a
Bamako-Bani railroad rather than the line to Bougouni
in his report of June 15, 1914, FOM, TP.
57. See Cosnier, pp. 129-130, 219-224, Cosnier was not the
first to do so.
Binger had already suggested earlier
in his account of 1892 of his explorations that the
Ivory Coast be made the entry point for lines of p e n e 
tration and development in West Africa.
See G. Binger,
Du Niger au G o l f e d e Guinee par le pays de Kong et le
Mossi, Volume II (Faris, 1892), p. 345; maps showing
routes and population concentrations are on pp. 398,
401.
58. See A l b e r t - S a r r a u t , La mise en valeur des colonies
francaises (Paris, 1923), pp, 361ff,; Suret-Canale,
L ’dre coloniale, pp. 350-354.
Also the report by
Georges Bartheiemy, for the Committee of Algeria, the
Colonies, and Protectorates on the "mise en valeur" of
colonies, 1921, copy in ARS, 1P35-32.
Implementation
of the entire program was predicated on a massive flow
of German materiel to French Colonies as a part of war
reparat io ns.
59. Report of Ma y 10, 1922 by M o u n e y r e s , FOM, TP.
60. The funds of 1913 were reallocated in the laws of
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-283Au gust 8, 1920 and July 29, 1923.
See the report by
Raymond Godfernaux to the Committee of Colonial Public
Works, January 10, 192 2, FOM, TP; Report n° 5059 by
Georges Boussenot for the Chamber of Deputies, session
of November 14, 1922.
GG Carde indicated that even
the Sarraut program was outdated in his note of April 8,
1926, ARS, 4 G-87-105.
61. See report of GG on the program of port Work a nd_trans
portation routes for French West Africa, /^1919_/, ARS,
6P166-36.
Note the continuing interest in a Transsaharan.
A Comite du Rail Africain, of prominent French
citizens, proposed in 1918 that French West Africa be
served by North African ports through a rail connection.
The Governor-General of French West Africa was very
hostile to the notion.
See GG to MC, March 15, 1919,
ARS, 6 P 1 6 6 .
62. The rails of the completed line were first joined on
August 15, 1923.
See ’’Inauguration T h i d s ’N i g e r ," in
the special issue of Annales Colo ni ale s, December 26,
1923.
The fusion was put into effect as of January 1,
1924 by the arrete of November 17, 1923, but the
budgets of the two lines were not merged until 1927
(by a law of December 30, 1927).
63. The failure of the Niger development scheme is outlined
in Jean Suret-Canale?L 'dre c o l o n i a l e , pp. 354-360.
64. See report Director TK, April 8, 1910, SARS, DCF, on
the purchase of locomotives; report Director TK on
railroad operations, September 18, 1913, ARS, 087.
65. On TK operations problems see: Director TK to GS,
December 22, 1910, SARS, DCF; Director TK to GS,
March 4, 1913, SARS, DCF.
See criticisms of the deputy
Barthe during debates of the proposed loan of 150
mil lio n in December 1912, excerpt in ARS, 087.
66. Launay "Note relative au fonctionnement des chemins
de fer du S£n£gal," April 10, 1920, FOM, TP; Economic
report, February, 1922, ARS, 2G22-26.
One problem had
been the rapid degeneration of locomotive fireboxes
designed for coal-burning when they had to use wood.
See Director TK to GS, April 1, 1916, ARS, 0233; same,
April 23, 1917, Ibid.
67. Report of Chief Surveillance Engineer, DSL, March 1,
1923, ARS, 6P104 -3 6.
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-28468. See mont hl y economic reports-February, March and May,
1922, ARS, 2G22-26; President CC-Rufisque to Director
TK, M a r c h 29, 1922, SARS, DCF; President CC Rufisque
to GG, February 14, 1922, SARS, DCF; GG to GS, O c t o 
ber 25, 1923, SARS, DCF.
69. See GG to MC, June 10, 1924, confidential, ARS, 1P6-10.
GG to MC. September 8, 1924, Ib i d . Ballabey's p e r s o n 
nel dossier is #A-496 in SARS^ ^Tee also Thies au
N i g e r , pp. 37,42.
70. See the publication by Government General of French
West Africa, Sur les difficult£s rencontr£es au
r'&seau Thi&s-Niger depuis sa crSation et sur- les
m^sures prises en vue d fassurer une exploitation normale
et rationnelle de ce reseau (n.d.-circa 1927); Thids au
N i g e r , pp. 62-67; Launay report on functionning of TKN
for GG, June 3, 1924, ARS, 1P119-32; Report of Director
of TKN, September 24, 1924, SARS, DCF.
See P.V., CCKaolack, February 27, 1924, pp. 38-40, ARS-L.
71. See mont hl y Economic Report, April 1925, ARS, 2G25-2.
See also monthly Economic Report, May 1922, ARS,
2 G 2 2 - 2 6 ; P.V., CC-Kaolack, June 26, 1924, SARS, DCF.
72. See Difficulties T h i e s -N ig er, pp. 7-10; Thids au N i g e r ,
pp. 67-69.
Ficatier had warned of the insufficiency
of rolling stock and personnel in his report to GG,
May 3, 1922, SARS, DCF; but his recommendations were
largely rejected for budgetary reasons by IGTP Mouneyres
in his answering note of June 19, 1922, I b i d . See also
adjoint Director TN to GG, April 19, 1925, ARS, 1P6-10,
Merly report on TKN personnel, June 15, 1925, ARS,
4G86-105.
73. See Inspector Merly to MC, July 3, 1926, FOM, TP;
Demongin report, May 20, 1926, Ibid.; "Bulletin Mensuel
sur la Situation Economique et Politique de l ’AOF,"
May 1926, copy in SARS, DCF; Acting GG Dirat's response
of July 2, 1926 to the Merly report of June 12, 1926,
ARS, 4 G 8 7 - 1 0 5 ; P.V., CC-Kaolack, April 26 and May 31,
1930, FOM, TP.
74. Report of Director TK on four tariff projects, October 4,
1913, ARS, 096.
75. See Report A ”Launay_7 > May 1924, ARS, 6P172-36, the
price to 50 km was 0.45 Fr/t-km; from 51 to 80 k m s ,
0.32 Fr/t-km; 81 to 150 km, 0.18 Fr/t-km; for 151 to
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-285350 km, 0.08 Fr/t*km; for 351 to 800 km,

0.05 Fr/t*km.

76. The need for more appropriations to repair the KN had
already been recognized earlier; see GG to MC, M arc h 8,
1923, FOM, TP on a proposed new loan of 55 million.
77. See the table in a report by the acting Director TN to
IGTP, September 26, 1931, SARS, DCF.
78. Le Gregram report, Mission Sol, June 16, 1930, p. 6,
See also Thids au N i g e r , p. 84.
79. Commercial Bulletin, Sine-Saloum, July 1909, SARS, DCF;
monthly reports on Niani-Ouli, 1915, ARS, 2G15-36;
commercial bulletin,
Tambaccunda, January 1920, SARS,
DCF.
See also Adam, pp. 19, 139-140; Riembau, Dakar
au N i g e r , pp. 42-56.
80. This seasonal migration from the Saloum was mentioned
in Rougier's report of 1903, ARS, 063, chapter 3, p.
11; Government General, AOF, D SL - T K , pp. 162, 175.
81. See Paul Pelissier, Les paysans du Senegal (Saint
Yrieix, 1966), pp. 302-310; Administrator cercle SineSaloum to GS, M a y 20, 1910, SARS, DCF.
See political
report, 2nd trimester 1914, ARS, 2G14-6.
82. Statistics from the annual reports of the DSL board of
directors to stockholders, 1910 and 1911.
83. See for instance, the political report for January, 1906,
ARS, 2G6-4, political report 1st § 4th trimester 1908,
ARS, 2G8-10; report for Sine-Saloum, January 1911, ARS,
2G 11-45.
84. Friry noted in his project report of June 9, 1906, p. 7,
that the port of Fatick also drew peanuts from Diourbel
40 kms away and even from N'Gahayes.
The total freight
exported from Baol may have been in the order of 15,000
to 20,000 tons of peanuts before the railroad's c o n 
struction.
85. For the protests of the merchants of Tivaouane and Thi§s,
see petition to GS, M a y 9, 1907, ARS, 085; extract of
P.V., Municipal Council of Thi§s, May 21, 1907, I b i d .;
GS to GG, Ma y 23, 1907, Ibid.; GG to GS, June 2 , 1 W 7 ,
Ibid.; copy GG to MC, October 6, 1907, I b i d . ; acting GS
to President, CC-Rufisque, March 28, 1908, SARS, DCF,
claimed there was little to fear, since in a rich country,
the new outlet would create new products.
See also the
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report for 1909 in folder 1, ARS, 2G9-6; the commercial
bulletins for Tivaouane in ARS, 2G11-44, and Januarythrough M a r c h 1909 in SARS, DCF,
86. See Roger Pasquier, "Villes du Senegal au XIXe siecle,"
Revue Franchise d *Histoire d *Ou tr e-M er, X L V H (1960),
pp. 3"87- 4 2 6 .
87. A report by Inspector Pherivong on the sand bar of St.
Louis, December 15, 1910, FOM, TP, noted that ships of
1200 tons at most could pass the bar.
Nevertheless when
the sand bar was in a favorable position the commercial
activity in the port of Saint-Louis could still exceed
that of Dakar, as in 1909.
See the annual economic
report 1909, ARS, 2G9-4, folder 4.
The situation for
St. Louis had deteriorated markedly by 1912 (annual
economic report, ARS, 2G12-8, folder 5).
Difficulties
of river navigation also played a role.
Senegalese
commerce found it difficult to evacuate by river a
mere 2500 tons of freight from the Sudan in 1925
(Difficultes Th i S s - N i g e r , pp. 4-6).
88. See Camille Camara, Saint-Louis du S£n€gal (Dakar, 1968),
pp. 103-106, 123-127, and
Commandant Geo M a d a J 7 , La
barre du Senegal , Une fleuve sans issue (Bordeaux,
/71918_7), rare copy in ARS-L; See also MC to GG, May 3,
1906, FOM, TP; report by Director Public Works, Mouneyres,
(Blache-Mouneyres project), July 18, 1910, Ibid.
89. GG to MC, June 12, 1911, FOM, TP; Copy note for Minister,
March 4, 1913, I b i d ; GG to GS, April 10, 1911, ARS,
P246.
Meniaud, Director of the Bureau of Economic
Affairs in the Ministry, noted in his report, Septem
ber 1, 1910, ARS, P 2 4 4 , that if the bar were cut, St.
Louis would retain almost all of the long-distance
import freight and some of the export freight which the
TK would otherwise get.
Many articles were written on
all sides of this subject in metropolitan newspapers
(e.g., Pierre Mille. "Le Fleuve Senegal," Dgpgche
Coloniale, January 7, 1904, p. 2; J, Hubler, "La Barre
du
S ^nt g a l ," Ibid.,
February 9, 1910, p. 2-4; same,
Ibid., August 13, 1912, pp. 1; same* I b i d ., August 21,
1912, p. 1; F, Jourdier, "La Barre du Senegal," I b i d .
February 26, 1913, p. 1).
Ponty attempted to avoid
undertaking the project by claiming that it ought to be
done instead by a private company, which would exploit
the improved harbor; but the Governor General never
displayed any interest in pursuing this solution.
See
GG to MC, July 13, 1912, FOM, TP; Note by Inspector
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-287General Devos, August 10, 1912,

lb i d .

90. As in Conseil General, extraordinary session, D e c e m 
ber 21, 1910, pp. 84, 85,
91.

In 1902, CSee P.V., CC-St. Louis, M a r c h 28, 1902, ARS,
Q28) the chamber of commerce rejected even the notion
of ameliorating the bar.
In 1909, the chamber was more
favorable, but certainly not enthusiastic (See excerpt
P.V., CC-St. Louis, November 22, 1909, copy in FOM, TP).
See excerpt of letter form Administration of CFAO to
its branch office at St. Louis, June 1, 1910, FOM, TP;
same, January 9, 1911, I b i d . The DSL had created a
special low rate on goods between Dakar and St. Louis
as an alternative to remedying St. Louis portuary
problems.

92. Boutteville note for MC, March 4, 1913, FOM, TP;
Boutteville to M. Cochery, March 17, 1913, Ibid. J.
Renaud's report recommending new, more detailed studies
of the project was published as "Amelioration de
l'embouchure du Senegal," in La G ^ o g r a p h i e , 19, (1914),
pp. 397-400.
Renaud's recommendation was affirmed by
the Committee of Colonial Public Works on July 7, 1913.
See copy MC to GG, July 25, 1913, ARS, P248; copy
P.V., Committee Public Works, July 7,1913, I b id. See
also the report by Louise, March 4, 1914, i b i d . The
vissicitudes of the problem to 1917 can be followed in
ARS dossiers P2-44 through P249.
93. Excerpt P.V., CC-St. Louis, May 5, 1919, ARS, P42;
Blaise Diagne to MC, July 8, 1920, FOM, TP.
Blaise
Diagne, to MC, M arch 30, 1921, FOM, TP.
See also
Conseil Colonial, August 1921 (extrordinary) pp. 4650.
The funds were first diverted to other works by
the law of August 8, 1920 and confirmed in the law of
July 29, 1923.
By 1923, the entrance to St. Louis was
so silted up that exports from the river had to pass
by rail to Dakar, (1923 report by Chief of Customs
Service, Senegal, SARS, DCF, p. 38),
The memorandum
on the bar of St. Louis prepared by Boutteville for
fMC) Sarraut for his trip to West Africa, n.d.
£ September, 1921 J FOM, TP, stated: "Dakar maintenant
est le veritable port du Sdn£gal et il n'y a pas
avantage a 6parpiller les travaux et les d£penses comme
on l'a fait trop souvent en France..."
94. Camara, S ain t-L ou is, pp. 111-123.
Camara also writes
optimistically of plans to ameliorate the entrance to
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-288the port in the future (ojo. c i t . pp. 122-126).
For
St. Louis as the port for Djolof, see the report by
Pherivong to MC, January 6, 1911, FOM, TP; Aubrespin
report of June 20, 1911, ARS, 053.
95. The Political report, 4th trimester 1912, ARS, 2G12-9
noted that the port of Kaolack was taking an important
part of the products of East Baol, heretofore exiting
via Rufisque.
The work by A. Dessertine.
Un port
secondaire de la cote occidentale d 1Afr i q u e , Ka o1ack
(Kaolack, 1967) is essential for a study of this p o r t .
See also Joseph Fouquet, La traite des arachides dans
le pays de K a o l a c k . .. (St” L ouis, 1958), especially
pp. 52-60, 108-116.
96. Some chamber of commerce statistics show that Khombole
and Bambey generally shipped all of their peanuts via
the DSL.
Obviously, from column 9 of Table 16 an
estimated 6,292 tons of Diourbel's peanuts went to
the DSL in 1913, and 5,136 tons in 1914.
The rem ain 
der, roughly 10,000 tons in 1913 and 15,000 tons in
1914 went to Kaolack.
97. See Economic Affairs report-Senegal, January 1924, ARS,
2G24-2.
Note that the play of the railroad's rate
schedule would send to Kaolack all peanuts shipped from
Guinguineo to the Faleme, but the exports of the Sudan
would go all the way to Dakar.
98. See "L'AOF en 1925," a special issue in 1926 of the
Bulletin Mensuel de l'Agence Economique de l'AOF,
p p . 41-43, for the figures.
99. See the following P.V., CC-Kaolack: May 31, 1922 for
the 1921-22 trade season, January 8, 1924 for 1922-23
trade season Bulletin, CC-Kaolack n6 12 (Dakar, 1926),
pages 42, 46 has statistics for the 1924, 1925 trade
season; Bulletin, C C- Kaolack, n° 13 (Dakar 1927), page
43 for 1926-27 trade season; all of above found in SARS,
DCF.
See the note by Ficatier to GG, May 3, 1922, SARS,
DCF; Note by IGTP of June 19, 1922, I b i d . IGTP
Mouneyres doubted that Kaolack would ever be as impor
tant as Ficatier thought.
The marginal notes on
Ficatier's report also indicated skepticism that Kaolack
would ever be a major port.
See also Chief Customs
Service, Senegal, report of 1923, SARS, DCF, p. 36.
100. E.g., Director General, Union Colonial Franjaise to GG,
June 27, 1914, ARS, 076.
Copy President CC-Dakar to
GS, November 27, 1923, SARS, DCF.
The government was
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-289reluctant to improve the approaches to Kaolack, h o p 
ing instead that degressive freight rates would bring
at least some of the peanuts along the line to Dakar.
See the speech by President CC-Kaolack on the visit of
the acting GG June 1922, copy in ARS, 17G190-104.
Also P.V. , CC-Kaolack, February 27, 1924, pp. 35-57.
101. See Director of TK, Thibaud, June 16, 1910, SARS, DCF;
contrast it with Ballabey to Surveillance Engineer,
September 16, 1910, ARS, 042.
Director General of
Union Coloniale Frangaise to GG, June 27, 1914, ARS,
075; GG (Ponty) to Director General of Union Coloniale
Franfaise, September 7, 1914, Ibid. ; Report of Director
of TK, October 4, 1913, Ibid.
See Director, TK,
Thibaud, June 16, 1910, SARS, DCF.
102. DSL to MC, December 13, 1921, FOM, TP; DSL to MC,
April 14, 1922, I b i d . Report by Director TKN, Ballabey,
December 18, 1923, ARS, 1P50-32.
See also the e st i
mate by Chief of Public Works Service to GS, J an u
ary 15, 1924, SARS, DCF; Lach&ze (DSL) to GS,
January 17, 1924, ARS, 1P50-32.
103. See GS to GG, June 28, 1928, StL; GS to GG, Septem
ber 19, 1928, SARS, C o n f i d . ; report by Aussel
(Demongin mission), April 16, 1936, FOM, TP.
104. The table for 1914 was in SARS, 22G50; the table for
1930 was in SARS, DCF.
See J. Lombard, Ggographie
hu ma i n e , pp. 21, 25-26, 31, 135-156.
105. The spacing was for technical as well as commercial
reasons since a series of stations at spaced intervals
was necessary both for water and for regulation of
traffic on a single-track line.
106. The census figures for the cercle of Thi§s, ARS, 1G296
in 1904 lists a total of 1,995 people at the village
of N ’Diourbel in East Baol, but this is not confirmed
by the Rougier-Belle studies.
The account by Belle
originally dated May 30, 1904 and printed in Gover n
ment General, AOF, D S L - T K , p. 114 specified only a
halt at Diourbel, the seat of a French resident that
"se reduit a quelques cases occupees par le personnel
indigene de la residence.
Le veritable village
indigene est un peu au snd de Diourbel, a Diarren."
The station was slated in this report for Sambe at
KM 86.
On p. 170, the population of the four villages
of Samb£ was estimated at 3,165 people.
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-290107. The figures are for 1904 from ARS, 1G290 for the
Sine-Saloum (indicating many villages of 500 to 700
people) and from ARS, 1G293 for Niani-Ouli.
In
Niani, the village of Maka-Colybentan had 1205 people
at the time.
Diourbel, Gossas, Koussanar and
Tambacounda notably were adjacent to marigots.
The
Rougier-Belle trace took into account existing
concentrations of populations on its way to Kayes,
but the route finally adopted was determined more by
topography and economic geography.
See Rougier r e 
port, June 3, 1903, ARS, 062; Belle report, May 30,
1904, ARS, 063.
The final trace skipped large
villages situated further north, (some of them sites
of abundant water at the junction of two different
vegetative zones).
108. For Belle's description of Tambacounda, see D S L - T K ,
p. 152.
Tambacounda became the chief center of the
cercle in 1920.
See J-F. Dupon, "Tambacounda,
capitale du Senegal Orientale," Cahiers d'Outre -M er,
April-June 1964, pp. 175-214, especially pp. 179180, 207-213.
109. For a breakdown in passenger traffic by class, see
the Legregram report, June 16, 1930, FOM, TP,
pp. 33-34 Third and Fourth class passengers accounted
for over 95% of the total number of passengers on
the TN from 1925 to 1929.
Despite the length of the
line, the average distance travelled by a passenger
in that period was between 86 to 99 k m s . Neither
first nor second class traffic was remunerative, but
the two lower classes were.
110. Gunnar Myrdal, pp.

27-33.

111. From 1906 to 1914, a special well-drilling brigade
operated in Senegal drilling by m i d - 1913 on the TK
alone some 103 new wells (totaling 2952 meters of
drilling depth).
See Ballabey list, June 7, 1913, ARS,
087.
Friry report, January 16, 1907, ARS, P37; situ
ation report, Director Public Works, April 20, 1907,
ARS, P 3 8 ; Administrator Sine-Saloum to GS, December 23,
1910, SARS, DCF; same, December 22, 1910, I b i d .,
with two maps pinpointing locations of wells for 1910;
report on Public Works situation, November 1913, SARS,
DCF; Public Service Report 1913, ARS, 2G13-35.
112. See GG to GS, July 1, 1915, ARS, 2G15-6; report 2nd
trimester, Ibid. ; M a y report, Kedougou, ARS, 2G11-38;
Kedougou reports, ARS, 2G12-57; Kedougou reports, ARS,
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-2912G13-50; February-March report for Kedougou, ARS,
2G15-34.
113. S. Herbert Frankel, Capital Investment in Africa
(London, 1938), pp. 375-376.
114.

It is hard to drawn any firm conclusions from statis
tics taken on a cercle-wide basis partly because of
boundary shifts between cercles.
Unfortunately
changes during the crucial period after 1925 are
obscured by several changes; viz., the merging of
Djolof into Louga; the dismemberment in 1928 of
Tivaouane between neighboring cercles, and the cession
of the two cantons of Fand^ne and Diack (totaling
28,400 inhabitants in 1904) from Baol to ThiSs in
late 1927.
See the report of the Chief of the Politi
cal Bureau, to GS, February 1928, FOM, AP3085; same,
May 16, 1925, Ibid.; GS to GG, October 5, 1929, ARS,
13G17-17.

115. GG to GS, September 10, 1917, SARS, DCF.
Van Vollenhoven commented: "It is certain that the prosperity
of the Sine-Saloum and in a more general way the
cercles traversed by the TK could only gain from
notable augmentation of their farming population.
But
the means foreseen by M. Brocard, which consists of
organizing a sort of official migration, of compact
masses of natives of the Nigerian region to the SineSaloum, seems unrealizable in practice..."
116. Charlotte Quinn, Mandingo Ki n g o m , p. 27 noted Sarakole
coming to the Gambia as navetanes before the conquest.
The colonial administration acted to promote and o r 
ganize the seasonal movement of navetanes in groups
from 1932.
Some notions of this can be gleaned from
Economic report-1932, ARS, 2G32-40; Customs report,
ARS, 2G32-6.
Economic report 1933, ARS, 2G33-4;
Economic report, 1935, ARS, 2G35-36; Economic report1936, ARS, 2G36-3; Political report 1937, ARS, 2G37-17.
The history of the navetanes is being studied by M.
Phillippe David, a former French administrator, who
wrote Gens de l'hivernage.
Sur la route du Sgnggal
avec les navetanes de 1954 / Paris, 1955_/, M§moire
Ecole Nationale de la France d'Outre-Mer.
117. See especially Pelissier, Paysans du S e n e g a l , pp. 302310.
See also annual political report-1929, ARS,
2G29-15.
The government of Senegal had discouraged
settlement of Mourides along the Louga-Lingu^re ra il
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-292road as late as 1928.
See GS to Administrator Louga,
February 4, 1928, SARS, Confid.
The political report
of 1934, ARS, 2G34-5 notes the movement not only of
Mourides along the TK line,
but also movements of
population from Louga and Djolof toward these regions.
118.

Pelissier, Paysans du S e n e g a l , pp. 302-310.
Type
report of Lucien Nekkach, Le Mouridisme depuis 1912
(Saint Louis, 1952), ARS-L.

119. Pelissier, Paysans du S e n e gal , pp. 308-310.
Pelissier
added on page 307 that a spontaneous colonization of
Tidjani Wolofs was also taking place along the r a i l 
road, but interestingly enough mainly in the sector
between Gossas and Kaffrine, the same area favored
by the nav e t a n e s .
120.

E.g., see P.V., CC-St. Louis, September 15, 1923,
SARS, DCF, pp. 8-9; the letter M. Carrie and Abrigeon
to GS, July^l7, 1923, SARS, DCF, expressed an interest
by the Societe des Etudes des Voies Economiques
d'Afrique Occidentale in building Louga-Coki and BambeyGaouane lines.
An economic conference under the aegis
of Governor-General Carde, March 25, 1926, SARS, DCF,
notedthe usefulness of building lines into Djolof and
the Casamance.

121.

Syndicat d'Etudes de Chemin de Fer de la C&te
Occidentale d'Afrique (henceforth SECCOA) to GS,
October 13, 1927, StL^ GG to GS, November 19, 1927,
ARS, 6P46-36.
Societe Auxilliare Africain to GG,
March 29, 1927, I b i d . described the formation of SECCOA.
See also copy SECCOA to GS, June 9, 1927, I b i d ., GS to
GG, January 7, 1928, I b i d ,; GG to GS, January 21, 1928,
Ib i d .; Note on 60 cm railroads, February 22, 1928. Ibid.
The Monguillot report, February 10, 1938, FOM, TP, p.
22, remarked that SECCOA had only been an "emanation"
of the DSL.

122.

The "road-rail" system was proposed by Director of the
Societ£ d'Etudes des Voies Ferrees Economiques de
l'Afrique Occidentale to MC, December 6, 1924, ARS,
6P42-36; see the brochures of the company for the
Louga-Yang Yang, B ambey-Gaouane, Diour bel -Th ie X,
Bignona-Velingara and Sedhiou-Kaorane lines.
See also
MC to GG, April 10, 1925, ARS, 6P42-36; copy of GG to
GS, June 18,1925, I b i d .

123. The ARS dossiers 052 through 056 are concerned with
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road.
See especially GS to GG, June 6, 1908, ARS,
052; project of convention, February 7, 1914, I b i d .;
reconnaissance by Aubrespin, May 24 to June 4, 1911,
ARS, 053; Parmentier study, June 11 to August 5,
1911, I b i d .
124.

The overall technical study was drawn up by the
Chief of S e n e g a l ’s Public Works Service, July 4,
1927, copy in FOM, TP. Construction of the LougaLingu&re Line by the colony was decided at the u r g 
ing of the c o l o n y ’s Colonial Council by 1925.
See
copy acting GS to GG, August 8, 1925, FOM, TP.

125.

See GG to MC, October 14, 1927, FOM, TP; DSL to MC,
December 2, 1925, Ibid. ; GG to MC, January 26, 1927,
Ibid.

126. Report by Coste to MC, June 4, 1938,

FOM, TP.

127. See note by Friry to IGTP, October 6, 1908, ARS,
065; Bouna N ’Diaye to GG, December 26, 1920, ARS,
17G239-108; Bouna N'Diaye to GG, November 3, 1937,
ARS, 13G48-17 credited Van Vollenhoven for getting
favorable consideration of the Louga-Lingu^re ra il
road.
128. See the Thibaud report of July 22, 1914 on the
Casamance railroad project, FOM, TP; Report by Ponty,
January 19, 1915, ARS, 088; The Casamance project
was raised again by Abdoul Diallo in the 1922 session
of the c o l o n y ’s Colonial Council (GS to GG, March 3,
1923, ARS, 088; Olivier to IGTP, March 14, 1923, Ibid.).
See Inspector Muller report on the Casamance railroad,
January 1, 1928, FOM, TP; Muller to MC, May 17, 1928,
I b id. The Chamber of Commerce of Ziguinchor threatened
to resign in 1926 because of delays in implementing
the project.
See also P . V . , CC-Ziguinchor, session
January 25, 1923, excerpt in SARS, DCF.
129. See the report by Monguillot, February 10, 1938, FOM,
TP; High Administrator of the Casamance to GS,
February 28, 1923, SARS, DCF; Report acting chief
of Public Works, August 31, 1926, St. Louis; Beurnier
to High Administrator of the Casamance, August 14,
1928, SARS, DCF.
130. P.V., Syndicate of Defense of Senegalese Interests,
January 18, 1929, SARS, DCF; President, CC-Dakar to
President Defense Syndicate, March 28, 1929, I b i d .;
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-294GS to Administrator Baol to GS, April 16, 1928,
SARS, DCF.
131.

See annual political report-1929, ARS, 2G29-15.
Formal approval for a complete Diourbel-Taltal
line was obtained in 1931 (arrete by GG, February 18,
1931); The section Diourbel-M'Back£ was opened for
partial exploitation as of April 1, 1931 (arrSte of
March 28, 1931).

132. Myrdal, pp. 44-45.
133.

In ARS, 6P438-36, tables of monthly shipments of
peanuts from stations on the TN and Sine railroads,
show that Diourbel only shipped out about 14,000
tons in 1933 (compared to over 40,000 tons in
1931), while the Sine escales of N'Doulo and M ’Backe
together shipped out a total of about 13,000 tons.
For truck traffic, see project by Surleau, June 28,
1930, FOM, TP.

134.

Inspector Monguillot report, December 20, 1937, FOM,
TP; GG comment on report, April 9, 1938, I b i d . The
note by Launay, October 18, 1935, FOM, TP, remarked
that no serious effort had ever been made to develop
land along the line.

135.

See the report, annex n° 445, 2nd seance, session of
November 22, 1906, Documents Parlementaires, C h a m b r e ,
p. 148.

136.

See the comments by Hopkins, Economic History of West
A f r i c a , pp. 72-77, on pre-colonial transportation
problems.

137. A north-south African-based trade continued to
flourish notwithstanding the east-west orientation of
the export trade.
When railroad traffic was cut with
the breakup of Mali and Senegal in 1960, Mali d e v e l 
oped a heavy truck traffic with Abidjan.
See e.g.
Claude Meillassoux, Urbanization of an African C o m m u n 
ity. Voluntary Associations in Bamako (Seattle and
London, 1968) p p . 20-22.
See also the remarks in
Hopkins, Economic History of West A f r i c a , pp. 243253; R . Peterec, Dakar and West African Economic
Development (New York, 1967), p p . 14-24.
138. The DSL was only 264 kms long, while the TK section
of the 1220 km Thi^s-Niger was 669 kms long (395 kms
Thies to Tambacounda a lo ne ).
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CHAPTER V
RAILROAD LABOR
Le premier devoir de 1'administration coloniale est de
rfpandre chez les indigenes la notion de la hbcessite
du travail...
-special commission report, 1928^
The mobilization or channeling of labor for imperial
ends lies at the heart of the imperialist enterprise.

This

may have been less apparent in other colonized areas, where
looted mineral treasures have distracted the observer's
attention.

It was evident in tropical Africa, where the

local labor supply was vital for all phases of economic and
political activity, whether for growing export crops, b u i l d 
ing railroads, or carrying out even the simplest directives
of the few imperial proconsuls on the scene.
European dependence on African labor in Senegal was
aggravated by the general scarcity of labor in the region.
Doubtlessly recalling the earlier slaving days, some m i s 
guided officials in Paris were urging into the 1890's that
Senegal send manpower to other labor-short French colonies,
such as Guiana in the Americas.

2

French officials and

merchants in Senegal, better aware of their own colony's
chronic labor shortages, were in turn trying unsuccessfully
at the same time to promote the emigration of both Europeans

-295-
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-296and non-Europeans into Senegal.

The problem was felt even

more acutely after the conquest, as the scarcity of p o p u l a 
tion throughout most of French West Africa became apparent
and after colonial authorities launched extensive public
works programs requiring large contingents of skilled and
unskilled labor.

By the 1920's, the colonial administration

was openly resorting to the massive recruitment of involun
tary manpower for both public and private needs.
The efforts of French colonial circles in the 1 9 2 0 's
to enlist formal government support in intensifying the
exploitation of colonial labor throughout French West Africa
and the countervailing attempts of the International Labor
Office at Geneva to abolish forced labor in European c o l o 
nies clearly deserve more detailed treatment than is
possible in this study.

In brief, certain French companies,

firmly dismissing the notion of some government officials
that the colonies be formed into nations of free peasants,
were urging instead in the 1920's that colonial authorities
be specifically enjoined to recruit labor for French firms
in the colonies.4

As a result,

in 1925, French West Africa

received its first comprehensive labor decree, which was
designed,

even while establishing some wage, health,

wo rk condition safeguards for African workers,

and

to introduce

into the colony "offices du travail" for labor recruiting
and "conseils d'arbitrage" to prosecute infractions of the
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-297labor contracts that African workers would be obliged to
sign.^

From 1927 on,the ” 2&m'e portion du contingent," an

inactive army reserve consisting of the surplus of young
Africans liable for military duty, was converted into a
pool of unskilled labor for both public works and private
industry.^

Many other men would hire on directly with p r i v 

ate firms or emigrate as "navetanes" simply to be exempt
from this onerous service.
Senegal stood apart to some extent, however,

from this

repressive trend in colonial labor policy, with only a few
companies in its remoter areas taking advantage of the
O

decree of October 1925.

This is not to deny the occasional

abuse of African workers both in its remote and its urban
areas.

9

Some involuntary labor was recruited within Senegal

or brought into Senegal from other French colonies, first
by direct recruitment and later by the 2kme p o r t i o n . ^
Sometimes,

as in the case of some Mossi brought in for

railroad construction in the 1 9 2 0 1s,recruited laborers could

,11

be horribly mistreated.
Nevertheless,
not widespread.

the abuses were infrequent and generally

Porterage was apparently rare in Senegal,

even in the Casamance.

12

The new offices du travail and

conseils d*arbitrage were generally disregarded in Senegal,
where Africans had long been hired on a free and informal
basis.

1^

Indeed, one of the chief attractions of the
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-298Senegalese labor market was its relative freedom, which
drew m a n y laborers and navetanes from other French c o l o 
nies,

just as others were also being drawn into neighboring

British colonies.

14

Despite occasional labor shortages,

European firms in Senegal,

for their part, continued to

prefer the informal hiring practices customary in Senegal,
if only to avoid the expense involved in the worker care
provisions of the 1925 act.

15

Like other French colonies

in Africa,

Senegal imposed

on its African rural subjects an annual labor service
obligation
bridges,

("prestations")

for extending and maintaining

roads, and other rural colonial facilities

as telegraph lines).

(such

Yet even in this case, Senegal's

comparatively light prestation obligation was redeemable
in cash from 1928, and there are indications that prestations
were generally applied with less rigor than in other parts
of West Africa."^

Railroad labor

Heavily dependent as they were on the

quantity and quality of available workers and agents for a
variety of functions for both the original construction of
the rail lines and their later operation,

colonial railroads

can provide some particularly useful insights into labor
problems

in Senegal.

For instance,

it will be recalled that

a scarcity of local labor had forced the Batignolles to
import experienced Italian laborers at great expense in
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The colonial admin is tra 

tion had resorted to a similar expedient for the Upper
Senegal railroad in 1881.

But the Chinese and Moroccan

workers imported for this purpose were decimated by yellow
fever.

It is significant that construction of the Kayes-

Niger was only undertaken seriously from 1898, when a large
African work force had been collected forceably and brought
into the Sudan.

17

The experiment in importing non-African

manual labor was never repeated.

Henceforth,

labor for

construction of railroads and other public works was
recruited locally or brought in from other parts of West
Africa.
Labor questions were equally important for ongoing
railroad operations.

Wages and related employee costs,

after all, formed the major share of operating expenses on
both the DSL and TN railroads.

1R

Besides the central

management offices in Paris and Dakar,

the DSL's employees

were distributed amont three main operating divisions--a
Movement division called ("Exploitation") providing personnel
to run the stations,
division

terminals and trains, a Rolling Stock

("Materiel et Traction")

to run the locomotives and

to repair and maintain rolling stock, and a Track division
("Voie et Batiments")

to repair and maintain the track,

roadbed, and company buildings.
There were four categories of employees at the DSL:
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-300permanent European agents hired under contract with a
monthly salary, European skilled workers under contract on
an hourly basis, permanent African employees, and temporary
workers

("auxilliaires"), the latter category including a

few Europeans hired temporarily, but also including African
skilled hourly workers and low-level, regular African emplo
yees, as well as a great mass of casual day laborers temporarily hired on a day-to-day basis.

19

The salary scale of

a permanent or semi-permanent employee and his advancement
in the company would be determined by his position within an
array of occupational grades and classes presumably corres
ponding to his seniority and skills, which also roughly
determined the specific job position that he occupied within
the company's table of organization.
The TK and successor TN and DN railroads had similar
operating divisions,

although the TK did combine the Movement

and Rolling Stock divisions for the first few years of its
existence.

20

The gradings and echelons of regular employees,

although differing greatly in detail, were similar to those
of the DSL; but European employees were organized into a
permanent administrative cadre

("cadre commun";

later a

"cadre superieur" and "cadre commun supgrieur") or hired
temporarily under contract.

Some African personnel were

hired on a permanent basis into an administrative cadre
("cadre local";

later divided into primary and secondary
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workers were hired on a daily basis.

21

Unlike the DSL,

the

TK and TN always retained a Service de Travaux Neufs,
largely run by military personnel and fielding a large work
force.

In 1926, for instance, this service employed 1,692

laborers, of whom 896 had been forceably recruited and 612
others obliged to "volunteer.”

22

The number of agents and workers employed by the DSL
and TN over a number of years are shown in Tables 21 and 22.
One point emerging from the tables is the large number of
African day laborers, of whom the majority were employed for
the hard manual labor necessary for maintenance work and
freight loading.

Another is the persistent employment of

significant numbers of European agents,

especially on the

DSL--a particularly important point since Europeans were
paid so much more handsomely than African employees.

European employees

23

From the inception of the railroad,

it

was necessary to bring in skilled and experienced railwaymen
from Europe capable of organizing and controlling traffic,
possessing the requisite technical specialties for ma in t a i n 
ing, replacing, and repairing rail equipment, or simply
literate enough to follow some of the manifold accounting
procedures involved in shipping freight, selling and
checking passenger tickets, and storing and distributing
parts and equipment.
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principle of European immigration when the ministry in
Paris was proposing the permanent settlement of Italian
laborers in Senegal.

24

Yet in hiring European agents for

the DSL, they were estimating privately instead that a
Eu ro pea n’s health would not be able to resist Senegal's
climate for a period longer than six years and limited the
duration of the contracts of DSL agents to this maximum
period of six years.
of operation,

25

Indeed, during the first few years

the attrition rate among DSL European employees

was extremely high.

In 1887, an estimated 8%% of the DSL's

European agents died, and another estimated 16% had to be
discharged for poor health, while many others were incapacited by ill-health for short period of time.

26

Of the

197 "permanent" European employees hired by the DSL from
1883 to 1885 for work in Senegal,
the company within two years

120 of them (61%) had left

(90 within one y e a r ) .

one of them died within their six-year period
first year of service),

Twenty

(9 within their

and 52 more are listed in company

records as having left for health reasons.

27

With time the DSL came to realize that Europeans could
be employed on a long-term basis in Senegal if certain precautions were observed.

28

Sixteen of the original 197

survived to serve for periods longer than six years, nine of
them serving for more than 15 years

(5 for more than 20
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The DSL took care to repatriate its European

agents with their families to France for a three month
vacation at two-thirds pay for every two years of service
in Senegal.

29

The company's staff became more stable as

working and housing conditions improved.
The TK railroad and its successor TN, coming into
existence as they did at

a much later date when conditions

in Senegal were more amenable for accommodating European
agents, did not suffer from the same initial upheavals in
staff.

It must be remembered that the bulk of European

personnel hired for the TK and TN railroads became, thereby,
functionnaries working for a government agency on a lon g
term basis.

Many of the posts on these railroads were filled

by military personnel attached for this purpose to the r a i l 
road, and many railroad civilian employees were retired
colonial officers and sergeants, deliberately hired by the
railroad because of a proven acclimatization to West
Af ri ca. 30
The lot of a DSL European railwayman was not p art i c u l 
arly pleasant during the period preceding World War I.
curring

epidemics of yellow fever continued,

Re

at least to

1927, with European agents and their families having to be
withdrawn from the colony en masse during the severe epidemic
71

of 1900-1901.

Company operations were centered at Dakar,

which was always regrettably short of good housing.
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-304first, DSL agents often had to resort to makeshift arr ang e
ments

(as sleeping in railroad cars)

or to dormitory

facilities that the DSL rented to its agents in a converted
freight station.

32

Along the railroad line,

the hastily-

erected wooden stations housing the stationmasters quickly
feel into disrepair.

33

The discovery after 1900 of the

mosquito's major role in transmitting yellow fever obliged
the DSL to pay more attention to the sanitary and housing
needs of its personnel and their families at the same time
that a large influx of Europeans was exacerbating the
housing situation in Dakar.

The DSL in that period u n d e r 

took to b u i l d :new housing for its European personnel and to
purchase some well-located houses in D a k a r . ^
The Thi§s-Kayes railroad was concerned with housing for
its European employees from the start.

But it was the efforts

of the unified TKN to attract large numbers of new rail
employees after fusion in 1924 that led this railroad
administration to appropriate over 4 million francs for
European housing in 1925, over 3.5 million in 1927, and over
35
6 million from 1928 to 1930.
A number of litigations brought by DSL railwaymen
against the company in the 19th century are the only remaining echoes of the grievances of European DSL agents.
is in a report of 1911 investigating DSL operations,

36

It

though,

that the company's exploitation of its European employees is
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37

According to this report, many an

unemployed worker in France had been lured to the colony
by the misleadingly high pay offered by the DSL.

Once in

the colony, the newly-hired worker would discover that his
high colonial wages • were relatively meager in view of
Dakar's extremely high cost of living.

Effectively, the

agent was forced to work long hours of overtime for the
company, at a peril to his health,
ends meet.

in order simply to make

Since an agent's work contract entitled him to

prepaid passage back to France only under certain conditions,
he was virtually trapped in his job, unless he was able to
find employment in commerce

(the colonial administration
? O

apparently had agreed tacitly not to hire DSL m e n ) .
Frustrated railwaymen took out their grievances against the
company,

the report lamented, by serving the public badly

and rudely.
The plight of European railroad employees as depicted
in the report of 1911, while probably accurate,

is too

narrowly drawn to give a complete picture of the complex
situation of these railwaymen.

There were, after all, agents

who prospered with the DSL and TN in long-term careers.
the other hand,

On

there were also a number of European r a i l 

waymen ready to take advantage of their positions either by
setting African rail subordinates to work for the European
agent's own personal benefit or by brazenly cheating African
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-306passengers too ignorant of French procedures and of their
own rights--or too frightened to insist upon them.

39

It

should be remembered also that European agents occupied the
better paying,

less strenuous posts on the railroad from

which they were expected to oversee and direct the African
workers, who carried out, after all, the heavy labor.

African manual labor

The c o l o n i s t s ’ admonition,

"any E u r o 

pean who digs in the earth, digs out his own grave," was
indeed heeded on the railroads in Senegal.

Both the DSL and

TK had to rely on Africans hired on a casual day-to-day
basis to fulfill the backbreaking tasks of loading and u n 
loading

(freight cars, coal, etc.), maintenance and r e c o n 

struction of the track and roadbed,
parts in the

lifting heavy machine

repair shops, and so on.

In the DSL's Track

service, even the Europeans who had originally formed the
majority of the foremen of the track work gangs--an arduous
task in the sun's heat--had to be replaced gradually after
1889 by experienced African foremen.

40

By the time the TK

was built, virtually all its maintenance work gangs were
directed by African foremen.
There were a number of other enterprises in Senegal
competing wit h the DSL and TN for unskilled day laborers.
Merchants needed manpower for hauling and stacking peanuts
and other goods at their trading stations in the interior
and at ports,

and to load and unload ships.

The colonial
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-3 0 7administration and private contractors needed workers for
public works projects and municipal works
etc.)

in the communes.

(streets,

sewers,

It should be noted that the total

number of African wage laborers of all types accounted for
only a small fraction of the able-bodied men in West Africa
--only an estimated 60,000 men for all of French West Africa
in 1928.

Furthermore, many of them were concentrated at

Dakar--the worker population of Dakar in 1924 was estimated
at 15,000.

41

Tables I and II indicate that the DSL and TN

accounted for a significant percentage of the total work
force,

and a tabulation of some 5,491 Africans regularly

employed for 34 different firms in Dakar in 1930 listed over
550 regular African employees for the DSL--a contingent second
in numbers only to the 1,07 0 men employed at the time by the
42
Entreprises des Travaux du Port de Dakar.
Despite the relatively small number of workers needed,
there were severe manpower shortages in Senegal from the
end of World War I.

This was due,

to a degree,

to demands

made on local manpower by military conscription for the
colonial army from 1912, as well as by government re c r u i t 
ment for local and general public works.

The shortage of

casual labor for loading ships at Dakar became so severe by
the waning days of the war, that it was only resolved by
the ad ministration’s importation of forced labor recruited
in other parts of Senegal and the Sudan.

43

But plainly,
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steep rise in wages received by African., laborers during the
post-war period, which was partly a reflection of rises in
living costs and the devaluation of French currency, was
made possible largely by a significant increase in business
activity in the area.

As might be expected, merchants were

complaining bitterly about the supposedly unfair,

high wages

that Afri ca n workers were asking, and they were demanding
through the local chambers of commerce that the administration intervene.

44

The TK was also experiencing difficul-

ties--the shortage of African laborers to load peanuts onto
trains in 1925 was a major cause of bottlenecks in TKN
operations--and this railroad was also appealing for g o v e r n 
ment i n t e r v e n t i o n . ^
The TK had already resorted to forced labor for c o n 
struction 6f unfinished sections of its line as early as
46
1913.
In the early 1920's,the construction of the TK line
was finally completed by using large contingents of forceably recruited African laborers, most of them Mossi brought
in from Upper Volta.

From 1927 on, about 1550 men on the

average of the 2&me portion du contingent of the French
Sudan was regularly assigned to the TN, despite the complaints
of the Lt. Governor of the Sudan against their use in Senegal
when the Sudan was suffering from its own labor sh o r t a g e s . ^
The evidence indicates that the DSL, on the other hands,
rarely resorted to requisitioned labor.

48

At least on
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the DSL was able to use its Track maintenance

crews for loading trains during the busy trade season.
And, of course,

49

the DSL also benefited indirectly as the

conscripted laborers imported for other employers,

such as

the TN, eased shortages generally in the labor market.
Labor in Senegal,

it has been noted, was generally

hired on a voluntary basis.

In the case of hiring in rural

areas though, a careful distinction must be made,

for often

the French would recruit laborers in these areas simply by
applying directly to local chiefs.

It was the chiefs who

were made responsible by the colonial government for raising
prestation labor annually.

Indeed, labor recruiting for

prestations was one source of the chiefs'
French rule.^®

authority under

Hiring laborers in groups was, of course, a

natural expedient in a society where communal solidarity was
strong; but it may be asked whether recruitment was truly
voluntary in all cases.

Mouride talibes volunteering to work

on the Diourbel-Touba rail spur were almost certainly really
volunteers.

But it is doubtful that this was true for

Africans recruited for clearance work in the original c o n 
struction of the DSL in the 1880's or for the labor recruited
locally for construction of the Louga-Linguere line by
chiefs strongly favorable to the project.

51

Those unskilled laborers willingly offering their labor
for wages in urban areas can be generally classified into
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Those living adjacent to work sites--

generally farmers willing to supplement their income during
the agricultural slack season after November--and those
emigrating deliberately to earn wages for a short period
with the intention (like the navetanes)

of returning home,

usually at the end of the trade season, with trade goods and
head tax payments.
maintenance)

As one former DSL laborer

(in Track

of the 1920's explained, a young man would

emigrate for a season to join a work crew where some of his
relatives might already be working.

He would intend to work

for a season only, living as frugally as possible, but would
acquire a taste for the work and the money it brought.

He

would be drawn to return year after year, and finally be
induced to settle down permanently in the vicinity of his
work on the railroad.

52

Not that the regular unskilled laborer divorced himself
entirely from the land.

Many laborers who came to live in

the vicinity of the urban areas and along the rail line,
even those who were employed full time by the railroad and
even some who were skilled workers,
least on a part-time basis and,
fish.

53

continued to farm at

in the case of the Lebu, to

This was not unwelcome to European employers, b e 

cause their workers could thereby get along with lower wages
and would have something on which to fall back during slump
periods when wages

were not available.

This meant, naturally
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But

this was not objectionable in an economic system based
largely on exporting peanuts,

for which the busy exporting

season coincided with the agricultural slack season.
Indeed,

54

even officials in the colonial government considered

in the late 1920's that recruited laborers would be happier
during their turn of service if they were allowed to c u l ti 
vate their own food in their spare time.5^
It would be worthwhile to know more about the org ani 
zation of work gangs on the railroad.
indicates that,

A report of 1907

in general, piece rate payments were not

welcomed by African day laborers in S e n e g a l . ^

The usual

method adopted was to pay daily wages while supervising
the output of the work crews closely, discharging the crews
that did not produce at the expected rate.

Given the

unstable employement of individual temporary laborers,

this

meant that European management would probably depend greatly
on the ability and reputation of the African foreman o r g a n 
izing the crew.

Indeed, although the railroads kept pay

records listing individual workers by name,

there are

indications that payments to crews may have been made, at
least at times,in monthly lump sums to be divided among the
workers on the c r e w . ^
It would be of considerable interest to learn the
origins of the African laborers working for the DSL and TN.
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chance references indicate that most of the African laborers
hired by the DSL, at least in its formative years, came not
from nearby Cayor, Serer country, or Baol, but were rather
Tukolor,

Sarakole, and Bambara of the middle and upper

reaches of the Senegal river--groups which had already been
serving as the bulk of the floating labor population for
the commerce of St. Louis.

58

With time, of course, many

Wolof also came to work for the railroad, probably coming
to form the majority, at least on the DSL.

But the facil i

ty with which many African immigrants Wolofized their names
(and in time their speech and culture) makes it difficult
to be precise on the evolution of the work force with time.
Tukolors,

it is generally agreed, were particularly numerous

in the Track service and were highly valued as laborers for
construction work on the TN line.

59

Bambara were also

prominent as laborers in all branches of railroad service
and were especially numerous on the TN line.

The Sarakole,

as we shall see, were especially drawn to work on lo co m o 
tives .
The movement of African workers and their hiring by
European employers in Senegal was not regulated by official
government statute until the 1890's.

From 1891, the colonial

administration became increasingly alarmed as agents of the
Belgian Congo began to recruit Senegalese for work in that
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(some as laborers,

some for specialized skills

some--claimed the French--as soldiers).
at first,

Conducted openly

later clandestinely through various subterfuges,

this recruiting, which drew significant numbers of S e n e g a 
lese to the Congo

(the French consular office at Bathurst

estimated in 1897 that as m a n y as 1300 Senegalese had passed
through there to the Congo in the previous y e a r ) , provoked
the first labor legislation in Senegal.

A series of acts

forbade foreigners to recruit Africans without government
assent and ultimately restricted African e m i g r a t i o n . ^
Given the limited labor supply,

it might have been

expected that European employers would be concerned about
their l a b o r e r s ’ well-being or at least attempt to husband
this manpower by substituting mechanical power for human.
But expensive imported mechanical devices tended to wear
out quickly in a tropical climate where there were few
skilled workmen

to maintain them properly; and many employer^

colonial officials lamented, were all too willing to squeeze
profits out of underpaid, overworked African laborers with
the blind assurance that the colonial administration would
provide replacements by dipping into a seemingly inexh aus 
tible pool of cheap manpower--whereas

in reality manpower

resources were strained to the breaking p o i n t . ^
were fewer abuses in Senegal
tent)

That there

(though they were not inexis-

is strongly indicated by the large, voluntary s eas o n 
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Abuses were also much less likely to occur in the operating
divisions of the railroads, which as the only really indus
trial enterprises in Senegal aside from the naval arsenal
at Dakar, were obliged to hire not only unskilled laborers,
but large numbers of skilled African workers as well.

African skilled labor

Africans had long been drawn to

European colonial trading posts and ports not only for the
attractive trade goods available there, but also for the
specialized skills which Europeans might teach.

62

This

was certainly why many Africans of the interior came to
enlist in the French colonial armed forces before and during
the era of conquest,

since many of these soldiers returned

to their homelands on discharge with newly acquired martial
skills--which in some cases were turned against their former
European mentors.

63

to European ports,

Likewise, other Africans would come
as St. Louis, to learn European skilled

crafts in order to pursue this trade within the colony or
•.
64
back in the interior.

The most famous example of the

latter was certainly Samba N ’Diaye--a Bakiri of the Upper
Senegal, despite his Wolofized name--who became the chief
cannoneer and military architect for El Hadj Umar when the
latter conquered an empire in the i n t e r i o r . ^
There were, of course,

the traditional specialized
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in their inherited specialties in metal-work,
weaving.

Some of these,

leather,

or

like the Wolof gold jewellers,

justly enjoyed fine reputations for their excellent w o r k m a n 
ship.

Their husbanded skills reach back to an era long

antedating contact with E u r o p e a n s . ^

But these artisans were

formed into special, hereditary castes, like the traditional
musicians and praise-singers, whose members might become
wealthy and even be feared, but with whom "honorable"
families avoided marriage.

The "European" skills,

even

those involving metal and woodwork, were regarded in an
entirely different light than the traditional artisan
skills.

67

Education in a European "metier" was sought by

people from different strata of society, not just the
members of the traditional castes; nor did the exercize of
the skill "dishonor" the artisan.

The reader would n a t u r 

ally expect that metiers on the railroad would serve as
opportunities for ambitious slaves or their descendants for
advancement in society.

He might be surprised to learn that

they also served as particularly well-paying opportunities
for the sons of notable families,
enough for clerical positions

especially those literate

in commerce or the colonial

administration, after the French conquest had eroded the
traditional means of support of the notable classes.

68

An obvious solution to the heavy financial burdens on
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at great expense, periodically repatriated for health
reasons,

escounced in special housing, and not operating at

par in a foreign climate--was to train and educate Africans
to take over their positions at more modest salaries.

69

In

the case of the DSL, a certain delay might be expected from
the inception while sufficient numbers of Africans were
being trained in the requisite skills--no mean feat when
most Africans had first to learn French before mastering
the unfamiliar railroad techniques.

Indeed with time, a

significant number of Africans became permanent employees at
the DSL either at lower-echelon positions in the c o m p a n y ’s
bureaucracy, as skilled workers in the workshops, or as
locomotive engineers.

Yet the top and higher middle-echelon

posts in all branches of the DSL were always reserved for
Europeans.

In all the years of DSL operations, only three

AFricans were ever allowed to attainthe grade of stationmaster and only one held it for any length of time
in the small way station of R a o ) .
engineers

(serving

Africans became train

(though the title of engineer was at first

withheld) only because European engineers could not endure
the heat in a coal-burning locomotive under a tropical
sun.

70

One might have expected government officials to have

been pressing the DSL to reduce its heavy expenditures in
the first few years of operations by substituting African
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But L. Petyt,

the main government

financial inspector in the company's formative years--who
went so fer as to urge the DSL to close the company hospital
in order to economize--was also insisting at the same time
that Africans be barred from responsible posts on the DSL,
and particularly complained against letting Africans run
the l o c o m o t i v e s . ^
National, cultural, and racial prejudices were clearly
involved in the persistent preference on the DSL for the
employment of European agents where AFricans would have
functionned just as well.
nation.

But this is not a complete e x p l a 

One piece of evidence indicates a fundamental,

rather obvious motive,
written reference.

to which there is rarely an explicit,

Referring to the high cost of the

company's European employees in Senegal, a DSL publication
of 1888 explained their need.

The European,

it stated:

ne repr€sentant que 18% de l'effectif total ...
D'ailleurs, a d€passer la limite actuelle on
s'exposerait d se mettre d la merci des indigenes,
d£s qu'ils se sentiraient maltres de la s i t u a t i o n . 72
This frank admission of insecurity--indeed of an u n d e r 
lying elemental fear--was perfectly understandable shortly
after Mamadou Lamine's Sarakole jihad and only shortly b e 
fore Tukolor rail workers were to aid Ahmadou's raiders to
cut the fledgling Upper Senegal rail line.

73

This p a r t i 

cular concern was indeed affirmed just a bit further in the
publication as it cautionncd:
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Squipes des diverses races noires, Saracolets,
Bambaras, Toucouleurs, S€r§res, Gabonais, Yolofs,
afin de ne pas se mettre a la discretion de fanatiques
ou d ' i n d i s c i p l i n e s .74
There is no question that European uneasiness must have
diminished as French colonial rule was consolidated.

Cer

tainly the severe yellow fever epidemic of 1900-01 during
which operation of the DSL was virtually in the hands of
its African employees, must: have clearly demonstrated that
they could be relied upon.
have been with time,

75

Yet, diminished as it must

the underlying element of fear and i n 

security was never wholly absent.

Rather,

it appears to

have been comingled with the self-serving interests of E u r o 
pean agents who were pursuing long-term careers with the DSL
later on.

These agents now had a stake in preserving the

discriminatory status quo which had come to be institutiona
lized on the DSL.

After World War I, colonial officials

remarked on a notable improvement in the technical p r o f i c i 
ency of African workers on the railroads.

Nevertheless,

they also noted at the same time the emergence of a new and
disquieting independent attitude on the part of many of
these workers, especially those who had seen military service
in France.

76

There was significantly different attitude on the TK
and the TN toward allowing Africans into more responsible
positions than on the DSL, although the top and middle-
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Europeans.

77

It m a y be argued that this was due in part

to the fact that the TK was built during an era of imperial
tranquility, with diminished fears for security.

Certainly

it was also due in part to the continued pressure on the TN
railroad administration to cut operating costs, particularly
after 1924-25.

78

Perhaps though,

it stemmed in good part

from the character of top officials in the railroad a d m i n i 
stration, most retired or detached active army officers and
sergeants who were accustomed to commanding large bodies of
AFrican troops and who were therefore able to form good
opinions of the abilities of African subordinates before
coming to the railroad.

Certainly European military men with

experience in the colony would have a greater self assurance
about their own personal role in West Africa and feel less
uneasy in commanding Africans than the civilian European
agents of the DSL, who after all were protecting acquired,
but fundamentally vulnerable positions.

79

This is not to say that African employees were n e c e s 
sarily better off working on the TK or TN.

The use by these

railroads of requisitioned labor has already been mentioned.
Those who worked on these rail lines also recall the d i s t i n 
ctly military tone in work d i s c ipl ine ,which gave these
railroads a harsh reputation.

Work discipline on the DSL

could also be strict; but some ex-DSL men at least still
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80

It should be emphasized, however, that the TK and TN,
unlike the DSL, did set out to hire large numbers of
educated A f r i c a n s .

As government agencies,

these railroads

were prepared to accept the graduates of primary and tech
nical schools that were run by the Government General or
by the colony of Senegal.

A very few well-educated Africans

were even admitted into the Cadre Commun Superieur on the
TN, especially after 1925.

81

Retired railwaymen recall

though that the railroad administration did not actively
undertake to attract large numbers of young,
Africans until later,

French-educated

in 1937, under Giran's directorship

of the Dakar-Niger railroad.

82

In considering what particular categories of African
skilled craftsmen
railroads,

might have been drawn to working for the

one immediately thinks of the inhabitants of St.

Louis and Goree as forming a pool of skilled workers as
well as clerical help for the railroad.

But St. Louisians

of long residence were generally reputed averse to taking
up a workman's trade.

This went back at least to 1855, when

according to Carrdre and Holle, St. Louisians, previously so
eager to learn metiers before 1848, were now leaving them to
recent Tukolor, Bambara, and Sarakole immigrants.

83

St. Louisians of good family preferred to engage in
commerce,

to be clerks for merchants, or to serve in the
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educated in France;

A number of St. Louisians had been

some, such as Justin and Georges

d'Erneville, had even received a technical education and
O A

served for a time in the colony's Public Works service.
There were indeed a good number of St. Louisians and Gor&ens,
both African and creole,
government's bureaucracy,
posts and telegraphs.
ranks,

85

in all branches of the colonial
including the technical service of
But few St. Louisians entered DSL

even in clerical capacities, because DSL management

based in Dakar apparently regarded St. Louisian creoles with
O

disdain almost from the start.
red,

in any case,

fL

Many St. Louisians prefer t

to engage in commerce or land speculation

(such as the above-mentioned Justin and Georges d'Erneville).
When commerce became less attractive after the turn of the
century,

it is apparent that they chose the more hospitable

ranks of the colonial bureaucracy over the DSL railroad.

87

As such they became part of a larger general movement of
young,

educated West Africans who were coming to grips with

colonial domination in the 20th centruy by taking positions
within the French colonial administration and demanding
equal treatment with their European counterparts.

88

It was

by this means that some entered the new Thies-Niger railroad,
another branch after all of the colonial bureaucracy.
in this case,

Even

educated St. Louisians apparently would serve

on the railroad only if unable to gain a post in other, more
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collection and "conditionnement."

89

The ethnic composition of the skilled labor force in
either the DSL workshops

in Dakar or the TK workshops in

Thils is difficult to determine precisely.

It seems that,

despite their small number, Goreens were prominent as
skilled workmen in the shops;
neers.

90

and even as locomotive engi-

The Lebus of Dakar, as might be expected,

became

prominent in the main DSL workshops in that town,but
apparently only around the turn of the century.

91

The corps of locomotive engineers deserves a special
mention.

Its members were of diverse origins, of course,

but it contained a significantly large proportion of Sarakole
from the very first.

The Sarakole had long been renowned for

emigrating temporarily as young men to seek fortune outside
their homeland on the Upper Senegal.

92

Many of them te mpo

rarily became petty merchants--"dioula"--on the lon g - d i s 
tance trade routes of the interior.

Others went to the

coasts of the Senegambia to farm as navetanes or serve as
mercenaries.

93

A good number of them were attracted to urban

areas of Senegal to work for merchants or the French adm ini 
stration, particularly as sailors on ships in the Senegal
river or on the ocean.

94

It was easy for them to make the

transition from steam-driven boats to steam locomotives,
and the Sarakole quickly became renowned for relishing the
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Clerical skills naturally would be learned in the
schools set up by the French in the colony.

A metier

whether it was a skilled craft or a specialized job, like
that of a train engineer

(who also had to make minor r e 

pairs) , might be learned at one of the few trade schools in
Senegal open to apprentices.

95

it was more likely, however,

that a young man would learn a trade skill during a term of
apprenticeship with an older,
home he might live).

skilled workman

(at whose

Even if both teacher and pupil were

both illiterate in French,

they were often capable of

attaining high technical precision with only rudimentary
tools.

96

Often a skilled craftsman could train his own son

or nephew on the job at the railroad, until the young man
was ready to apply directly to a railroad manager for a
job as a skilled apprentice
for a d m is si on) .

(by passing a simple craft test

In fact before training in regular trade

schools became common, the railroad administration preferred
to hire the sons of regular employees.
Employment stability

97

Skilled craftsmen,

like the general

mass of laborers, were often unwilling to be employed at
the railroad, or with any other one employer,
tended length of time.

for any ex

Instead, many of them preferred to

move as temporarily employed day laborers from one job to
the next, better-paying job, depending on the work av ail-
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This tendency is related to the phenomena called

the "backward-sloping labor supply curve."

98

Simply put,

it means that the African worker, especially the seasonal
migrant, often labored with a target sum in mind.
the sum was amassed, he would quit his job.

Once

Increased

wages, according to the theory, only hastened his d e p a r t 
ure,

lessening productivity instead of raising it.

scholars,

Some

such as Pfefferman, argue rightly that European

employers exaggerated the importance of the phenomena and
the transiency of their African employees simply to justify
paying low wages.

99

Even the colonial administration, which

was capable of deploring the greedy exploitation by private
firms of African laborers, was itself not exempt from r e 
cruiting unskilled workers at low wages on a short-term
basis,

rather than paying the additional costs for long

term workers with greater productivity.^-®®
There was, nevertheless, a real reluctance on the
part of many Africans to work for Europeans on a long-term
basis.

Target wages many have been one factor in the case

of some skilled African workers, especially if these workers
could fall back on some lucrative alternative

(as f a r m i n g ) .

But this factor was far more important for the seasonally
migratory unskilled laborers.

In the case of skilled w o r k 

men, an instinctive, culture-bound aversion to long-term
labor obligations, which implied a servile relationship in
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since the French were also resorting to formal contracts
elsewhere as a means of enforcing work.

101

Mobility in

employment was also a matter of practical self-interest,
for a skilled worker often was able to find a higher paying
job or better working conditions somewhere else at a given
moment.

Many would move from the DSL to the TK, to Public

Works, or the naval arsenal, and back again--but for higher
wages, not for the sake of change alone.

102

An extreme

example of this job mobility was the Belgian Congo's r e 
cruitment of Senegalese workers

in 1896, when the DSL lost

at least 17 locomotive engineers of various grades and 6
skilled workers who left for higher paying jobs in the
Congo
Interestingly enough, when asked what as railwaymen
had set them apart from other Senegalese,

to a ma n the retired

Senegalese railwaymen could suggest'nothing except the
assurance of a steady salary and comforting retirement pay
that they had received from the railroad.

Their common u n 

pretentious answer perhaps goes to the heart of the matter.
The railroads,
salaries,

as other European firms, did offer steady

even in the early days.

But they were pitifully

slow to arrange for any long-term employee or retirement
benefits, which might have stabilized their work force
104
earlier.
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France notoriously lagged b e 

hind other industrialized European nations in passing
legislation-to guarantee social benefits and work protection
to its workers in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
A law on w o r k accidents was passed only in 18 98, working
hours for women and children was limited to 10 hours daily
in 1900, and a six-day week made obligatory only in 1 9 0 6 . ^ ^
It is not surprising therefore to find European employers
in Senegal resisting attempts to extend any metropolitan
social legislation into the colony.
Out of necessity,

the DSL ran a hospital and medical

service for its e m p l o y e e s i t

also permitted its E u r o 

pean employees, again out of necessity,

long vacations

in

France every two years during the railroad's slack season.
For a number of years though,

its only other benefit ar ran ge 

ment for European employees was a bonus of one year's salary
payable in a lump sum to the employee only if he survived to
complete a full six years service.

There was no provision

for sickness and accident benefits--a serious matter in
Senegal,

since an unlucky agent might find himself simply

repatriated back to France with few resources and his health
broken.

In 1893, the company did begin,

in conformity with

a metropolitan law of December 1890, to set up for its E u r o 
pean employees a retirement fund, which accumulated r e g u l 
arly (from 1894)

5% of its employees salaries along with
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earmarked Account.

But company officials had not even

bothered to draw up a statute regulating disbursement of
these funds to its personnel, even as late as 1898.

107

The D S L ’s pension plan, finally elaborated fully in 1903,
was not far different from the earlier bonus of one year's
salary after 6 years of service.

Aside from 5% withheld

from his salary, the agent would receive company funds
equal to 13% (later 16%) of his total accumulated salary
only after six years of service with the company.

108

After World War I, the fringe benefits accorded to European
DSL agents did improve.

109

This was a reflection not simply

of changes in metropolitan law, but more importantly of in
creased worker militancy in the colony after the war.
European employees of the Thi^s-Niger were more fortunate
in this respect than DSL employees,

since as agents for an

autonomous government agency their employee benefits tended
to parallel those given to other functionnaries in the
colonial bureaucracy.
Demonstrably reluctant to accord benefits to their
European agents,

employers in Senegal were certainly less

willing to accord any to their African personnel.

In

response to queries about extending metropolitan laws on
pensions to West Africa,

Senegalese chambers of commerce

objected that its administration would be extremely d i f fi
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(registered birth, marriage,

etc.)

and because so many

Africans moved about freely in urban areas changing their
names at w i l l . ^ ^

Even accident insurance was opposed on

the grounds that Africans could easily obtain the tradition
al charitable aid available in their own society;

and some

even claimed that accident insurance would only lead some
Africans to mutilate themselves deliberately in order to
«. it. 111
get

In this respect, the DSL was better than most.

At

least the DSL set up a retirement fund for its permanent
African employees in 1908.

In one account,

2%% of a worker's

salary would be set aside, payable to him with accrued in
terest whenever he left the company; while a second account
fed by company funds equal to 51 of the employee's salary
would be payable in full to him in a lump sum only after
20 years of service

(a part of it after 15 years).

112

This was not much; and during the period of labor militancy
following World War I, African workers concentrated on im
proving salaries and allowances, not pensions.

It was only

later that pension benefits came to be appreciated.

Strike activity

113

Labor militancy in the period before 1933

was seriously circumscribed.

French subjects in French West

Africa were not permitted to join labor unions; nor were
labor unions officially permitted to form as such until
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An industrial labor consciousness and solidarity

among Africans in Senegal, at least as expressible specifi
cally in French terms, did not emerge clearly until the
great railroad strike of 1947-1948, and to a much lesser
extent in the strike of railroad day laborers in 1938.
Nevertheless,

the period before 1933, an era of labor

Mpre-historyM for Senegal as it were,

is instructive for

understanding later developments and the patterns of
transformation of African labor.
There were attempts,
unions well before 1937.

it should be noted,

to form

European railwaymen on the DSL

were trying to form a union as far back as 1 9 0 8 . But
the courts denied them this right, because the law of 1884
permitting unions to be formed in metropolitan France had
not yet been promulgated in French West Africa.
an act signed

In 1920,

(inadvertently) byt the Governor General seemed

to have promulgated the act of 1884 in the colony.
did so in such an ambiguous fashion,

But it

that in the face of the

colonial g o v e r nme nt ’s opposition it was unclear whether the
formation of unions had really been permitted or not.
In this legal twilight period after 1920, however,

117

the

colonial government did permit the grouping of rail employees
in "associations amicales"--organizations, which were not
exactly unions, but were entitled to a legal personality,
could collect dues from their members,

and thereby give
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Naturally,

there was strike activity even without

formal worker organizations.

The DSL locomotive engineers

went on strike briefly in 1909, and there were isolated
strikes in other sectors of the economy as well.

118

Historians of African labor will find the DSL strike
of April

1919 instructive.

It broke out in response to

rapidly increasing prices and embraced virtually the entire
personnel of the DSL.

119

Since the strike leaders remained

anonymous in view of the ban on unions,

there were no worker

representatives available to negotiate with management.
The government therefore decided to break the strike quickly
by simply inducting railroad personnel into the military
(the same expedient used to break railroad strikes in France).
In Dakar, European personnel confronted with induction s u b 
mitted immediately.

But the strike held, simply because the

African personnel, especially the critical locomotive e n 
gineers, could not be l oca te d--and the trains could not run
without t h e m . ^ ^
The colonial administration was naturally worried about
the bad example that European workers were giving their
A f rican subordinates.

Even more important was the d e m o nst ra

ted dependence of the European workers on the support of the
skilled African workers,

and this lesson was strongly r e 

inforced by events shortly following the strike.

Realizing
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that their successful, but too hastily conceived strike
demands had been too meager, the Afr ic an workers proposed
to launch a second strike and appealed for support from
their recent European strike comrades.

The African DSL

workers were scornfully rebuffed by these now-satisfied
European workers, but proceeded nevertheless on their own-and won the additional gains.

121

After 1920, new labor associations were formed on both
the DSL and TK.

An amicale was formed on the TK in 1920 and

amalgamated with one on the KN in 1924.

Europeans and A f r i 

cans had separate "committees" on this association, but a
separate association was created for African TN agents in
1929.

122

Both European and African employees within the DSL

each formed their own separate active associations from the
first.
scribed.

The activities of these organizations were circum
But they could channel the grievances of workers

to railroad management,

and they certainly served to school

a generation of African workers and their leaders in h a n d 
ling labor problems.

Even illiterate African subjects,

though theoretically not permitted to join, could in fact
make their grievances known through the associations.
associations were a two-way street in another sense.

The
The

closely detailed police reports on meetings of even small
numbers of railwaymen reveal that they also served in k e e p 
ing the colonial government well informed of the mood and
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By 1925,

12*z

in the face of rapidly rising prices, both

European and African workers were again prepared to strike
for higher pay and benefits.

Their actions were now

markedly different than in 1919.

124

Not only were the

workers on the DSL better organized to win a quick strike,
but this time the TKN workers were also prepared to carry
out their own threat to strike.

DSL workers actually went

on strike for several days; but no strike was necessary on
the TKN.

In the year of crisis

in overloaded rail transport,

neither the DSL nor the TKN could afford a strike; and so
both were obliged to satisfy worker demands quickly.
Historians may be tempted to posit a linear progression
in African worker sophistication and strength from the years
1919 to 1925 to 1938 to 1947.

This might be true in l i m i 

ted respects, but would be entirely misleading in others.
Governor General Carde was furious about the labor unrest
of 1925 on the railroads and because of it refused to allow
125
legalization of unions in the colony later that year.
The government's riposte was not long in coming.
TN, Chardy,

the new director,

On the

brought in new railwaymen

from Europe as short-term "contractuals" in order to
balance and weaken the TN's militant cadre, while the
broom which he wielded against incompetents on the r a i l 
road was certainly directed against the "troublemakers'1
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1 2 6

At the same time, Chardy acted to

gratify basic employee needs by such actions as setting
up food-buying cooperatives on the TN for both European
and A frican employees, with the administration of the
African cooperative firmly in the hands of the TN administration.

127

The DSL associations were stronger and more cohesive.
They were able to threaten strikes as late as 1929, and even
1931, and were able to obtain higher levels of overall pay
and benefits than their TN c o m p a t r i o t s .1^8

But this gave

them little respite as the economic crisis that began in
1928 induced the colonial government to purchase the DSL
from its owners.

In the aftermath of the government's t a k e 

over in 1933 and the abundance of labor during the d e p r e s 
sion, the ranks of the DSL workers were decimated and they
were cowed into quiescence.

129

A close examination

of

events leading to the labor strike of 1938 would probably
show that the seeds of unrest did not come from the s uc c e s 
ses of 1925, but from the subsequent repressions of 1927
and 1934.
Tentative Conclusion

This survey of aspects of labor

practices on Senegalese railroads is much too limited to
allow firm conclusions; but I hope it suggests some d i r e c 
tion for future studies.

Basically the chapter has attempted

to sketch out a frame of reference,

linking historically the
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dependence of European enterprise on African labor with the
g

emergence of a growing African industrial labor c o n sci ou s
ness.

Closely related to this historical evolution was the

seminal role of expatriate European workers as both teachers
and taskmasters, while they themselves were adjusting to
work conditions in a foreign climate.
The year 1933 is significant within this chronology,
not only because it marks the time at which the colonial
administration was successfully snuffing out an incipient
trade un ion militancy among both European and African rail
employees, but also because it signaled the elimination of
the structure of Afro-European labor relations distinctive
to the DSL.

Previously there had been two autonomous tenden

cies on the railroads, with the African employees on each
line recruited on a different basis and subject to a
different s t a t u t e . O n

the TN, a tiny African elite had

been given European status, while the lower ranks of emp loy 
ees had been subject to a harsh discipline.

On the DSL, a

racially discriminatory line had been drawn between European
and African employees, but the consequent solidarity among
African personnel apparently bettered the general lot of
the rank-and-file, who often were able to offset the d i s 
advantage of less education with their status as French
citizens.

With the elimination of the DSL company,

the TN

pattern of development was imposed uniformly on both lines,
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easing the color line for an assimilated elite, while the
workers as a whole were bent to the administration's will.
M u c h more remains to be done on this pre-amalgamation
era of labor history on both the DSL and TN.

What is needed

are complementary efforts on statistical surveys by q u e s 
tionnaire and on additional oral interviews.

This would

help to determine the origins of African railroad workers
(social, regional, and ethnic) and their personal experiences
(duration.of employment, mobility,
disposal of earnings).

promotions,

skills, and

Such work should be accomplished as

soon as possible, while so many railwaymen of the pre-1934
era or their sons are still alive.
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K 4 09-132.
5. The prestation obligation was first regulated in an arr^te
of November 25, 1912.
The study of labor contracts by
the Government General began in 1912.
See ARS, K398-132.
In its response to the 1912 questionnaire, the DSL came
out solidly against government regulations in general
and work contracts in particular (DSL to GS, July 3, 1912,
S t L ) ; Demongin remarked in his report of February 20,
1926, FOM, TP, that laborers forceably recruited for the
TN railroad were furnished with contracts that they were
forced to sign by the colonial government.
See the
typed resume on the proposals of different colonies of
French West Africa, December 1923, ARS, K55-19; two
decree projects on "native labor" in French West Africa,
I b i d . ; projects approved, November 13,1924 (Guiraud),
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(1923 or 1924), ARS, K55-19; GS to GG, November 12,
1930, ARS, K66-19; Annual Report on workers of 2§me
portion-French Sudan, 1933, ARS, K47-19; Annual Report
on 2§me portion-French Sudan, 1938, Ibid.
7. P.V., Office du Travail (Sudan), October 27, 1927, ARS,
K56-19.
The question of forced labor in French Africa
is taken up by J. Suret-Canale, L'ere coloniale,
pp. 312-327.
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Tropicales (Tambacounda), the Compagnie des Sisaleraies
et Carburants Africaines, the Soci^te? des Plantations
de la Haute-Casamance, and the Soci^te des Mines de
Falem£-Gambie (acting GS to GG, September 29, 1930,
ARS, K60-19).
9. As in political report, January 1906, ARS, 2G6-4;
acting GG to Administrator Dakar, June 3, 1931, ARS,
K60-19; Report on Charles Lombardini, May 18, 1931,
Ibid.
10. GS to GG, November 17, 1918, ARS, K408-132; GG to GS,
October 19, 1918, Ibid. ; GG to GS, December 19,1927,
ARS, K47-19.
This leaves aside the occasional use of
soldiers and the
common use of jail prisoners as
la bo rer s.
11. Report Lt. Governor Upper Volta to GG, October _7, 1922,
ARS, 10G11-107; copy Taillebourg report (^1922_/, I b i d . ;
Ballabey to IGTP, February 2, 1923, Ibid.;Report
acting Director TK, August 28, 192 2,~T 5 T d .; GS to Lt.
Governor, Upper Volta, February 12, 1924, SARS, Confid;
GS to GG, February 23, 1924, I b i d .
12. See acting GS to GG, August 8, 1916, SARS, Confid.
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exceptions were the cercles of Upper Gambia, Matam, and
parts of the Upper Casamance.
See economic report
1929, 4th trimester, ARS, 2G29-2; political report 1939,
ARS, 2G39-4; political report 1940, ARS, 2G40-2.
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14. Administrator Dakar to GG, March 23, 1931, ARS, K66-19,
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oft le travail force serait organise a Dakar, la popu
lation flottante menacSe de recrutement disparaitrait,
ainsi de main d'oeuvre les entreprises des pa rticuliers."
Recruited labor, though, could be brought into Dakar
from neighboring colonies.
15. Acting GS to GG, September 29,

1930, ARS, K60-19.

16. Only Dahomey had less onerous prestation obligations.
See annexed table 1930, ARS, K69-19 which shows Senegal
having an annual obligation of 4 days of labor.
See
circular of September 23, 1913, GS to Administrators of
cercles, J O S , 1913, p. 949; GG response to Rheinhart
report, December 13, 1913, ARS, 4G15; Senegal annual
reports: ARS, 2G27-18(2); ARS, 2G28-8; ARS, 2G39-4;
circular of GG, September 12, 1930, ARS, K120-26; Note
by Inspector du Travail for IGTP, May 31, 1933, ARS,
K143-26; Berthet note to Director Cabinet, April 19,
1940, I b i d .
17. About 1000 of Samory's "sofas" captured as war prisoners
were brought in to build the railroad.
CrossonDuplessis, Le chemin de fer de Kayes au N i g e r , copy of
excerpt of Bulletin de la SociStS Francaise~cfes
Inggnieurs Coloniaux (Paris" 1904) in RA, wrote on pages
68-69: "il en est presque toujours ainsi dans les
entreprises coloniales; au d£but, on est souvent oblig£
de constituer un noyau de travailleurs avec de la main
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In fact, labor requisitions caused many to flee the
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See MC to GG, October 29, 1902,
ARS, 2G2-1, and Crosson-Duplessis, pp. 11-13,67.
18. For the DSL, see Petyt report of DSL expenses, 18881889, FOM, TP, Senegal XII,69, pp. 107,111-112; report
of Chief Surveillance Engineer, December 7, 1917, FOM,
TP; report of Chief Surveillance Engineer, December 8,
1928, FOM, TP.
For the TN, see Legregram report,
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of July 20, 1930, I b i d .
19.

For a concise explanation, see E. Deveze, Chef du Bureau
personnel de la Direction Fed6rale des Chemins de Fer
de l'AOF, Formation Professionnelle-Cours de P e r s o n n e l ,
1956-1957, RA, pp. 9-23 which went into a detailed
explanation of DSL cadres for 1925-1926.
For a brief
comparison with rail workers in France, see K.A. Doukas,
The French Railroads and the State (New York, 1945),
pp. 64-74.

20.

The report of Director TK, May 6, 1914, SARS, DCF,
recommended division of the unwieldy combined Movement
and Rolling Stock division.

21.

See Dev&ze, Forma ti on, pp. 23-78, 91; arretS of N o v e m 
ber 29, 1910, J O S , December 1, 1910, pp. 872-873, 934936; an arrete of April 1, 1921 reorganized the cadre
commun.

22.

Report Demongin, February 20, 1926; FOM, TP.
Of the
896 forced laborers, 201 were from Senegal; the rest
from the Sudan.
Demongin's impression is confirmed
in Lt. Governor, Sudan to GG, April 12, 1926, ARS,
K410-132 (and K81-26).
The Sol report on TN personnel,
August 5, 1930, FOM, TP, listed as working on the
Travaux Neufs service a total of 64 Europeans (57
military), 1,497 hired laborers and 1,320 of the 2eme
portion.

23.

E.g., see salary scales for Africans and Europeans in
1925 in Deveze, Form ati on , pp. 11, 14-21, 38-40.
The
Pruvost report on the Dakar-Niger railroad, June 25,
1935, FOM, TP, p. 103, noted that Europeans accounted
for 58.6% of the total personnel expenses (chapitre I)
in 1930, for 46.7% in 1931, and for 51% in 1932.
See
Legregram report, July 4, 1930, FOM, TP, pp. 18ff.

24.

Gasconi to S/Sec,
February 21, 1884, FOM, Senegal X V , 1;
GS to MMC, March 13, 1885, I b i d .

25.

See DSL brochure,
"Notes relatives a la construction et
eJ 1'exploitation du chemin de fer DSL," December 1888,
copy in FOM, TP, p. 35. "La compagnie ne peut envoyer,
en effet, au Senegal que des agents experiment's . . .Quel
avantage trouveraient-ils cL quitter les Compagnies ...
pour s'expatrier s'exposer & un climat dangereux,
et
revenir en France au bout de 2, 3, ou 6 ans au maximum,
avec une sant€ d£truite, car l'Europlen ne s'acclimate
pas au S£n£gal ..."
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-34026. See Ibid., pp. 34-35, and the Etienne report, March 31,
1887, FOM, Senegal X I I , 59, p . 36.
27. The following tables were tabulated from individual
employees records in the archives of the DSL Company
in Paris /~henceforth DSL (Paris)_7:

year
hired

#
hired

1883
1884
1885
TOTAL

21
51
125
197

year
hired

fired

1883
1884
1885
TOTAL

5
11
10
26

Less
than
one
mo.
0
0
7
7

laid
off
4
7
15
26

#Left Company Within
Six
Two
One
One
to
mo.
year
yrs.
to 1 to 2 to 3
six
m o . 71*.
yrs . y r s .

Three
yrs.
to 6
yrs.

More
than
six
yrs.

5
12
27
44

3
9
21
33

2
3
16
21

quit
3
9
18
30

1
9
30
40

4
9
17
30

died
with
in
died year
5
5
16
26

2
-

7
9

6
9
7
22

repatri
ated
for
health

other

1
14
38
53

3
5
28

JS

28. The DSL must have recognized that European employees
could work on a long-term basis by the early 1 8 9 0 ’s,
although the personnel statute of 1897 was still laid
out on the basis of a six-year agent contract.
The
Fontaneilles report of July 17, 1898 concerning the
DSL, in FOM, TP, makes it clear tht long-term employment
was possible.
29. See DSL personnel regulations-1897, copy in FOM,TP.
The Petyt report of expenses for 1890, FOM, Senegal
XII,69, indicated that European agents went on vacation
with their families in France at company expense.
30. For general policy on hiring retired military personnel
at the Kayes-Niger, see answer to question 7 by Director
KN, September 9, 1912, ARS, K399-132.
A list of E u r o 
pean personnel on the KN, in a report of January 18,
1907, RA, listed 14 active military personnel out of a
total of 68.
See Demongin report on TKN personnel,
April 10, 1926, FOM, TP, and especially Chardy's comments
pp. 6, 10.
See also Petyt report 1891-1892, FOM, TP,
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-341p. 28, on the proposed use of military personnel on the
DSL.
TK agents were subject to the decree of August 5,
1910 regulating personnel in the "Travaux publics
des colonies."
See acting GS to Director TK, March 30,
1915, SARS, Confid.
As "functionnaires," they had
more job security than someone hired by contract on a
temporary basis.
31. Report of DSL board of directors to stockholders,
June 15, 1901, FOM, TP.
32. On rentals, see DSL board of directors report to stock
holders, April 28, 1888, FOM, TP; unsigned note on
Dakar station (1897 or 1898), FOM, TP.
33. Petyt report, DSL expenses 1890, FOM,Senegal X II ,69,
p. 60; DSL to MC, November 8, 1894, FOM, TP.
The
Jacquerez report of September 14, 1901, FOM, TP, found
several stations unsuitable to house rail agents and
their families.
34. DSL to MC, November 23, 1900, SARS, DCF, proposed using
government reserve funds for various constructions on
the DSL line, including five new stations which would
shelter European agents in more sanitary circumstances;
DSL to MC, April 25, 1904, FOM, TP, suggested building
housing in the "Dunes area" for its European agents.
Even as late as 1925, the DSL was buying housing in
Dakar for its European agents.
See Director DSL to
DSL Administrators, Paris, July 16, 1925, DSL (Paris).
In 1894, high company officials had felt no need to
house DSL personnel.
See report by Pouyer and A.
de Traz, FOM, TP, pp. 17-21.
35.

Thi&s au Niger, p p .

73-74.

36.

L. Petyt report on DSL for 1887, May 30, 1888, FOM,
Senegal X I I,69, pp. 32-33.
Petyt report, DSL expenses
1890, Ibid., pp. 70-71.
Boissel to Premier Briand,
December 24, 1910, FOM, TP; Boissel to Deputy Blaise
Diagne, December 1, 1920, Ibi d. ; DSL to MC, April 21,
1921, I b i d .

37.

See report by Roily on DSL functioning, January 29,
1911, ARS, 043, pp.
24-31. The Ligue Fran 9 aise pour la
Defense des Droits de 1*Homme et du Citoyen had made
more general but unsubstantiated charges earlier.
See
Francois de Pressense to MC, October 23, 1906, ARS,
K 3 2 ; GS to GG, March 9, 1907, I b i d .
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-34238. Telegram GG, Ponty, (at Kouroussa) to Cabinet (GG),
December 21, 1910, RA: "me suis engage avec compagnie
Et ne pas nous faire guSrre d'employes et enlever agents
Et la dite compagnie dont bonne exploitation nous
i n ter ess e."
39. GS to GG, February 22, 1921, SARS, Confid, noted how a
TK agent had worked African rail laborers for his own
personal profit.
See Inspector Merly to MC, July 8,
1926, FOM, TP; Demongin report, April 8, 1926 on service
in stations, Ibid. A general, wide-spread practice of
overcharging Africans for passenger tickets was noted
in Chief Exploitation Service TN to Lt. Silvani,
Commandant Gendarmerie of TN, June 30, 1930, FOM, TP;
Chief Exploitation Service of TN to Chief Commercial
Section of TN, March 24, 1930, Ibi d.
40. The Petyt report of 1891-1892, FOM, TP, pp. 8,9, listed
16 che fs-cantonniers (undoubtedly Europeans) for 1889
and only 6 for 1892.
A report on DSL personnel with an
attached tabular listing of September 15, 1892, FOM,
Senegal X II , 72, specifically listed 5 European c h e f s c a n t o nni er s. The Fontaneilles report of July 17, 1898,
FOM, TP, pp. 59,60 indicates that by 1897, at least,
even these were gone.
The job, it should be noted,
involved skills at basic surveying measurements to align
the track.
41. Copy GG to MC, January 18, 1928, K56-19; GS to GG,
January 10, 1924.
ARS, K82-26.
In GS to GG, August 4,
1928, ARS, K58-19, an estimate was made that 3,500
workers were needed for public works projects in Senegal.
Lt. Governor of Sudan to GG, August 12, 1927, ARS,
K57-19, estimated 8:^000 men would be recruited by the
administration for public and private needs, not inclu d
ing separate private hiring.
See also acting GS to
GG, September 29, 1930, ARS, K60-19.
42. Administrator Dakar to GG, October 20, 1930, ARS,
K60-19.
Most were Tukolor from the Senegal river and
Sousous from Guinea.
43. General Bonnier to GG, June 29, 1918, ARS, K408-132;
commentary on draft arret‘d by GG, n.d. (1918) on d r a f t 
ing manpower for Dakar, ARS, K408-132; GG to Ravitaillement-Marine, September 28, 1918, Ibid.; copy acting
President CC-Kaolack to Administrator Sine-Saloum,
October 24, 1918, Ibid. ; copy telegram Administrator
Sine-Saloum to Delegate Senegal (Dakar), December 30,
1918, ARS, K399-132; report by Syndic of manpower,
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-343February 26, 1919, I bi d. ; Aumont to Chief Economic
Affairs Service, February 19, 1919, I b i d .
44. E.g., Oldani to GS, December 6, 1918, ARS, K399-132;
Economic Bulletin-December 1920, ARS, 2G20-1; A d m i n i 
strator Dakar to GG, July 31, 1926, ARS, K81-26; P.V.,
CC-St. Louis, December 18, 1926, SARS, DCF.
45.

GG to Lt. Governor of Upper Sen ega l-Niger, January 20,
1919, ARS, K399-132, complained that permitting higher
salaries in his colony would have repercussions on the
cost of completion of the TK.
On the shortages of
laborers for shipping peanuts on the TN, see June 1925
economic report, ARS, 2G25-2.

46. Thies au N i g e r , p. 46; earlier in 1911, work on the
K a o l a c k - G u m g u i n e o spur alone required 1200 recruited
laborers, June report, ARS, 2G11-43.
47. TN report on 2&me portion, ARS, K47-19; report of acting
Director TN to GG, October 4, 1932, I b i d .; annual report
on workers of the 2§me portion, French Sudan 1938, ARS,
K47-19.
The actual contingents sent in a given year
varied wildly from none to 1600 men, but most recruits
were kept on the job for almost 2 years.
See also Lt.
Governor of Sudan to GG, August 12, 1927, ARS, K57-19;
same, September 16, 1927, I b id. ; GS to GG, December 19,
1927, ARS, K47-19; Demongin report, February 20, 1926,
FOM, TP, on forced labor on the TKN; Demongin report,
April 10, 1926, I b i d ., on TKN personnel; Me rly report,
June 22, 1926, I bi d., on African manpower for the TKN;
response of Lt. Governor of Sudan, May 28, 1926, ARS,
4G87-105; response of GG, June 2, 1926, Ibid.
48. Director DSL to Chief Surveillance Engineer, M a y 15,
1926, ARS, K81-26; Director DSL to GG, June 9,1926,
I b i d .; Commissaire Police, St. Louis to GS, December 6,
1926, I b i d .
49. Petyt report 1891-1892, p. 85, FOM, TP.
50. See answer to question 9 of the questionnaire on forced
labor in French West Africa /^circa 1928J7, ARS, K66-19;
remarks in GG conference, January 8, 1921, ARS, K82-26.
The Lt. Governor of Upper Senegal-Niger noted that the
chiefs received 5 francs per worker recruited.
For
general background on rural labor, it is useful to
consider African domestic slavery.
See Denise Bouche,
Les villages de liberty en Afrique noire, 1887-1910
(Paris, 1968), p p . 5 8 f f .; J.-L. Boutillier, "Les captifs
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-344en AOF (1903-1905)," Bulletin de l' IF A N , serie B, 1968,
pp. 513-535.
51. On labor recruiting of 500 men for the Louga-Lingudre,
see Administrator Louga to GS, October 8, 1926, StL;
Economic report, December 1926, ARS, 2G26-3; Political
report 1929, ARS, 2G29-15.
52.

Testimony of a retired African "cheminot."
During the
course of my sojourn in Senegal, I interviewed 26
African ex-cheminots (all but one in the spring and
summer of 1972) on a confidential basis.
Henceforth,
information provided by these men will be footnoted as
"EX-RR."
These interviews were very informative, not
only for factual information, but in directing the
study toward basic questions.
Unfortunately a small
sample of only 26 men, however informative, has to
be preliminary in nature.
See Appendix II for details.
A letter, DSL to MC, November 8, 1894, FOM, TP, refers
to laborers working on the DSL track living nearby with
their wives and children in straw huts; see also Petyt
report on DSL expenses 1890, FOM, Senegal X II, 69, p. 21.

53. EX-RR interviews.
For a few years, the company even had
its employees growing peanuts on DSL property for its
own profit.
54. With exceptions.
During World War I, heavy port traffic
was handled at times only with recruited labor (see
report by the Syndic of manpower, February 26, 1919, ARS,
K399-132).
Typical base salaries for unskilled urban
laborers were 1.25 to 1.50 francs per day from 1881 to
World War I (less 0.50 Fr/day if meals were provided).
In 1918-1919, with much manpower in the army, these
salaries rose to 3 and even 6 francs per day (Oldani to
GS, December 6, 1918, I b i d .).
55.

See art. 31 of the draft decree on offices du travail,
ARS, K55-19; P.V., Commission on regulation of work,
August 9, 1924, I b i d . (referring to this article as #37).

56. Report by Friry, Janury 16, 1907, ARS, P37.
In contrast
see Mornet report on piece work in northern Nigeria,
1913 (for the Congo railroad project) in ANF, u nc las si
fied 89AQ-Brazzaville.
See also Avant-projet Noirot,
July 20, 1894, p. 64, FOM, Senegal XII,82 on road
construction gangs.
57. Port workers in Dakar, at least, were paid in lump sums
for an entire crew.
See GG to Administrator Dakar,
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-345July 22, 1926, ARS, K81-26; Administrator Dakar to GG,
July 31, 1926, I b i d . A draft report by Petyt (1898),
FOM, TP, indicates that a record was kept of the work
of individual workers only in the central workshops,
but not outside.
58. GS to S/Sec, April 12, 1886, ARS, 2B75; Petyt report on
DSL expenses 1890, FOM, Senegal X I I, 69, p. 21.
GS to
GG, Political report 1908, ARS, 2G8-10.
In a monograph
on Thies in 1910, ARS, 1G337, p . 35, an official noted:
"Les manoeuvres se recrutent assez difficilement sur
place; cette categorie de travailleurs est fournie par
les bambaras, toucouleurs et sarakoles qui viennent
pendant la traite travailler dans les escales, et
ensuite regagnent leurs pays d ’origine ou ils livrent d
la culture."
See also Director DSL to Chief Surveillance
Engineer, May 15, 1926, ARS, K81-26.
59. EX-RR interviews.
60. Decrees of June 17, 1895 and January 17, 1897.
See GS
to S/Sec, January 6, 1892, ARS, 2B67; same, January 5,
1893, Ibid.; same, March 11, 1893, I b i d . ; Delegate
Interior (Dakar) to Director Interior, May 19, 1892,
ARS, K31; excerpt of notice in J O S , December 5, 1891,
ARS, K31; documents #47 and 106, I b i d .; draft GG to
General,. Commandant en Chef, July 26, 1896, ARS,
K397-132; report Director Interior to GG, August 4,
1896, Ibid. See also the dossier FOM, Senegal X IV ,26.
Senegal reluctantly permitted, however, its workers
to be recruited for the French Congo and Madagascar.
See French Congo to GG, March 22, 1902, ARS, K398-132;
GalliSni to GG, December 14, 1901, I b i d .; GG to GovernorGeneral of French Equatorial Africa, April 30, 1913,
ARS, K397-132.
61. See report by Inspection Generale des Services
Sanitaires et M^dicaux, October 12, 1931, ARS, K60-19;
draft report by Maretti on agricultural manpower in the
cercle of Kayes, July 17, 1923, ARS, K81-26; "Danger of
Depopulation, French West Africa," November 21, 1931,
ARS, K162-26.
The Societe des Mines de la Senegambie
failed to extract gold with machinery on the Faleme in
1912 when its dredge broke down (see Commercial Bulletin,
May 1912, Upper Gambia, SARS, DCF).
Its successor, the
Compagnie des Mines de FalemS-Gambie, impressed local
labor brutally (copy GS to Administrator Upper Gambia,
January 30, 1930, S t L ) . See also APA report of
November 1939, ARS, 17G160-28.
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-34662. Note Balandier's penetrating comments on the reaction
of Africans to "material inferiority," in The Sociology
of Black Africa (New York, 1970), pp. 160-163, 282-284.
63. See GS to S/Sec, June 6, 1890, ARS,

2B67.

64. Senegalese craftsmen skilled in European trades, those
of St. Louis in particular, were justly famed through
out French West Africa and the Congo.
See CrossonDuplessis, Kayes au Niger, pp. 67-68; questionnaire on
manpower-1897 (5 cercles of Sudan), ARS, K398-132;
questionnaire on manpower-1897 (St. Louis, Dakar), SARS,
DCF.
65. E. Mage, Voyage d'exploration, p.

221.

66. There are many works which describe the castes briefly.
See Majhemout Diop, Histoire des classes sociales ...
Senegal (Paris, 1972), pp. 49-52.
Martin Klein, Islam
and Imperialism, p. 10.
67. EX-RR interviews.
See also A. Aumont, proofs of pamphlet
for National Colonial Congress, 1889, ANF, 148AP2, p . 3.
68. EX-RR interviews.
Of the 26 retired railwaymen
inter
viewed, 11 claimed a notable ancestry (some even a royal
ancestry), and 6 of these 11 had specialized in a
technical metier.
Metier can be used in a very general
way to mean an specialized occupation, including w a t c h 
men or clerks.
In this work, I mean metier to refer
narrowly to work of a technical nature.
The large
number of notables in the African "working class"
suggests that more work needs to be done on the c o m 
position and evolution of this class.
It is often
pointed out that industrial workers in Africa have
stood out from the mass of peasantry as a privileged
group.
One starting point for a study would be J.
Lombard's analysis of the erosion of the traditional
ruling class' power in Autorites traditionnelles,
pp. 68-88.
69. See footnote 23 above.
In addition to a "supplement
colonial," bonuses at the end of six years service and
a housing allowance (when no housing was prov id ed) , DSL
agents received from World War I, an "indemnity de
deplacement de chert6 de vie" as well as an " indemnity
de d^place men t." See salary scales for each DSL employee
on the DSL list of January 1, 1890, FOM, Senegal X I I , 59.
Colonial government officials also received a supplement
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-347coionial.
70. Sahib Diop of Dakar was a stationmaster from 1913 to
1917, Amadou Gu&ye briefly from April 1919 to May 1921,
and Guibril Bit of St. Louis from 1911 to 1932.
See
also list attached to DSL to MC, August 29, 1907, FOM,
TP; DSL to MC, November 23, 1900, SARS, DCF.
Almost
all facteurs and facteurs-chefs on the DSL were European.
Chardy suggested (Chardy to IGTP, July 28, 1934, RA)
that these posts be held henceforth by Africans, as
they were already on the TN.
On African locomotive
engineers, see e.g., Etienne report, March 21, 1887,
FOM, Senegal XII,69, p. 88; Couteau report, September 15,
1892, FOM, Senegal X I I , 72.
71. See Petyt's 1887 report on the DSL, FOM, Senegal XII,69,
pp. 88-90.
Compare with Ibid., pp. 84-86.
Petyt report,
DSL expenses, 1888-1889, Ibid., p. 49; Petyt report,
DSL expenses 1890, I bi d., p. 20; Petyt report 1891-1892,
FOM, TP, pp. 47-48.
Petyt, who had been employed on a
railroad in the U.S.A., was clearly motivated by racial
prejudice.
Other government officials felt differently.
See Inspector Fournie to S/Sec, January 25, 1894, FOM,
Senegal XII, 68.
Jacquerez report, September 15, 1901,
FOM, TP.
72. DSL pamphlet, "Notes relatives a la construction et a
1'exploitation du chemin de fer DSL (decembre 1888),"
(Paris, 1888), p. 45.
On pages 34-36, the pamphlet
complained that its European employees cost 3 times as
much as in Europe, and worked half as hard because of
the climate.
73. Crosson-Duplessis, Kayes au N i g e r , pp. 71-72 describes
the Tukolor attack on the KN line in 1890.
74.

DSL pamphlet of 1888, p.

52.

75. EX-RR interview.
Report of DSL board of directors to
stockholders, June 15, 1901, FOM, TP.
76.

Notes by Launay on the functioning of the TK and DSL
railroads, April 10, 1920, FOM, TP.
See also the
diatribe against Senegalese workers in the note by
police inspector, Vallet, n.d. /7l920_7, ARS, 17G239105.

77. The Legregram report, June 16, 1930, FOM, TP, pp. 2526, noted that of the 62 stations, large and small, on
the TN, only 12 were run by Europeans.
Calmel, "Le
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-348chemin de £er du Senegal au Niger...," Revue du G e n i e ,
October 1896, p. 323, remarked that Africans had already
served as chefs de t r a i n , and even as stationmasters at
remote stations on the unfinished KN.
78. Response GG to Legregram report, August 5, 1930, FOM,TP.
79. European colonial officers were generally convinced that
Africans would only respect and willingly obey E u r o 
peans clad in military uniforms.
See Revin to Freycinet,
July 19, 1879, ANF, F14/12438.
80.

EX-RR interviews.
Copy GG to GS, August 1927, ARS,
1P6-10, expressed surprise that the Lt. Governor would
favor shortening work hours for Africans on the TN to
the same hours as European TN agents.

81.

EX-RR interview; admission to this cadre was extremely
important, for it brought certain privileges, such as
a right to railroad-supplied housing.
DSL management
resisted extending to African agents of the TN's Cadre
Commun Superieur the courtesies they normally extended
to European TN agents (copies of exchange of letters
Director TK to Director DSL, June 4, 1923, ARS, 6P165-36;
Director DSL to Director TK, June 7, 1923, I b i d .;
Director TK to Director DSL, July 31, 1923, I b i d . ;
joint letter of five TK agents to GG, November 30, 1923,
Ibid. ; GG to GS, December 26, 1923, I b i d .

82. EX-RR interviews.
A circular of October 31, 1910 by GG,
Ponty, ARS, 17G160-28 enjoined the lt. governors of the
federation to reserve administrative positions in their
respective colonies for African school graduates.
GS
to Lt. Governor of Dahomey, July 26, 1912, SARS, DCF,
and GS to Lt. Governor of Ivory Coast, July 26, 1912,
Ibid., urged that these governors accept African
graduates of Senegal’s Ecole Pinet-Laprade on the
railroads of their colonies.
83. F. Carr£re and P. Holle, De la Senegambie francaise
(Paris, 1855), pp. 12-13: "Avant le decret de 1848,
abolotif de l'esclavage, ils consentaient volontiers
a £tre masons, menuisiers, ch arpentiers, calfats, metiers
consideres comme honorables; mais depuis 1 ’emancipation
les marabouts ... se sont empares des enfants, les
d&tournent ... des metiers qui les mettaient en contact
avec des EuropSens .... Un homme ne au Senegal regarde
a u j o u r d ’hui comme vil le metier de laptot ... et les
navires de l ’Etat sont obliges de recruter leur
personnel parmi les etrangers ou les gens nouvellement
€tablis (bambaras, sar ac ole ts )." See also Ricard,
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-349Le S en e g a l , pp. 237-247;
FOM, Senegal 1,61.

GS to MC,

September 22, 1876,

84. Young Senegalese were sent to France for a technical
education as far back as 1837 (see G. Hardy,
L 'enseignement au Senegal de 1817 d 1854 (_ Paris, 1920_V>
p. 83).
At least a few returned to serve with di st inc 
tion in the colony's technical services at an early
date.
(See Boilat, Esquisses senega la ise s, pp. 258,
274-275; Ricard, Le S § n 6 g a l , pp. 17-18) . Of the
originaires of St. Louis, the most successful in a
technical career was Frederic Michas, who rose to the
rank of Chief of Senegal's Public Works service in
1924 after a long period of service outside the colony
(Personal dossier, SARS, A628).
85. See e . g . , Conseil General du S e n e g a l , 1906, pp.

135-144.

86. See DSL, "Notes relatives ... DSL," December 1888, FOM,
TP, p. 52; Petyt report 1887, FOM, Senegal XII,69,
pp. 88-89; Etienne report, March 31, 1887, FOM,
Senegal X I I , 59, p . 36.
87. The number of skilled workers in St. Louis was too small
for the needs of the 1 8 8 0 's (see GS to MMC, April 23,
1882, FOM, Senegal 1,66).
DSL Company records (DSLParis) show that, at least up to 1895, only 5 St.
Louisians were registered as permanent or semi-permanent
(auxiliary) employees.
Three of these were train e n g i 
neers; only two were hired as clerks, and only for a
short time.
Only five St. Louisians were hired as
facteurs from 1897 to 1900, only one of which became
a stationmaster (Guibril B&) . Six other St. Louisians
commissioned by the DSL from 1902 to 1909 were only
work crew foremen.
In contrast, there were eight
Gor£ens hired by the DSL for its auxiliary staff up to
1893, and three others for the permanent staff up 1897.
An ex-railwayman claimed in an interview, however, that
there had been a number of St. Louisians in the main
DSL workshops.
88. A movement
history of
ism" among
vividly by
africaine

of prime significance for the political
Senegal during this period of "proto-nationaleducated francophone Africans, it is recounted
Lamine Gu&ye in his autobiographical Itineraire
(Paris, 1966), pp. 8-10, 85-101.

89. EX-RR interviews.
See also Launay to Director TN,
July 24, 1924, RA, which noted the difficulty of getting
African graduates of professional schools to come to the
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school.

He suggested that the railroad form its own

90. EX-RR interviews; personnel records, DSL (Paris).
As
early as 1891, L. Petyt spoke highly of African pe rs o n 
nel employed on a long-term basis at the DSL repair
shops of Dakar, (see Petyt report on DSL expenses 1890,
FOM, Senegal X I I , 69, pp. 21-23).
There were 65 skilled
workers in the DSL Dakar workshops in 1897, with some
24 apprentices and laborers; in 1900 there were 47
workers, with 46 apprentices and laborers (Jacquerez
report of September 15, 1901, FOM, TP).
91. EX-RR interviews.
92. Of a group of 156 Senegalese workers observed leaving
Bathurst for the Belgian Congo in March 1897, 107 were
Sarakole, mostly unskilled laborers from Bakel.
See
list in Administrator Gambia to GG, March 18, 1897,
ARS, K397-132.
93. See C. Quinn, Mandingo Kingdo ms, pp.

27, 42,

49.

94. A detailed 1938 analysis of the "general character"
of Sarakoles sailing on French vessels and another on
Wolof sailors can be found in ARS, 17G160-28.
See also
GS report for Direction des Colonies, January 22, 1880,
FOM, Senegal 1,63; GS to S/Sec, June 6, 1890, ARS, 2B67;
acting GS to S/Sec, November 7, 1892, I b id.
95. Francine N'Diaye, "La colonie du Senegal au temps de
BriSre de l'Isle, 1876-1881," Bulletin de l ' I F A N , s£rie
B, 1968, pp. 470-471, mentions the formation in 1879 of
an "ecole des arts et metiers" in Senegal, and the
training of tradesmen at the Catholic mission of St.
Joseph at N ’Gazobil.
The school run by the Fr£res de
Ploermel also trained apprentices in some metiers at
both St. Louis and Goree from an early date (Franjoise
Flis-Zonabend, Lyceens de Dakar (Paris, 1968), pp. 167169).
A training school was also attached to the naval
arsenal at S. Louis in 1886 (see GS to S/Sec, D e c e m 
ber 10, 1890, ARS, 2 B 6 7 ) . Later on, an Ecole de
Pupilles Mecaniciens de la Marine was created at Dakar
(J O S , September 12, 1907, pp. 469-470).
The Ecole
Pinet Laprade was run by the Government General at
Goree and the Ecole Blanchot at St. Louis by the colony
of Senegal.
See Flis-Zonabend, Lyclens pp. 169-172;
response of acting GG to Merly's report of July 7, 1926,
ARS, 4G87-105; copy GG to MC, January 18, 1928, ARS,
K56-19; inquest manpower, Senegal-1927, ARS, K92-26.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-35196. At the railroad workshops, the skills would include-in addition to the familiar crafts of bricklayer,
ironsmith and carpenter--the industrial skills of
fitter, latheworker, b r a s s - f o u n d e r , tinsmith, and
electrician, as well as locomotive engineer.
The writer
is particularly indebted to the comments of ex-cheminot
El Hadj Ibrahima Di&ne.
97. EX-RR interviews.
98. Guy Pfefferman, Industrial Labor in the Republic of
Senegal (New York, 1968), pp. 28-29, 34-38, 218-219.
99.

Ibid., pp.

28-29, 36-38, 250.

100.

See acting GS to Chief Public Works service of
September 25, 1926, S t L .

Senegal,

101.

EX-RR interviews,
pp. 156-158.

102.

EX-RR interviews.
A report of Director Interior to GS,
June 19, 1886, SARS, DCF, noted that African workers
and laborers insisted on being paid every 2 or 3 days.

103.

Telegram DSL to GG, July 22, 1896, ARS, K397-132; te le
gram Superville to GG, July 28, 1896, Ibid. ; Delegate
Interior to Director Interior, August 2, 1896, I b i d .;
Superville to GG, August 4, 1896, Ibid.; DSL to MC,
July 25, 1896, FOM, Senegal X I V , 27.
Petyt noted the
loss of some DSL workers already to the Congo in his
report on DSL receipts 1890, FOM, Senegal XII ,69, p . 18.

104.

EX-RR interviews.
Some of those interviewed noted that
many refused to be commissioned in the railroad, because
they h a d n ’t understood the advantage of a long-term
pension.

See Bouche, Villages de l i b e r t e ,

105. Gordon Wright, France in Modern Times (London, 1962),
pp. 362-363.
For a contrary view see Peter Stearns,
Revolutionary Syndicalism and French Labor (New B r u n s 
wick, 1971), pp. 13-14.
A law of December 27, 1890
stipulated pensions for workers hired under contract.
See Doukas, French R ai l r o a d s , pp. 68-71, 198-204.
106. A draft report by Petyt for 1898, FOM, TP, lists 180
workers in 1894 receiving 1554 hours of treatment in
the company hospital, 248 agents in 1895 for 2473 hours,
165 agents in 1896 for 1417 hours and 254 agents in 1897
for 1969 hours.
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-352107. Fontaneilles report, July 17, 1898, FOM, TP, p. 81;
draft of report by Petyt, 1898, FOM, TP.
A completed
regulation was only submitted by the DSL to the Ministry
of Colonies in November 1901 (report DSL board of
directors to stockholders, June 18, 1902, FOM, TP).
108.

See DSL personnel regulation-1908,

copy in FOM, TP.

109. See DSL "ordre de service," no. 211, December 31, 1919,
ARS, K35, DSL ordre de service, n. 261, August 5,
1925, FOM, TP.
110.

P.V., CC-Rufisque, April 30, 1912, SARS, DCF; draft
report GG to MC, November 18, 1910, ARS, K399-132; GG
to MC, November 30, 1910, ARS, K33; GS to GG, April 14,
1910, I b i d .; GG to GS, December 30, 1918, ARS, K398-132;
acting GG to MC, June 4, 1923, ARS, K76-26.
See also
the dossier ARS, K34, on a proposal of 1919 for an 8
hour workday in West Africa, especially documents #10
and 11, which summarize the responses of government
agencies and chambers of commerce.

111.

Excerpt opinion CC-Rufisque, attached
January 8, 1912, ARS, K399-132.

112.

DSL to MC, August 29, 1907, FOM, TP, makes it clear
that the pension plan, applicable at that time to only
45 African exployees, was being put into effect b e 
cause of the express request of these African employees.
A copy of the 1927 version of the pension plan for
Africans is in FOM, TP.

to GSto

GG,

113. For TN agent benefits, see the Legregram report on TN
personnel, July 12, 1930, FOM, TP.
114.

See circular of October 14, 1937, ARS, 21G53-17; acting
GG to MC, September 8, 1936, ARS, K70-19.
Labor unions
were made legal again in France by a law of March 21,
1884.
Not surprisingly, the merchants of that day in
Senegal came out roundly against its promulgation in
Senegal.
See P . V . , CC-St. Louis session of December 18,
1884.

115. For the railroad strike of 1938, see Iba der Thiam, "La
gr£ve des cheminots du S£n6gal de Septembre 1938," 2
vols., Memoire de Mattrise (University of Dakar, 1972).
116. MC to GG, April 3, 1908, ARS, K106-26; copy GG to M C ,
June 24, 1908, I b i d .; deliberations of the Cour d ’Appel
de l'AOF, June 1, 1908, Ibid. An attempt had already
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-353been made in 1906 to form a "Syndicat des Ouvriers
R§unis" at Dakar (Procureur de la Republique to GS,
June 19, 1906, SARS, DCF, and unsigned copy to MC, n.d.,
ARS, K399-132).
117. ArretS of April 22, 1920 by Merlin, copy in ARS, K10626; draft GG(Merlin) to MC, February 10, 1921, I b i d .;
acting GG to GG(Carde), April 14, 1923, Ibid; GG to
acting GG, May 15, 1923, I b i d . ; GS to GG, October 4,
1924, I b id. ; acting GG to GS, October 11, 1924, I b i d .;
draft of acting GG to MC, February 1930, Ibid. ; note
on craft unions by Director APA, I b i d .
118. Telegram Friry to Director Public Works, May 10, 1909,
SARS, DCF; Director Public Works to GS, May 10, 1909,
I b i d . The strike was confined to DSL personnel r u n 
ning the trains on the new Thids-Diourbel branch.
In
1910 there was a dockers' strike at Dakar (agent of
Phillippe, Delmas § Co. to GG, May 27, 1910, ARS,
K399-132).
In 1916 there was a strike of African
butchers at Lyndiane (Brocard to GG, November 2, 1916,
SARS, DCF) and in 1918 one of masons in Rufisque (ARS,
2G18-1).
A dockers' strike at Rufisque is described in
a note of January 4, 1919, ARS, K399-132.
119. Letter from cheminots to GG, April 8, 1919, ARS, K35;
note by Mouneyres, April 12, 1919, I bid .
120. The arr£te of April 12, 1919, ARS, K35, mobilized r a i l 
road personnel; see police report (Commissaire Central
de Dakar) to GG, April 15, 1919, Ibid.;
report of
General Bonnier, April 30, 1919, I b i d .; report of GG
to MC, May 1, 1919, Ibid..; note also the telegrams from
commercial interests in Senegal (e.g., President
CC-Rufisque to GG, April 14, 1919, I b i d .).
121. EX-RR interview, confirmed in part by police report,
April 25, 1919, ARS, K35; see also "Les agents indigenes
du DSL" to Chief of DSL Rolling Stock, December 30,
1919, Ibi d. ; telegram MC to GG, June 3, 1920, I b i d . ;
arbitration decision of June 9, 1920, Ibid.; GG to MC,
June 12, 1920, ARS, 17G239-105; DSL to MC, September 30,
1921, FOM, TP.
A glimpse at European worker attitudes
on the TKN is provided in "Personnel TKN" to President,
CC-Rufisque, June 4, 19 24, SARS, DCF, as these agents
deny responsibility for failures adding: "le personnel
indigene, auxilliaire naturel du personnel europeen,
ne lui apporte aucun aide, tout au contraire! ...le
chemin de fer marche mal c'est entendu, mais il marche
cependant mieux qu'il peut marcher et cela gr&ce au
personnel europeen."
There were fights between African
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-354workers and Europeans at the TKN depot of Thies in
August 1924 (Senegal political report 1924, ARS,
2G24- 14 ).
122. An arr&tS of January 10, 1920 approved a constitution
for the Association Amicale et Professional des Agents
du chemin de fer du TK.
A n arr§te of July 15, 1924
permitted the amalgation of this association with a
similar association for the KN.
A separate African
association was created in 1929 (J O - A O F , January 1929,
p. 79).
A number of other associations were formed
in Senegal before the war; but a letter to MC,
January 31, 1907, ARS, K399-132, indicates that there
were none before 1907.
123. Existing police reports cover various meetings of the
associations or their members; e.g., a report of
May 17, 1926 on a banquet of African DSL cheminots,
ARS, 6P434-132; that of November 14, 1925, I b id.; or
that of December 19, 1926, I b i d . Those in ARS, 21G133108 include reports on the European DSL association,
as those dated September 3, 4 and 8, 1928 and
January 18, 30 and 31, 1929, and one on the African DSL
association dated January 21, 1929.
A police report
of September 12, 1931 (ARS, 21G41-17) covers a meeting
of only 20 Africans of the DSL association, and another
of October 4, 1931 (Ib id.) a meeting of only 15 members.
See also report of police inspector Wilt to Director
TN, December 3, 1927, ARS, 1P6-10; same December 4,
1927, I b i d .; confidential report, September 12, 1931,
ARS, 1P8-10.
124. See Lamine Gu£ye, "Gr^ve du DSL," L ' A O F , January 29,
1925, copy in FOM, TP; d'Oxoby, "En grbve," Journal de
l'Ouest A f r i c a i n , I b id . ; GG to MC, January 30, 1925,
Ibid.; DSL to MC, February 11, 1925, FOM, TP; copy note
for MC, February 12, 1925, Ibi d.; Chief of Police,
Thi&s to Administrator Thi&s, February 10, 1925, SARS,
Confid; GG to MC, February 19, 1925, FOM, TP: President
of Syndicat Defense Inferets Senegalais to Blaise Diagne,
March 17, 1925, Ibid.; the dossier ARS, 0234 has several
documents of early 1925 discussing drafting workers on
the TK and DSL.
Contrast worker action on the TN with
that shown in acting Director TK to GS, October 28,
1920, ARS, K 409-132.
125. GS to GG, March 2, 1925, ARS,
May 11, 1925, I b i d .

K106-26;

draft GG to MC,
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-355126. Government General, AOF, Sur les difficultes ren co ntr€es au r£seau Thi^s-Niger depuis sa creation...,
n .d ., / 1 9 2 7_j p p . 2-3, 7-8; see IGTP to Secretary
General of the Government General, November 29,
1927, ARS, 1P6-10.
127. Director TN to GG, September 23, 1926, ARS, K53-19;
Director TN to IGTP, February 27, 1928, Ibid.;
Legregram report on TN personnel, July 12, 1930,
FOM, TP.
128. See police report of January 30, 1929, ARS, 21G133-108,
report of April 19, 1929, I b id.; report of May 8, 1929,
Ibid. The police report of January 21, 1929, ARS,
21G133-108 saw little cohesion left in the DSL African
association; but a report of February 1, 1929, I b i d .,
shows them negotiating actively for raises, and another
report of September 14, 1931, ARS, 21G41-17, indicated
more agitation for raises.
129. See GG to MC, December 1, 1933, FOM, TP, on reduction
of DSL effectives; GG to MC, February 4, 1933, ARS,
K66-19; note for GG by Direction APA, April 18, 1934,
Ibid.
130.

The police report of February 1, 1929, ARS, 21G133-108
noted that the African TN association was reluctant to
cooperate with their DSL colleagues.
"Par leur genre
different de recru tem ent ," it explained, "ils se
consid^rent comme au-dessus de leurs collegues du
DSL..
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I I

Of the 26 ex-cheminots, one began work on the DakarNiger only in 1934, but deserves to be included.
25 others,

10 began with the DSL,

5 with the KN, '4 with the

TK, and 6 with the consolidated TN.
work before 1911,

Four began railroad

7 more before 1921,

and the rest afterward.

Of the

3 more before 1926,

Fourteen of these men received a

formal French education, while the other 12 did not.
Fifteen did all or most of their work in the Rolling Stock
division or associated rail workshops,
Movement division,

four in the Track

sion, and two in the central offices
much to be classified).

four were in the

(and Buildings)

(one moved around too

Ethnicity cannot be easily p i n 

pointed in many cases because of mixed parentage.
speaking,
3 Lebu,

divi

Roughly

these men can be grouped as 8 Wolof, 5 Khassonke,

3 Sarakole,

2 Bambara,

1 Tukolor,

1 Serer,

1 Peul,

and 2 not classified.
The interviews were generally conducted in the infor
mant's home, usually privately in French,
friends present;

sometimes with

but five men were interviewed

in the

street usually with friends sitting by, and one was inter
viewed in an office.
Rufisque,

Six were interviewed at Dakar, one at

one at St. Louis, and the rest at Thi&s.

interviews were not tape recorded

The

(except in one c a s e ) , but

the following questionnaire was used as a general guide dur-
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TRANSLATION OF QUESTIONNAIRE FROM THE FRE N C H :
Details on the general functioning of railroads
names,

(as

dates organization,

directors'

etc.) can be found in

books or archives.

But the personal observations of rail

road workers are particularly useful for undocumented items.
Some questions are:
1. When did you begin to work for the railroad and what posts
did you come to occupy?

Did your father or grandfather

work for the railroad?
2. Where had you come from, and what attracted you to work
on the railroad?
come from, and,

Where did your father and grandfather
if they worked for the railroad, what

attracted them to work for it?
3. What sorts of men were drawn by railroad work?

From

which lands, which origins, which former occupations?
4. Where and how did they live when they were single?
When they were married, where and how did their families
live?
5. Were there voluntary associations or cooperatives for
these workers?
habitation,

(societes d'entreaide for eating,

for purchasing goods,

days, for social affairs,
loans,

for burials,

etc.)

for sickness,

for
for h o l i 

for receiving new workers,

for

How did they function?

6. What leisure days were there?

What did one do on those
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-358days or on religious festivals?
7. Were the mosque,

the church,

or the quarters of the city

centers of communal life for the rail workers?
8. Do you

recall any traditions,

How?

songs or well-known

stories about important incidents or eminent railwaymen
which illustrate aspects of the life of railwaymen?
9. Do you recall any stories of your father or grandfather
about the development and functioning of the railroads,
or on the development of trading posts and villages along
the lines?
10. Do you think that there were any changes in the lives and
perspectives of railwaymen as compared to other Senegalese,
because of their work for the railroad?
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CHAPTER VI

RAILROADS AND AFRICAN LAND

/"In France_7 one meets at each step cities, villages,
homes, chateaux, parks, with which one must reckon so
as not to augment the enterprise's expenses unreasona
bly . . . in a new country like the Sudan, one only
worries about the general contours of nature. _/~Even_7
the populations to be served are a secondary considera
tion. They don't summon the railroad. The railroads
summon them.
]_
-Ch. Freycinet,

1881

The impact of railroad lines on property values,
especially on ur ban land located n ear rail stations and
yards or near right of way approaches into towns,

is a

familiar theme of 19th century urban social history in
Western countries.

Even in the early days of railroading

it was soon generally recognized that this means of locomo
tion would raise the values of commercial properties wellsited to take advantage of the shipping and traveling
facilities that an adjacent rail station w ou ld offer.

Some

land speculators w o u l d aim at cheap, early purchases of
land located astride a projected railroad's right of way in
rural areas, or better yet on the approaches into towns,
-359-
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Alternatively a speculator might gain even m ore by invest
ing in the anticipated commercial appreciation of proper
ties located near a projected railroad line.
be a risky gamble, however,

This could

since a railroad trace often

also reduced the value of some properties,

especially

those residential areas m ask e d or isolated by the contours
2
of a railroad's tracks and yards.
The impact of railroad construction in the 19th
century on property values of land in the clusters of
settled communities in Europe and the eastern United States,
w i t h their pre-existing patchworks of property holdings,
rural and urban, and its impact on the social fabric of
these areas involved the complex interplay of many inter3

related elements.

In comparison,

a pioneering railroad

lanced into unsettled territories,

as in the American

West, clearly was a simpler case.

Here,

a railroad was

one of a set of conditioning factors newly-imported into
the territory by the railroad itself--factors which were,
in fact, creating n e w land values where none or virtually
none ha d existed before.
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The case of railroads in Senegal stands out in
contrast to the experiences in both the pioneering and
settled situations.

F or while the lands in question

had indeed been occupied by settled communities before
the coming of the railroad,

the promoters and organizers

of the rail projects,

thinking largely in terms of

pioneering railroads,

considered that they wer e indeed

creating n e w property values where none had existed
before.

The nub of the problem really lay, however,

in

the fact that two radically different notions of land
value, European and African, were involved.

African land tenure

In contrast to European society,

traditional Senegalese society, in a land-rich and labor
scarce region, placed a relatively higher value on human
resources and relationships than on material resources.
The similarities in Western and African attitudes toward
land and labor should not blind us to the significance
of the different emphasis accorded these factors within
African and Western societies.

These similarities some

times misled earlier observers into considering African
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institutions as primitive versions of the Western.
fact, despite some obvious congruities,

In

the differing

perceptions within African and Western perspectives of
the relation between land and labor indicates fundamental,
underlying differences in the balances within the two
cultures
Within Western society,

there seems to be a impli

cit assumption that society is purposeful in itself-'that it exists to bring to fruition a given potential of
development.

Within this general assumption,

land and

labor are viewed as instrumental--as factors useful in
accomplishing the tasks of development.
fore valuable even in potential alone;

Land is there
and while land is

exploitable only with appropriate applications of labor,
labor itself is only given the status of another factor
of production.
Traditional African societies in Senegal, with
their long agricultural background,
tive land,

also valued produc

and property rights had long been carefully

defined throughout the region.

But in a setting where

land was abundant, with the predominance of a slash-
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a n d - b u m system of agriculture, w h i c h encouraged mobility,
and a relative scarcity of labor,

the powerful, respected,

and rich were in general not those who could make exten
sive land claims per s e , but those who could attract or
compel military manpower and agricultural labor.
greater the m a n u a l support,
production,

The

the greater the fruits of

and the greater the security.

This was

especially true during the u n s et tle d era of the Atlantic
slave trade.
Interpersonal relations and mutua l obligations
were,

therefore,

society.

a more central concern than in Western

Fertile land and w ater resources were also

esteemed, but if depleted or too m ea g e r locally, they
might be easily found in relative abundance elsewhere.'*
In fact, productive land, abundant water,

and flocks were

prized in large part for their usefulness in attracting
n e w supporters to a group or leader,

as well as in satis

fying and retaining the more capable wit h rewards.
Perhaps the differences in Western and African a tt i
tudes toward land and labor were the result,

in origin,

only of differing agricultural techniques under different
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theless,

It is interesting to note, n e v e r 

that servitude in Europe was characterized by

tying the serf to the land, in contrast to African servi
tude where the tie to a ma ste r was of a personal nature
and where the personal qualities of the slave could enable
h i m to rise to h i gh positions of power.
Senegalese land tenure was complex,
varied wi t h the ethnic group and region.
that,

and its rules
It can be said

in general, property rights were conferred by the

act of clearing out forest land for cultivation.

6

For

example, W olof custom, drawing upon ancient Serer p ra c
tice, recognized the overlapping rights of an original
claimant,

the "lamane", who had earned rights over wide

tracts of land by being the first to clear them with fire,
and those of an occupying tenant,

the "borom n'gadio",

who h a d cleared a family plot for cultivation on a portion
of this land w it h tools later on.

The lamane was entitled

to collect a fee from the latter.

But this fee origin

ally had the nature of a symbolic gift rather than rent
and arose from a religious relationship between the lamane
and the land, rather than an exclusive property claim.
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M or e importantly,

the borom n'gadio could n ot in general

be dispossessed and property being h e l d on a familial
or even a communal basis was, in general, not alienable,
although its management might be confided to a family
head.
After the 16th century, powerful monarchs usurped
the rights of m a n y a lamane, granting these land rights
in turn as fiefs to members of their entourages, to
warriors,

or to religious leaders.

In these cases, the

fees exacted from the borom n'gadio might become onerous;
but the ve ry nature of these fees only emphasizes the
importance of the personal bond in land tenure.
Set fees for land use were only levied at the
inception of occupancy and for renewals at the death of
either o f the contracting parties.

Regular annual taxes

of various kinds were generally exacted on the basis of
a set percentage of the crop harvested--a levy correspond
ing more directly to the amount of labor invested in
cultivation rather than to the intrinsic value of the
land itself.^

There was never any question of an active

market for land, nor of the peasant's basic right to
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continue occupying the land.

After all, he, not the

land was the source of wealth.

European land values on African turf

Despite a prolonged

European presence in ports or trading posts along the
African coast and along some rivers, little headway was
made at first in creating an extensive network of pr op e r 
ty holdings according to European standards.

There is

no reason to doubt that French officials and merchants
imported European notions of property at an early date
as a useful tool in organizing and administering inter9

nally their A fri ca n trading stations.
cance of these measures,

But the signifi

even at these trading points,

was vitiated by the fact that, aside from the military
advantages of a given position, there were generally
many other alternative sites in the environs that could
be just as suitable for trading, and indeed were often
used for the p u r p o s e . D u r i n g

the period of the A t l a n 

tic slave trade, the very nature of the trade prompted
the competing European powers to scatter their trade
operations widely in far-flung networks of small posts
and anchorages along the coast, interspersed untidily

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-367-

among those of other rival nations, rather than concen
trating operations at a few points or occupying long,
contiguous stretches of coastline.

11

Even after the

demise of the slave trade, the rising trade in staple
commodities did not necessarily transform the situation.
Terrains within

the French-run escales trading in gum

along the Senegal river were indeed neatly subdivided

into parcels bought by merchants.

But these property

holdings retained little real value when free trade
allowed commerce to take place at many other points
along the river's banks.

12

It was the growing profitability of larger and
larger, coal-burning iron ships during the course of
the 19th century that, as it gradually changed the char
acter of seaborne transport, also drastically altered
the relative importance of various coastal sites.

13

Unlike the smaller wooden sailing vessels, these more
efficient maritime carriers could be accommodated only
at a limited number of points along the African coast.
Everywhere, anchorages and ports became less and less
adequate as ships became larger, requiring extensive
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alterations and expansion even at the few natural harbors
on the coast.

Driven by a growing competition for com

merce with Africa and for the maritime carrying trade, the
various powers strove to improve docking, coaling, and
.
1
4
provisioning capacities at their colonial ports.

Never

theless, given the budgetary stringencies on colonial
projects, governments could only undertake large-scale
construction and dredging operations at a few ports.

The

heavy cost of construction at a port, such as Dakar with
its excellent natural harbor, would prompt the colonial
government to encourage a greater flow of traffic into
Dakar simply in order to generate a better return on its
earlier construction investment.

This was, moreover, a

cumulative process, since traffic could be attracted to
Dakar by making even more improvements on its harbor and
port.

Thus the earlier investments were inviting even

heavier investments in the port, and these made the diver
sion of traffic to Dakar even more essential.

Inevitably,

the government also would deliberately neglect the construc
tion needs of competitive ports, such as St. Louis and
Rufisque, in order to funnel even more shipping into Dakar^
It was this increasing concentration of commercial
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activity at a few points (including at first St. Louis
and Rufisque) that was the primary determinant in creating
or in magnifying enormously property values in and around
favored ports— by endowing well-located parcels of land
with an undeniable intrinsic value based on their poten
tial for facilitating business transactions and increasing
trade volume, while reducing the costs of operation.

In

Senegalese ports, land at a site would be valued according
to its proximity to the harbor, business district, and
government administration offices, and to the site's ade
quacy for commerce, storage, or habitation.

Other nearby

parcels might now also become objects for speculation,
since they could also acquire value simply in anticipation
of future increased shipping activity in the port.
As railroad lines were being built into the African
hinterland, it was obvious that they were also reinforcing
and extending the European system of land valuation on
the African continent in two ways.

The railroads were,

on the one hand, attracting and concentrating even more
of the hinterland's trade within certain ports, so that
the overall value of real estate in a favored port would
rise, even while the sitings of the railroad station and
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rail approaches in or near the port also reshuffled local
property values to some degree.

At the same time, the

railroad was also embedding a system of European property
holdings deep within the interior, by creating a string
of focal points for local concentrations of the export
trade within the peripheries immediately around the sta
tions along the rail trace.

Before the railroad, African

caravans could choose among a multitude of alternate
routes leading to a number of different ports.

16

The rail

road line, cheaper and faster than a caravan, would now
funnel freight and passenger traffic along a fixed trajec
tory.

But as noted earlier, the railroad, unlike a trail,

highway, or river, was only open at a restricted number
of points, its services available only at limited times,
according to the directives of a railroad administration
that formed part of the colonizing power.

The concentra

tion of shipping at the railroad stations would tend, there
fore, to produce a gradation of land values in rural land
based on their proximity to the rail station.

17

In this

sense, the railroad was thus playing a primordial role in
the creation of monetary land values in Africa, both by
rendering areas in the interior accessible to ports engaged
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in the export trade and by helping to concentrate this
trade within narrow geographic channels.
In contrast, the bits of terrain set aside for .the
needs of the railroad--rectangles of 400 meters by 100 for
DSL stations, 800 meters by 200 for TK stations, and from
30 meters width for the DSL right of way to a variable
span of 30 to 100 meters for the TK--had limited, though
not inconsequential direct impacts in themselves on the
growth of urban areas or the development of private prop
erty systems.

These railroad properties were only enclosed

at a comparatively late date, and many unused portions of
the properties were, in fact, occupied informally by Afri
can huts or plantings, even into the 1930's.^

The two

partial exceptions to this rule were Dakar and Thi^s; but
this was due largely to the installation of railroad head
quarters in both towns, and to the unique conditions at
these sites.

19

The growth of urban areas, their morphol

ogy, and the evolution of land tenure rights in and about
these areas were governed to a much larger extent by other,
more fundamental factors, peculiar to the nature of the
colonial enterprise or intrinsic to the African scene,
rather than to any direct, specific role of railroad opera-
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tions or to the layouts of rail traces and terminals.

Law, land and labor

Land, whether in remote rural dis

tricts or in the new urban areas coveted by the colonial
regime, was regulated originally according to local Afri
can law and custom, in which rights over the same piece
of land might be held, perhaps consecutively, by a commu
nity, by an extended family, or by an individual.

After

the conquest, the contact of these traditional land
tenure systems with a system of European law based on indi
vidual property rights and assigning a cash value to ter
rain could only be corrosive for the former.

This became

evident wherever French law became preeminent, and espec
ially when a need to pay taxes in cash arose.

Sale of

land, which might occur inadvertently out of ignorance of
French law or because of a need for money, might now
permanently alienate to Europeans as private property a
community's formerly exclusive and theoretically non-alienable right or negate the legitimate traditional claims
of others.
The French administration was interested, of course,
in expropriating large tracts of land for its own needs,
as well as seeing to it that French merchants and colonists
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could also obtain land under easy terms for trade opera
tions and for agricultural development.

The administra

tion could claim wide stretches of terrain on the basis
of treaties obtained by consent or force, and in fact had
little trouble in taking the land it needed for fortifications or for the railroad lines.

20

In other cases,

however, Africans proved much more intractable about yield
ing parcels of terrain that they were cultivating or inhab
iting.

The obstinancy of Africans in these cases was bad

enough in the eyes of those colonial officials who could
imagine more vital or productive uses for the land.

But

insistent African claims to apparently deserted tracts of
territory indeed often infuriated top colonial officials.
It is likely that these officials were aware of the local
practice of leaving fields in fallow for extended periods
of time.

However, they generally considered these prac

tices backward and wasteful.

As a consequence, the colon

ial government was generally well disposed to awarding
large tracts of rural terrain to French citizens or com
panies, under condition that they be developed economi
cally, and it did so often enough with little compensation
for African occupiers or claimants of the terrain. 21
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Nevertheless. a sytem of rural concessions or plan
tations never became widespread in Senegal, as it did in
other French colonies in Africa.

The political hostility

in the 19th century between members of the colony’s General
Council and the colonial government originally may have
played an important role in this development.

22

Even more

significant in the long run was the disappointing produc
tivity of the rural concessions, in contrast to the profit
ability of an export trade based on peanut cultivation by
peasant families, who would abandon a terrain if it was
awarded to a concessionaire.

OO

The government had little

interest, therefore, in the dispossession en masse of Afri
can peasants, who were the mainstay of production.

Instead,

the colonial administration tended, in practice, to moder
ate the adverse impact of concession grants by limiting
their size

and avoiding settled productive areas.

But

it continued, nevertheless, to award these concessions.

24

The colonial administration also had to be wary of
French merchants and colonists.

All too often, a petitioner

seeking a rural concession in the name of agricultural
development was only out to obtain cheaply plots of wellsited land that might be used advantageously for commercial
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purposes or sold at a profit later.

25

Nor was the admini

stration pleased, on the other hand, to be forced to pay
high prices for needed urban land to French citizens who
had already bought the rights to the land earlier, at a
pittance, from Africans needing cash.^
To minimize other conflicts arising from fundamental
differences between French laws and African custom, espec
ially in the case of slavery, the colonial administration
had divided Senegal in 1890 into two areas:

the directly

administered territories, covering the urban coastal towns,
the major trading posts, and, later on, a one kilometer
ribbon of territory on either side of the DSL railroad,
where French law would prevail; and the "Pays du Protectorat", covering the remaining territory, where local custom was to prevail under French supervision.

27

This divi

sion could not resolve, however, the question of land
tenure, since the majority of terrains in direct rule areas
were rural in fact and still held according to African
custom, while the administration also wished to grant con
cessions in the Protectorate area.

Neither could the prob

lem be resolved easily by associating rights acquired under
the customary law with those acquired under the Civil Code
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because of the complexity of overlapping rights involved
in familial and collective land tenure.

Even worse, under

the technicalities of French law, most African land rights,
being of a nature akin to that of usufruct in European
terms, would have been voided.

pQ

The very act of regis

tering African land into a French system of property hold
ings, it should be added, presented a formidable problem
to the administration, since in the absence of a land cad
astre the physical effort of surveying and marking property
boundaries for even a limited number of terrains was a
burdensome material task. 29
The abrupt imposition of French property laws within
consolidated urban zones might also have had some grave
consequences.

The success of the colonial occupation did

not depend so much on the acquisition of parcels of terrain
as on attracting or compelling African labor to contribute
to the export trade.

Large numbers of Africans had to be

drawn to reside within or near the urban areas for more
or less extended periods of time, not only to perform the
myriad skilled, semi-skilled, and menial tasks that ran
the trade, but also for the associated tertiary activities
that fed and sustained the populations of these towns.
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Fashioned by Europeans, the towns quickly became, as has
o n

been remarked, largely populated by Africans. u

Trade

goods and the need to earn cash for the head tax--the same
devices which drew Africans into cultivation for the export
trade--also enticed many into the towns, at least for short
periods.

The towns of course had other allures.

They

offered bright lights and refuge from rural labor recruit
ment, from chiefly and parental authority, and for a time
from the head tax itself.

31

But the towns chronically

suffered from labor shortages, and it would not do to com
pound the shortage by making it difficult for African
laborers to find housing or by repelling long-term resi
dents from the vicinity by troubling unnecessarily their
tenures on land.
The colonial administration's answer to these dilem
mas was to proclaim a general right of eminent domain over
land in Senegal (and later for all French West Africa) in
the name of the French state.

Enunciated as far back as

1862, this claim was based at first on treaties with African sovereigns granting land to the French.

32

After the

conquest, even more sweeping claims were put forth on the
grounds that the rights of the African sovereigns had
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passed to the French state by right of conquest.

Under

this questionable theory, African sovereigns were consid
ered to have been the sole proprietors not simply of
abandoned and empty terrains, but also of all landed prop
erty in the realm, with the actual cultivators entitled
only to precarious rights of occupation.

In case of land

expropriation, a parcel's African occupants were therefore
to be entitled only to a meager compensation for the loss
of use of the land and for displacement costs, in contrast
to holders of titles legally registered under French law,
who had recourse to a highly favorable expropriation procedure.

33

Naturally, this principle could also be used

to assert, though with mixed effectiveness, that any direct
sales of land by Africans to Europeans were invalid.
This legal principle of land tenure, which was to be
a cornerstone of colonial social law, was dominant in
Senegal particularly after 1907, until rejected by the
courts in 1933.

34

One should not be too concerned with the

formal legalisms of most government documents on this ques
tion, although many an important court case turned on the
logic of a theoretical argument.

Essentially, the admini

stration was pragmatically staking out as wide a claim as
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possible--retaining wide powers of expropriation and a
veto over land registration--in order to be able to exer
cise a firm control over a changing colonial situation
that could evolve along contradictory lines.

The long term

interest of the colonial power, of course, was to extend
the sway of Civil Code provisions over its entire colonial
domain, and to do it in such a way as to reward those who
were helping the colonial administration consolidate and
develop the territory economically.

At the same time,

care had to be taken not to create social and economic tur
moil nor to impair the administration's freedom of action
by a too hasty extension of French metropolitan property
laws.

This might not only alienate and repel needed Afri

can labor, but also allow greedy or unsympathetic elements,
both European and African, to profit at the government's
expense by exploiting the technical restrictions in these
laws.

The zone of private property holdings would be ex

panded steadily, but only at a rate and in ways conforming
to the government's immediate policies and interests.

Under

the circumstances, it was convenient for officials to view
this unregistered land as valuable mainly in potential-- as
a patrimonial treasure that would generate governmental
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revenue through lucrative land sales, as well as a resource
held in trust for supposedly unsophisticated Africans.

Escales, ports, and trade

35

Urban land had been claimed by

the 19th century colonial administration in the name of the
French state, the colony, and its municipalities.

But

within a few days of the decree transforming the Government
General into a powerful, consolidated political authority
in October 1904, a new decree was also issued advancing
an exclusive claim of eminent domain over practically all
0/1

land in French West Africa in the name of the French stated
Confirmed after legal tests in the courts, it was this claim
which was to be the legal basis of property rights for the
07

lion's share of urban property.

Under French colonial

regulations, urban property could be granted in a number of
ways.

In the early days, French citizens could buy land

from the African occupants and formally register them with
the colonial government, or they could buy directly from
the colonial government itself.

Seasonally inundated urban

lands were granted freely by the government with the pro
viso that they be filled in above water level within a set
period.

Concessions for the temporary occupancy of plots

of land were also granted on the basis of annual rents to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-381-

the government, and could be converted to a permanent
title if the land was sufficiently developed during occu
pancy.

The administration preferred to sell plots of land,

however, in order to profit from the sales, and to simplify
its own responsibilities.

After 1887, surveyed urban land,

in principle, had to be offered at least initially for
38
sale at public auction.
Sale and registration of a plot
of land would be made after a surveyor reconnoitered and
marked out the terrain, and after a formal inquest into
outstanding claims on it.

Prior to auctions, the govern

ment would itself formally survey and formally register the
land to be auctioned.
The colonial administration mapped out lots in each
important trading center or each port at various times
depending on the growth of the agglomeration.

In general,

and in contrast to the typical African village with its
serpentine lanes winding about compounds of diverse, but
generally rounded contours, the administration would try
to lay out the lots, as had been prescribed by the metro
politan ministry, in rectilinear checkerboard fashion,
generally in the form of square islets of four equal square
lots separated from other islets by streets or wide boule
vards .

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-382River or seaboard escales were generally aligned
about streets giving access to the shoreline and its quais.
Inland trading centers would form along the junctions of
roads, with a central market square often located at the
crossroads.

At a railroad junction, the checkerboard p a t 

tern mapped out for the trading center,

also generally

called an escale, would be aligned along one long side of
the rectangle forming the rail station property, w i t h the
m a i n street of the center leading directly into the station
at a right angle (See Figure 1 0 a ) .
cales,

an open square,

In these railroad e s 

set aside as a market, often p r o 

vided a focal center within the rectilinear layout,

and a

number of DSL escales were laid out on both sides of the
station property,

though commercial operations almost al-

ways concentrated on one side only.
centers,

39

In more important

a local administrator's residence would form an

alternate focus, generally on the outskirts of the agglom
eration.

Unofficial or informally aligned settlements that

had been in place before the formal administrative division
of their terrains sometimes prompted deviations from the
rectilinear patterns in order to preserve pre-existing
alignments, especially along diagonally oriented trade
routes.

Sometimes, on the other hand,

an over ambitious
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-384administrative plan for a given escale w o uld map out a
m u c h greater area for allotment than was used by the a g 
glomeration,

and in fact m u c h of the m a p p e d land w o uld be

under cultivation as though the pattern of the allotment
did not exist.

40

The railroad station w o uld exert a powerful attrac
tion tending to centralize trade wi t h i n the adjacent escale.
But this was offset to a large extent by the commercial
advantages of waylaying road traffic w h ile it was still
enroute to the escale.

Competing maStres des langues would

often be found on the roads to the escale,

attempting to

guide produce-hauling cultivators or whole caravans toward
particular patrons within the escale itself.

41

Smaller

traders, unable to afford the expense of a private plot or
of permanent installations wit h i n the escale, w o u l d also
open their operations on the access roads beyond its p e r i 
meter- -a ploy that w o uld often lead the larger merchants
to set up competing subsidiary operations near them on the
roads.

It was precisely just such a competition of traders

and merchants attempting to outflank each other on the
road leading out of Dakar,

that resulted, after a series of

leapfrog jumps along the road,

in the formation of Rufisque

42
in the 1860's.

It was this kind of process w h ich also
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-385created m a n y satellite trading centers on the roads and
riverways near larger escales.

Merchants based in the e s 

cales w o uld naturally resent having to invest in subsidi
ary operations while smaller competitors were escaping
the higher costs of escale installation, particularly after
1904 when tax-collecting municipal governments were set
up in a number of escales.

43

Indeed from 1912, the larger

merchants were demanding that commerce be banned for a
radius of 5 kilometers or more about each escale and that
ambulant traders be barred from operating within them.

44

Although sympathetic, the administration balked neverthe45
less at fettering free trade outright.

Instead,

it w o u ld

rely, into the 1920's, on extending the system of formallysurveyed escales into the roads and waterways of the inter
ior in pursuit of an expanding commercial geographic distribution.

46

The m a i n district wit h i n a rail escale could become
so congested that there was insufficient space for storing
the peanuts awaiting shipment by rail.

O f ten stocks were

heaped up at auxiliary sites at the outskirts of the escale,
or beyond its perimeter.

Peanut freight would be trun

dled from these storage heaps to the railroad station on
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wheeled carts rolled along by hand over light, metal tram
ways

("voies Decauville") running through the streets.

At first,

the metal tracks for these lines were installed

at the initiative of individual commercial firms for their
47
own needs.

But later on, the commercial tram systems in

the various escales were consolidated into municipal sys
tems, either by a private entrepreneur or by the m u n i c i 
pal government i t s e l f . ^
As for the ports, railroad lines could have contra
dictory effects on their growth, depending on the port's
commercial situation and the efficiency of port facilities.
In so far as the structural layouts of the ports were c o n 
cerned

these depended m u c h more on the peculiar features

of the port sites and on the orientation of docking and
storage facilities than on the position of the railroad
terminals themselves.

Nevertheless,

the terminal location

clearly did have some effect (see Figures 10b through lOe
for various ports).

The rail terminal's location was of

greatest importance at Rufisque, where the railroad,

in

redoubling the port's natural advantage of proximity to
centers of agricultural production, more than compensated,
along w i t h the site's abundant water and storage space,
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-387for the grave inadequacies of Rufisque's unsheltered
anchorage and meager docking facilities.

The railroad sta

tion was not placed within the limits of the commercial
town, but at some distance to the north, about a half-kilometer from the wharfs.

The gridiron pattern of the c o m 

mercial town's streets was,

therefore, naturally aligned

along the connecting passages that married the railroad
station to the seafront docks.

The streets running in from

the seafront and the branching lateral streets were criss
crossed w i t h a dense network, of metal tram lines running
up to the railroad station--a binding webwork of m e t a l
arteries carrying a rich flow of produce from rail to ship,
while showering the municipal coffers with revenue from
its tolls.

49

The limited impact of the rail stations at St. Louis
arose obviously from their remoteness,

in a sparsely-

settled, marshy, continental suburb far from the m a i n c o m 
mercial hub of the island port.

A private entrepreneur

provided an irregular carriage service from the island to
the stations; but it was plainly i n a d e q u a t e . ^

Unfortu

nately, by the time a n e w passenger terminal was built in
a convenient location at the foot of the pont Faidherbe,
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-388the town's commercial situation h a d radically worsened.
Even as the river trade,
ing in volume,

51

long and short haul, was shrink

a capricious river m o u t h entry was blocking

the larger ocean shipping from the port.
ditions, the relocated rail facilities,

Under these c o n 
far from acting

as an armature for n e w commercial activity and urban growth,
as they m i g h t have in an earlier period,

operated instead

as just one m o r e siphon on a rapidly decaying port.
Similarly cramped by a partially-strangled river
access to the sea, the port of Kaolack was buoyed,
trast, by a rapidly improving commercial situation.

in c o n 
Al

ready well- p l a c e d to receive the produce of a rich agri
cultural region only beginning to expand its production,
Kaolack received an added filip by being selected as a
m ajor port outlet for the new T K railroad line.

The sensi

ble fashion in w h ich the TK freight terminal was wedded
directly to the port contrasted favorably with the dismal
conditions at St. Louis, or even those at Rufisque.

The

roadbed here was traced around the we s t e r n edge of the
already existent commercial escale down to a newly construc-

52

ted rail pier on the western edge of the port's riverfront.
This happy arrangement, wisely drawn to leave space for
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-390n e w commercial installations near the station, nicely facil
itated an easy transfer of freight (often carted by tram
ways) b e t w e e n rail and port or commercial establishment
and added significantly to the site's inherent advantages
of plentiful natural quais, water, and storage space.

The

m a jo r drawback to the orientation of this trace was that
as K a o l a c k expanded in prosperity,

the rail line came to

form a b a rrier to communication between newly-forming
(African)

residential suburbs and the commercial quarter

of the town."*^
D a k a r was one case where the rail terminal actually
hampered the initial growth of the port.
lier,

As recounted ear

the ill-conceived 1883 design for the rail line's

approach into Dakar restricted commercial activity by m a s k 
ing stretches of shore line, while the passenger terminal,
deeply embedded in the port area,

further congested a

54
cramped commercial quarter.

Dakar s fine natural harbor

led to its early use as an important port of call for coal
ing and provisioning shipping on the m a j o r Atlantic routes;
55
but commercial traffic w i t h the interior languished.

A

glance at early street maps of Dakar clearly reveals one
reason in the occupation of m a n y of the better sites by a
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-391steamship company and by edifices housing administrative
services or military and naval units.

56

The railroad c o m 

pensated to some degree for the town's eccentric position
w i t h respect to the interior; but commerce was still h a m 
pered by a lack of storage yards for peanuts in Dakar,
and by the narrowness of shoreline available to c o m m e r c e . ^
The commercial success of Dakar came, of course, w i t h
the m a jor construction efforts from 1908 to 1932 to create
a suitable port adjacent to the military port.
ing, deepening,

The w i d e n 

and improved sheltering of the harbor i t 

self was coupled to the creation of vast n e w quais by s h o re
line fill and the opening of wide n e w areas for stocking
produce and coal.
The n e w quais and piers w e r e served directly by a
network of rails linked to the DS L system.

But removal of

the railroad terminal from the commercial center--a long
standing grievance of local commerce--was also an integral
part of the port overhaul program.

58

DSL freight opera

tions w e r e transferred back into the dunes region on the
north edge of the town, while DSL administrative offices
and housing were expanded in that zone.

The ne w siting

of the passenger terminal was less easy to settle, delayed
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-392as it was b y a tug of war between merchants who wanted the
station just at the edge of the commercial center, and
naval authorities, who

wished to p u s h it out even farther

for an easier access to the n e w n a val arsenal.

Interest

ingly, it was the navy's insistence on giving its naval
commander's n e w headquarters an u n o b structed view of the
harbor that was decisive,

as a new,

grander passenger rail

terminal tucked in behind the arsenal was opened finally
in 1914, on an emplacement 1000 meters from the old site.

African land rights

59

The growing importance of the es

cales and ports played a paramount role in shaping the
colonial administration's attitude toward African claims of
traditional land tenure.

The government's record in r e c o g

nizing these traditional claims h a d never been wholly co n 
sistent in the 19th century, with colonial officials taking
care at times to purchase rights to land at times,

and

deliberately undermining or disregarding strong claims at
other times.

60

Even as the DSL was being completed, offi

cials were purchasing the rights to land on the future sites
of the escales of Thids and M'Pal,

in French territory,

from their African possessors before proceeding to survey
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-393plots for auction at these sites.

61

In Cayor,

the French

state held title to wide perimeters around each of the
DSL rail stations by treaty.

But as long as a darnel ruled,

the ministry in Paris only allowed the government of Senegal
to rent plots w i t h i n these perimeters to French merchants
and traders on a temporary, annual basis.

It was only

after the elimination of the darnels in 1886, that the m i n i 
stry finally permitted the colonial administration to form
permanent escales and sell plots at these sites.
as late as 1896,

62

Even

the colonial government felt obliged,

before expanding the perimeter of the growing escales into
the Protectorate,

to obtain a prior formal cession of the

land in question in treaties with the paramount chiefs of
Cayor and N'Diambour.

63

In that era, even the colonial

government h e l d that French citizens had to obtain chiefly
permission before occupying terrain in the interior,
though in practice the chiefs w o uld obey administration
o r^
d e r s .64
These distinctions and scruples were swept away by
the ministerial decrees on land in 1900 and 1904, and by
the dominance from 1907 of the administration's doctrine
of being the sole proprietor of all unregistered lands in
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Senegal.

65

Henceforth, as other railroads were built—

the Thi&s-Kayes,

the Louga-Linguere--colonial officials had

few qualms about seizing land u n r e gistered under French
law for rail installations or for the n e w rail escales.
Whole villages might even be removed from their old sites
under this doctrine, with the occupants reimbursed only
for the costs of displacement and for any crops ruined in
the process.

fifi

African property rights based on traditional claims
had received some statutory recognition in article 2 of
the decree of July 20, 1900 and w e r e even guaranteed speci
fically in article 58 of the ministerial decree of July 24,
1906.

These short passages seemed to promise that land

held under traditional custom could no longer be sold or
conceded to third parties by the government, without at
least alerting the traditional claimants.
also seemed to provide a means

The 1906 act

(though in practice a limi

ted means) by w h ich these claimants could obtain full title
to the land u n d e r French law on the basis of their tradi
tional r i g h t s . ^
Nevertheless,

the guarantees that might be read into

these decrees for traditional rights were seriously undercut
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-395in most u r b a n areas by the admi n i s t r a t i o n 1s court victories
in 1907 upholding the contention that the F r e n c h state as
successor to the darnel held title under traditional law to
all lands in Cayor or formerly in Cayor.
tion was bent, moreover,

The administra

on narrowing the scope of the

1906 decree as m u c h as possible,

so as to reta i n for itself

a decisive p o w e r of discretion in matters of land expropriation and registration.
1906 was not intended,

68

Article 58 of the decree of

in any case, to m a i n t a i n the social

relations embodied in customary land law--for that matter,
the colonial government only became familiar w i t h the
particulars of local African customary law later on.
Instead,

y

officials h a d hoped vaguely that the decree of

1906 wo u l d indeed gradually reduce p easant m o b i l i t y by lead
ing eventually to the formation of a private property system
of small peasant holdings based on the Civil Code.
Thus,

the colonial administration specifically barred

African collectivities from acquiring legal title to land
in their own right.

70

Theoretically,

the property might

be registered in the name of the chiefs.

But since the

administration was also dead set against the formation of
extensive latifundia,

the chiefs were generally permitted

to acquire only small p a r c e l s . ^

Nevertheless,

given the
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-396inconveniences of land registration and the general adher
ence to cultivation based on the traditional methods scorned
by Fre n c h officials, it was hardly surprising that there
was in fact little formation of private property holdings
m

rural areas. 72
It was, of course, the situation in urban areas that

m ade the colonial government so sensitive to African land
claims.

On the one hand there were the public works p r o 

grams undertaken by the Government General in the larger
ports,

such as Dakar--projects particularly dear to the

Government General's overall policies.

On the other hand,

there was also the remarkable upsurge in the volume of
peanut trade after 1S00.

As a result, ne w escales were

being formed in the interior as trade moved deeper inland,
while the older escales also expanded notably.
DSL escales,

Of the

lots had been surveyed and auctioned earlier

only at M'Pal (1883), at Thi£s

(1885) and at Tivaouane (1888).

Merchants trading near the other stations along the line
had b e e n content in the meantime to rent lots in the g o v e r n 
ment owned perimeters on a temporary basis.

Formal auctions

of lots first took place at L o u g a only in 1894, and at
five other escales in the center of the line (Pire, Mekhe,
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Kelle, Kebemer, and Goumbo Gueoul) only in 1896; auctions
were held in the other DSL escales only after 1899.

The

growth of the DSL escales, first marked by an ample en
largement of the government owned perimeters in 1896, was
again exhibited in 1902 as the existing escale perimeters
were doubled.

Urban land auctions also began occuring more

frequently at about this time.

Only a short time later,

lots were being sold at the new escales forming on the TK
even as that line was under construction.

Already before

World War I, new trading centers were being formed and sur
veyed on the roads of the interior, and this development
resumed on a much larger scale in the 1920's. 73

Most sig

nificantly, the growth of these urban areas was provoking
an increasing awareness among Africans of the advantages
of property titles, or at least of the disadvantages of
their absence.
In 1883 and 1884, the darnels had casually granted a
St. Louisian merchant huge concessions of good terrain
around the French-controlled perimeters at the new rail
stations in Cayor— for a pittance.^

By 1896, the chiefs

of Cayor had hesitated, at least, before conceding to the
French state wide zones of land (some already producing
rent) on the outskirts of rail escales--and had received
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in exchange the political command of a canton of Baol. 75
Still, at the same time, the hour N'Diambour was unhesi
tatingly ceding similar terrains around Louga, without

any

compensation. 76
It was only belatedly in the first decade of the 20th
century that chiefs were advancing claims to parcels of
terrain within the main escales.

Not surprisingly, it was

the chiefs educated in French schools, or having frequent
77
contact with Frenchmen, who made these claims earliest.
African traders of St. Louis had, of course, been among
the first to purchase lots in the new rail escales, al
though some of these African purchasers may have been
"fronting" for European firms.

It is also clear that some

St. Louisian creoles, at least, were actively speculating
in escale property at an early date.

78

Perhaps one of the

most interesting cases in regard to African land claims
was that of Rawane Boye--a notable, former member of Sene
gal's General Council, and sometime trader.

Boye had been

already paid in 1887 for lands taken by the colony for a
growing trade center at Leybar on the DSL line.

In 1894,

he undertook to sue the DSL for land occupied by its tracks
on a great portion of its line between Leybar and St. Louis,
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and for damages supposedly resulting from its installation
in the 1880's.

Boye was armed with solid traditional rights,

confirmed by an arret§ of none other than Governor Faidherbe.
Though the claim was clearly speculative in design, it
tested some fundamental points in colonial jurisprudence,
establishing for the first time, in the landmark's deci
sion of the Court jf Bordeaux in 1903 that rejected Boye's
claim, that the state held rights of eminent domain over
all land in Cayor.

79

But speculation had little appeal for most Africans,
few of whom possessed the means to indulge in it.

There

are indeed many recorded cases of Africans selling their
land rights for cash, especially in urban areas, and there
were at least some early instances of Africans who began
80
to charge other Africans for use of land.
There were
instances, later on, of African speculators taking land from
others.

81

Nevertheless, in general there was not that much

interest among Africans in procuring land in full title,
even within the escales and ports, where it usually had
been possible to occupy land with little regard for the
official divisions of terrain into lots.

82

The procedures

of land registration were difficult, in any case, and could
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be distasteful if it involved the abrogation of someone
else's traditional rights.

For instance, despite a long

history of steady usurpation of their land by the colonial
regime, m o s t Lebu in Dakar,

although defending themselves

rigorously against new encroachments, consistently abstained
from securing their land as private property registered
,

under French law until the mid-1920 s.

83

It was a growing

appreciation for the dangers of a precarious claim to land
occupied in the urban areas, ports and escales, or in their
immediate vicinities, that prodded many Africans into seek
ing more secure formal arrangements--for the administration
was becoming more intolerant of both customary and infor
mal occupation of urban land, which seemed to threaten
not only its commercial and municipal plans, but European
health itself.

Sanitation and segregation

There had always been some

tendency for separation of European and African housing in
both the ports and escales in the late 19th century because
of differing life styles.

The formation of an African

quarter at Guet N'Dar in St. Louis comes to mind as one
example.^

The very growth of the urban areas obliged the
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authorities to relieve the effects of congestion with
zoning ordinances prescribing health and safety measures,
building codes, and street alignments, and to limit rowdy
and clamorous activities.

Local ordinances of this type

were obviously drawn from metropolitan models, but also
included bans on activities that seem to have annoyed
Europeans

such as nocturnal singing, drumming, and millet

pounding by Africans.®-*

A concern for fire safety was

also evident in the reservation of empty zones around forts
and explosive stores and along the railroad line, as well
as in the separation of urban housing by wide rectilinear
streets.86

The questions of fire hazards, especially from

the clusters of straw huts that sometimes caught fire near
more permanent European structures, had occasioned spor
adic expulsions of Africans from the centers of towns.®^
There were even some abortive efforts at laying out model
villages near urban areas for occupation by African resi
dents of the congested towns.®®

Yet in the 19th century,

there had never been any serious effort to segregate Euro
peans and Africans in these areas on the basis of race;
and European settled areas were, in fact, generally med
leys of habitations of various types, styles and occupants.
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The situation took a more serious turn after 1900 as
the colonial government’s program of port expansion ran
into the unsavory sanitary conditions of ports with wellearned reputations as pestholes.

Dakar’s plight in 1900

tragically demonstrated the problem:

there, a severe out

break of yellow fever totally halted construction work
underway on its harbor.

Europeans had to be hastily eva

cuated, while the colonial government was obliged to shoulder the losses of the construction contractor.

90

At first, the Government General set out to find a
solution for these sanitation problems with ambitious plans
for sewage and drainage ditches, refuse disposal, and
street grading construction at St. Louis and Rufisque, as
91
well as at Dakar.
Execution of these plans would have
led inevitably to some additional separation of African and
European housing, as at Rufisque, where the clearance of
the commercial quarter and the construction of major drain
age ditches was carried out with mass expulsions of Africans
from the central parts of the town.

92

After 1900, how

ever, even before this program could be fully implemented,
new discoveries in tropical pathology led to an even strong
er emphasis on segregation.
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Nineteenth century germ theory, it must be remem
bered, considered that disease germs could pass easily from
one material object to another.

Deadly germs were assumed

to be lurking within "unhealthy" soils in Africa, within
the mists arising from streams, or borne through the air
in wind gusts.

93

It was, for instance, a fear of disinter

ring germs supposedly infesting the earth of an abandoned
cemetery at the foot of pont Faidherbe, that had prevented
the DSL for so long from transferring its badly-located
passenger station at St. Louis to the only site where it
could effectively serve the town's commercial center.

94

Yellow fever, the deadliest killer of Europeans,
and malaria, it was now found, were only communicable from
the bloodstreams of previous victims by mosquito bite.
These findings, accepted in the area with reluctance even
as late as 1910, naturally revamped public works construc
tion projects and urban sanitation ordinances toward an
emphasis on eliminating mosquito breeding grounds by drain
ing and filling depressions where water pools could form
and on enforcing stricter building codes.

95

ledge happily saved many potential victims.

The new know
Unfortunately,

it also directed fresh attention to Africans as breeders
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and carriers of these diseases, particularly since Afri
cans, because they were less gravely afflicted by the
disease, could also be unwitting intermediaries in trans
mitting these diseases to Europeans through mosquito bites.
In the absence of a medical prophylaxis for yellow fever,
it was obvious that a measure of safety would be gained
for Europeans by segregating their living quarters from
96
Africans.
At an outbreak of yellow fever in 1911-1912, Afri
cans were expelled by force from the escale of Thi£s and
installed in newly created villages on the periphery, and
similar expulsions took place at Dakar.

97

Even before

this, the administration had already taken steps to create
segregated African villages in the north of Kaolack and
in the south of Foundiougne in 1910.

These villages were

set up to house Africans dislodged from the commercial cen
ters of these towns; and these towns were being cleared
not only to make way for takeovers of occupied land in the
centers, but also evidently with sanitary segregation in
mind.

98

Chronologically, the maturation of the notion of

segregated quarters in 1910 can be confirmed approximately
by the coincidental construction of the TK railroad.
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The first four escales surveyed for the new line--Khombole,
Bambey, Diourbel, and Gossas— were laid out with solitary
commercial centers next to the new rail stations, much as
in the old DSL escales, with the plan for Gossas approved
in November 1909.

A map for the projected layout of Guin-

guineo, the fifth escale, dated April 8, 1911, announced
plans, however, for a segregated African village to be set
up in the vicinity of the escale. 99

Henceforth, at each

new TK escale, two checker-board apportionments were made.
A commercial escale slated for European residence, on lots
auctioned by the government, was placed conveniently oppo
site the rail station.

Africans could reside in this quar

ter, but only in housing meeting stringent construction
regulations.

A second quarter, located not far from the

commercial escale and mapped out in a similar pattern, was
reserved for African residence (see Figure lOf).

These

quarters set aside near previously unoccupied escales were
not needed to accomodate any displaced Africans as in the
older escales.

They were plainly intended only to facili

tate the immigration of a labor force and to stabilize its
presence by facilitating worker access to sites for inex
pensive lodging.
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The new centers would differ fundamentally in two
respects from the African villages heretofore nestling next
to urban commercial areas in Senegal.

They were, though

this was rarely admitted publicly, to be deliberately sep
arated from designated "European" areas in order to decrease
the medical danger to Europeans from infection-bearing mos
quitos (a separation zone of 800 meters was considered safe).
At the same time, they were intended, in line with a much
earlier concept endorsed in 1905 for Dakar by Governor
General Roume, to provide urban living space for Africans
on land reserved and mapped out by the administration.
The predetermined rectilinear alignments would presumably
not only create more hygienic conditions in these new-style
African agglomerations and lead to an easier surveillance
of them, but would also hopefully guide Africans toward a
100
greater acceptance of European forms of u r b a n living.

Occupancy of a lot by a family head was free but
precarious, and a permit of occupancy was revocable with
out compensation in case the quarter was to be displaced.
Purchase of a full title to a lot was possible, but the
initial purchase terms were too high in any case for most
Africans even into the 1930's.

101
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Plans were soon made to extend the system to older
urban centers.

In 1912, a segregated African quarter was

set up within the perimeter of Ziguinchor.

The establish

ment of separate commercial and African quarters was dis
cussed for Louga in 1912 and for Tivaouane as early as
March 1914, though these were only implemented after World
War I.102
The most dramatic move took place in Dakar, where
earlier expulsions of Africans from central areas to make
room for municipal reconstruction had exempted the Lebu,

the original inhabitants of the town and claimants to a
great proportion of its terrain.

103

Plans made earlier for

a European sanitary quarter at Goree in case of epidemic
had been abandoned meanwhile as impractical.

104

An out

break of bubonic plague in 1914 gave colonial officials an
opportunity to oust the Lebu from the vicinity of the port

105
and to divide the city into segregated quarters.

Sub

standard housing was torn down and burned and its occupants
expelled to the Medina, a newly-created village reserved
for Africans on the outskirts of the city, while strict
construction regulations were instituted in the city.

As

many as 5,000 of the 20,000 African residents were removed
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to Medina before the operation was halted for political
reasons under wartime conditions.

106

Colonial officials

continued to urge renewed displacements of Africans to the
Medina throughout the war, but failed to obtain ministerial

approval.

107

Eviction henceforth had to proceed in Dakar

not on the basis of official segregation, but more slowly
and subtly on the basis of stringent urban building codes;
and Africans could avoid expulsion by arranging for construction in line with the codes.

African urban living

108

In the absence of any serious, con

temporary studies of African urban life in Senegal before
the 1930's, it is difficult to be precise to any great
extent about the conditions of African urban life during
109
the period considered.
Whatever attention was given to
African urban and suburban dwellers was most likely to be
directed toward the ancient occupants of the vicinity, such
as the Lebu in Dakar, rather than to more recent immigrants
and transients, who nonetheless formed an important element,
if not the majority of both the labor force and population
within the urban areas.

Occasionally a rare, illuminating

notation can be found on immigrant living conditions, as
Canard's remarks in 1882 on an appalling shortage of sleep-
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ing quarters for escaped slaves flocking into St. Louis at
that time.

110

But generally, little was known of these,

more volatile portions of the urban populace, whose comings
and goings marred badly indeed the accuracy of colonial
censuses.

111

Dresch observed in 1950, that the white man in Africa
could expect to be lodged by his employer, while the African
was still expected to fend for himself.

112

Retired African

railwaymen recall that in their day young men migrating in
to an urban or semi-urban area usually encountered little
trouble in finding lodging and food.

Even if there were

no relatives, fellow countrymen, or recommended friends to
be found locally, a newcomer.could generally rely on tra
ditional African hospitality for temporary accommodations.
It was also easy as a rule, affirm the ex-railwaymen, to
rent room and board from local, settled families on a reg113
ular monthly basis.
Canard's brief notation of 1882
reveals, interestingly enough, that such monthly rentals
to migrants were a common practice in St. Louis at that
time.

114

Reputedly, immigrant Tukolor or Sarakole men of

the same region would tend to room together in large groups
to save and share money.

Other groups, notably the Wolof,

were known, on the other hand, to prefer renting single-

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-4 1 0 -

occupancy lodging, whether in rooms or huts.

115

The specific conditions of African occupancy in ur
ban and suburban areas before the 1930's were usually
established on an informal basis within and without commer%

cial areas, often escaping official attention unless the
area was to be cleared for new construction or sanitary
segregation.

An official alignment would often be disre

garded in reality, as at Guinguineo, where a large African
quarter took form just to the east of the commercial escale
in spite of official plans designating a segregated African
village on the other (south) side of the rail station.

T 1 fi

The shortcomings and dangers of informal occupancy
first became apparent to Africans in the ports, as the ad
ministration moved from 1900 to implement massive construc
tion programs.

This was evident in Rufisque about 1902 as

many Africans began to buy plots of land within the commune.
It was also evident at St. Louis as large numbers of Afri
cans also began to apply for property titles from about
1909, when it became evident that the colonial government
might wrest control over municipal land from the commune
*
0«•
1 1 7
of
St. TLouis.

In the 1920's, informal occupancy, although still
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widespread, was nevertheless becoming clearly less satis
factory and less tenable.

One sign was the colonial admini

stration's increased concern about housing for African
workers in the mushrooming port of Dakar, with the creation
of an Office of Economic Habitations in 1926 to deal with
the problem.

118

Even more significant in this period was
l

the creation of a large number of segregated African quar
ters both at older trade centers--as in Tivaouane in 1919,
Louga in 1925, M'Bour in 1923--or at the host of newer
trading centers being created in the interior.

119

Segregated African quarters, of course, were the
means by which the administration could reconcile its as
pirations for both sanitation and an urban labor supply.
But curiously, the system was being extended in the hinter
land precisely when official efforts for racial separation
%

were flagging in Dakar.

There, in the mid-19201s, the

administration was eradicating an 800 meter wide isolation
zone erected between the Medina and the town in 1915 and
1918, while steps were being taken simultaneously to create
a long-promised Lebu center in the Tound area of Dakar.

120

A good deal of the impetus for creation of segrega
ted quarters in the escales, however, was coming from the
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Africans themselves.

1 2 1

This clearly came about not from

a passion for segregation, but from a better appreciation
by Africans of the hazards of informal occupation.

The

segregated quarters, however precarious in theory, were
infinitely safer than occupation without official sanction.
Full ownership of the occupied lot might even be obtained,
since the terms of purchase, though onerous for Africans,
enabled some who could not afford to buy and build within
the escale, and who were unable to make a claim for land
based on traditional rights, to enjoy the guarantees of
122
ownership.
The hazards of displacement from informally occupied
lots were becoming all the more painful, since many Afri
cans were also turning increasingly at the end of the war
toward more solidly constructed housing, which could not
be as easily transported or discarded as the old straw
123
huts.
The tragic possibilities of dispossession were
graphically displayed at Thies in the early postwar period
as an unfortunate court decision validated a questionable
claim to 2 square kilometers of terrain in Thies, over the
administration's opposition.

The unfortunate African occu

pants of this thickly populated area were now forced,
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whatever the duration of their residence had been,

to

choose between paying the ne w owners or moving out without
10/

*

compensation.
The interest of Africans in the formation of segre
gated quarters did not m e a n reconciliation with the object
ives of the colonial power.

European merchants for example,

cast a baleful eye on the formation of African quarters,
which constituted a potential commercial danger to its
nearby trading centers.

At first, commercial activity

within the quarters had been strictly forbidden,

and the

ba n on non-African residence or ownership wit h i n them also
acted as an additional surety against clandestine European
and Lebanese operations.

125

Yet in practice,

petty trade proved ineffective,

the ba n on

and tended in many cases

to benefit Lebanese commerce more than European.

A n ar-

rete of 1924 had finally to recognize the fact by legali
zing petty trade in these quarters,

to the dismay of some

merchants who suspected, with good reason, that this trade
126
could stray into forbidden activities.
The administration was also displeased by the devel
opment of these quarters into lively agglomerations w i t h a
life of their own, rather than mere sleeping quarters for

permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

laborers and local cultivators.
writers,

traders,

Marabouts,

"griots", public

sharpsters--elements of Senegalese society

regarded as parasitic by French officials--were also attrac
ted to these centers, which tended to free themselves from
chiefly a u thority.

"The inhabitant of the / “A f r i c a n ^

escale," lamented an official in 1934,
doesn't worry about the precariousness of his
title . . . The habitation permit, although unnegotiable, is still the object of profitable
speculation . . . little by little the inhabitants
of the native escale escape all tax payments.
Knowing h o w to avoid the law, lazy . . . detached
from the authority of the canton chief, they e s 
cape prosecution . . . It can be said that the
native escale exists in full independence, just
within the bounds of regulations.
Conclusion

If a structural portrayal of the impact of

the colonial situation on African society ever becomes p o s 
sible,

it would probably have to be mapped out largely

in

terms of opposing forces of attraction and repulsion acting
on Africans in the aftermath of the conquest.

The r a i l 

roads were only one factor among others introduced or
amplified by the colonial conquest.

In facilitating the

entry and circulation of the other factors,

the r a i l r o a d ’s

primary role lay in molding the geographic stage (and to
some degree the tempo)

in which the interaction of these

forces would be played out.

In concentrating economic
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the railroads were c oncentra

ting m a n y of the contradictions and conflicts generated
by the colonial situation, as well as its benefits, w i t h 
in n a r r o w spatial confines.
At the same time,

this compression was creating the

mater i a l conditions w h i c h allowed the spread of a system
of property values in the Western sense.

African land

was being transformed into a commodity to be gradually
assimilated into a Westernized sector, just as was the
African's laboring contribution.
cepts of land,

its value,

But the African's c o n 

and its relation to other facets

of society were also being transformed subtly as well.
The opportunities and predicaments posed by a spreading
legal system of private property evoked,
range of reactions among Africans,

of course,

a wide

from a worldly-wise

Rawane Boye, versed in the possibilities of speculation
through court action,

down to incomprehending peasants

chased from their ancestral homes by new,
bac k e d by the forces of law.

alien landowners,

The critical ingredients in

determining an individual's reactions were the degree of
m at e r i a l

(mainly financial)

opportunity,

the amount of

m ate r i a l investment already sunk in the property,
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-4 1 6 degree of mastery of French legal procedures

(indeed,

familiarity w i t h French culture)--each of w h i c h evolved
progressively during the course of the colonial occupation.
The African's stake in land could be a factor encouraging
his acculturation,
dispossession.

if h e were not alienated meanwhile by

No t surprisingly,

the distinctive feature

of the emerging n e w attitudes toward land in this situdion
w oul d be the decisive mediating role of the colonial
J 129

apparatus between the A f rican and his land.
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1. Freycinet at Senate debate, February 17, 1881, JORFDebats Pari.- S e na t , p. Ill, copy in ANF, F 1 4 / 12439.
2. John R. Kellett, The Impact of Railways on Victorian
Cities (London, 1969), pp. 337-346.
3. See Kellett, pp.

1-20.

for an excellent summary.

4. Cross-cultural comparisons are m u c h more illuminating
if meaningfully-linked pairs of facets native to each
society are compared, rather than dwelling upon the
structure or evolution of any one facet taken in isola
tion in each society.
Not only is more revealed about
each facet in both societies, but the dynamic relation
be t w e e n the paired facets in either society can expose
m u c h about the natures of the societies and, therefore,
of the problems that can arise from cross-cultural
contact.
Land and labor are obviously such a pair of
facets.
Paul Bohannan also pinpoints another pair
of such facets in editing L a w and Warfare (Garden City,
1967) , since the relation b e t w e e n "authority" and
"conflict" are also of fundamental importance.
M u c h of
the basic argument in this text was presented in P.
Pheffer, Problems of Land and Labor in Colonial Senegal:
Fre n c h Colonial Administrative Action Before 1 9 3 0 . P r e 
sented at the Fifteenth Annual Meeting of the African
Studies Association, Philadelphia, November 8-11, 1972.
5. See Paul Bohannan, Africa and Africans (Garden City,
1964), pp. 174-182; Elizabeth Colson, "The Impact of
the Colonial Period on the Definition of Land Rights,"
in Vic t o r Turner, ed., Colonialism in A f r i c a , Vol. Ill
(London, 1971), pp. 193-215. An obvious partial excep
tion is the "oualo" terrain of the Senegal river valley,
w h ose fertility is renewed by the river's innundation.
But even here, given the general cultural and economic
setting, the relation of land to labor was not m u c h
different than nearby drier regions.
6. There are several fine works on this subject, including
L. Geismar, Recueil des coutumes civiles des races du

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-4 1 8 Senegal (St. Louis, 1933); Paul Pelissier, Les paysans
du S£n§gal (St. Yrieiux, 1966), especially pp. 123133; Etienne Le Roy and Mam a d o u Niang, Syst&nes fonciers africains.
Le regime juridique chez les Wolof
ruraux du Senegal. Associee du CNRS, no. 201 (Paris,
1971).
7.

Pathe Diagne, Pouvoir politique traditionnel en Afrique
Occidentale (Paris, 1967), pp. 84, 91, 103-105, 171173, 210-213.

8.

It would be interesting to analyze the economic and
social relations of the region in terms of "land
rights" used as coinage in a "market" of marriage
alliances and political favors.
A circulation of
"goods" results, but on a strongly personalized basis.
See Fredrik Barth, "Economic Spheres in Darfur," in
Themes in Economic A n t h r o p o l o g y , ed. by Raymond Firth
(London, 1970), pp. 149-174, on the demarcation of
economic spheres w i t h i n total patterns of circulation
of value.

9.

Two separate issues were involved, both tied to the
size of the settlement.
One was the rectilinear layout
for urban hygiene and fire prevention.
This existed
at St. Louis at least as early as 1705 (see Abdoulaye
Ly, La Compagnie du Senegal / ”Paris, 1958_7 , map
opposite p. 272).
The other was private property
ownership, which w o u l d acquire importance once a g o v 
ernment had taken charge of a colonial post, whose
terrains would be divided among various private firms
and government services.

10. Once an agglomeration was formed, the specialized ser
vices it offered also acted as a magnet; but the
attraction was generally too w eak at mos t sites to
create a need for a system of private property values.
11. E.g., see J. D. Fage, A History of West Africa (Cam
bridge, 1969), pp. 68-77.
For stretches of the A f r i 
can coast, the slave trade was concentrated at p a r t i 
cular entrepots (Hopkins, Economic H i s t o r y , p. 106);
but this occured m a i n l y where Africans wer e able to
excercize greater control over the trade.
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-4 1 9 12. Aumont, pp. 3ff, describes the clandestine trade of
the "marigotiers" who evaded regulations restricting
river trade to certain escales.
13.

See Hopkins, Economic H i s t o r y , pp. 149-151, 195. L a r 
ger ships became m o r e profitable partly because, in
the late 19th century, products hauled from West Afri
ca were of low value for large bulk. Lighter cargo
shipping in the Saloum up to Kaolack, however, was a
partial exception to the general trend.

14. E.g., see the report of M a y 1887 by the Chief of Sene
gal's Public Works service, Sallenave, FOM, Senegal
X I I , 71, w i t h its comments on Las Palmas.
15.
16.

See

Pasquier, "Villes du Senegal," op. c i t .

Maximizing safety and minimizing tolls were the chief
considerations in choosing a caravan route.
The
French conquest eventually eliminated both dangers and
tolls, so that a variety of routes became available.

17. The gradation of land values in the immediate vicinity
of the rail stations is easily confirmed from records
of lot auctions at trading centers near these stations.
At this point, without further research, a gradation in
rural land values can only be conjectured on the basis
of the costs of animal transport with distance.
There
was an upsurge of speculative interest among St. L o u 
isians over old land concessions in Oualo as the r a i l
road was being built; but little came of it.
See note
for GS by V. Ballot, August 13, 1884, FOM, Senegal X V ,1.
18. Enclosures were installed after World War I around
Rufisque's station because of a surge of thefts. E a r l
ier attempts at enclosure in the 1 8 9 0 's failed.
Examplesof informal occupation of railroad property are in
GS to Director DN, October 28, 1939, RA; Chief of 2nd
track district to Chief of Track Service, November 10,
1939, RA; Telegram, Administrator Thi«*s toGS, March 23,
1929, SARS, DCF.
M o s t DSL terrain had never been form
ally registered during the period in which the company
ran the line.
M u c h of the terrain taken for the TK
was also unregistered in 1929 (Bose to IGTP, October 19,
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-4 2 0 1 9 2 9 , R A ).
19. The expansion of Thies was particularly difficult in
the 20th century because so m u c h of the terrain r i n g 
ing the original center h a d been appropriated earlier
by a milit a r y base, a Catholic mission, and private
owners.
See G. Savonnet, La ville de Thids (St. Louis,
Senegal, 1955), pp. 30ff, and especially Administrator
Thids to GS, December 12, 1902, SARS, DCF.
20. Treaties w i t h local sovereigns in the 1880's and 1890's
u s ually included a standard clause allowing the French
state to take land for building forts, roads, or r a il
roads .
21. There was m u c h interest in developing castor oil or
rubber latex as a cash crop.
See e.g., the arrdtd of
N o v e m b e r 27, 1890, copy in SARS, DCF; Administrator
Thies to GS, M a r c h 19, 1914, Ibid.; Administrator Thies
to GS, M a r c h 6, 1910, SARS, DCF; Delegate Senegal
(Dakar) to GS, August 17, 1908, SARS, DCF.
22. The colony's General Council was hostile to the admin
istration's grant of a concession in the Casamance
from 1889 to a private firm.
See brochure of the
Compagnie Commerciale et Agricole de la Casamance
(1889), copy in FOM, Senegal XV, 34.
O n the other hand,
the administration opposed an attempt by some St. L o u 
isians to stake out a large rural concession near
Thies.
See, e.g., Director Native Affairs to Faure,
December 24, 1898, FOM, Senegal X V , 34.
23. As in lands conceded to Deves and Chaumet in 1899 in
Cayor (Administrator Tivaouane to GS, January 27,
1908, SARS, DCF).
24. This point is made succinctly in Suret-Canale, L'ere
c o l o n i a l e , p. 239.
The governor could grant (decree
of O c t o b e r 23, 1904) concessions of up to 200 h e c 
tares, and the Governor General up to 2000 ha.,without
minist e r i a l approval.
Some examples of m o d e r a t i o n that
show sympathy for African occupants are Administrator
Thids to GS, January 25, 1909,
SARS, DCF; A d m i n i s t ra
tor T a mbacounda to GS, September 3, 1923, SARS, DCF.
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-4 2 1 25. GG to GS, June 3, 1905, SARS, DCF.
See also P . V . ,
Conseil Prive, March 1, 1902, SARS,DCF, on a c o n c e s 
sion demanded by Demoly; Administrator Louga to GS,
July 17, 1913, SARS, DCF.
26. As in Dakar or Rufisque in the 1860 's* where traders
avoided rent payments to the government by purchasing
land from local inhabitants.
See P . V . , Conseil d'Administration, March 21, 1862, FOM, Senegal X V , 28.
There
were m a n y examples later.
The Laude affair in wh i c h
an apparently bogus purchase was upheld in the courts,
stands as perhaps the m o s t drastic example of the
difficulties into w h i c h the administration could fall.
See, e.g., Richard to MC, M a y 27, 1919, FOM, AP524(9);
GS to GG, August 18, 1921, I b i d .
27. The formation of the two distinct areas was a com p l ic
ated development from 1890 to 1902, inextricably
enmeshed with local politics in St. Louis.
The juridi
ical distinctions b e t w e e n land regimes in the two
areas disappeared in the ministerial decree of O c t 
ober 23, 1904, well befo r e the political fusion o f the
two areas in 1920. See J O S , November 12, 1904, no. 202,
pp. 608-610.
28. Under terms of articles 2236 and 2237 of the Civil
Code.
This point is m a d e b y Gilbert Epinay in his
ver y useful Les droits domaniaux de l'etat et la propri£te fonci&re autochtone au S e n e g a l , th£se du doctorat, University of Paris (Paris, 1949), p. 283.
29. M a n y documents allude to the difficulty in getting
surveyors to lay out alignments at various sites. The
comments of Governor Cor on a report of August 25, 1925,
SARS, DCF, testify to the importance of this obstacle
in developing a coherent land policy.
30. Pasquier, "Villes," p. 388; Jean Dreseh, "Villes d'Afrique Occidentale,M Cahiers d fO u t r e - M e r , July-September
1950, p. 201.
31. See the remarks by Abdoulaye Bara Diop, Sociite
toucouleur et migr a t i o n (Dakar, 1965), pp. 85-91.
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-4 2 2 32. See Jacques Charpy, La fondation de Dakar (Paris,
1958), pp. 265-295.
33. Compensation, in accord with a decree of February 16,
1889, was set b y acourt of local notables, who were
also property owners. Acting GS Antonnetti complained
against the system in aletter to GG, M a r c h 23, 1915,
SARS, Confid.
See also GG to’MC, M a y 13, 1915, FOM,
AP522.
34. An excellent summation of the doctrine is given by one
of its architects--in GG(Merlin) to GS, February 27,
1923, SARS, DCF.
See also G. Epinay's dissertation
(1949), o£. c i t . for a
very good account of the evolu
tion of the doctrine. The precedents usually cited in
government documents were those of the a r r £ t s ; of
February 8, 1907 and March 1, 1907 of the Court of
Appeals of F r e n c h West Africa.
A n arr&t of the Court
of Bordeaux on January 24, 1903 h a d already established
the principle in rejecting the suit of an African
notable against the DSL.
Earlier the concept had been
rejected by the Conseil d'Etat in 1892, and it was
finally k n ocked down by an arret of M a rch 10, 1933 on a
case in Dahomey before the Court of Appeals (AOF).
35. Circular of GG to Lt. Governors, June 5, 1906, SARS,
DCF; GG circular, March 5, 1913, I b i d .
36. The decree of October 18, 1904 reconstituting the G o v 
ernment General on a politically and financially secure
basis was followed by a decree of October 23, 1904 on
domanial questions.
The general claim resulted from
the w a y in w h i c h the phrase "terres vacantes et sans
maltres" was interpreted by the administration. See GG
circular, M a r c h 5, 1913, SARS, DCF.
37. In an arr&t of the Court of Appeals of French West
Africa, July 16, 1915.
The claim, although supposedly
b a sed on ancient rights of the Fre n c h state, effective
ly stripped the colony of Senegal, and therefore the
colony's General Council, of any v o ice in the disposal
of land in the colony. At the same time, the communes
no longer could sell terrains w i t h i n the perimeters of
their borders as they had previously.
See G. Epinay,
o p . c i t . , pp. 275-278.
See also session of the
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-4 2 3 Municipal Council of Rufisque, November 26, 1912,
SARS, DCF; GG to MC, January 31, 1913, FOM, AP522; GG
to MC, August 7, 1909, Ibid.; acting GS to Mayor of'
Rufisque, October 6, 1923, SARS, DCF.
38. Key legal measures were the arr£t£s of January 5, 1887
(Moniteur du S e n e g a l , January 13, 1887, pp. 1-2), the
decree of October 23, 1904 (JOS, November 12, 1904,
pp. 608-610) and local arretes of August 30, 1906,
(JOS, October 4, 1906, pp. 572-573), October 9, 1909
(JOS, October 17, 1909, p. 597) and February 19, 1910
(JOS, March 3, 1910, p. 164).
The arrete of Ma y 13,
1927, pp. 423-424) was intended to correct abuses of
occupation permits.
39. Thits, in its later stages of growth, was a partial
exception, because the Catholic mission property
blocked expansion to the north.
But the older part of
the escale clearly continued to be predominant.
Savonnet, pp. 107-133.
40. Diagonal streets were laid out at Louga to avoid m a k 
ing traders m o v e their operations (P.V., Commission
charged with layout of Louga, M a rch 16 & 17, 1893,
SARS, DCF; copy of plan of Louga, drawn September 14,
1893, I b i d .) and at Kelle (map of Kelle drawn up
July 20, 1895, and approved April 2, 1896).
A map of
Rao, July 31, 1923, SARS, DCF, shows that the pattern
approved for Rao in 1903 (Private Council, March 25,
1903) was largely ignored.
41. As in merchants of M'Pal to Director of Native Affairs,
February 9, 1888, SARS, DCF.
See above Chapter III.
42. Charpy, Fondation, pp. 328-329 (Pinet-Laprade to GS,
Ma y 9, 1862).
See also copy GS to Attorney General,
November 17, 1912, SARS, DCF.
43. Arrttls of December 31, 1904, erected limited municipal
governments ("communes-mixtes") at Thi^s, Tivaouane,
and L o u g a . (JOS, January 7, 1905, no. 210, pp. 1-2).
Other escales w e r e erected into communes-mixtes later
(as Kaolack, Khombole, Bambey, Gossas, etc.).
Build
ing codes in these centers, particularly from 1911,
also increased business costs.
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-4 2 4 44. GS to Administrator Baol, Febru a r y 24, 1911, SARS, DCF;
GS to Administrator Sine-Saloum, September 9, 1912,
SARS, DCF; acting president, CC-Sine-Saloum to GS, O c t 
ober 12,1912, I b i d . ; GS to Administrator Baol, n.d.
/ “September 1918__7, SARS, Confid; Teleg r a m GS to A d m i n 
istrator Thids, June 11, 1919, SARS, DCF.
45. Chief o f Agriculture Service to GS, April 2, 1911, SARS,
DCF; copy GS to presidents o f CC's of Senegal, n.d.
/ “Febru a r y 1912_7, SARS, DCF; see also copy GG to GS,
Oc t o b e r 24, 1912, SARS, DCF; A dministrator Baol to GS,
M a r c h 14, 1912, I b i d . ;on ambulant traders in escales
and in A f r i c a n markets.
46. The pol i c y of converting the small trade centers into
subdivided escales also aimed b o t h at cutting down
Lebanese and African competition by forcing these tra
ders to b u y in auction the lots they already occupied
and at reducing the state's losses in rents due to
informal occupation.
See copy GS to Administrator
Kaolack, November 26, 1920, SARS, DCF; Administrator
Baol to GS, October 27, 1924, SARS, DCF; Administrator
Sine-Saloum to GS, June 22, 1926, SARS, DCF.
47. There w e r e many arretes permitting the installation of
tram lines for commercial purposes (as well as for
temporary use on public works) . On e of the earliest is
an arr£te of December 6, 1879 permitting Maurel & Prom
to install a line on Goree (Bull, admin du S£n6gal1879, no. 772).
48. Rufisque ha d a municipally-run system in the 1890's.
Th e Soci£t& S£n£galaise des Voies Economiques set out
in 1909 to construct and run narrow-gauge tram lines in
the n e w T K escales and in some of the older DSL escales.
By 1920, L o uga had taken over its system from the com
pany.
See Municipal Council of Louga, P.V. of F e b r u 
ary 3, 1917, SARS, DCF.
49. E.g., in 1908, the municipality of Rufisque estimated
that 180,000 francs of receipts w o u l d be collected in
tolls on the tramway in 1909 out of 268,400 francs
total in budgetary receipts (P.V. , Municipal Council,
M a y 15, 1908, SARS, DCF).
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-4 2 5 50. Petyt report,

1891-1892, FOM, TP, p.

113.

51. One heavy b l o w to St. Louis was the plunge in gu m
prices after 1900.
The competition of the TKN from
1924 subsequently diverted river traffic from the French
Sudan to Dakar and Kaolack.
Construction of the n e w
station only b e gan in 1907 (report of D S L board of d i r 
ectors to stockholders, June 16, 1909, FOM, TP).
52. Plan of Kaolack, M a r c h 8, 1915, SARS, DCF.
53. Map of Kaolack b y Chief of Topographic Section, Septem
ber 9, 1926, SARS, DCF; map of Kaolack, 1937, ARS,
3GX/6-17.
54. See Chapter II above.
55. See Richard Peterec, Dakar and West A f rican D e v e l o p m e n t ,
(New York, 1967), pp. 37-43.
56. Plan cadastral Dakar, July 12, 1877, SARS, DCF; P l a n
cadastral Dakar, 1885, SARS, DCF; ma p of terrains of
Messageries Maritimes in Dakar, M a r c h 21, 1892, SARS,
DCF; map u s e d for Hersent project, n.d. ]_ 1901_7, FOM,
TP.
Competition for space was all the m o r e intense
after 1900.
See n a v y situation in D a kar by the naval
commandant, January 23, 1902, ANF, DD /2452.
57. Projected works for the commercial port of Dakar,
April 20, 1899, FOM, TP; deliberations of General Counc
il (Senegal), session of 1898 (excerpt in FOM, TP, dated
N ovember 23, 1898).
58. Petyt report for 1891-1892, FOM, TP, p. 100. M i x e d
conference for the study of the displacement of the
Dakar station, January 17, 1906, ANF, DD /2452.
59. Map of Dakar, 1904, ARS, P263; note for central service
of hydraulic works, August 11, 1905, ANF, DD^/2452;
reports of services at meeting of January 17, 1906, I b i d .
Paillet to N a val Minister, April 12, 1907, I b i d . ; P . V . ,
Commission, Ma y 17, 1911, Ibid.; L/AOF, M a rch 9, 1912,
no. 187, p. 1; "La nouvelle gare de Dakar," LVAOF,
June 13, 1914, no. 281, p.l.
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-4 2 6 60. O n e example would be the directives in Director of I n t 
erior to Administrator Cayor, September 22, 1896, SARS,
DCF; see also ARS, 2G13-14(11).
61. Conseil priv6 of Senegal, excerpt of deliberation,
No v e m b e r 20, 1883, SARS, DCF; Delegate Interior (Dakar)
to Director Interior, J anuary 17, 1885, SARS, DCF.
But
A f r i c a n claims for land taken for the rail line in Dakar
w e r e disregarded (Conseil G e n e r a l - 1886, P . V . , June 8,
1886, p. 109).
62. A c ting GS to MMC, September 9, 1884, FOM, 2B58; S/Sec
to GS, October 29, 1884, cop y in FOM, Senegal X V , 1;
acting GS to MMC, December 22, 1884, Ibid.; same,
June 23, 1887, I b i d .; draft M M C to GS, August 5, 1887,
I b i d .; acting GS to MMC, September 4, 1887, I b i d .
63. C opy Director Native Affairs to Administrator St. LouisCayor, Ma r c h 15, 1896, SARS, DCF.
64. Convention of December 12, 1892 w i t h the chiefs of the
cercle of St. Louis, copy in FOM, Senegal X V , 34; GG to
MC, June 3, 1897, I b i d .
65. See GG to GS, December 6, 1904, SARS, DCF.
66. Appropriation of land was covered in article 10'of the
decree of October 23, 1904; see also acting GS to A d m i n 
istrator Louga, October 11, 1926, SARS, DCF; note by
acting Director of Economic Affairs to IGTP, N o v e m 
b e r 18, 1929, ARS, 6P46-36.
67. Instructions of October 23, 1906 by Merlin, J O S , N o v e m 
b e r 8, 1906, no. 306, pp. 663-666.
68. See especially GG to GS, M a y 8, 1907, SARS, DCF; same,
O c t o b e r 13, 1920, SARS, DCF. A note on terrains at Tivaouane, August 6, 1912, SARS, DCF, pointed out that imm i 
grants to the area (virtually all residents of the
escale) were not entitled to benefits under traditional
rights.
Occupation also h a d to be definite and e f f e c 
tive for a long prior p e riod of time.
A limitation on
traditional rights continued even with the n e w decree
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of October 8, 1925. See copy GS to Administrator Baol,
December 20, 1926, SARS, DCF.
69. Delafosse published his study of Upper Senegal-Niger in
1912. Administration files reveal detailed studies of
land tenure laws for the different cercles of Senegal
only as early as 1916 in response to the questionnaire
of a commission set up in October 23, 1915. E.g., for
Thies (June 18, 1916), Sine-Saloum (March 8, 1917),
Cayor (March 9, 1917), etc. A complete published study
was first issued by Geismar only in 1933 (op. cit.)
70. Instructions of October 23, 1906 by Merlin; copy GS to
Administrator Baol, November 11, 1919, SARS, DCF, indic
ates that this applied to the extent of denying worship
pers the right to buy land in common for a mosque.
71. Acting GG to MC, June 9, 1901, FOM, TP; GG circular of
March 5, 1913 on agrarian policy, copy in SARS, DCF.
The administration followed the same principle in deny
ing, or at least in trying to deny, rural concessions
in full property to Mouride collectivities (GS to Admin
istrator Baol, December 30, 1913, SARS, Confid; GS to
Blaise Diagne, September 2, 1918, SARS, DCF; Administra
tor Baol to GS, August 1, 1922, Ibid.
72. Circular GG to Lt. Governors, December 17, 1921, SARS,
DCF; note on "regime foncier," July 30, 1932, Ibid.
73. Arret& by GG, June 7, 1902 expanded the perimeters of
the territorial reserves around most DSL stations to
squares of 2000 meters by 2000 meters. The extension
of many DSL escales in 1896 expanded most of their
perimeters from oblong shapes of a 300m radius around
the rail station to squares of 1000m x 1000m. New
escales were rapidly surveyed along the TK even as that
line was being built (see GS circular to Administrators,
March 23, 1909, SARS, DCF).
74. See the maps showing the grants to Lodois Neubourg in
August 1883 and the larger concessions to Gaston Neu
bourg in August 1884 at Tivaouane, Pire, N'Dande, and
Kebemer in FOM, AP3024. See also GG to MC, May 26,
1905, Ibid.; Mme Neubourg, March 8, 1906, Ibid.; GS to
MMC, June 23, 1884, FOM, 2B 54.
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75. Treaty of March 23, 1896, SARS, DCF; Director Native
Affairs to Administrator St. Louis-Cayor, March 15,
1896, SARS, DCF; Administrator St. Louis-Cayor to Dir
ector Native Affairs, April 3, 1896, Ibid., noted that
Demba War made 5,000 francs per year on these rents
at Tivaouane.
76. Administrator St. Louis-Cayor to Director Native Af
fairs, April 3, 1896, SARS, DCF. Later the "bour,"
jealous of Demba War's receipt of a province for his
land, put in a claim for three terrains in the escale
of Louga (GG to MC, January 10, 1899, Senegal XII,111).
77. Meissa M'Baye, son of Demba War, only got around to
asking for a lot in Tivaouane in 1912 (GS to Adminis
trator Cayor, March 8, 1912, SARS, DCF) and for a rural
concession at his father's old headquarters at Sakh in
1910 (Administrator Tivaouane to GS, May 10, 1910, SARS,
DCF). Examples of chiefs interested in property owner
ship at an early date are Bouna N'Diaye and Fara Biram
LS, both well acquainted with French practices. Often
a chief would try to obtain a parcel next to the French
administrator's residence (e.g., the bour Sine at
Fatick and the chiefs Samba Khary Cisse and Soce Sow
at Louga.
78. Notably the d'Emevilles--Justin, Germain, Georges.
79. The case remained in the courts at least until 1910.
Rawane Boye had asked for over a half million francs in
1894. Interestingly enough, the claim originated rem
otely with Boye's ancestor, the 'iJean Barre" who first
allowed French settlement on the island of St. Louis.
The key decision was made in the arr&t of June 24, 1903
of the Court of Bordeaux, copy of excerpt in FOM, TP,
on the narrow and doubtful grounds that the canton of
Toube had formed part of Cayor. See also acting GG to
MC, June 9, 1901, FOM, TP; GG to MC, January 19, 1906,
Ibid.
80. Particularly for lands bought in Dakar and Rufisque
going back as early as the 1860's. A questionnaire on
land tenure in Thies, n.d. ]_ circa 1902_/, SARS, DCF,
noted that the original Serer occupants normally let
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strangers cultivate land on a temporary basis for a cow
or the equivalent, but also remarked that some communi
ties were now renting their surplus land at 5 francs per
year for a one-man field. It also mentioned one case
of a Bambara who had bought a hectare for 100 francs,
and then sold it to a Frenchman for 4000 francs. See
also Administrator Thi£s to GS, March 6, 1910, SARS,
DCF, on rental of land near M'Bao.
81. E.g., note on terrain of Diokouly N'Diayene (Rufisque),
March 20, 1924, SARS, DCF. This is not to deny that
there were disputes over possession of rural land in
traditional societies; but these arose and were settled
in a different manner than those now regulated by
French law.
82. A note of acting GS, August 20, 1930, ARS, L63-132,
stated that in Senegal, excluding Dakar, as of Decem
ber 31, 1928 the government held 5,650 hectares of
registered land in its own name, that Frenchmen held
6,163 ha. morejbut that Africans had a total of only
1,150 ha. Vadier to Director Agence Economique,
March 29, 1930, Ibid., listed some 4,276 ha. in the
hands of 1,807 proprietors in Dakar without distinguish
ing between African and European proprietors.
83. Armand-Pierre Angrand, Les L^bous de la presqu'^tle du
Cap Vert(Dakar, 1946), pp. 102-132; Delegate Senegal
(Dakar) to GS, September 19, 1907, SARS, DCF. Many
were content with a certificate signed by a government
official attesting to the accuracy of their traditional
claim. This, however, did little good if the adminis
tration decided later on to take the land (draft GS
circular, January 13, 1925, SARS, DCF). The Tound area
was set aside in 1905 as a quarter held communally by
the Lebu community, but registered for that purpose in
the name of the state. See Delegate Senegal (Dakar) to
GS, September 1, 1913, SARS, DCF.
84. Camille Camara, Saint-Louis du Sinegal (Dakar, 1968),
pp. 231-239.
85. E.g., local arr£t£ of Administrator-Mayor of Louga, Dec
ember 8, 1905, SARS, DCF; same, December 1, 1912, Ibid.
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86. As noted in Moniteur du Senegal, January 12, 1888,
no. 1673, p. 11. Areas were also cleared around
forts for military reasons.
87. As in St. Louis in the 1850's (Camara, St. Louis,
pp. 56-57 and again in 1889 (Moniteur du Senegal,
January 31, 1889, no. 1728, pp. 50-51). Or in
Dakar (Moniteur du Senegal, April 11, 1889, no. 1738,
pp. 138-139). See also Roger Pasquier, "Les villes
du Senegal au XIXe siecle, Revue franqaise d'histoire
d'Outre-Mer, 1960, p. 419.
88. As at Goukhombaye at St. Louis under Faidherbe and
in the 1880's (Camara, St. Louis, p. 56; arr£te of
March 31, 1884 creating the village, SARS, DCF).
89. As in d'Anfreville de la Salle, Notre vieux Senegal,
(Paris, 1909), pp. 23-24, 73, 181-182; Partial
report_on urban hygiene (Senegal) by Marchoux,
n.d. / 1901_/, FOM, TP.
90. Note of Director of Construction of the Arsenal,
November 29, 1905, ANF, DD^/2431.
91. Report, Director Public Works, Ficatier, December 16,
1902, FOM, TP.
92. The report of a sanitary mission to Senegal ^Partial
report on urban hygiene, by Marchoux, n.d. ]_ 1901_/,
FOM, TP) recommended explusion of all straw huts
and wood shacks from the major centers, because of
a belief that these structures, if infected, could
not be sanitized. A local arrete of June 8, 1903
by the assistant mayor of Rufisque, SARS, DCF,
ordered the ejection of all straw huts beyond the
new drainage canals erected around the commercial
quarter.
93. A theory still advocated by Dr. A Kermorgant in
"Epidemie de fi&vre jaune du Senegal, 16 avril
1900 au fevrier 1901," Annales d 1Hygiene et de
Midecine Coloniales, no. 3, July-Aug. Sept., 1901,
copy published by Ministry of Colonies in FOM,
AP3236. The Government General seemed on the way to
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accepting the mosquito theory in 1904 (See copy of
of ComiteSup&rieur d'Hygiene..., session of June 21,
1904, in Ibid., pp. 46-47), but the theory was still
not fully proven in 1905 (See Frederic Haskin, The
Panama Canal / Garden City, 1914_/, pp. 105-112).
See alo Claude Pulvenis, "The !pidemie de fievre
jaune si St. Louis du Senegal (1881), "Bulletin de
l1IFAN. XXX, series B, 1968, pp. 1352-1373.
94. Draft Petyt report, n.d. / 1898_/, FOM, TP; DSL to MC,
November 23, 1900, FOM, TP. The papers of a con
sulting engineer working on Rufisque's sewage system
were burned for fear of contamination after he died
of yellow fever (P.V. Municipal Council, May 22,
1905, SARS, DCF).
95. The Government General had to override objections
of local authorities in Grand-Bassam against using
old cemetery terrains in P.V., Comit! Superieur
d'Hygiene..., March 5, 1910, FOM, AP3239; GG to MC,
January 9, 1911, Ibid.
96. The stegomya mosquito is a noctural creature, pre
ferring obscure corners during the day, and coming
out in large numbers at night. Reference is rarely
made to this motive. See P.V. Comite Superieur
d'Hygiene et Salubrite Publiques, Session June 17 to
21, 1904, FOM, AP3236, esp. p. 22; Note on "Terrains
de Tound," by P. Denard, July 26, 1921, ARS, 4P660-132.
97. On the Thies explusions, see report of 4th trimester
1911, ARS, 2G11-7; report of second trimester 1912,
ARS, 2G12-9; copy acting GG to GS, April 20, 1912^
ARS, H54. A health emergency was declared at Thies
in an arret! of January 20, 1912. On expulsions in
Dakar, see telegram GG to MC, September 28, 1911,
FOM, AP3239; political report, 3rd trimester, 1911,
ARS, 2G11-7.
98. Administrator Sine-Saloum to GS, June 27, 1910, SARS,
DCF; same, September 5, 1910, SARS, DCF; same,
April 7, 1913, Ibid.; Two arr£tis of October 29,
1910, in JOS, November 10, 1910, no. 515, pp. 832-833.
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A plan for the new African village was drawn up in
November 1910 (map of November 24, 1910, SARS, DCF).
Similar plans for Fatick were approved in 1911 (re
port to GS, August 21, 1911, Ibid.; Administrator
Sine Saloum to GS, March 21, 1911, Ibid.).
99.

The plan for Gossas was approved on November 25,
1909 (draft GS to Administrator Sine Saloum, SARS,
DCF) . The map for Guinguineo was drawn up
April 11, 1911; but a revised version was drawn up
October 20, 1911 (SARS, DCF). A plan showing an
extension of Bambey, without mention of segregated
areas, was drawn up on April 12, 1910 and approved
on June 15, 1910. Perhaps the arrival in 1910
of a new administrator charged with command of
the cercle of Sine Saloum played some role in the
development.

100. See the excellent expose in the note on "Terrains
de Tound" by P. Denard; July 26, 1921, ARS, 4P660-132.
Roume aimed at the erection of African villages on
land owned by the state, with lots available free
for residents, but with street alignments determined
rigorously by the state.
101. Report of Inspector of Administrative Affairs to
GS, August 30, 1934, SARS, DCF. A note of the
ler Bureau (Senegal), n.d. j_ after 1924_/, SARS,
DCF, noted only a dozen properties owned in the
African quarter of Kaolack (erected 1910), Some
marabouts were active in acquiring both urban and
rural terrains after the turn of the century.
Speculation may have been an aim; but it is more
likely that the purchases were motivated by
defensive attitudes— of marabouts acquiring prestige
by creating zones of land not subject to administra
tive confiscation.
102. P.V., Municipal Commission of Louga, February 2,
1912, SARS, DCF. Bize to GS, March 10, 1914,
SARS, DCF. P.V. of Municipal Commission of
Tivaouane, May 28, 1914, SARS, DCF. Plans were
afoot in 1912 to add a segregated village at
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Diourbel (Chief Topographic Service to GS, Feb
ruary 9, 1912, SARS, DCF). GS to GG, April 18,
1912, ARS, P246, indicates that a segregated system
was being considered for St. Louis at that time.
See also Administrator Dagana to GS, March 30,
1912, SARS, DCF.
103. Report by Boulland de l'Escale, 1909, doc. no. 85,
ARS, 1G267, p. 27; D ’Anfreville, Notre vieux
Senegal, p. 73.
104. Grail report to MC, February 10, 1913, ARS, H54.
105. This story is told by Raymond Betts, "The establish
ment of the Medina in Dakar, Senegal, 1914, "Africa,
XLI (1971), pp. 143-152. A plan to install an
African village at the site of the future Medina had
been underfoot as early as 1909.
(Boulland de l'Es
cale report-1909, ARS, 1G267). An outbreak of
bubonic plague in St. Louis also led to turmoil in
1918 because of quarantining; but the consequences
were less drastic. (GS to GG, March 25, 1918,
SARS, Confid).
106. The expulsions were clearly motivated in part be
cause of an antagonism toward Africans, by some high
officials. See acting GS to GG, July 11, 1914,
SARS, Conf id. Care was taken, however, to admit
laborers into the city for work in the port area
(P.V., Local committee of Hygiene, May 18, 1914,
ARS, H55.).
107. GG to MC, September 16, 1916, FOM, AP3238; Kair
report, November 6, 1916 (Picanon mission), Ibid.;
acting GG to MC, July 18, 1916, Ibid.; report of GG
to MC, February 15, 1919, FOM, AP3237. Large
scale resettlement in the Medina would have required
a projected trolley line to carry workers to the
port, some 3 to 4 kms. away.
108. See acting GS speech to General Council, session of
Oetober 1915, pp. 16-19.
109. As in the inquiry of 1938 on the habitation and
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alimentation of Africans in French West Africa
(Report on food, June 27, 1938, SARS, DCF).
110. Canard to MMC, April 23, 1882, FOM, Senegal I,
62; same, May 23, 1882, ARS, 2B54.
111. A letter of Senegal's Record Office to Director
Interior, March 1, 1888, SARS, DCF concluded that
although many of the huts and shacks in urban areas
were being rented (by verbal agreement), so little
was known of the floating population, that it was
impossible to collect the legal tax on rents.
112. Dresch, p. 206. "le Blanc est loge dans sa ville,
par son employeur, entreprise ou etat; le Noir se
d^brouille." There was a growing tendency for
employers to house their European employers after
1900; but even as late as 1921, the housing crisis
was so severe in Dakar that many couldn't find
lodging, even in the port's hotels.
(Note presented
to GG, by the Commission of January 17, 1921, ARS,
L40-39), Europeans commonly rented lodging in St.
Louis; but this was apparently more difficult from
about 1928 (GS to GG, September 19, 1928, SARS,
Confid.).
113. Ex-RR interviews. One informant, starting to work for
the TK at a good wage in 1917 of 4 francs per day
(6% day week), paid a landlady for a room in ThiSs
(Diakhao quarter) some 12.50 francs per month rent
and 15 francs per month board.
114. Canard to MMC, April 23, 1882, FOM, Senegal I,
62: "A St. Louis la plupart des maisons sont des
asiles qui abritent un nombre incroyable d'individues;
les cours, les rez-dechaus£es, les dessous des
escaliers memes sont habites, les chambres sont
occupees chacune par une vingtaine d'individus.
Ces maisons appartiennent des families indigenes;
generalement c'est une signare qui loue; elle occupe
IS un petit logement tout le monde l'appelle 'Tauta'
elle pourvoit d la nourriture de tous moyennant une
quinzaine de francs par mois et par t£te."
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115. Ex-RR interviews. Confirmed in the Affaires Politiques
report on Wolof seamen, July 1938, ARS, 17G-160-28.
116. Report Deseille, Decembre 23, 1932, SARS, DCF;
Chief Topographic Section to GS, January 27, 1933,
Ibid.; note of February 9,' 1933 by Chief Public
Works Service, Ibid.; avrkte of October 3, 1933,
Ibid. The same was true for other TK escales,
_
save Kaolack. See note for GS, n.d. ]_ July 1926_/,
SARS, DCF.
117. On Rufisque, see e.g., P.V., Municipal council of
Rufisque December 9, 1902, SARS, DCF; same, May 6,
1903, Ibid. This was occuring when a new sewage
system was being built in Rufisque and when many
Africans were being expelled from the town center.
On St. Louis, see Mayor of St. Louis to GS, December
18, 1909, SARS, DCF; Receveur Domaines to GS,
January 12, 1910, Ibid.; GS to GG, February 15, 1910,
Ibid. acting Chief Topographic service to Chief
Public Works, October 24, 1912, Ibid.; P.V., St.
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Ibid.
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Kebemer, and Goumbo Gueoul.
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October 9, 1925, excerpt in FOM, AP3238; MC to GG,
April 20, 1926, Ibid. Serious official interest in a
Lebu village in the Tound is evident as early as in
copy Delegate Senegal (Dakar) to Mayor of Dakar,
April 23, 1921, SARS, DCF.
121. Telegram Administrator Sine Saloum to GS, May 13,
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1919, SARS, DCF; Administrator Baol to GS, Jan
uary 15, 1924, SARS, DCF; same, August 17, 1923,
Ibid.; petition of Thi&s residents to Administrator
Thi&s, November 12, 1926, 1926, SARS, DCF;
notables Thi^s to GS, March 20, 1925, SARS, DCF;
Administrator Louga to GS, June 26, 1927, SARS,
DCF; notables M'Bour to President, Colonial
Council, March 19, 1929, SARS, DCF; notables of
Keur El Hadjie Malic at Gossas to Administrator
commune-mixte of Gossas, February 17, 1933, SARS,
DCF; inhabitants of Guinguineo to Administrator
Sine Saloum, September 16, 1931, SARS, DCF.
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number of application by Africans for certificats
administratifs--a first step to obtaining property
rights; perhaps this was an indication of new atti
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123. Report of Chief Customs Service Senegal-1923, SARS,
DCF.

124. Administrator Thies to GS, December 1, 1921, SARS,
DCF; same, December 22, 1923, SARS, DCF. This was
the Laude affair. Laude, a feared colonial officer,
apparently forced or forged an irregular sale of
land at Thi&s while using a servant as a front. The
claim was upheld in court in May 1918 on the narrow
issue that the administration could not claim eminent
domain because Thi^s had never been part of Cayor.
The local residents tried to stop the takeover with
their own legal suit, which was rejected. See GG
to MC, May 29, 1920, FOM, AP524(9).
125. GS to Administrator Sine-Saloum, December 26, 1912,
SARS, DCF; Arr^te of October 30, 1912, JOS, Nov
ember 7, 1912, no. 619, p. 860; Arrete of August 16,
1913, JOS, August 21,.. 1913, no. 660, p. 848;
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126. Lebanese traders previously had simply set up
boutiques for petty trade on open terrain just out
side the African quarters. Administrator Baol to
GS, January 23, 1924, SARS, DCF; same, October 27,
1924, SARS, DCF; Administrator Thies to GS,
February 9, 1926, SARS, DCF.
127. Inspector of Administrative Affairs to GS, Aug
ust 30, 1934, SARS, DCF.
128. Ibid.
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pp. 93-94. However, Lombard, whose interest was in
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CHAPTER VII

RETREAT INTO A NARROWER PATTERN

Each economic region corresponds to . . . an axis,
branched on the exterior by a port. . . . Each region
resembles a sort of lung, with its parallel arterial
and venous systems, receiving its oxygen from agri
cultural production. But ]_ the system's^ heart is
located externally, far overseas.
After an unsettling period of post-World War price
and monetary instability, economic activity in Senegal
seemed finally to be easing into a period of new prosperity
from about 1924.^

By 1928, however, the Senegalese economy

began to weaken with a worldwide downturn in commodity
prices, and a year later it entered upon a new, major
period of prolonged, severe deflation and contraction as
a general international economic crisis sharply intensi
fied the local crisis.

As in all such major crises, power

ful economic tides cruelly tested existing economic struc
tures, reshaping the economic landscape of Senegal drasti
cally as the weaker and less fortunate firms and individ
uals were toppled by the receding economic waters into
-438-
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a quagmire of defaulted credit.

It was a financial cat

aclysm in which less hardy economic alternatives and
institutions were ruthlessly eliminated.^
Commerce in Senegal had always been based on a gener
ous, even imprudent, extension of credit, which trickled
down in a pyramidal chain from the large merchants (gener
ally of Bordeaux) through small traders and even down to
the cultivator, who might borrow his seed on credit— while
the large merchant himself raised cash by borrowing from
metropolitan banks.

Now, as the price of peanuts fell

sharply on European markets, intermediate merchants and
traders were bankrupted by their debts as their own debtors
defaulted.

The two largest investment banks specializing

in French West Africa were soon in difficulties, and major
French commercial houses sharply reduced their operations
in the interior.^

Various optimistic schemes for increased

private investment in Senegal--such as the projects for
new, light, narrow-gauge railways in Senegal--simply
evaporated.

And the economic crisis continued to deepen.

After experiencing successive disappointing trading seasons,
many discouraged farmers turned back to the more reliable
subsistence crops while cutting down sharply on peanut
cultivation for export.

If the peanut trade were not to
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collapse completely, taking with it the entire weakened
economic structure of the colony, the colonial government
had to take action to give cultivators higher prices for
their peanuts.
A variety of organizational and fiscal measures were
proposed and executed at different times by the government.
Some were designed to secure a better market for peanuts
in the metropole by raising tariff barriers against foreign
competitors and by upgrading the overall quality of peanut
exports through field inspections.

Other measures aimed

at slashing intermediate handling and marketing costs by
eliminating superfluous middlemen (such as the ubiquitous
small African trader) from the chain of exchange and
credit, and by reducing freight hauling rates.

This was

the era in which the SIP's ("Societes indigenes de pr£voyance") began to be transformed from "cooperative11 seed
reserves for cultivators into marketing agents for them.^
It was also the moment that transportation networks in
Senegal were going to be reshaped into a new and rigid
mold.
Purchase of the DSL

It was evident that railroad freight

rates ought to be reduced as part of the effort to main
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tain peanut exports at reasonable prices and volumes.

But

it was also plain that this could come about equitably only
if the unwieldy division of the rail net between two dif
ferent railroad managements--the DSL and TN--were ended,
and if rail service were consolidated and streamlined.
Coordination of common operations on the two separate
lines of the Senegalese rail network had been an issue ever
since the DSL had been ousted from participation in the
fledgling Thies-Kayes line in 1910.^

Operations of the TN

line had been especially penalized by its termination at
Thi^s on the DSL line some 40 and 70 kms away from the
major ports of Rufisque and Dakar.

The TN’s alternative

outlet to the sea at Kaolack relieved it, to be sure, from
a complete dependence on the DSL; but both the colonial gov
ernment and a large fraction of local merchants were al
ways unhappy with the consequent diversion of traffic from
Dakar and Rufisque, entailing as it did substantial extra
capital investment in port and commercial facilities at
Kaolack.^

Government purchase of the entire DSL line under the
terms of the 1880 convention was one solution; but the
metropolitan government shrank from the costly price tag
for such an action, which would moreover only have ben-
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efited some colonial interests at the metropole's expense.®
The Government General would have been willing to purchase
the key Thies-Dakar section of the DSL alone; but the
company had no intention of parting with the most valuable
section of its line.

Construction by the government of

its own Thi^s-Dakar spur parallel to the DSL was also
impossible politically and legally, since it would have
struck a major blow at the company's viability by drawing
off a good part of its traffic.

It might be expected

that a simple consolidation of rates and fares on the
two lines would serve as a practical alternative, enabling
rail users to use either line as an extension of the other.
Some merchants, for instance, wished that cheap long-dis
tance degressive rates for peanut freight on the TN simply
apply for the remaining 70 kms of DSL line to Dakar.
Rail passengers wished for better timing of connecting
passenger runs and more through service across the lines.
In reality, however,

there were serious obstacles to

simple solutions for cross-line traffic problems, not the
least of which was the division of common traffic r e 
ceipts .1-0

It must be remembered that operations along the two
lines were of a fundamentally different nature.

The
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Thies-Niger, saddled with extensive operations over 1100
kms of track, much of it through barren, unpopulated
areas, effectively cast the burden for its long-haul oper
ations onto users of the more prosperous portions of the
line by means of a degressive freight rate structure,
while the railroad line's receipts barely covered its oper
ating expenses.

Passing through the populous littoral,

the DSL carried a denser traffic over a shorter line,
while its receipts, produced from rates and fares directly
proportional to the distance hauled, were generally almost
double the line's operating expenses after 1900.

Whereas,

the TN, in its role as a major instrument of governmental
economic and strategic policy, might be operated at fin
ancially unprofitable levels, the DSL was expected, in
contrast, to produce a substantial profit for the private
corporation that owned it, as well as to repay the met
ropolitan treasury for the huge sums advanced to the
company earlier.^

If, for instance, one tried to attract

more of Diourbel's peanuts to Dakar by applying the TN's
degressive rates for the additional 70 kms of DSL line,
the DSL would stand to lose from the resulting expense
arising out of a heavier consequent traffic and a drop
in receipts on an already assured through traffic from
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Bambey and Khombole.

These losses would therefore have

to be made up to the company, either by giving the DSL
a disproportionate share of receipts from the common TNDSL run (at the expense of a financially feeble TN) or by
raising fares and rates for other parts of the DSL line
(anathema to local merchants) .^
The dislocations of the World War and its aftermath
only complicated an already murky picture.

The DSL's costs

of operation shot up sharply from 1917, as the prices of
fuel and replacement parts skyrocketed and as personnel
salaries jumped by large percentages in several steps
beginning with the labor unrest of 1919. ^

Orders in the

United States for new rolling stock in 1919, for instance,
doubled in cost almost overnight simply because of the
franc's immediate post-war decline.^

The economy bonus,

which had formed an important part of the company's
profits during the pre-war period, shrank to nil as rap
idly rising real expenses dwarfed the nominal expense
figures calculated from the formulas of the convention of
1900.■*--*

At the same time, the company's reserve funds

became totally inadequate not only because of inflation,
but because the company had invested these funds in
securities that had dropped in value in the meantime.1^
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To top it off, customer claims for losses due to missing,
stolen, and damaged freight grew to alarming proportions-almost 1,300,00 francs in 1920, 570,000 francs in 1922-and the French government refused to cover any of these
losses.
In order to survive as a viable operation, the DSL
obviously needed new revenues from higher freight rates
and passenger fares, ds well as from a reworked version of
the old convention formulas, which might award the company
new economy bonuses under inflationary conditions.

These

changes were reasonable enough given the inflationary situ
ation.

Unfortunately, bound as it was by the terms of the

original 1880 convention to maintain its rates and fares
at stipulated levels, the DSL had to obtain parliamentary
approval for any changes.

For their part, contemporary

government officials were reluctant to let the basic
working agreements be altered for what were viewed as
temporary perturbations in the economy.

Finally by 1920,

the National Assembly allowed the DSL to raise its rates
and fares, but only on a basis worked out jointly between
the company and the Ministries of Finance and Colonies for
application over a fixed, limited period, with the expect
ation that the economic situation would settle down mean-
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while.
The upshot, given the continuing economic instability,
was a succession of protracted negotiations leading to
temporary agreements in 1920, 1921, 1925, and 1929 on the
financial formulas for DSL operations, while rates, and
fares were also allowed to rise by joint agreement at
several junctures.

The additional revenues raised from

the higher rates and fares were fed into a special fund,
whose assets were distributed according to a complicated
set of formulas to the profit of the company, the French
treasury, and new, larger reserve funds for the railroad.
It is not surprising, given the unforeseen manner in which
the economy evolved, that the clumsy, inflexible formulas
did not work very well, leading to all sorts of acrim
onious quarrels as the terms were repeatedly renegotiated
between the principals.-*-^
It might be thought that the DSL's delicate financial
and legal position would have m a d e the company comply
readily with the Government General's policies on rates
and fares.

Sentiment in the ministry,

men t General,

as in the Govern

it must be noted, was still strongly in

favor of reducing DSL profits in the interest of the
colony's commerce as a whole.

The war emergency may have
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in due ed the Ministry of Colonies, indeed, to drop its
earlier efforts to suspend application of the overgenerous
convention of 1900, for it allowed this convention's con
tinued application from 1915, with the benefits to the DSL
only moderately trimmed.20

Nevertheless, the ministry

never actually retracted its earlier denunciation of the
convention of 1900, and the DSL's pleas for financial
relief were received coldly at first.21
Surprisingly though, the colony's leverage over the
DSL was less effective than might have been expected.

The

indifference, real or pretended, of the Ministry of Colo
nies to the DSL's financial plight was, in reality,
sharply limited by the countervailing interest of the
French treasury--the watchdogs at the Ministry of Finance
in particular--in seeing to it that the DSL generate
large enough receipts in order to pay off some of its
huge debt to the state, or at least enough to service the
large annual interest on the de b t . 22

a canny DSL manage

ment was even able several times in the course of the
1920's to turn the colony's argument for a common DSL-TN
rate and fare structure around into a means of obtaining
rate and fare increases in tandem with increases on the
financially beleagured TN, even when the DSL really did
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no t need the increase.^3

Senegalese merchants were quick

enough; to object that raising DSL rates to equal the high
est level on the TN's degressive scales was hardly justi
fied at times when the DSL was turning a good profit.

But

the DSL generally received its requested hikes.24
The controversy over uniform DSL-TN rates (at the time
technically DSL-TK rates) came to a head in 1921-1922,
when the colonial government, which had permitted large
rate increases for both the TK and DSL earlier in 1921,
proposed that both the DSL and the soon-to-be fused TKN
now lower freight rates significantly, especially for
long-haul traffic, in order to stimulate commerce in the
interior.

The efforts of the Government General, ener

getically supported by the Ministry of Colonies, to force
compliance from an uncooperative DSL company were frustra
ted, however, by the adverse ruling of a consultative
interministerial committee. ^

Lower rates on the DSL

might have spurred business activity for Senegalese
merchants as the Government General claimed, but a major
ity on the committee objected that this acknowledged
benefit to the colony's commerce (it would also increase
the federation's tax revenues indirectly) would take
place at the expense of the metropole's treasury, which
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stood to lose thereby a share of the DSL's potential pro
fits due in repayment of earlier subsidies to the company.
Maintenance of high DSL rates, on the other hand, might
change the company's account with the state from a long
standing accumulating liability into something of an asset.
The Government General continued to argue for lower
DSL rates into 1924.^6

But by then, the DSL's obstinacy

was resoundingly vindicated as a flood of traffic over
whelmed an underequipped, undermanned, and barely viable
TKN.

The management of this government-owned railroad

was severely upbraided for poor service by the very mer
chants it had acted to please with lower rates.

TKN rates

subsequently had to be hiked back up in order to meet the
operating costs of needed new material and personnel.

In

contrast, operating conditions on the DSL line and the
financial health of the company, with its stable high
rate structure, improved remarkably during the same period.
The metropolitan government was certainly pleased as the
DSL management repayed a very good portion of the com
pany's old debt in the period of relative economic pros
perity from 1924 to 1930.^7
Perhaps this denouement accounts in large part for
the noticeably improved relations during the following
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period between the DSL and the Ministry of Colonies, and
even the Government General (despite continued wrangling
over some rate issues).

It was in 1927 that the DSL was

awarded a 25 year lease by the colony of Senegal for oper
ation of the Louga-Lingu^re spur line under very attractive
financial conditions.3®

During this period also, the

complicated regime of short-term financial arrangements
were finally scrapped, as the DSL obtained from the French
legislature in 1931 a new convention much like that of
1900, with most of the original formulary constants simply
multiplied by a factor accounting for the post-war infla
tion of the franc.
This relatively amiable atmosphere did not persist,
however, as the economic crisis of the Great Depression
hit with full force in Senegal.

As receipts fell, the

DSL reacted initially by raising its rates; but in the
face of a rapidly dwindling traffic, the DSL's total
operating receipts still plunged.

Peanut freight fell

from 178,736 tons in 1929 to 125,408 tons in 1931, and
then to 47,870 tons in 1932.

In the same period, overall

DSL freight traffic dropped by 68% to 99,755 tons in
1932, while the number of DSL passengers shrank from
545,771 in 1929 down to 99,443 in 1932.30

The financial
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arrangements of the recently concluded convention, devised
as they were for more prosperous conditions, failed to
yield any economy bonuses for the company, whose manage
ment was soon asking for a new convention.31

The company's

curtailments of operating expenses could not come close
to matching the drastic decline in receipts, so that the
carefully accumulated reserve funds were soon exhausted
in covering the large deficits.32
Raising more revenue through increased rates was selfdefeating and later out of the question given the fragile
state of the economy.

Lowering rates was also unpalatable

since it would only increase the deficit.

Oddly enough,

operation of the unsuccessful Louga-Linguere line was a
bright spot in the DSL's finances, because of an operating
contract that obliged the unfortunate colony of Senegal
to pay the company a large minimum bonus, whatever the
volume of traffic carried on the

line.

Basically the DSL was kept afloat financially by the
metropolitan government's guarantee of its stock dividends
under the terms of the convention, which effectively com
pelled government coverage of DSL budget deficits as
before 1900.

Metropolitan officials were appalled, how

ever, at the size of the mounting company deficits--well
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over 9 million francs for fiscal year 1932 alone. ^

DSL

management seems to have been inclined toward sitting out
the economic storm, buoyed as they were by the guarantee,
in the hopes of an early recovery in Senegal's economy.
But government officials were interested in a less expensive
remedy.

The question was, what was to be done.

Purchase of the DSL by the government offered one
clear-cut solution.

The terms of purchase of the DSL by

the metropole had been set down in the original 1880
convention, and there was a solid precedent for this kind
of action in the government's purchase in 1909 of the
metropolitan Western railroad.35

Yet, the government was

visibly reluctant to assume the burden of purchase, which
according to the terms of the convention would have saddled
the French treasury with the obligation to pay the DSL
company an annuity of 1,300,000francs for the next 51
years.^6

It was the Government General instead which

stepped forward to propose direct purchase of the line by
the colonial government itself--an act that relieved the
metropolitan budget of any future expenditures for the DSL.
The Government General ha d been absorbed since the
onset of the crisis w i t h reinvigorating the sagging Senegal
ese economy by a coordinated policy of lower freight rates
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on both the DSL and TN railroads.

Negotiations aimed at

unifying and harmonizing rates and fares on the DSL and TN
were indeed undertaken in 1930 between the DSL, the Govern
ment. General and the ministries in Paris.

But the old

three-sided controversies among the principals soon flared
up, despite some progress on rate unification, as the com
pany acted to limit potential receipt losses, first by
raising rates in 1930; then by balancing the rate decreases
obtained by government negotiators with rate hikes in other
sections of the DSL’s rate schedules. ^
The colonial federation's purchase of the DSL seemed
to offer a way out of these problems, since it would
simplify the political and financial arrangements for run
ning the line.

It was not that the Government General and

the Ministry of Colonies were particularly bent on elimin
ating private enterprise from the operation of the Senegal
ese railroads.

Colonial officials were, on the contrary,

also seriously considering at the same time a project for
turning over the management of operations on all the rail
lines in French West Africa— government-controlled as well
as the DSL--to a consortium of metropolitan railroad
companies and banks.^

The point was that an outright

purchase of the DSL would finally enable the Government
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General to impose its own economic policies on a consoli
dated network of Senegalese rail lines without the unwel
come opposition of a private company pursuing its own
narrow interests over a portion of the network.

The com

bined administration of a purchased DSL and TN would also
allow substantial savings on joint operation expenses,
which would be passed on to commercial users of the rail
lines in the form of reductions on a consolidated DSL-TN
rate and fare structure.
Negotiations between the DSL and the Government
General for a direct retrocession of the rail line to the
colonial federation proceeded apace in mid-1932, ending
with the conclusion of a convention in September 1932.39
Final approval of the agreement and its implementation
were held up, however, because of the dilatory tactics of
DSL stockholders and the delays inherent in parliamentary
approval until April of the following year.

Meanwhile,

the DSL company continued to run the line, technically
as the agent of the Government General, from January 1,
1933, the nominal date of transfer of the line, until the
actual transfer or. May 1st.

Under the terms of the final

agreement, the DSL company yielded the DSL and LougaLingu^re rail lines, their equipment, their budgetary
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assets and liabilities--less some real estate properties
not used directly for rail operations--and received in
exchange an assured schedule, up through 1983, of sub
stantial annuity payments by the Government

G e n e r a l .

^0

A new era dawned with the fusion of Senegalese rail
roads under the colonial government's control in May 1933,
and the rejection of the private metropolitan consortium's
bid for operation of the unified network in 1934.

Officials

of the TN administration, charged with management of the
new Dakar-Niger railroad, ruthlessly purged the staff and
work force of the old DSL, diminishing their ranks in order
to reduce rail expenses.

The center of gravity of economic

activity in colonial Senegal, heretofore radiating from two
roughly perpendicular railroad spines, was slowly but
perceptibly shifted southward and eastward, following in
large measure the newly-consolidated main Dakar-Niger
artery, which passed through Thi^s and Diourbel on the way
tp Tambacounda, while the Thies-St. Louis portion of the
old DSL was reduced to a mere branch of the main trunk. ^
In the meantime, however, the colonial government had been
obliged to take other important steps to assure economic
development in this direction.
Automobile versus rail

If the railroad had been a useful,
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but imperfect instrument for solving transportation prob
lems in West Africa, the advent of the automobile, with its
solid advantages of flexibility and low fixed capital
investment, seems in retrospect to have offered a particu
larly favorable opportunity for further growth in Senegal,
not only of the export sector of the economy, but also of
domestic interchanges of goods.^
Demonstrating again a vivacious predisposition for
solving the problems handicapping their operations in
tropical Africa with the latest technical devices, French
colonial officers had tried to introduce the automobile
into the region as early as 1899 in an abortive experiment
in transportation service for the Sudan.^

Virtually no

automobiles were operating in Senegal as late as 1914.^
But in 1916, French colonial officials already were strong
ly interested in linking North and West Africa by auto
mobile, and were acting to cover the railroad gap on the
unfinished TK line with a connecting regular automobile
service for mail and a limited passenger and freight
t r a f f i c .

^

By 1921 some adventurous souls even succeeded

in reaching St. Louis from Dakar in 6 hours by driving
their autos along the sandy beaches connecting the two

ports.^
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More serious was the abiding, growing concern of the
colonial administration, from the early 1920's at least,
to improve and extend the colony's rudimentary network of
dirt trails so that they might carry auto traffic.^

The

length of the network utilisable by auto was estimated
optimistically by 1926 to stretch over 10,000 kms within
Senegal: but in reality, except for the short, paved
stretch from Dakar to Rufisque, the roads and trails were
of uneven quality, often without usable bridges and barely
passable even in the dry season.^
Nevertheless, as cheaper, American-built autos and
trucks became generally more available from the mid-1920's,
there was a remarkable upsurge in the number of such
vehicles imported into Senegal.

An estimated 945 vehicles

were imported in 1925, 1598 in 1926, 602 in 1927, and then
844 in 1928.

Despite increasing government restrictions

and taxation, an estimated 3,087 additional vehicles, and
some 46,700,000 liters of gasoline were imported into
Senegal in the period 1929 to 1932.^9

And most of these

vehicles were utilized commercially as common carriers,
not pleasure vehicles.
It was obvious that these vehicles would be used to
serve areas hitherto disadvantaged by their remoteness
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from the railroad.

It was expected at first, therefore,

that the motor vehicle would play a useful complementary
role to the locomotive, feeding traffic to the railroad
station as a more efficient version of the pack animal
carriers that had been hauling produce along roads and
trails running perpendicular to the rail line for some
time.

It soon became evident, however, that trucks hauling

produce could simply bypass a railroad station, and indeed
the nearby escale, to head directly for a port.

By mid-

1928, a number of French commercial houses with operations
based on the railroad escales were already noting, with
some alarm, that competitors driving trucks were buying
up peanuts directly from farmers at the sites of product
ion, bypassing entirely the escales, which were consequent
ly suffering from a sharp decline in business activity.^
Many of the truck owners were, moreover, small African or
Lebanese entrepreneurs, who were being spared the expense
of heavy investment in a fixed escale installation, with
Frenchmen, only recently driven back to the escales by the
yellow fever epidemic of 1927, put at a clear disadvant51
age.-,i
This motor vehicle traffic was growing rapidly.

No

precise figures are available to gauge the volume of this
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traffic; but one survey of vehicles circulating daily on
the Dakar-Rufisque road alone yielded an average daily

count of 114 freight haulers and 75 passenger carriers in
March 1928, which grew to 237 freight haulers and 288
passenger carriers daily by March 1929.

52

The evident danger to French-based commerce and to the
system of escales soon produced a reversal in the colonial
administration's attitude toward the motor car.

Serious

consideration was once more given to limiting the number
of points at which the trade in peanuts could take place,
ostensibly to assure the quality of the exported product
by facilitating government

i n s p e c t i o n .

^3

In response to

the concerns of the large French commercial houses, stiff
new tariff duties were imposed on imported motor vehicles
and gasoline. ^

The railroad already under construction

from Louga to Lingu^re, the line projected from Diourbel
to Touba, and the various projects for narrow-gauge rail
lines branching from the main railroads were almost
certainly designed, in part, to replace an already exten
sive truck traffic in the interior."*"*

But road traffic

continued to grow.
The consequent diversion of freight traffic from the
railroads to trucks was disturbing.

The tonnage of slow
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freight carried by the DSL fell from a high of 423,909 tons
in 1926 down to 314,039

tons by 1929, while total freight

tonnage on the TN went from 297,705 tons to 262,523 in
the same period (though admittedly total peanut exports
from Senegal fell from 494,000 tons to 407,000 tons at
the same time).^

Even more serious as a threat to the

viability of the railroads, however, was the growing
diversion of its passenger traffic to common carrier motor
vehicles.

Passengers carried annually by the DSL fell from

a high of 1,042,217 in 1925 down to 545,771 in 1929, even
before the onset of the economic crisis, which brought
passenger service down to a low of 99,443 by 1932.

The

TN also experienced a similar drop in passenger traffic,
which went from 1,090,088 in 1925 to 591,093 in 1929
(though the TN's subsequent low was 346,629 passengers in
1931).^

Measured in terms of the product of passengers

times the distance travelled, the DSL had gone from 51
million kms-travelled in 1925 to 27 million in 1929, while
the TN had gone from 98 million kilometers-travelled to
52 million during the same period.

An estimate of auto

traffic on three roads--Louga-Diourbel, St. Louis-Louga,
and Dakar-Rufisque— concluded that the railroads were
losing 10% million kilometers-travelled in traffic to the
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highways annually for those three runs

a l o n e .

^8

The

losses in third and fourth class passengers were parti
cularly serious, since this service had previously been
one of the most profitable elements of traffic on the DSL
and TN railroads.

It had indeed been an essential element,

whose margin of profits had permitted the rail lines to set
lower freight rates for selected products, such as the
low-priced, bulky peanuts, and even comparatively low fares
for other passenger classes, thereby stimulating business
activity along the rail line.^^
The DSL made several, largely unsuccessful attempts
to lure passengersback to the railroad, mainly with reducedfare, light express trains. °

However, it was simply much

more convenient for passengers to take to the highways
rather than the railroad.

The trains were more comfortable

and less subject to breakdowns than autos.

But voyagers

travelling to a center located a dozen kilometers or more
from a railroad station could make the journey with less
effort and in less time in a motor vehicle.

The voyager

would generally be spared a long march to and from the
railroad stations (as in Dakar where the passenger station
was far from the African Medina).

The auto ride itself

would often be shorter, especially for trips requiring
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train connections.

A trip from Louga to Diourbel took 4

to 6 hours by auto, compared to 8 hours by train; while
it took only 6 hours to get from Kaolack to Dakar by
several routes, as compared to 11 hours by train during
weekdays.
Moreover, unlike a railroad, where vehicles could
roll on the tracks only according to tight schedules at the
direction of a central railroad management, the roads
were available at all times to any user equipped with a
vehicle.

Autos with seven passengers, or trucks carrying

twenty, would start off as soon as a full complement of
passengers were on board.

Departures would occur often

on the popular, crowded runs in contrast to the railroads
with their limited, fixed schedules, with most trains
subject to long unscheduled delays while freight was loaded
and unloaded at stations enroute.^2
It might have been expected that a common carrier
road service would not have been profitable in a territory
where poor roads and a hot climate wore out the vehicles
twice as fast as in France.

In fact, even with stiff

import taxes on autos and gasoline, skillful local
entrepreneurs could gain a reasonable return from an
automobile passenger service at fares, which for rel-
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atively short runs and for the more populous centers were
roughly equivalent to those on the railroad.

63

The con

tinuing ability of trucks to compete with trains for hauling freight was also evident.

(\lx

One early measure that the colonial administration did
take against the increasing road traffic was simply to
allow roads running parallel with the railroad lines to
fall into disrepair.^

This was particularly easy to do

at a time when a strong local political effort was being
made to relieve rural Africans of the prestation obligation
to labor a set number of days annually on local bridge and
road repairs. ^

The railroad administrations were indeed

hopeful that the competition by parallel roads might be
greatly reduced by this means, even as roads perpendicular
to the rail lines were maintained as feeders for railroad
traffic.

But this policy of selective road neglect was

patently unrealistic when so many major centers lay along
the rail lines.

It had little immediate impact on road

traffic in any case, especially along the heavily trav
elled Dakar-Rufisque highway, which had to be maintained
for political reasons.^7
The onset of the economic crisis gravely magnified
the problem posed by the automobile as early as 1928.
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Merchants were calling on the railroads to reduce their
freight rates, even as the railroad was forced to compete
with the more flexible motor vehicle for a share of an
ever-shrinking passenger and freight traffic.

The French

merchants, forced as they were to retrench by closing
down branch operations in the smaller escales in the
interior, were upset that free-lance truckers could bypass
their remaining fixed operations in the larger escales by
purchasing the peanut crops directly on site from the
growers.
In metropolitan France, the confrontation between rail
and route during the depression led the government to
ease competition by imposing a coordinated division of
traffic between the two vehicular m o d e s . I n Senegal, the
colonial administration acted simply to eliminate the
motor vehicle from the competition with a succession of
severely discriminatory measures.

This began with a local

arrete in Senegal in January 1931, which made the roads
running parallel to the railroad lines off limits to
motor vehicles above a certain weight class (1000 kg in
the dry season, 600 kg for the h i v e r n a g e ) V e h i c l e
registrations and driver permits were then made renewable
in a time-consuming procedure on a quarterly instead of
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an annual basis, while the fees were raised to punitive
levels.70

The tax on gasoline was raised.71

Several

communes and coxranunes-mixtes in Senegal also decided a
little later that exorbitant daily parking fees for common
carrier vehicles would be useful fiscal

m o n e y - r a i s e r s .

72

Appeals by French auto dealers against the discrimina
tory measures, particularly against that of January 1931,
led to some apparent relief in the form of a new local
arrete in December 1931; but the freer circulation allowed
under this measure was set to end in June 1933.

Moreover,

it would apply only to vehicles registered at a particular
government agency before May 1931, and this right was not
transferable to any new owner of the vehicle.73
As if this were not enough, an arrete of June 1932
suddenly restricted peanut commerce in the interior to a
fixed number of selected escales (143 in 1932, selected
supposedly to limit the journey from the fields to a 25
km

m a x i m u m ) .

7^-

Finally, an arr£t£ of 1934 flatly banned

the use of trucks for hauling peanuts to the trading
centers, limiting the carrying trade to slow, costly pack
animals--camels, mules,

o x e n .

75

Of course, the colonial government could muster some
plausible reasons for each of these measures.

Heavy
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truck traffic, it was alleged, wore out the roads rapidly,
burdening the colony with extra expenditures for repairs.
A growing vehicular traffic was obviously in need of
careful government regulation.

The practice of Lebanese

truckers in buying up crops might lead to a drastically
shortened buying season (and monopoly of the trade by the
L e b a n e s e ) . E v e n the resort to animal carriers was
justified by the argument that it would provide a nec
essary stimulus to the local development of animal husbandry,
ultimately benefiting African farmers as a growing supply
of draught animals became available for

p l o w i n g .

^7

In the final analysis, nevertheless, these argu
ments- -save perhaps the underlying, real fear of Lebanese
competition— should not be taken too seriously.

Heavy

road traffic required more road maintenance--and the col
onial administration could win local African support for
a campaign against the auto by raising the specter of
increased rural road prestations.

But license fees and

import tariffs on gasoline and vehicles were producing
enough revenues to finance road repairs with professional
road crews.^

In reality, the colonial administration

was deliberately hampering the use of commercial vehicles
simply in order to protect the railroads from a dangerous
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competitor.
In rebuttal to the qualified sympathy given by another
government official to the plaints of French automobile
dealers facing ruin in Senegal, a high official of the
Ministry of Colonies insisted that automobile traffic
ought indeed to be penalized in the interest of the colon
ial railroads, whose:
administration could survive only as long as ]_ its_/
monopoly was maintained, excluding all competition
which might permit the passengers and high-valued
merchandise to escape it. That is the price to pay
for low f_ rail_/ rates on low-valued freight.
Rate structures on the railroads were designed to support
the export of low-value freight from the interior by dis
criminating against more lucrative elements of traffic.

To

remove these elements from the railroad's traffic was
to wreck the railroad's entire financial structure, and
to change its operation and purpose.
indeed being well protected.

But the railroad was

Even by 1931, the importation

of vehicles was already down to 221 for the year.®®

The

earlier brisk business in automobile imports was reduced
to nil in short order.

A growing transportation network

of great flexibility and promise had been arrested, and
then ruthlessly eliminated from the scene.®1
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Aftermath

Government actions taken in the wake of the

economic crisis cast the economic substructure of Senegal
into the narrow mold it was to assume for the next several
decades.

Various measures of protection and subsidies

were used to rescue the peanut trade for the small farmers
and for the large Bordeaux commercial houses, albeit with
the intermediate small African trader— considered incon
venient and superfluous— finally squeezed out of the
trade.

The railroads had also been rescued from their

financial plight, and then used in turn by the government
as instruments in saving the trade.
The net of railroads in Senegal was a legacy of
great value.

It was a major factor in endowing post

independent Senegal with one of the most dense, wellserved, convenient transportation networks of tropical
Africa (no mean advantage in the gasoline and water
droughts of the 1970's); but a network which even today
can effectively serve only a portion of the national
t e r r i t o r y . X n place of a multicentric geographic
diversity, which had briefly begun to flourish spontan
eously along a widespread grid of roads--promising a
wider spatial dispersal of trade and an attendant growth
in domestic commerce--Senegalese economic development
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was confined by the colonial government's policy within
a thin, narrower pattern, whose lifeblood radiated from
the long arteries of the railroad.

Even the formerly

principal rail highway from Thies to St. Louis was largely
bypassed in favor of a seemingly monomaniacal commitment
to the port of Dakar and the strategic Dakar-Niger trace.
The opening of the Sudan, the economic isolation of the
Gambia, and the centralization of administrative and
economic activities at the eccentrically-placed port of
Dakar--the same objectives which the colonial government
and the ministry in Paris had been pursuing in 1880--were
still being applied, with a vengeance, in 1933.^^
It would be easy, from the available evidence, to con
clude uncharitably that the colonial government had been
acting simply to rescue the narrow material interests of
French expatriates in Senegal-- those of the larger
commercial firms and the bureaucrats employed in admin
istering a publicly-owned railroad--from the economic
crisis.

To do so, however, would be to miss an opportun

ity to expose the nature of the system which the French
had succeeded in implanting in Senegal.

By acting as it

did against the automobile in the 1930's, the government
was, after all, also injuring the material interests of
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certain French firms, including the powerful Banque de
l'Afrique Occidentale to the tune of 3 million francs of
investment.85
The deepening economic crisis made the colonial gov
ernment face hard choices of what was to be sustained
and what eliminated.

Under the existing conditions of

competition and without consolidation, it was questionable
whether the railroads could bear up without mass infusions
of government aid from the metropole.

Large scale finan

cial aid from the metropole was unlikely under the circum
stances, and stringent cutbacks in rail services or hikes
in freight rates were intolerable, since they would only
have made commercial recovery difficult, if not impossible,
for some areas in the interior (as in the Sudan).

The

motor vehicle would have been a viable alternative to
the railroad in areas near the coast; but it was unclear
what geographic pattern would emerge from a reliance on
this means of locomotion (aside from a possible collapse
of Sudanese commerce).
Since the 1880's the French colonial system had
been based increasingly along the railroads.

A good deal

of commerce also flowed along the rivers and through some
of the smaller seaports.

But the railroads had come to
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stand as one of the major hallmarks of the French presence
and, to the official colonial mind, as one of France’s
proudest contributions to the "opening" of the African
interior.

It was not likely that top government officials

would willingly allow the legacy of over 50 years of effort
to go under ignominiously by tolerating an uncertain
experiment in highway transportation.

It seemed more

natural instead to reserve the profitable traffic to
"that which fructified, that which acted in the general
interest, and to penalize at the same time that which
would render sterile the enormous capital invested by the
colony to assure transportation.

86

The automobile was striking not only at the vitals of
a railroad in which the colonial government had a large
stake invested, but also at an entire interlocking complex
of commerce, property, and administration based on the
railroad.

The auto was a threat to the web of escales

nourished by the railroad, since it allowed commercial
operations established within them to be bypassed.

More

over, evasion by auto was not just simply a matter of
geography, because highway traffic— free as it was from
the railroad's need to follow a set route according to
the rigid timetables of a central authority— was also
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therefore less susceptible to surveillance and control.
Government documents of the period manifest indeed an
underlying fear of the auto as a sort of harbinger of a
more "anarchic" social order, indicating that the issue
was not simply a question of commercial and real estate
i n v e s t m e n t . * ^

it

was also a question of control--central-

ized control over what French officials had always per
ceived to be the unrooted African, whose body and mind,
like quicksilver, seemed ever to be eluding them.

With

the elimination of the auto, African producers would be
largely obliged once more to come to and deal directly
with European dominated institutions and facilities.
Some losses would have to be accepted, as in the
decay of some of the older escales cf the defunct DSL,
in the virtual abandonment of the Louga-Linguere venture,
and in the continued, temporary expansion of Kaolack with
its share of exports at Dakar's expense.

But the focus

along which economic recovery would be oriented--the geo
graphic and administrative core which would channel the
energies of the region— would be the newly-fused axis of
the Dakar-Niger railroad.

The steel trace of the railroad

had been introduced into West Africa by the French in
order to liberate human society in that region from the
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physical restraints of an overgenerous space and hard
climate.

However, the play of economic systems and budgets

as well as the weight of history, converted the rails
into a constrictive straitjacket of control, which even as
it nourished growth also firmly encased it within certain
bounds.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-4 7 4 -

Notes
1. Suret-Canale, L'£re coloniale, p. 251.
2. Despite continued monetary instability into 1926, the
French metropolitan economy was becoming prosperous
again by 1924--a prosperity lasting as late as 1930.
See Martin Wolfe, The French Franc between the Wars,
1919-1939 (New York, 1951), pp. 33ff.
3. See Yves Mersadier, "La crise de 1'arachide sen^galaises au d6but des ann6es trente,” Bulletin de l'IFAN,
B, 28, 1966, pp. 826-877; X. Guiraud, L 1arachide
sln^galaise (Paris, 1937), pp. 165ff.
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it to undertake credit operations.See Mersadier,
"La crise," pp. 843-846; Guiraud, L 1arachide, pp.
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5. For the SIP's in particular, see Guiraud, L*arachide,
pp. 133-144; Suret-Canale, L'ere coloniale, pp. 299310.
6. See above, Chapter IV, p. 242.
7. See Chief of Public Works Service to GS, January 15,
1924, SARS, DCF; President, CC-Dakar to GS, November 27,
1923, Ibid.; Launay note of April 28, 1924, ARS,
6P172-36; Note of Director of Economic Affairs,
April 22, 1924, Ibid.; the division of peanut exports
can be difficult to discern, because ships calling
at Kaolack generally loaded only to 2/3rds capacity
to avoid navigation problems on the Saloum river--the
rest of the cargo would be taken on at Dakar or
Rufisque.
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8.

Since 1900, the colonies had become directly respon
sible in principle for covering their budgetary
expenses. The DSL, as a colonial enterprise sub
sidized directly by the state, had therefore become
an historical anomaly, as well as a bone of contention
between the colonial and metropolitan governments.
See above, Chapter IV, p. 222.

9.

Launay note, February 15, 1924, ARS, 6P172-36.

10. Setting rates for long-haul traffic and dividing
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problems for railroads in other lands. See the
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Investor and the Railroad (Cambridge, Mass., 1967,),
pp. 206-222, on the problems of the B & W and Western
railroads in Massachusetts.
11. The ratio of real expenses to receipts ("coefficient
d'exploitation") generally hovered for the DSL around
a comfortable 0.6. The TN generally got by with a
ratio of 0.9 to 1.0; and then sometimes only by not
counting some governmental subvention funds. For
specifics see a minute of December 27, 1919 on the
new DSL convention, FOM, TP, which listed annual
DSL expenses and receipts from 1910 to 1916 correspond
ing to ratios of 0.5 to 0.69; P.V., CTPC, November 3,
1925, FOM, TP, shows the ratio back at 0.63 in 1924;
the Legregram report of June 24, 1930, FOM, TP, p. 13,
shows the ratio hovering between 0.5 to 0.73 from
1925 to 1929.
12. See Legregram report, June 24, 1930 on unification of
rates, FOM, TP; Inspector Sol to MC, July 25, 1930,
Ibid.; Launay note, April 28, 1924, ARS, 6P 172-36;
P.V., Conseil Consultatif du Chemin de Fer du TN,
November 30, 1925, Ibid.; Report of Chief Surveillance
Engineer, December 31, 1929, FOM, TP; GG to MC,
January 25, 1930, Ibid.
13. See DSL to MC, October 4, 1917, FOM, TP; Ormesson to
MC, October 10, 1917, Ibid.; DSL to MC, September 10,
1919, Ibid. A letter, DSL to MC, November 10, 1919,
FOM, TP, noted that real DSL expenses had increased
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from 2,586,000 francs in 1914 and 2,300,00 in 1916,
to 4,258,000 francs in 1918, while traffic had
languished. See also DSL to MC, December 4, 1919,
FOM, TP.
14. The letter, DSL to MC, November 10, 1919, no. 2029
M/7, FOM, TP, estimated that the revaluation of the
dollar had cost them 800,000 francs. See also DSL
to MC, December 18, 1919, Ibid.
15. Copy MC to DSL, June 21, 1919, FOM, TP; Mouneyres
note, November 25, 1919, Ibid. See P.V., DSL Verifi
cation Commission, March 23, 1914, FOM, TP, on the
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FOM, TP.

17. Bouclier report for the Commission de Verification
des Comptes, March 24, 1924, FOM, TP. Much of the
increase came from the inflationary increase of
peanut prices; but contemporary documents indicate
that thieves had also become much bolder and more
successful.
18. On the basis of a law of January 7, 1920, authorizing
temporary conventions for three colonial railroads
(the DSL, an Indochinese railroad, and the FrancoEthiopian) upon agreement between the Ministers of
Finance and Colonies and after a favorable review
by the Comite des Travaux Publics des Colonies. This
regime was extended by a law of October 17, 1924 until
December 31, 1929 and was again extended by a law
promulgated on February 17, 1930 for an additional
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summarizes these temporary arrangements. Some DSL
special rates and accessory charges were allowed to
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# 782 CM/5, FOM, TP). Broad increases in rates and
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March 1, 1921 (Boutteville memo, September 17, 1921,
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(Legregram report, June 24, 1930, FOM, TP). As for
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uary 25, 1920, FOM, TP; Report to the Comite des
Travaux Publics des Colonies (henceforth CTPC) by
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(New York, 1945), pp. 96-97.
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Ibid.; P.V., CPTC, May 23, 1929, Ibid.; copy MC TO GG,
August 13, 1929, Ibid.; P.V., CPTC, February 20, 1930,
Ibid.
25. See DSL to MC, December 13, 1921, FOM, TP, which re
jected the ministry's proposal on the grounds that
over 2 million francs in receipts would be lost; DSL
to MC, April 14, 1922, Ibid. claimed that the lost
receipts would make little difference in the price of
peanuts; acting MC to Preside it of CPTC, February 14,
1922, Ibid.; Constantin report for CPTC, July 18, 1922,
Ibid.; Boutteville report to MC, October 16, 1922,
Ibid.
26. See Lacheze to Administrators of DSL, September 11,
1923, FOM, TP; Ballabey report, May 1924, ARS,
6P172-36. After a strong attack on the DSL's rate
policy in the note by the Director of Economic Affairs,
April 22, 1924, Ibid., Launay felt obliged to alter
his views on the use of Kaolack from his previously
favorable note of February 15, 1924, Ibid., to a more
rigid stance in a new note of April 28, 1924, Ibid.
See also the report of Director TKN, September 24, 1924,
SARS, DCF, and the Rousseau report to CTPC, October 29,
1925, FOM, TP.
27. A copy of the bill for the modification of the legal
and financial regime of the DSL (# 4371, December 1930)
in FOM, TP, noted that some 51 million francs had been
repaid by the company by December 31, 1930 out of 52
million in advances for guarantees of operating
expenses and dividends plus interest on these advances.
This did not include, however, another 34 million
advanced to the DSL in addition for equipping the
line with more materiel. The same figures are given
in the Pruvost report, June 1, 1935, FOM, TP. Note
the overriding interest of the ministry in the profit
ability of the DSL, as in the report.to MC by Gubiand
and Henry, January 16, 1926, FOM, TP.
28. The report by Gubiand and Henry to MC, January 16,
1926, FOM, TP, was mainly concerned with any possible
risk run by the French treasury due to the DSL's
involvement in the Louga-Linguere rather than any
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risks that the colony of Senegal might run.
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profitability see Pruvost report, June 1, 1935, FOM,
TP; Launay notes of June 18 and 25, 1935, Ibid.;
Note by Minot, June 26, 1935, Ibid.
34. Analysis of DSL accounts for 1932 by Sailly, FOM,
AP546. Bagot.report on DSL retrocession, September 27,
1935, FOM, TP.
35. See Doukas, pp. 55-64. The government also shrank in
the 1930's, however, from purchasing any metropolitan
lines. Nationalization had to await the Popular
Front government. See Ibid., pp. 234ff.
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36. GG to MC, September 8, 1932, FOM, TP, reviews the
history of the purchase decision. The colonial govern
ment was asked tu study the matter in a ministerial
dispatch of October 10, 1931. Purchase of the DSL
was considered immediately after the war, but rejected
because of legal uncertainties (Boutteville memo on
DSL, September 17, 1921, FOM, TP). In 1929 the min
istry considered that government purchase of the DSL
had no chance of occuring because of the successful
operation of the line (draft of MC to GG, February 27,
1929, FOM, TP).
37. Copy of GG TO GS, May 19, 1930, FOM, TP; report by
Sol to MC, July 25, 1930, FOM, TP; Minot to Director
DSL, August 8, 1930, FOM, TP; DSL to MC, September 26,
1930, Ibid.; copy of DSL to MC, January 9, 1931,
SARS, DCF; draft MC to Minister of Finance, February 5,
1932, Ibid.; GG to MC, March 17, 1932, Ibid.; copy
MC to GG, May 5, 1932, Ibid.; GG to MC, May 21, 1932,
Ibid.; GG to MC, May 21, 1932, Ibid.; copy MC to GG,
August 4, 1932, Ibid.; copy GG to GS, September 27,
1932, SARS, DCF.
38. See GG circular to Presidents of Chambers of Commerce
in Senegal, July 25, 1932, SARS, DCF; also printed in
Bull. Mensuel de Dakar, July-August, 1932, pp. 279-280.
GG to MC, December 27, 1933, FOM, AP546; Note by
Gaston Joseph, January 29, 1934, Ibid.; Note by
Ma$tre Devallon, February 6, 1934, Ibid.; proposed
convention with consortium, n.d. (1932), Ibid.
39. Local merchants were calling for this action; e.g.,
P.V., CC-Dakar, February 9, 1932, DSL(Paris). The
Government General and the DSL concluded a convention
of retrocession on September 8, 1932; but there were
delays in getting the DSL's stockholders to ratify
the convention, which was finally approved by decree
only on March 31, 1933, See GG to MC, September 8,
1932, FOM, TP; acting GG to MC, April 21, 1933,
Ibid.; MC to Minister of the Budget, May 10, 1933,
Ibid.; Dugas report for CTPC, June 20, 1933, Ibid.
40. The DSL had asked for an annuity of 2 million francs
for the 51 years remaining in the convention grant.
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The final agreement pared this down to 1,550,000
francs for the first 10 years, 1,375,000 for the next
14 years, 1,165,000 for the next 26 years, and 873,750
for the last year (1983). See DSL to GG, June 23,
1932, DSL(Paris); Pruvost report, June 1, 1935, FOM,
TP.
41. See GG to MC, September 30, 1932, FOM, TP; the prin
cipal objective was to funnel Sudanese products to
Kaolack, Rufisque, and Dakar and to reduce the price
to Kaolack of products shipped from the Thi^sKoussanar portion of the line. See the December 1932September 1933 rate schedules on fast and slow freight,
ARS, 6P 36-36.
42. The reader may
study: George
way Investment
especially pp.

find useful the Brookings Institute
W. Wilson, et al., The Impact of High
on Development (Washington, 1966),
1-16, 174-218.

43. Interview with General Berdoulat, document #41,ARS,
0244, and document #78,-ARS, Q49.
44. GG to IGTP, April 16, 1914, ARS, 0244; President,
CC-St. Louis to GS, July 4, 1914, SARS, DCF.
45. For the Cotiari-Ambidedi automobile service see folder
9, ARS, 2G16-4; political report, 4th trimester 1916,
2G16-5. Studies of Ford autos for this purpose are
in the dossier: ARS, 046. Transsaharan auto crossings
were discussed in. Governor General of Algeria to GG,
April 10, 1916, ARS, 0244, and GG to IGTP, May 22,
1916, Ibid. Although a crossing of 5 Citroen cars
was made from Tuggurt only in 1923.
46. Economic report, February 1921, ARS, 20G21-1.
47. The construction of roads was pushed strongly in the
colony of Senegal's "Notice succincte sur le programme
des grands travaux au Senigal, 1926-1927-1928,"
October 9, 1925, SARS, DCF. The interest of the
colonial administration in development of a wide
network of good roads for use by automobiles is
evident in a telegram: GS to GG, June 6, 1912, ARS,
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0244; Political report, 4th trimester 1916, ARS,
2G16-5; report on Diourbel, third trimester 1920,
ARS, 2G20-28; report on Louga, fourth trimester 1920,
ARS, 2G20-30; Political report, 4th trimester 1920,
ARS, 2G20-5; Political report, 1923, ARS, 2G23-11;
Political report, 1924, ARS, 2G24-14; Economic report,
January 1926, ARS, 2G26-3; Administrator Thi&s to GS,
December 23, 1926, StL; GS to President, CC-Rufisque,
February 10, 1928, StL.
48. The estimate was given in the report for 1927, ARS,
2G27-18(2); a report that shows the variability of
reporting on local roads is that of 1926, in ARS,
2G26-10; the Verdun report on roads in French West
Africa, August 15, 1933, FOM, TP, is a useful tech
nically-oriented exposition; the "Rapport compl&nentairej^-circulation sur la route au Senegal,"
[_ 1931_/, FOM, AP545(5) is also useful, as is SuretCanale, L'^re coloniale, pp. 265-266.
49. Estimates for 1925 to 1927 imports are in "Lettre
ouverte au Ministre des Colonies," L 1Quest Africain
Franyaise, June 1, 1929, p. 2; the number of vehicles
imported in 1927 and 1928 were mentioned in GG to MC,
September 14, 1929, FOM, AP545(5). The estimated
imports for 1929-1932, yielding a total of over 12
million francs raised in customs receipts, were
given in P.V., CC-Dakar, August 19, 1933, copy in
FOM, AP545(5). According to the Customs Service
report of 1931, ARS, 2G31-3, 1,258 vehicles had been
imported in 1930, but only 211 for 1931. Conseil
Colonial, Le Senegal en 1925 (Paris, 1925), p. 34,
lists a total of 1,253 autos, mostly American* im
ported from 1919 through 1924. The low figure of
324 autos for 1925 (though probably incomplete)
indicates that only autos were tabulated, and not
trucks.
50. P.V., CC-Rufisque, December 1, 1928, SARS, DCF;
anonymous, "La Limitation des points de verification,"
L 1Quest~Africain Francaise, April 13, 1929. This was
a turnabout for French merchants, who previously had
called for better roads, as in P.V., CC-Rufisque,
April 21, 1927, SARS, DCF, and President, CC-Rufisque
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1928,
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51. Gubiand commented in a meeting of the CPTC (P.V., CPTC,
May 23, 1929, FOM, TP, that auto transport for pas
sengers was largely in the hands of "entreprises
indigenes." The auto dealer Potton noted in a letter
to the Director General of the Banque de l'Afrique
Occidentale (BAO), December 12, 1931, FOM, AP545(5),
that many of the purchasers of trucks were Africans
or Lebanese, who had begun transportation enterprises.
See also Guiraud, L'arachide, pp. 118-121.
52. GG to MC, January 25, 1930, FOM, TP.
53. The P.V., CC-Rufisque, December 1, 1928, mentioned
that the Syndicat de Defense des InterSts Sen^galaises
had called in September for a limitation of trade
points to the escales located on railroads and water
ways only. See also P.V., Syndicat de Defense des.
Interfets Senegalaises January 18, 1929, SARS, DCF.
54. d'Oxoby, "Lettre ouverts au Ministre des Colonies,"
L fQuest Africain Frangaise, June 1, 1929, p. 2;
Georges Barthelemy, "Les coloniaux de Bordeaux contre
1'automobile," Gazette Coloniale, June 6, 1929; copy
of F£d£ration Nationale de 1'Automobile ... to MC,
June 7, 1929, FOM, AP545(5); copy MC to GG, May 2,
1929, Ibid.; GG to MC, September 14, 1929, Ibid.
55. A note predicting the traffic for the Louga-Linguere
railroad, dated October 29, 1925, FOM, TP, noted the
existence already of a heavy truck traffic from
Djolof to Louga. The growth of M'Backe as a center of
auto traffic, especially for the Sagata-M'Backe run,
was noted.in Administrator Baol to GS, April 16, 1928,
SARS, DCF. The project for the Sine railroad by
Surleau, June 28, 1930, FOM, TP, noted that trucks
hauled 10,000 tons of peanuts from M'Backe to Diourbel
at 150 francs per ton.
56. Pruvost report, June 1, 1935, FOM, TP, p. 5; Legregram
report, June 16, 1930, FOM, TP, p. 36; table of
peanut exports in Guiraud, L 'arachide, p. 37.
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57. Pruvost report, June 1, 1935, FOM, TP, p. 5; Pruvost
report, June 25, 1935, Ibid., p. 6; Legregram report,
June 16, 1930, FOM, TP, p. 33.
58. Report of DSL Surveillance Engineer, August 20, 1930,
FOM, TP. The auto may, however, have generated some of
this new traffic as well (see Wilson et aL., Highway
Investment, pp. 177-179).
59. The Pruvost report, June 25, 1935, FOM, TP, p. 70,
calculated the profitability of various classes of
passengers on the TN for the period 1930 to 1933 and
for the DN in 1934. During this depressed period,
only fourth class passenger service remained profitable.
First and second class service were, as always, highly
unprofitable during this period.
60. DSL to MC, October 25, 1928, FOM, TP; MC to GG,
November 30, 1928, Ibid.; P.V., CPTC, May 23, 1929,
FOM, TP; DSL to MC, February 14, 1930, FOM, TP, gave
a report on the small number of passengers taking the
special trains; GG to MC, February 25, 1930, Ibid.;
GG to MC, September 11, 1930, Ibid.; draft MC to GG,
October 17, 1930, Ibid.; draft MC to DSL, February 11,
1931, FOM, TP; DSL to MC, February 17, 1931, Ibid.
61. Railroads in Senegal faced the same automobile competi
tion for passenger traffic in the 1960!s and 1970's.
The best description of this traffic in the 1920's is
in the detailed report of the Chief Surveillance
Engineer, August 20, 1930, FOM, TP. The TN did try
to change its timetable to carry more of the DakarKaolack traffic (GS to Director TN, October 30, 1930,
SARS, DCF); but autos continued to dominate this run
(acting Director TN, September 26, 1931, Ibid.) Most
documents on this question simply attribute the shift
to an "infatuation" (engouement) of the African for
the automobile.(See Surveillance Engineer report,
December 28, 1928, FOM, TP). The colonial administra
tion was upset that proposed increases in DSL fares
would only make auto competition worse (Surveillance
Engineer report, December 31, 1929, FOM, TP; GG to
MC, January 25, 1930, Ibid.)
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62. Surveillance Engineer report, August 20, 1930, FOM, TP.
63. Ibid.
64. Surveillance Engineer report, December 31, 1929, FOM,
TP; GS to Director TN, March 4, 1931, SARS, DCF,
considered a reduction in the TN's special rate for
peanuts on the Guinguineo-Kaolack run in order to
compete with autos; despite high truck rates and
the competition of the new Louga-Lingu^re railroad,
trucks were still preferred for freight hauling from
Djolof, according to Administrator Djolof to GS,
November 12, 1931, SARS, DCF. Despite discriminatory
administration measures, automobile freight haulers
were still competitive up to 1933 (acting GG to MC,
October 27, 1933, FOM, TP).
65. See the GG1s recommendation on deliberately neglecting
the maintenance of roads running parallel to a pro
posed narrow-gauge rail line into Baol, in GG to GS,
January 21, 1928, ARS, 6P46-36. See also Geoffrey
Gorer, Africa Dances (New York, 1962), p. 69.
66. Political report, 1928, ARS, 2G28-8; note for IGTP,
May 31, 1933, ARS, K143-46.
67. For instance, Fatick, a major center, was connected
by roads to both Thi&s and Kaolack. Plainly Thi£sKaolack traffic could run along these roads. At a
later era, the printed report by the RSgie des Chemins
de Fer du S£n£gal, Consequences de la rupture de la
Federation du Mali sur 1 1exploitation du chemin de fer,
October 19, 1960, copy in RA, still recommended the
restriction of auto traffic along roads paralleling
the railroad. The contrary view was expressed clearly
in the Pruvost report, June 25, 1935, FOM, TP, pp.
90-94. See also P.V., CC-Dakar, August 9, 1933.
68. Doukas, French railroads, pp. 214-219, 223-229.
69. The arrete of January 12, 1931 can be found in JOS,
April 8, 1931, pp. 248-249. See also Georges
Barthelemy, "la circulation des camions au S£n6gal,”
Gazette Coloniale, March 17, 1932.
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70. GS to GG, December 5, 1931, FOM, AP545(5); acting
president of CC-Dakar to Administrator Dakar, Jan
uary 5, 1932, Ibid.; Gaston Joseph to President of
F6d£ration Nationale de l 1Auto ..., July 13, 1932,
Ibid.
71. GG to MC, April 28, 1932, FOM, AP545(5).
72. GG to MC, February 24, 1933, FOM, AP545(5); MC to
Union des Vehicles Industriels, March 30, 1933, Ibid.
73. Copy of Potton to Director General of the Banque
d'Afrique Occidentale (Henceforth BAO), December 12,
1931, FOM, AP545(5); copy of BAO (Dakar) to BAO(Paris),
December 17, 1931, Ibid.; GS to Director BAO(Dakar),
February 26, 1932, Ibid.
74. Guiraud, L 1arachide, pp. 121-133. In contrast, the
writer of the December 1917 report for Tivaouane,
ARS, 2G17-33 clearly saw that the limitation of trade
points only worked against the interests of the cul
tivators by increasing his expenses. Some Lebanese
competition was also undermined deliberately by the
elimination of some formerly busy trade centers, such
as that at Gaoune, within a concession held by Cheik
Anta M'Backi (Telegram of Administrator Baol to GS,
October 29, 1932, SARS, DCF).
75. Economic report, 1934, ARS, 2G34-33 (the SIP's were
allowed to use trucks, however, for seed transporta
tion) ; the LIGUS mission, Rapport de l'^tude sur la
coordination des transports du Senegal(1954), ARS-L,
pp. 36-37, noted sadly that growers were still forced
to depend on costly, slow pack animal transport be
cause of the policy of excluding trucks from trade
in the interior. See also J. Fouquet, La traite des
arachides dans le pays de Kaolack, et ses conse
quences ... (St.Louis, Senegal, 1958), pp. 91-100.
76. Guiraud, L 1arachide, p. 120, complains of the result
ing rapidity of a season's transactions. Admitedly
this rapidity did eliminate the traditional social
event involved in the seasonal, prolonged dickering
between buyer and seller over the price of peanuts
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in the escale. But Guiraud was obviously more worried
about the threat of competition to fixed French
interests. An economic report of 1933, ARS, 2G33-4,
suggested, on the contrary, that competition from
Nigeria and Gambia could best be met with rapid
purchases of available peanuts in Senegal.
77. Guiraud, L'arachide, pp. 119-120; economic report,
1934, ARS, 2G34-33.
78. P.V., CC-Dakar, August 9, 1933, copy in FOM, AP545(5).
79. Note by MaTtre Devallon for the Direction of Political
Affairs, December 13, 1933, FOM, AP545(5), in answer
to a note by Gaston Joseph of November 30, 1933,
Ibid.; see also the note by Gaston Joseph, December 26,
1933, Ibid.
80. Customs Service report, 1931, ARS, 2G31-3. By this
time, the onset of the depression was taking its toll
as well.
81. The alternative was for the government to subsidize
the railroad. See the thorough analysis of m o d e m
road-rail competition and coordination in Arthur
Hazlewood, Rail and Road in East Africa (Oxford, 1964),
especially pp. 43-81.
82. The published report by the Direction des Transports
du MinistSre des Travaux Publics de la Republique du
Senegal, Les transports terrestres au S&n€gal (Thies,
1964), pp. 2-4, termed the consequences of this div
ision of the country "tragic.” See also Corinne
Beneviste, Les relations Dakar-St.Louis. Le rail et
la route, DES (Dakar, 1967), ARS-L.
83. The administration chose the headquarters for the new
DN at Thies, already the headquarters of the TN,
largely because of the difficulty of finding new
lodging at Dakar for railroad personnel (GG to MC,
September 8, 1932, FOM, TP).
84. Suret-Canale ( in L'ere coloniale, p. 254) selected
1936 as the year in which Dakar's supremacy was
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final ly assured. The annual political report for
Senegal, 1936, ARS, 2G36-5, noted a strong seasonal
migration from the Senegal river basin, Djolof, and
Louga toward the southern lands, which were richer,
better-watered, and "ou les frais de transport sont
moindres pour 1*Evacuation des produits vers les
centres d 1achat." For general remarks on rate and
fare structures on the DN and on other railroads of
French West Africa, see the Coste report, March 10,
1938, FOM, TP. The growth of a transportation network
based on roads would also have channeled more trade
into the Gambia, which the railroad had deliberately
bypassed (see Administrator Sine-Saloum to GS, Jan
uary 21, 1924, SARS, DCF, in which this official
strongly advised against such a development).
85. Involving 172 unsold vehicles as well as auto replace
ment parts in one enterprise alone. See copy BAO
(Dakar) to BAO(Paris), December 17, 1931, FOM,
AP545(5); BAO(Paris) to MC,February 23, 1932, Ibid.
86.

Note by Maltre Devallon
forthe Direction ofPolitical
Affairs, December 13, 1933, FOM, AP545(5).

87.

Guiraud, L 1arachide, p. 120, for one, flatly described
the situation brought on by the auto in Senegal, before
discriminatory restrictions were imposed, as a state
of "virtual anarchy.” Mattre Devallon referred to it
as a "state of indiscipline" (note for Direction of
Political Affairs, December 13, 1933, FOM, AP545(5).
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TABLE 1
DSL RAILROAD IN THE PEANUT TRADE

YEAR

PEANUTS2
CARRIED
B Y DSL
(METRIC TONS)

% OF TOTAL
PEANUTS
CARRIED B Y
DSL

PEANUTS 2
SENT FROM
THIES &
TIVAUUANE
(METRIC TONS)

$DSL PEANUT
FREIGHT FROM
THIES &
TIVAOUANE
(PERCENTAGE)

TOTAL 2
FREIGHT,
OTHER THAN
PEANUTS ON
DSL (METRIC
TONS}
1

prohibited without permission.

1878
1879
1880
1882
1883
1884
1885
1886
1887
1888
1889
1890
1891
1892
1893

34 ,524
34,529
52,134
48,015
42,858
38,250
41,248
22,565
19,714
40,3423
32,080
27,386
26,394
46,790
59,302

-489
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PEANUTS1
EXPORTED
FROM SENEGAL
(METRIC TONS)

-

10,002
10,714
28,867
22,818
18,892
22,818
37,305
43,729

44.3
54.4
71.6
71.5
69.0
86.6
79.7
73.7

19,830
24,001

53.2
54.9

14,637

TABLE 1— CONTINUED

YEAR

1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910

PEANUTS1
EXPORTED
FROM SENEGAL
(METRIC TONS)

65,289
51,537
63,556
48 , 1 2 3 3
95,987
85,547
140,921
123,482
110,225
148,843
137,784
96,175
100,476
154,447
144,140
224,326
227,299

PEANUTS°
CARRIED
BY DSL
(METRIC TONS)

46,718
34,837
42,863
38,474
53,089
57,642
90,386
97,660
51,318
78,296
66,209
53,817
51,741
101,833
76,969
146,130
160,170

% OF TOTAL
PEANUTS
CARRIED BY
DSL

PEANUTS^
SENT FROM
THIES &
TIVAOUANE
(METRIC TONS)

71.6
67.6
67.4
80.0
55.3
67.4
64.1
78.9
46.6
52.6
48.1
56.0
51.5
65.9
53.1
65.1
70.4

22,723
18.195
25,095
20,330
27,216
27,414
41,667
45,992
24,921
41,558
32,309
27,201
25,032
40,049
30,225
83,475
84,162

$DSL PEANUT
FREIGHT FROM
THIES &
TIVAOUANE
(PERCENTAGE')1

48.6
5 2.2
58.5
52.8
51.3
47.6
46.1
47.2
48.6
53.1
48.8
50.5
48.4
39.3
39.3
57.1
52.5

TOTAL
FREIGHT,
OTHER
THAN PEA
NUTS ON
DSL (MET
RIC TONS)
19,919
11,954
21,505
27,098
35,311
21,899
57,354
51,657
40,882
34,512
26,419
44,982
90,927
103.343

Reproduced
with permission

TABLE

1 -- C O N T IN U E D

of the copyright owner.

Several s o u r c e s :
1 Figures for 1878-80 from Ministry marine, Tableaux de Population, de culture et
de commerce des colon i e s . Figures for 1882-87 from Ministry Marine, Statistiques
Coloniales. For 1892-1910 from S/SEC Colonies Statistiques c-oloniales; Petyt Report—
receipts DSL-1890,FOM, Senegal Xll,69;

3. X. Guiraud, L 1arachide ginegalaise. (Paris,

1937), p. 37.

prohibited

a A % calculation on the basis of the trade season, or from November through the
following October, would be much more meaningML, but figures for total exports from
Senegal on this basis are not available--Presumably shipments of peanuts within the
country, as seed for example, would be negligible, this is confirmed by a glance at
Table V.

without permission.

b

Includes freight shipped in from T K railroad.
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2 Figures 1886 to 1891, in Fontaneilles Report, July 17, 1898, FOM, TP; Figures 18921910 in annual reports of DSL board of directors to stockholders (1896 missing) same
as figures 1892-1905 in Government General.
Les Chemins de fer en AQF, I, 1906.

-4 9 2 TABLE 2
PEANUTS ARRIVING B Y RAIL A T P O R T S 3
(Freight Volume in Metric T o n s —
Percentage of the Total Peanut
Rail Freight is in Parentheses)

TOTAL
A T ALL '
OTHER RAIL
STATIONS

TRADE SEASON

AT RUFISQUE

AT ST. LOUIS

1884-85

7,321 (60.8#)

4,475

37. 2#)

238

12,034

1885-86

6,761 (72.5 )

1,955

21.0 )

610

9,326

1886-87

6,512 (68.2 )

2,984

31.3 )

47

9,543

1887-88

17,604

(66.7 )

8,496

32.2 )

290

26,390

1888-89

17,745 (80.8 )

4,007

18.2 )

216

21,968

1889-90

15,782

(83.1 )

2,922

15.4 )

279

18,983

1890-91

16,595 (90.5 )

1,479

8.1 )

263

18,377

1891-92

36,334 (88.2 )

4,347

10.6 )

505

41,186

1892-93

41,661 (89.3 )

4,820

10.3 )

156

46,637

1893-94

38,792 (85.9 )

6,106

13.5 )

279

45,177

1894-95

31,917

)

2,467

7.2 )

63

34,447

1895-96

38,320 (92.8 )

2,885

7.0 )

67

41,27 2

1896-97

33,996 (89.6 )

3,908

10.3 )

33

37,937

1897-98

44,642

(86.8 )

6,379

12.4 )

401

51,422

1898-99

43,667

(85.6 )

7,239

14.2 )

118

51,024

(92.7
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TABLE 2--Continued

AT ST. LOUIS

TRADE SEASON

AT RUFISQUE

1899-1900

84,854 (86.2 ) 13,309 (13.5 )

1900-1901

69,066 (87.6 )

9,256 (11.7

AT ALL
TOTAL
OTHER RAIL
STATIONS

)

257

98,420

515

78,837

aSource: Chief of DSL operations to GG, May 27, 1901, SARS,
DCF.
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ANNUAL PEANUT FREIGHT PER STATION ON D S L a-(METRIC TONS)
OUTGOING

INCOMING
YEAR

DAKAR

1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911

578
32,163
566
38,748
185 40,051
30
32,047
58 39,618
48
34,554
47 6 45,556
68 49,004
245 77,823
294
85,968
70 45,343
205 72,037
201
58,994
128 48,937
4,971
43,882
2,317
81,732
5,351
64,312
1,970 131,212
3,910 135,902
2,874
76,529

RUFISQUE

ST. LOUIS
4,484
4,369
6,393
2,691
3,133
3,819
7,007
8,504
12,261
10,987
5,762
5,948
6,928
4,139
5,852
17,726
6,564
12,688
19,876
7,339

SEBIKOTANE POUT
150
130
155
111
163
144
229
209
511
993
836
1,214
440
357
333
712
421
696
838
332

7 27
640
920
466
628
485
649
1,201
865
1,498
1,071
1,604
663
507
671
1,886
1,649
1,616
1,960
1,178

THIES
6,393 ...
7,926
9,534
8,111
11,675
10,019
13,273
11,360
20,238
21,496
12,459
23,119
15,031
13,015
9,691
18,244
14,270
71,139
73,585
46,760 . . .
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-4 9 5 TABLE 3 — CONTINUED
OUTGOING
YEAR

TIVAOUANE PIRE
GOUREYE

1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911

13,437
16,075
13,189
10,084
13,420
10,311
13,943
16,054
21,429
24,371
12,462
18,439
17,278
14,186
15,341
21,805
15,965
12,336
10,577
5,940

2,919
3,660
2,703
2,962
3,101
2,254
3,046
3,199
6,009
8,556
4,083
6,373
5,159
2,815
2,781
7,459
6,461
7,104
9,132
4,302

N 'GAYE
MEKHE

5,398
5,563
6,145
5,116
6,109
6,063
7,767
6,977
15,493
13,935
7,364
13,193
11,210
7,180
5,344
15,634
14,187
16,816
16,075
8,123

KELLE

N'DANDE

3,215
3,589
4,252
2 922
2^013
1,926
1,802
1,674
2,916
3,774
1,664
2,312
1,835
1,697
4,510
2,946
3,251
4,957
5,353
2,482

1,209
7 28
1,683
980
1,967
1,075
1,666
524
2,009
608
2,515
828
2,605
1,725
3,204
1,928
3,417
3,610
3,905
3,608
1,500
2,261
2,393
2,816
3,211
3,412
2,803
3,204
2,683
2,711
5,999
6,177
4,832
5,020
8,000
7,547
7,345 10,153
3,624
4,012
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TABLE 3—

CONTINUED

OUTGOING
YEAR

GOUMBO
GUEOUL

1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911

87 2
1,352
1,426
7 57
753
943
2,130
2,710
5,145
4,584
1,874
2,006
3,350
2,818
2,657
5,940
3,444
5,363
7,621
2,408

LOUGA

SAKAL

M ’P A L

BAO

1,376
1,536
3,669
1,774
1,673
1,771
4,249
6,946
7,303
7,505
3,299
2,800
2,757
2,890
3,372
8,159
3,224
7,795
12,525
5,644

145
51
511
147
239
228
564
913
1,735
1,662
1,020
829
952
937
1,278
2,141
461
969
1,720
1,009

573
101
354204
267
505
713
840
1,449
941
370
264
325
304
588
1,697
313
224
907
579

62
22
212
62
141
427
361
232
686
509
894
674
530
351
76
1,465
455
785
1,191
631

TOTALS

37,305
43,729
46,718
34,837
42,863
38,474
53,089
57,642
90,386
97,660
51,318
78,296
66,209
53,817
51,741
101,833
76,969
146,130
160,170
87,363

a S o u r c e : Figures from annual reports of DSL Board of
Directors to stockholders (1896 missing); same as figures
1892-1905 with very slight differences in Government
General, AOF, Les chemins de fer en A O F , I; Le S e n e g a l (Paris
1906.
Figures showing tonnages per trading season (November
to May) would be preferable, but only scattered figures
are available for some stations.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-4 9 7 -

TABLE 4
POPULATION STATISTICS
-COMMUNES

YEAR

ST. LOUIS

.1
11,636
\Za
15,980
1876
1
1884
18,924
16,682[3
1885
18,620
1888
25,000i5
1890
1891 (June) 16,119|6
.1
1891 '
20,17 3,
24,070
1904
1908
24,679
'8
i
1909
22,219I
a
1910
22,093
TO
1913
23,326
11
23,481
1914
8
1916
1835

GOREE
-

RUFISQUE
-

DAKAR
-

3,2432b

1,2932 c

l,5562d

1,928?
1,744
1,700?
2,068°

6,783^
5,127
5,000?
8,091°

4,829
6,300?
8,737°

1,5607
-

12,446?
12,469

18,447?
24,910

12,4579
11,112®
12,SOS11
11,658®

24,914®

1,195®
923
7 598

1.946I

24,609
21,624?1
24,577

1 Rousseau's notes on St. Louis, ARS, 3G^/1
2 SARS, 22G40
3 SARS, 22G39
4 Annuaire du S e n e g a l , 1888
5, SARS, 22G41
6 SARS, 22G42
7 Government General, AOF, Recencement de la population du
Senegal en 1904 (St. Louis, Senegal, 1904), pp. 6-7.
8 SARS, DCF
9 Government General, AOF, L 1A O F . 1911
10 ARS, H57
11 SARS, 22G51
a Includes 1182 of floating population
b Includes 27 6 of floating population
c Includes 113 of floating population; the rural suburbs
held 6,601 people also
d Includes 360 of floating population
e Includes 2,500 of floating population
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TABLE 5

of the copyright owner.

POPULATION STATISTICS ESCALES

YEAR

260
1,003
2,094
443

prohibited without permission.

657 6
2,784
2,707
1,750
2,404
-

19ll° 3,044
19169 2,969

1
2
3

TIVAOUANE PIRE
N'GAYE
GOUREYE MEKHE

650
1,178
-

384
301
3,135®
4,318
4 , 2528
3,403, q
1,848
2,110
1,978

2,000
-

167
1,137
1,503
-

KELLE

250

600

-

-

-

-

-

-

143
-

200
191
-

814
1,460
-

395
516
-

379

758
-

1,172
-

SARS, 22G40
Walter map, November 14, 1978
SARS, 22G39

-

N'DANDE

400

LOUGA

M'PAL

1,000

l , ^ 1
2,500

-498-
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1876
187 8 9
1885
1888
1891
1894
1895
1897
1898
1904
1905
19079
19089
1912

THIES

r
901
661
736
-

353
-

-

£
1,199°
1,353,
1,395
1,726

1,478
1,433

232
130
-
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TABLE 5— CONTINUED

of the copyright owner.

Annuaire du S e negal, 1888
SARS, 22G45
SARS, 22G49
Government General, AOF, Recensement de la population, pp. 6-7.
Report of GS to GG; in JOS, January 1905, p.l
SARS, DCF
SARS, 22G51
The perimeter of Tivaouane was expanded from 4 to 16 square kilometers in 1897.
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-5 0 0 TABLE 6
A NNUAL MILLET FREIGHT PER STATION ON DSL3
(METRIC TONS)
INCOMING
YEAR DAKAR

RUFISQUE

1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911

419
169
50
126
127
82
64
141
12
65
155
108
277
373
477
413
224
322
377
355

294
153
69
282
218
199
123
256
73
138
318
444
686
403
579
326
562
719
527
554

THIES

65
7
6
12
4
34
50
9
19
2
10
6
33
109
133
460
170
1,040
1,182
265

TIVAOUANE

92
28
35
4
49
73
143
29
66
18
31
4-2
67
180
82
822
73
277
232
166

ST. LOUIS

851
349
194
999
256
1,327
422
516
147
353
669
2,939
1,899
162
268
185
1,562
614
95
727

TOTAL

1,793
1,465
855
1,646
1,035
1,818
1,115
1,182
449
786
1,744
4,131
3,355
2,112
1,954
4,143
2,920
3,574
4,186
2,564

a S o u r c e s : Figures from annual reports of DSL board of
Director to stockholders (1896 missing); 1896 figures
in table in Government General, AOF, Les chemins de
fer en A O F . I. Le Senegal (Paris, 1906), p. 35.
That
table is virtually the same as the above for 1892-1905.
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TABLE 7 — CONTINUED

of the copyright owner.

1

Figures 1892 to 1911 ih annual reports of DSL Board of Directors to stockholders (1896 missing)

2

1886 figures in Etienne "Report, FOM, Senegal XII, 69.

a

Sources:

For 1892 to 1911 - Annual Reports of DSL Board of Directors to stockholders.
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-5 0 4 TABLE 8
PASSENGER TRAPPIC-DSLa

YEAR

N U M B E R OP PASSENGERS
1ST CLASS
2ND CLASS

1885
1886
1887
1883
1889
1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
1895

1681
1845
2043
2192
2110
2264
2263
2694
3275
3987
3144

6083
7148
8422
9828
8702
9036
9200
10,828
12,955
12,264
10,941

3rd CLASS

TOTAL

93,113
103,525
144,267
17 5,134
148,814
136,707
144,417
187,865
207,656
190,536
159,506

100,877
112,518
154,732
187,154
159,626
148,007
155,880
201,387
223,886
206,787
173,591

NUMBER OP PASSENGER-KILOMETERS
YEAR
1885
1886
1887
1888
1889
1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
1895

1ST CLASS
139,108
105,650
222,942
238,430
236,554
244,654
260,27 6
290,223
344,133
388,380
345,310

2ND CLASS
365,356
461,790
574,464
698,999
603,543
615,409
662,325
720,665
830,793
779,916
718,429

3RD CLASS

TOTAL

4,691,092
6,354,911
7,589,786
8,920,889
7,879,014
7,585,330
8,061,518
10,384,187
11,273,686
10,276,736
8,442,229

5,195,556
6,922,351
8,387,192
9,858,318
8,719,111
8,445,393
8,930,119
11,375,075
12,448,612
11,445,032
9>505,965
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-5 0 5 TABLE 8 - -CONTINUED

YEAR

1ST CLASS

1885
1886
1887
1888
1889
1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
1895

12,218.15
12,158.50
20,424.76
20,451.88
21,667.49
21,703.62
22,551.79
25,880
25,207
36,316.81
31,542

PASSENGER RECEIPTS (FRANCS)
2ND CLASS
3RD CLASS

$3RD
% 3RD
CLASS
CLASS
PASSEN RECEIPTS
Y E A R GERS

1885
1886
1887
1888
1889
1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
1895

92.3
92.0
93.2
93.6
93.2
92.3
92.6
93.3
92.8
92.1
91.9

86.7
87.4
85.5
86.7
85.6
85.0
85.7
87 .2
86.8
84.9
84.3

26,696.50
26,279.25
47,823.84
53,618.56
47,947.27
46,900.98
45,485.09
52,946
62,909.40
58,281.21
50,610

254,637.01
336,019.47
403,980.16
481,008.82
413,909.12
387,715.86
408,846.57
538,711.83
592,418.65
531,626.90
441,303.20

TOTAL

293,551.66
384,462.22
472,228.76
555,079.26
483,521.93
456,320.46
476,883.15
617,536.45
682,542.
626,225.93
523,528.17

AVERAGE TRIP ONE-WAY (KMS)
1ST CLASS

82.8
57.3
109.1
108.8
112.1
108.1
115.0
107.7
105.1
97.4
109.8

2ND CLASS

60.1
64.6
68.2
71.1
69.4
68.1
72.0
66.6
64.1
63.6
65.7

a Source:
Prom tables of traffic by DSL,
Senegal XII, T4.

3RD CLASS

50.4
61.4
52.6
50.9
52.9
55.5
55.8
55.2
54.3
53.9
52.9
in POM,
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TABLE 10
BREAKDOWN OF TK RECEIPTS, 1910-1922a
COMMERCIAL RECEIPTS (franos)

YEAR SECTION PASSENGERS
AND BAGGAGE

1910

1

607,001
3,715
610,715

967,012
11,609
978,621

974,575
11,698
988,272

388,997
60,496
"5,064
463,557

26,840
8,665
'83
34,502

455,061
34,134
1,108
490,305

869,998
112,893
5^255
988,452

890,165
113,595
6,440
1,010,199

322,000
121,180
57,796
500,976

27,146
16,637
6,705
50,488

381,406
81,717
38,400
501,582

730,662
210,533
102,961
1,053,047

111,067
1,090,591

1
2
3

598,370
142,442
112,660
553,473

32,477
26,537
11,754
70,768

332,160
399,324
89,580
821,063

763,008
568,302
213,994
1,545,303

793,052
578,468
238,652
1,610,172

1

462,833
179,342
75,637
717,813

31,763
37,505
5,690
74,958

625,087
157,082
43,161
825,310

1,119,665
375,929
134,488
1,518,080

1,150,708
392,258
159,089
1,682,056

294,556
156,829
75,355
456,740

29,182
44,253
8,162
81,501

593,929
204,000
188,682
986,010

847,666
405,062
272,205
1,524,951

873,531
424,425
314,989
1,612,925

1
2

3
TOTAL
1
2

3
TOTAL
1913

TOTAL
1914

2

3
TOTAL
1915

1
2

3
TOTAL
(1)
(2)
(3)

TOTAL
RECEIPTS
INCLUDING
GOVERNMENT
TRAFFIC

30,988
608
31,596

TOTAL

1912

TOTAL COM*
MERCIAL
RECEIPTS

329,023
7,286
336,309

2

1911

EXPRESS SLOW
FREIGHT FREIGHT

754,823
234 ,70 1 1

Thies-Diourbel section (79 Km)
Diourbel- Kaolack section (77Kin)--not including Diourb&l
Guinguineo to Terminus of line
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COMMERCIAL RECEIPTS (francs)
YEAR SECTION PASSENGERS
AND BAGGAGE

1916

324,248
150,861
150.584
625,413

702,709
375,261
235.631
1,311,601

737,715
385,904
359.432
1,484,049

1
2
3

417,110
214,887
115.610
807,608

32,665
44,740
7.006
84,411

395,405
230,617
202.803
828,315

845,181
560,144
395.510
1,790,834

892,810
565,455
344.358
1,802,623

1
2
3

542,074
237,777
199.148
978,997

59,458
60,185
14.119
135,763

631,161
233,980
234.952
1,150,092

1,252 ,694
531,942
498.214
2,262 ,653

1,389,176
558,336
787.188
2,734,700

1
2
3

501,305
464,917
200.902
1,167,124

157,019
100,819
10.708
248,344

680,167
253,229
154.177
1,087,574

1,318,408
812,767
356.766
2,503,041

1,332,023
933,669
450.022
2,935,776*

1
2
3

1,134,279
1,012,936
435.790
2,583,005

402,123
280,068
51.739
733,930

1,402,697
669,536
347.386
2,509,620

3,029,100
1,962,540
854.914
3,826,555

3,432,622
2,060,376
946.336
6,444,514*

1
2
3

1,094,824
982,115
2,403,158

■\92,781
140,522
J.8,679
351,979

2,155,695
841,731
627.536
3,624,891

3,443,230
1,964,367
1.062.431
6,470,028

3,858,051
2,110,811
1.432.358
7,943,182*

1,185,760
1,075,830
557.941
2,819,532

168,730
125,463
18.259
312,453

2,531,814
1,054,622
657.208
4,223,643

3,686,305
2,255,916
1.213.407
7,355,628

4,070,201
2,303,450
1.401.664
8,334,897*

TOTAL
1920
TOTAL
1921

TOTAL
1922
TOTAL

TOTAL
RECEIPTS
INCLUDING
GOVERNMENT
TRAFFIC

30,010
41,924
7.391
79,255

TOTAL
1919

TOTAL COM
MERCIAL
RECEIPTS

343,541
190,727
77.756
607,023

TOTAL
1918

SLOW
FREIGHT

1
2
3

TOTAL
1917

EXPRESS
FREIGHT

1
2
3

x - includes transportation of construction material
(a) Souroe* Notioe on the TK by Direotor Tl^Ballabey, July 20, 1923,
ARS, 6P 160-36
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TABLE 11

of the copyright owner.

GROSS RECEIPTS AND EXPENSES AFTER THE TKN FUSION 3
RECEIPTS (FRANCS)

EXPENSES

(FRANCS)

Further reproduction

YEAR

THIES-KAYES

KAYES-NIGER

THIES KAYES

KAYES-NIGER

PROFITS
(Receipts Less
Expenses)

1924

16,858,979

7,056,298

13,510,392

8,039,559

2,385,328

1925

24,610,424

9,927,277

20,808,861

16,135,212

2,406,313

i

g
vO

prohibited without permission.

1926
1927

36,095,665
17,204,964
THIES-h riGER
58,632, 237

25,167,340
20,093,507
THIES-JJIGER
36,035, 906

'

8,939,722
3,596,331

1928

64,635, 073

61,393;,177

2,741,896

1929

62,554, 838

60,839; 513

1,715,325

1930

55,525, 412

65,743, 580

-10,418,169

1931

42,505, 586

52,564, 917

-10,059,330

1932

36,336, 382

43,558, 353

- 7,322,075

a Source:
Pruvost report, June 25, 1935, Page 35 (Bagot Mission)- FOM,TP
Niger
These figures are not exactly the same as those presented in Qhemln de fer de ffirTgg‘~au
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TABLE 12

of the copyright owner.

PEANUT FREIGHT SHIPPED3 (METRIC TONS)

1928-29 SEASON
TO DAKAR &
TO KAOLACK RUFISQUE

prohibited without permission.

6,805
KOULIKORO (KN)
BAMAKO-TOUKOTO
5,241
TOUKOTO-KAYES
1,237
13,283
TOTAL KN
1,926
KAYES-VILLE
248
KAYES-AMEIDEDI
AMBIDEDI-COTIAR3 2,389
4,268
TAMBACOUNDAKOUNGHEUL
6,813
KOUNGHEULMALEME HODAR
6,745
KAFFRINEBIRKELANE
GOSSAS &
GUINGUINEO
16,072
SINE RAILROAD
37,106
DIOURBEL

1929-30 SEASON
TO DAKAR &
TO KAOLACK RUFISQUE

1930-31 SEASON
TO DAKAR
TO KAOLACK
RUFISQUE

-

8,064
6,653
1,261
15,978
1,458
185
2,179
5,933

3,265
2,433
237
5,935
1,047
984
151
23

4,561
5.462
671
10,694
408
303
1,188
5,246

-

11,770

-

13,091

-

-

11,060

-

12,968

-

-

24,299

-

4,235
3,479
773
8,487
1,904
994
159

-

3,713

-

38,522

-

7,485

19,650
1,131
23,906

3,037
2,177
337
5,551
1,139
662
103
8

-

20,127

-510-

Further reproduction

FROM
RAILROAD
SECTION OR
STATION

Reproduced
with permission

TABLE 12--CONTINUED

of the copyright owner.

PROM
RAILROAD
SECTION OR
STATION

1928-29 SEASON
TO DAKAR &
TO KAOLACK RUFISQUE

1929-30 SEASON
TO DAKAR &
TO KAOLACK RUFISQUE

1930-31 SEASON
TO DAKAR &
TO KAOLACK RUFISQUE

prohibited without permission.

1,516

23,103
26,421

1,039

23,796
23,893

TOTAL TK

77,083

56,297

96,445

57,379

77,891

52,496

TOTAL TN

90,366

64,784

112,423

63,313

88,585

58,047

$ on ThiesKaolack Section
a

Source:

69. 6$

67 .7$

65.0$

Copy report acting director TN to IGTP, September 26, 1931, SARS, DCF.

511

Further reproduction

18,212
12,245

BAMBEY
KHOMBOLE
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TABLE 13

of the copyright owner.

EFFECTS OF FUSION VOLUME AND INTENSITY OF TRAFFIC3

prohibited
without permission.

1920
1921
1922
1923
1924 Fusion
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929

192,541
168,035
194,622
202,246
234,668
267,823
297,705
256,106
258,658
262,523

9,899,424
8,282,438
13,156,351
11,119,801

25,503,657
20,655,682
26,548,063
27,123,335
54,951,696
66,643,859
85,453,844
67,760,959
83,034,380
86,343,774

-512-

Further reproduction

YEAR

(TK + KN ADDED)
TONNAGE EXPRESS
EXPRESS AND..,^. „ »
AND SLOT-/ FREIGHT TONNAGE X DISTANCE-SLOW FREIGHT
*
T K + KN ADDED
(TONS)
T K ONLY
TK 4- KN ADDED
PASSENGERS X DISTANCE
(UNIT KM)

94,937,266
98,470,084
64,453,246
57,736,503
52,282,572

a S o u r c e : From legregram report (mission Sol) , June 16, 1930, F0M,TP, p. 33.
figures are close to, but not exactly the same as those given in Ohemin de fer de
Thids au Niger, p. 84, for the years 1924 to 1928.
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TABLE 14— CONTINUED

Several Souroest
1*

Rrom tables in

annual customs service reports on Senegal, especially for 1932, SABS, DCF.

2 . Annual reports of DSL Board of Directors to Stockholders•
Annual reports to DSL stockholders- See Table 15*

4.

Legregram report (Sol Uission), June 16, 1930, FQH, TP.

5.

Derived from tables of monthly peanut freight in

A®,

6P438-36.

a - Probably reflects a heavy traffic due to "Havitaillament" operations within Senegal.

-514-

Further reproduction

3.
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-5 1 5TABLE 15
ANNUAL PEANUT FREIGHT PER STATION ON DS L a
INCOMING
YEAR

DAKAR

1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932

5,351
1,970
3,901
2,874
8,028
8,000
4,160
5,812
7,700
16,294
24,183
18,846
13,060
22,437
31,823
26,787
43,356
83,393
89,646
57,766
67,999
80,503
81,888
86,257
25,419

(METRIC TONS)

OUTGOING

RUFISQUE ST. LOUIS SEBIKOTANE POUT

64,312
131,212
135,902
76,529
82,930
114,091
107,865
136,786
62,849
74,561
85,171
87.401
141,653
117,079
102,009
92,569
76,504
132,812
123,349
89,215
103,563
88,788
66,420
36,489
15,030

6,564
12,688
19,876
7,339
5,715
3,380
3,252
3,598
878
1,123
4,039
1,496
1,500
1,405
6,102
10,359
8,750
18,145
15,986
9,329
8,999
8,839
7,610
1,366
1,394

421
696
838
332
667
1,045
824
1,024
562
994
486
1,038
483
744
680
860
7 20
1,324
1,316
7 26
889
780
215
13
301

1,649
1,616
1,960
1,178
2,020
2,709
2,630
2,675
1,454
2,244
1,927
2,980
2,816
3,383
3,564
3,442
3,811
5,541
5,102
3,062
3,742
4,977
2,604
1,693
1,333

THIES

14 , 270 ...
71,139
73,585
46,760
40,029
49,906
57 ,507
95,529
31,369
46,220
58,401
63,680
80,533
64,564
65,889
48,745
55,509
93,128
99,435
66,800
77,329
79,060
61,185
54,687
16,921 . . .
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TABLE 15— CONTINUED
OUTGOING
YEAR

THIES LESS
T K FREIGHT
TRANSIT

1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932

13,814
18,053
24,819
7,593
7,489
13,086
11,245
18,579
3,771
8,401
6,341
7,474
11,835
5,919
9,291
8,052
7,229
18,597
17,996
11,952
13,938
16,887
5,193
6,437
3,677

TIVAOUANE PIRE
BO UREYE

15,965
12,336
10,577
5,940
6,284
9,033
6,047
10,032
5,257
6,403
3,912
4,257
8,434
11,430
10,040
11,024
9,802
15,671
16,702
11,010
12,758
13,902
8,637
5,448
3,252

6,461
7,104
9,132
4,302
5,243
7,790
5,328
9,415
4,177
3,917
6,044
4,754
6,636
7,07 2
5,218
5,854
5,176
9,245
9,772
7,605
6,989
8,217
6,270
6,138
2,491

N'GAYE
MEKHE

14,197
16,816
16,07 5
8,123
9,053
13,300
13,548
12,966
7,416
8,291
12,061
7,772
15,593
14,052
16,031
14,822
13,099
23,846
25,319
17,937
17,548
18,801
16,088
17,520
6,902

KELLE

3,251
4,957
5,353
2,482
2,603
4,883
§,932
4,320
2,169
3,415
6,621
5,330
5,994
5,345
4,396
4,612
5,101
8,356
7,981
5,316
5,189
7,778
4,980
4,152
1,565

N'DANDE

4,832
8,000
7,345
3,624
5,811
5,263
5,109
3,105
2,729
3,046
3,325
2,719
5,916
5,147
4,390
4,972
5,650
11,168
9,886
6,943
7,491
7,008
7,169
4,819
1,699
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-5 1 7 TABLE

1 5 — C O N T IN U E D

OUTGOING
YEAR

KEBEMER GOUMBO
GUEOUL

1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932

5,020
7,547
10,153
4,012
3,402
9,259
8,480
4,303
3,552
5,189
9,459
6,144
10,556
10,650
9,347
11,211
11,097
19,353
17,260
13,330
11,608
12,009
12,519
10,838
3,679

’3,444
5,363
7,621
2,408
6,467
7,738
5,847
1,795
3,317
3,078
4,528
4,104
7,342
6,741
7,177
8, 329
5,571
13,365
9,653
6,333
9,472
5, 994
7,097
5,463
1,972

LOUGA

SAKAL

M ’PAL

3,224
7,795
12,525
5,644
6 , 686
10,443
5,030
1,144
2,414
3,222
3,198
4,149
8,980
8,115
8,449
10,454
9,984
26,171
21,092
14,543
17,274'
15,831
18,359
12,611
3,001

461
96w
1,720
1,009
1,712
2,297
530
143
419
793
208
616
1,012
885
1,528
2,149
1,639
3,698
3,066
1,654
2,671
2,116
3,141
1,021
473

313
224
907
579
762
558
40
13
72
93
34
68
227
230
435
670
346
809
693
421
658
540
829
349
86

RAO

455
785
1 ,191
631
742
515
301
42
92
422
263
272
619
385
677
681
496
1 ,196
1.,040
591
862
616
726
279
87
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-5 1 8 TABLE 15--CONTINUED
OUTGOING
YEAR

TK TRANSIT

TOTAL

1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932

456
53,084
48,900
39,167
32,540
36,820
46,262
76,950
27.598
37,819
52,060
56,206
68,698
58,645
56,598
40,693
48,280
74,531
81,439
54,848
63,391
62,173
55,916
48,250
13,244

76,969
146,130
160,170
87,363
97,190
129,820
115,675
146,947
.7 2,138
93,105
113,887
108,450
159,364
140,915
140,012
129,000
128,740
234,402
229,041
156,507
181,666
178,736
156,007
125,400
47,870

a S o u r c e : Annual reports of D S L Board of Directors to
stockholders (1909 to 1933).
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TABLE 16— CONTINUED

of the copyright owner.

Sources:
1

Annual reports to DSL stockholders.

2

Table of peanut freight from5'TK stations,

a

Column 6 minus column 7.

Further reproduction

b

After fusion of the T K with the KN, Dakar received about 1/3

so

that the more complicated pattern of traffic makes this term meaningless.

1911-1926,

in FOM,

TP.

of the KN's peanuts,

-520-
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TABLE 17

of the copyright owner.

RECORDED POPULATIONS OP COMMUNES AND ESCALES IN SENEGAL

prohibited without permission.

19141

19162

19214

19255

19302

19346

Saint Louis
Dakar

23,481
21,624

22,169
24,577

20,358
37,145

19,006
—

19,373
54,000\
(In 19318 )

30,800
76,100

Goree
Rufisque
Louga
Mekhe
Tlvaouane
Thles
Khombole
Bambey
Diourbel
Gossas
Kaolack
Fatlck
Foundiougne
Zigulnchor
Dagana

923
12,873
1,476
379
2,110
3,044
1,075'
4587
2,192
1,454
1,3197
994'
1,477
1,689

7 59
11,658

998
11,307

1,433

3,108
1,300
2,584
6,427

-

1,978
2,967
-

-

-

-

2,283
-

1,442

2,538
-

1,532

-

-

-

-

1,479
1,462

2,629
-

-

-

17,082
3,772
1,918
3,615
6,612
1,202
-

5,852
-

5,652
2,185
1,625
1,669
-

-

20,029a
6,316
2,074
3,230
12,620
1,929
-

11,348
2,765
13,348
3,035
1,784
8,225
1,516

17,600
3,600
1,860
2,900
15,500
1,900
4,200
15,400
5,900
44,200
3,400
2,700
6,100
-

-521

Further reproduction

Commune
or Escale

Reproduced
with permission

TABLE 17— CONTINUED

of the copyright owner.

Commune
or Escale

Further reproduction

Podor
Bakel
Tambacounda
M'Bour

1914 4

19162

2,17 2
3,081

2,227
3,134
-

-

-

-

19214

19255

-

-

-

-

-

5,351

Several S o u r c e s :

prohibited
without permission.

1
2
4
5
6
7
8
a

Extracted from tables In SARS, 22G50
Extracted from tables in SARS, DCF
ARS, 17G 239-108
Table dated September 25, 1925, SARS,DCF
Table III, Annuaire statlstique de l'AOF, 1933-34, p. 20
From tables in SARS, 22G52
Lombard, ideographie h umaine, p. 153
Including Bargny

19302

1,329
2,840
1,626
3,182

19346

-

i
Ul
1

Reproduced
with permission

TABLE 18

of the copyright owner.

EUROPEAN POPULATION OF COMMUNES AND ESCALES IN SENEGAL3

COMMUNE OR
ESCALE

19081

1914 2

19162

19214

Further reproduction
prohibited without permission.

627
Saint Louis 1,010 417 + 633 Metisl 346 + 540 Metis
2,201
[2,157 + 762 M&tis 2,534
2,434
Dakar
48 + 110 Metis'
81
31
Goree
181 + 115 M§tis
201
186 250 + 118 Mgtis
Rufisque
67
59
100
34 + 10 M§tis
Louga
34 3
Mekhe
36
77 + 10 Metis
8 6 + 1 0 Metis
Tivaouane
43
185 + 10 Metis
140 222 + 29 M§tis
296
ThiSs
50
49 3
Khombole
213
26
Bambey
53
Diourbel
28
8 6 + 6 Metis
90
Gossas
Kaolack
5 3 + 7 Metis
27
143 + 12 Metis
68
30 + 10 Mgtis3
40
Fatick
24
2 0 + 5 Metis
Foundiougne
33
22
Ziguinchor
67 + 20 Metis
52 + 10 Metis
45
22
Dagana
13
Podor
3 1 + 5 Mgtis
2 0 + 4 Metis
Bakel
2 + 2 MStis
2 + 1 Metis
Tambacounda
M'Bour
333

19242

19302

-

440

-

-

307
72
74
73
415
—
—
—
—

-

37 6
231
38
53
628
56
-

248
80
813
179
42
160
15
44
9
179
-

1934k5
990
10,250
264
180
60 ,
100 01
810 w
160 '
110
240
100
620
160
50
190
—
_
_

160
180

Reproduced
with permission

TABLE 18--CONTINUED

of the copyright owner.

a. Metis were sometimes tabulated into the figures for "Franjais."

Sometimes not— which

may account for some fluctuations in the size of populations, especially for St.
Louis, Dakar, and Ruflsque.
Several S o u r c e s :

prohibited without permission.

From tables in

SARS, DCF

2

From tables in

S a RS, 22G50

3

From tables in

SARS, 22G52

4

ARS, 17G239-108

5

Table III, Annuaire statistique de-<l*AOF, 1933-34, p . 20.

-524-

Further reproduction

1

-525TABLE 19
POPULATION OF CERCLES DIRECTLY AFFECTED
B Y RAILROADS

CERCLE

19081

19142

19253

Tivaouane
Thids
Louga

131,082
74,656

131,848
96,947
92,660

131,337
107,327
98,213

a
227,396°
176, 124

Total:
Thies+Tiva
Tivaouane+
Louga

305,372

321,455

336,877

403,520

Baol
Sine-Saloum
Niani-Ouli
(later Tambacounda)

17 6,839
171,203
25,256

197,858
199,305
34,491

166,953
223,590
33,467

179,750°
291,471
41,224

Total: Baol+ 373,298
Sine-Saloum+
Niani-Ouli

431,654

424,010

512,445°

25,833

42,067

20,680

Upper Gambia

OQ

CZA

22,564

19301

4
Total Senegal 1,173,000 1,280,933 1,354,000 1,638,000
(Includes
(in 1926)
(in 1931)
(in 1910)
other cercles
and communes
1 From S A R S ,DCF
2 From ARS,22G50
3
Table dated September 25, 1925 In SARS, DCF
4
From Lombard, Geographie H u m a i n e , p . 21
a Cercle of Tivaouane disbanded in 1928 and divided b e 
tween neighboring cercles
b
Figure includes population of ne w cercle of Djolof,
previously part of Louga cercle.
c Cantons of FandSne and Diack transferred from cercle of
Baol to cercle of Thies in 1928.
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-527TABLE 20— CONTINUED
Sources:
1

F r o m tables in Note sur difficultes creation T N .

2

L egregram report (Mission SOL) June 16, 1930, p. 33,

FOM, TP.
3

Annual reports DSL Board of Directors to stockholders.

4

F r o m Pruvost report (Mission B a g o t ) , June 1, 1935,

FOM, TP.
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TABLE 21— CONTINUED

of the copyright owner.

(A) EUROPEAN AND AFRICAN EMPLOYEES

YEAR

CENTRAL
SERVICE
PARIS

prohibited
without permission.

36
37
37
37
37
39
40
41

19282
19292
19317
ex-DSL7
1935 on'
TN

43
43

103
121
137
142
146
158
17 2
176
149
167
146
90

"PERMANENT"
AFRICANS

TOTAL
AFRICANS
-SENEGAL

590
644
682
666
607
642
768
812
804
841

TOTAL
EMPLOYEES
SENEGAL

TOTAL
EMPLOYEES

693
765
819
808
753
800
940

7 29
802
856
845
790
839
980

988
953
1008

1029
996
1051

165
126

Sources :
1 From annual organization tables in FOM, Senegal XII, 74, 1885-1897./ 2 From list
remaining files DSL (Paris), 1913-1929./ 3 Petyt Report, DSL expenses 1888-1889, FOM,
Senegal Xll, 69, p. 108./ 4 Petyt Report, DSL expenses 1890, FOM, Senegal XII, 69,
p. 14./ 5 Figure from Launay note on DSL, April 10, 1920, FOM, TP./ 6 Fontaneilles
Report, July 17, 1898, FOM, T P . / 7 Pruvost Report, June 25, 1935, FOM, TP, p. 104
a
Including the 7 member board of directors.
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19202
19212
19222
19232
19 24 2
19252
19262
1927 2

TOTAL
EUROPEANS
-SENEGAL
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TABLE 21

of the copyright owner.

DSL EMPLOYEES
(B) TOTAL PER COMPANY DIVISION
*(PARENTHESES,

( ), INDICATE NUMBER OF

AFRICANS IN THE DIVISION

prohibited without permission.

Dec. 1885*
Dec. 1886-,
Dec. 18871"
Dec. 1888
Dec. 1889
Dec. 18901
1891 Sentence
Arbitral
operations
a forfait
Dec. 18911
Dec. 1892
18942
Dec. 18951

CENTRAL
SERVICE
IN PARIS

CENTRAL
SERVICE
IN DAKAR

......... 7" - ' /
MOVEMENT/
ROLLING/ TRACK
(
STOCK /

25
26
23
26
25
25

24
54
16

85
73
88

132
158
117

17
13
16

96
95
93

133
130
129

24
24

13(3)*
17(3)*

-

27

18
18b

94(39)*
105(58)*
?
115(64)*

46a
632
582
522
493
499

125(53)*
474(463)*
148(139')* 548(530)*
154
571
159(153)* 718(700)*

_

7
MEDICAL/
/

GRAND
TOTAL

11

312
943
837

9
9
8

803
765
770

-

-530-
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YEAR

6(4)* 736(562)*
7(5)* 849(735)*

7(5)* 1044(922)*
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TABLE 21— CONTINUED

of the copyright owner.

(B) TOTAL PER COMPANY DIVISION

YEAR

CENTRAL
SERVICE
IN PARIS

1897 2
19003

-

32

19
14
19

MOVEMENT

?
106
112

ROLLING
STOCK

134
130
138

TRACK

548
316
?

MEDICAL

GRAND
TOTAL

?
10
4

57 6
?

SOURCES:

prohibited without permission.

1
2
3
a
b

Prom DSL annual tables of organization in FOM,Senegal XII,
74.
Fontaneilles Report, July 17, 1898, FOM, TP.
Jacquerez Report, September 15, 1901, FOM, TP.
Not Including locally recruited laborers.
Africans in Central Service in 1895 lumped in with those
of M ovement division.

-531-
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18962

CENTRAL
SERVICE
IN DAKAR
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TABLE

22

T K AND TN EMPLOYEES
(A )

YEAR

EUROPEANS

EUROPEAN AND A F R IC A N EM PLOYEES

PERMANENT
A F R IC A N

A F R IC A N S
ON CONTRACT

DAY
LABORERS

U N S K IL L E D

TO TAL

MANPOWER

A F R IC A N S

CADRE

TK-19131
TK-19172
TK-19192
TK-1920
TK-1921
TK-1922
TK-1924
TN-1926^
TN-1930
TN-1931®
TN-1933^
TN-1935
only
DN1938 °

109
70
97(73)a
70
92
106
360
314
443a
403
334
268

-

349

802

30
45
55
72
73
315
333
225
388
403
373

275
290
248
142
106

823

-

-

-

u
6,152°

7 27
658
804(816)a
832
1166
1316
5500
(7,490)

-

-

3,699

-

-

7,648

(A) EUROPEAN AND AFRICAN EMPLOYEES
Sources:
1

Launay note on TK, April 10, 1920, FOM, TP.

2

Lists in T K annual reports, FOM, TP.

3

Tables in ARS, 6P30-36.

4

From 1926 list of TN personnel, RA - Budget annex only.

5

Legregram Report, July 12, 1930, FOM, TP.

6
7

(As of June 1930)-Budget Annex only.

Pruvost Report, June 25, 1935, FOM, TP, p. 104 - Budget Annex only.
Fiche dated February 22, 1933, ARS, IP 212-32.

8
From Compte Rendu de gestion-Direction chemins de fer-AOF, 1946,RA, p.
4 and 5).
a There were 298 of Cadre,
were on vacation.

12

(tables

124 under contract and 21 temporary; of the total, 96

b
316 were in Movement, 1510 were in Rolling Stock, 4254 on Track and Buildings.
And 967 were in the 2eme Portion.

-533-
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TABLE 22— CONTINUED

-5 3 4 TABLE 22
T K EMPLOYEES
(B) NUMBER WORKERS OP DIFFERENT
STATUTES IN EACH DIVISION

Year

CENTRAL &
GENERAL
SERVICES

MOVEMENT

ROLLING
STOCK

TRACK &
BUILDINGS

1917 :
18
Euros
30
14
8
25
Afric Cadre
Afric Day
5
138
268
222
Labor
1919:
Euros
21
47
16
8
Afric Cadre
27
13
Afric Day
5b
249
217
293
Labor
1920:
Euros
22
5
16
29
Afric Cadre
5
14
31
Afric Day
5
236
297
294
Labor
1921:
Euros
7
30
27
27
—
Afric Cadre
37
6
16
Afric Day
354
384
294
12b
Labor
1922:
Euros
5
27
41
33
Afric Cadre
59
5
17
““■u
Afric Day
12
379
443
421
Labor
Source:
a From lists in TK annual reports FOM, TP.
b Not possible to tell whether they were in the Cadre or
not.
c Total in Table 22 (A) includes workers on automobile
service at Cotiari.
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GLOSSARY

TERMS
b o u r - royal title of the rulers of several states in the
Senegambia.
b o u r b a - the ruler of Djolof.
b o r o m n'gadio - W o l o f term for the family h e a d entitled to
occupy a plot of terrain for cultivation after
having cleared it w i t h tools.

cheminot - French term for railwayman.
communes-mixtes - m i x e d municipal and colonial system for
governing a m u n i c i p a l i t y , with the local French
administrator serving as the mayor and an appointed
municipal council.

creole - in Senegal, someone of mixed African and Euro
pean ancestry.
cr own b o n d s m e n - from the F r e n c h term "captifs de la
couronne" indicating the slaves of the royal
household, the chiefs of wh o m had in time risen to
important political positions in Cayor by the
m i d - 1 9 t h century as servitors of the darnel.
darnel - the ruler of Cayor.

degressive rates - French term for schedules of slidingscale charges on a kilometric basis for freight
hauling by rail; called "tapering" in England.
dio u l a - ambulant A f rican traders, particularly those
operating along trade routes in the interior.
-535-
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-5 3 6 Dir e c t i o n - French term for a bureaucratic department
w it h i n the French government (as wit h i n a
ministry).
escales - French term originally signifying trading posts
along the Senegal river; later applied generally
to trading centers in Senegal, whether on the
coast or inland, and especially used to designate
the centers growing next to the rail stations.
facteur - grade of rail employee, inferior to stationmaster, serving at rail stations.
griot - in the Senegambia, member of an important strata
of society of musicians, oral historians, and
praise-singers.
hivernage - the season in Senegal of rain and humidity,
lasting roughly from about June to November.
lamane - original occupier of a tract of land, laying
c laim to it by being the first to clear it w i t h
fire.
ma'itre des langues - French term for Africans interposing
themselves as intermediaries in trade by inter c e p
ting produce-bearing carriers on the routes
leading into trading centers.
marab o u t - French term for Mus l i m religious leader.
mar i g o t - in West Africa, French term for stream beds that
fill w i t h water during the hivernage, but dry out
during the dry season.
met i e r - in Senegal, a professional skill introduced by
Europeans; in this work, specifically referring to
the craft and industrial skills.
Mou r i d e - member of a largely Wolof M u s l i m brotherhood
founded in Senegal in the 19th century by A h m a d o u
Bamba.
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-5 3 7 n a v e t a n e - French term for seasonal migrant worker coming
f rom the interior to g r o w peanuts in coastal and
rail areas of Senegal.
n' d i atigui - intermediary in specialized market trans
actions .
niayes - string of humid, fertile depressions along the
w e s t coast of Senegal.
prestations - labor obligation o f a set number of days of
w o r k imposed on Af r i c a n residents of rural areas
b y the French colonial administration for
maintenance and repair of roads, bridges, and
other works supposedly of a local nature.
sofas - slaves used as warriors in African armies.
spahi - cavalryman in French A f r i c a n colonial military
units.
talibe - student or follower of a marabout.
trader - the French term of "traitant" in Senegal gene
rally meant A f rican or creole intermediary traders.
tyeddo - a warrior, m e m b e r of the warrior strata in the
Senegambia, generally u s e d only to designate those
adhering to fetishist custom.

ABBREVIATIONS
AMMP - Archives of the Ministry of Marine, Paris.
ANF -

National Archives of France, Paris, rue FrancsBourgeois.

AO F -

Afrique Occidentale Francaise.

AP -

"Affaires Politiques"- series in French National
Archives, Section d'Outre-Mer.
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-5 3 8 APA -

"Affaires Politiques et Administratives."

ARS -

National Archives of Senegal, Dakar.

ARS-L - library of the National Archives o f Senegal.
BAO -

Banque de l'Afrique Occidentale.

B.C.E.H.S.A.O.F. - Bulletin du Comite d*Etudes Historique
et Scientifiques de l'Afrique Occidentale
Franyaise.
Bull

A d m i n du Senegal - Bulletin Administratif du S e n e g a l .

Bull. SGCB - Bulletin, Societe de Geographie Commerciale
de B o r d e a u x .
Bull. SGC de Paris - Bulletin,
Commerciale de P a r i s .
CC -

Societe de G^ographie

chamber of commerce.

Confid - series of unclassified registers in National
Archives of Senegal.
DCF -

unclassified dossiers of documents dealing with
railroads and related subjects in the National
Archives of Senegal, D a kar (literally stands for
"dossiers des chemins de f e r " ) .

DN -

Dakar-Niger railroad.

DSL -

Dakar-Saint Louis railroad.

DSL(Paris)

- archives of the DSL Company in Paris.

EX-RR - reference to African ex-railwaymen interviewed.
FOM-

National Archives of France, Section d'Outre-Mer,
rue Oudinot, Paris.

GG -

Governor General of French West Africa.
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-5 3 9 GS -

Governor (or later Lt. Governor)

of Senegal.

IGTP - Inspector General of Public Works of French West
Africa.

JO-AOF - Journal Officiel de l'Afrique Occidentale
Fran^aise.
JORF - Journal Officiel de la R&publique Frangaise
-Debgts Pari.-Chambre - Debats Parlementaires-Chambre
-Ddbats Pari.-Sdnat - D6bats et Documents Parlementaires-S§nat.
JOS -

Journal Officiel du Senegal.

KN -

Kayes-Niger railroad.

MC -

French Minister of Colonies.

MMC - French Minister of Marine and Colonies.

Moniteur du Senegal - Moniteur du Senegal et Dependances.
MTP P.V.

French Minister of Public Works.
- "prbces-verbal"

RA -

Reg.

(in English: minutes)

archives of the R£gie des Chemins de Fer du
Senegal.
- a set of three registers, minutes of the Commission
de Verification des Comptes du chemin de fer de DSL.

S/Com(s) - Sub-commission(s).
SARS - unclassified "fonds du Senegal" at National Archives
of Senegal.
SECCOA - Syndicat d'Etudes des Chemins de Fer de la Cote
Occidentale d'Afrique.
StL -

archives of the colonial government of Senegal
still remaining at St. Louis (unclassified).
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-5 4 0 -

TK TKN -

Thi^s-Kayes railroad.
Thi^s-Kayes-Niger railroad.

TN -

Thi^s-Niger railroad.

TP -

unclassified dossiers on railroads and public
works at the National Archives of France,
Section d'Outre-Mer.
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